Energeia in the Enneads of Plotinus: A Reaction to Plato and Aristotle by Hancock, Curtis L.
Loyola University Chicago 
Loyola eCommons 
Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 
1984 
Energeia in the Enneads of Plotinus: A Reaction to Plato and 
Aristotle 
Curtis L. Hancock 
Loyola University Chicago 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss 
 Part of the Classical Literature and Philology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hancock, Curtis L., "Energeia in the Enneads of Plotinus: A Reaction to Plato and Aristotle" (1984). 
Dissertations. 2427. 
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/2427 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more 
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu. 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. 
Copyright © 1984 Curtis L. Hancock 
ENERGEIA IN THE ENNEADS OF PLOTINUS: 
A REACTION TO PLATO AND ARISTOTLE 
by 
Curtis L. Hancock 
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 




I would like to deeply thank the members of my dissertation 
committee, Leo Sweeney, S.J., David Hassel, S.J. and Dr. Francis 
Catania. Their unfailing attention to the demands of this disser-
tation encouraged me to labor through its most difficult sections. 
I would like to especially express my gratitude to Fr. Sweeney who 
was available twenty-four hours a day for consultation and support. 
I must also thank a close friend, Roman T. Ciapalo, Assistant 
Professor of Philosophy at Loras College, for his time and advice 
during the writing of this dissertation. 
I am grateful also for my dedicated typist Diana Robertson. 
Lastly, I thank my beloved wife, Kathryn, who selflessly 
endured and supported my long tenure in graduate school. 
ii 
VITA 
Curtis Lynn Hancock was born in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma on August 
1, 1950, the son of John Daniel and Pauline Lois Hancock. He was educated 
in the public schools of Oklahoma City. He attended John Adams Grammar 
School, Franklin Roosevelt Junior High School and U. S. Grant High School. 
Upon graduation from the last in 1968, he entered the University of 
Oklahoma on an athletic scholarship. He graduated with a B. A. in 
philosophy in 1972 and with an M. A. in philosophy in 1974. 
In February of 1975 he enrolled in the Department of Philosophy of 
Loyola University of Chicago. After one semester at Loyola he returned to 
Oklahoma for personal reasons. He returned to Loyola in the Fall of 1977, 
completing by 1980 his course work and candidacy exams for the Ph. D •• 
He is the husband of Kathryn L. Hancock and is the father of two, 
Jason (age 14) and Elizabeth (age 10). He has taught philosophy and 
a variety of other subjects as an Instructor in Adult Education at the 
University of Oklahoma. Presently, he teaches philosophy at Cardinal 
Newman College, St. Louis, Missouri. 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS • • • • • • • • • • ii 
VITA • • • • • • • iii 
INTRODUCTION • • 1 
TEXT A • • • • • 16 
TEXT B • • • • 48 
TEXT C • • 91 
TEXT D • • • • • • • 151 
TEXT E • • • • • • 219 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS • • 275 
BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • • • • • 311 
iv 
INTRODUCTION 
t ,) / 
Aristotle's neologism, 1 tY6fJ'{~ta., which occurs in almost all his 
writings, from the very earliest to the very latest,l appears often in 
the writings of such Hellenistic philosophers as the Epicureax;is, the 
Stoics and, especially, Plotinus.2 Our present study aims to discover 
how the last named, who is the founder of the Neoplatonic school, accommo-
dates the Aristotelian doctrine of energeia to his own distinctive 
metaphysics. 
That this is a worthwhile project would seem evident given the 
numerous instances of energeia in the Enneads. Indeed, Plotinus employs 
the term more often than Aristotle himself .3 Nevertheless, it is worth 
noting that at least one prominent scholar of Neopolatonism doubts the 
significance of energeia in Plotinus' system. According to Philip Merlan 
lEnergeia appears as early as the Protrepticus {see w. D. Ross, 
Fragmenta Selects Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955, fragment 14) and as 
late as the Poetics, Politics and Rhetoric. For a helpful listing of the 
instances of energeia in the works of Aristotle see G. A. Blair, "The 
Meaning of 'Energeia' and 'Entelecheia' in Aristotle," International 
Philosophical Quarterly, 7 (1967), p. 103. 
2That energeia appears in the writings of these thinkers is con-
firmed by consulting the following sources: (1) Glossarium Epicureum, 
Hermannus Usener, ed. (Roma: Edizioni Dell'Ateneo e Bizzarri, 1977), 
p • 255; (2) Stoicorum Veterum Fragments, J. von Arnim, ed. {Leipzig: 
1903-1924; repr. Stuttgart, 1964), Vol. I, p. 50; (3) Lexicon Plotinianum, 
J. H. Sleeman and G. Pollet, eds. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1980), pp. 
374-384. 
3Aristotle uses energeia 537 times (according to Blair, "The Meaning 
of 'Energeia' and 'Entelecheia' in Aristotle," p. 103) compared with 
Plotinus' 768 times, which we record below. 
1 
2 
in~ Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, 
"Plotinus does not have much use for either of the two concepts of 
actuality and potentiality. ••4 Merlan bases this conclusion on the 
assumption that, since the dynamis/energeia distinction originates out of 
the peculiar demands of Aristotle' s philosophy of becoming and . matter, 
it has little value in a philosophy developed mainly along Platonic lines. 
While we may protest even here that such a view underestimates the 
synthetic power of Plotinus' acute mind, we will withhold final judgment 
on the extent of Plotinus' commi tJnent to energeia until our study is 
complete. In other words, in examining how energeia is operative in 
Plotinus, one of our chief aims will be to answer whether, contrary to 
Merlan, energeia is a central doctrine in Plotinian metaphysics.5 
In addition to testing the truth of Merlan's view, this study is 
demanded in the face of the absence of any other thorough study on the 
subject in Plotinus. This is confirmed by a survey of secondary litera-
ture on Plotinus. The three primary bibliographical sources, Bert Marien' s 
"Bibliografia Critica degli Studi Plotiniani" (which records studies up 
I I 
to 1949), L'annee philologique and Bulletin Signaletique (both of which 
list studies form 1949 to the present), disclose an absence of careful 
studies of energeia in Plotinus.6 There has been no book primarily 
4The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, 
A. H. Armstrong, ed.; Part I written by Merlan: "Greek Philosophy from 
Plato to Plotinus"; see p. 49 for above quotation (Cambridge: University 
Press, 1967). 
5For the most part throughout this study I will merely transliterate 
energeia. The preferred translation or translations of the term will be 
clarified and emphasized in the final chapter of this book. 
6Bert Marien, "Bibliografia Critica degli Studi Plotiniani," in V. 
Cilento, Plotino Enneadi, Vol. 3, Part 2, pp. 391-622 (Bari: G. Laterza 
3 
devoted to energeia in Plotinus. Some books on other subjects have 
touched on the topic in passing but insufficiently. Chapter four of 
/ 
Rene Arnou' s 1921 study, Le desir de Dieu dans la philosophie de Plotin,7 
gives a mere six pages to the issue, based on a small sampling of texts, 
and fails to investigate whether the doctrine develops from Plotinus' 
early to late treatises. Serious limitations are also apparent in Hans 
Buchner' s 1940 volume, Plo tins Moglichkei tslehre. 8 Buchner provides no 
separate chapter on energeia, offers no thorough study of the important 
texts and mainly treats the subject only to illumine dynamis in Plotinus. 
Only four articles merit attention. Two of them, one by G. Bruni, 
"Note di polemica neoplatonica contro l'uso e 11 significato del termine 
entelecheia, .. 9 published in 1960, and another by G. Verbeke, "Les cri-
/ I I 
tiques de Plotin contra l'entelechisme d'Aristote: Essai d'interpretation 
de l' Enneads, IV, 7, 8, 5, "10 published in 1971, are helpful but only of 
peripheral importance. They only consider Plotinus' polemic against 
Aristotle's doctrine of entelecheia, which (as we shall see in Text A) 
Plotinus rejects, believing that it pertains only to Aristotle's theory 
I 
and Figli, 1949); L. Marouzeau, Juliette Ernst, et al (eds.), L'annee 
philologique (Paris: '0Les Bejle Lettres," 1949 sqq:}; N. Dusoulier, 
~al (eds.), Bulletin Signaletique, Section 519 (or 19 in some tomes): 
"Philosophie, Science religieuses•• (Paris: Centre de Documents tion du 
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1949 sqq.). 
I 7Rene Arnou, Le desir de Dieu dans la philosophie de Plotin, 
repr., 2nd ed. (Rome7 Presses de l'Universite Gregorienne, 1967). 
8Hans Buchner, Plotins Moglichkeitslehre (Munchen: Pustet, 1970). 
9G. Bruni, 0'Note di polemics neoplatonica contro l' uso e 11 signi-
fica to del termine entelecheia," Giornale Cri tico dells Filosofia 39 
(1960)' 205-236. 
/_ / 
lOG. Verbeke, 0'Les cri t~ques de Plotin contra l' entelechisme 
d' Aris tote: Essai d' interpretation de l' Enneads, IV, 7, 8, 5," in 
4 
of soul and that it is in no way synonymous with, or even related to, 
energeia. A third and very brief article, ·"La doctrine des deux actes 
dans la philosophie de Plotin,"11 published by c. Rutten in 1956, relies 
·basically upon only two treatises (V, 4 and II, 5) and yet tries to give 
a definitive statement about energeia with questionable results. For 
example, Rutten seems to reduce energeia solely to activity and then 
refuses to consider Plotinus as a monist. Finally, there is Andrew 
Smith's intelligent article published in 1981, "Potentiality and the 
Problem of Plurality in the Intelligible World." 12 This article is 
accurate and carefully constructed. However, with its focus on dynamis 
rather than energeia and with its brevity (eight pages) it does not di-
minish in any way the need for our study. None of these scholars provides 
adequate information on energeia, but I will consult them (and of course 
others) when relevant. 
Before investigating energeia in Plotinus, let us first briefly 
consider how various scholars interpret energeia in Artistotle. A survey 
of secondary literature uncovers a prevailing opinion: energeia signifies 
eidos, which is ousia in the most basic sense.13 The words of Joseph 
Owens typify this interpretation: "'Entity' [ousia] and 'form' [eidos] 
Philomathes: Studies and Essays in Memory of Philip Merlan (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), pp. 194-222. 
llc. Rutten, "La doctrine des deux actes dans la philosophie de 
Plotin," Revue Philosophique 146 (1956), 100-106. 
12Andrew Smith, "Potentiality and the Problem of Plurality in the 
Intelligible World," in Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought: Essays 
.!!!. Honor of !:._ !!.:.. Armstrong, R. A. Markus and H. J. Blumenthal, eds. 
(London: Variorum Publications, 1981), pp. 99-107. 
13Metaphysics Eta 3, 1043 a 29-1043 b 18; also Zeta 3, 1029 a 29-
30; Theta 8, 1049 b 5-1051 a 3. ·see ahead to Text A, . notes 15-21. 
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are equated. Act is prior in Entity or form because it is itself form; 
potency is not form, but has form only through its act. "14 The remarks 
of c. H. Chen we may add for emphasis: 
Since the form is 'that precisely in virtue of which a thing is 
called a this,' it is itself determined as 'a this,' i.e., it is 
actually 'a this.' Aristotle then goes a step beyond matter's being 
potentially 'a this' and form's being actually 'a this,' to call the 
former expressly 'potentiality' and the latter 'actuality,' in order 
to stress their distinction.15 
It is important to note that basic to this interpretation is the 
view that prime matter is only passive dynamis and of itself powerless to 
effect perfection, form or energeia. Prime matter can acquire form or 
energeia only through the agency of another which already possesses form 
or energeia. In other words, energeia is really distinct from prime 
matter, and it is for this reason that "pure act" is altogether dissoci-
ated from matter. 
14Joseph Owens, ~Doctrine 2.f. Being in~ Aristotelian Metaphys-
ics, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1963), 
p. 254. Owens says elsewhere in the same work that "the priority of 
act assures the absolutely dominant role of form, for Aristotelian act 
and form are understood to coincide" (p. 255). 
15c. H. Chen, Sophia: The Science Aristotle Sought (New York and 
Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1976')"7' p. 307. The following authors also 
support Owens' and Chen's interpretation: Werner Jaeger, Aristoteles: 
Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung (Berlin: Weidmannsche-
Buchhandlung, 1923), translated by K. Robinson as Aristotle: Fundamentals 
..2f. ~ History 2.f. His Development (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948), P• 
220; Werner Marx, ~Meaning of Aristotle's Ontology (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1954), p. 50; A. E. Taylor, Aristotle (New York: Dover Publica-
cations, 1955), pp. 48-49; Josef Stallmach, Dynamis ~ Energeia: Unter-
suchungen .!!!!. Werk ~ Aristoteles ~ Problemgeschichte ~ Moglichkeit 
und Wirklichkeit (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1959), p. 50 
sqq.; Anfann Stigen, ~ Structure of Aristotle's Thought (Oslo: Univer-
sitetsforlagets Trykningssentral, 1966), pp. 218-238; Giovanni Reale, Il 
Concetta di Filosofia Prima e l 'Unita della Metafisica di Aristote'Ie 
(Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1967), translated by John R. Catan as The 
Concept 2.f. First Philosophy ~~Unity 2!_ ~ Metaphysics of Aristotle 
(Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1979), p. 60 sqq.; A. Rosales, "Dynamis y 
Energeia," Revista Venezolana de Filosofia. 1 (1973), 77-109; G. E. M. 
6 
In essence, the above scholars argue that energeia primarily 
signifies form as a reality distinct from, but superior to, matter. 
However, at least two scholars, namely, J. H. Randall and his student 
G. A. Blair, dissent from the prevailing view.16 According to them, 
energeia should be translated as .. activity.. because energeia .belongs 
primarily to motion.17 So understood, energeia is "the operation or 
functioning of powers (dynameis) in a process of change ... 18 The most 
basic of these "powers" is, of course, prime matter itself: matter is 
the power for form or ousia and form is what energeia (understood as 
"activity") signifies. In a word, for Randall and Blair, form is the 
"activity .. of matter.19 
We may here ask about the application of energeia to eternal ousiai. 
If energeia is the "actlvl ty'" of sensible matter, how can we describe as 
energeiai those entities which always are and never become? Randall 
Anscombe and Peter Geach, Three Philosophers, essay on Aristotle (chapter 
one) by Anscombe, pp. 54-55 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973). 
16see J. H. Randall, Aristotle (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1960), esp. ch. 6, pp. 107-144; see Blair, "The Meaning of 'Energeia' and 
'Entelecheia' in Aristotle,M 101-119; see also his doctoral dissertation 
) / J \ / Evt:,Pt~tci. ,!!!!!. fvl'&f\€A~l0 .!.!l Aristotle (Fordham University, 1964). 
17Randall and Blair give primacy to the following quotation from 
the Metaphysics (Theta 5, 1047 a 30-32): "The word energeia, which is 
associated with the word entelecheia, has been transferred to other 
things from motions, to which it is especially applicable. For motion 
above all things seems to be energeia." They take this statement to 
command the interpretation that every energeia must be a kind of operation 
or functioning analogous to the outcomes of motions or processes. One 
wonders how Randall and Blair might explain away Aristotle's comment at 
Metaphysics Theta 1, 1046 a 1-4. 
18J. H. Randall, Aristotle, p. 129. 
19For some critical remarks regarding Randall's and Blair's transla-
tion of the dynamis of matter as "power" see c. H. Chen's Sophia: !!!!. 
Science Aristotle Sought, chs. 25 and 26; see ahead to Text A, n. 10. 
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insists that energeia, still understood as "activity," applies to eternal 
objects analogically. Eternal entities ''are not 'outcomes of processes'; 
' ' ··20 they are just outcomes • Such ousiai are "activities" of their own 
appropriate matter: 
ousia is to matter as activity (energeia), even when that activity 
is not strictly the outcome of a motion or process of change, but is 
only the functioning--perhaps, as in the case of the stars, the 
eternal and unchanging functioning of the powers of that matter.21 
Furthermore, one may wonder how this interpretation reconciles with 
Aristotle's conception of the Separate Intelligence, which is "pure 
i " energe a. Randall responds that the First Reality is a myth, a remnant 
from Aristotle's Platonic adolescence, and is incoherent with Aristotle's 
overall metaphysics. Nonetheless, as a myth the doctrine of the Separate 
Intelligence may conform roughly to the doctrine of energeia conceived as 
"activity" or functioning, since the Separate IntelHgence is the ideal-
ized projection of man's own supreme operation or functioning--namely, 
contemplation.22 
In sum, while most Aristotelian scholars agree that energeia 
basically denotes form, some deny that form or energeia is something 
really distinct from the operation, functioning or "activity" of matter. 
This disagreement forces us to consider Aristotle's conception to be 
problematic until we have clarified his position by studying and contrast-
ing it with Plotinus. 
This we shall do by isolating all instances of energeia in the 
Enneads, selecting the most important for detailed investigation. These 
20J. H. Randall, Aristotle, p. 130. 
21Ibid. 
22Ibid, pp. 140-142. 
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important instances constitute the "'key texts" or key passages revealing 
the nature of energeia in Plotinus' system. 
To insure that our examination is clear and exegetically sound, I 
have established the following methodology. First, we shall take up each 
key text in the chronological sequence of the treatises. Thereby, we 
shall be in a position to eventually judge whether Plotinus modifies his 
views on energeia over the course of his fifty-four treatises. Secondly, 
we shall prepare for an examination of each key text by commenting on the 
precise context of that treatise within Plotinus' Enneads as a whole. In 
particular, the precise relationship of the key text to the treatises 
that immediately precede and follow it shall be identified. Thirdly, the 
key text itself shall be translated in as exact a fashion as possible, 
even at the price of a certain inelegance in English. A translation of 
Plotinus, if truly accurate, forbids elegant English because Plotinus 
writes inelegant Greek.Z3 Fourthly, since Plotinus' texts are often ab-
struse and elliptical, it shall be helpful to show the movement of 
thought for each key text. By "'movement of thought" I mean simply the 
separate steps comprising the overall argument of a key text. Fifthly, 
we shall subject the important issues manifest in each key text to a care-
ful and thorough commentary, the results of which shall be immediately sum-
marized. After all key texts have been analyzed, our study shall end with 
23For this reason my own translations will rely heaviliy on 
Marsilius Ficinus' Latin translation of the Enneads (Plotini Eneades cum 
Marsili! Ficini Interpret at ione Castigata, F. Creuzer and G. H. Mose?: 
eds. [Oxford: Typographicum Academicum, 1835]). Even four centuries 
after its composition, Ficinus' translation is of considerable value for 
its prizing the literal over the elegant. The work has the special 
virtue of taking few UbeI:'ties with the Greek terms (Le,, Ficinus employs 
comm.on Latin words whene~er possible) and of remaining relatively faithful 
to the original Greek syntax. 
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a chapter summarizing all our findings and reaching ultimate conclusions. 
Before attempting to identify our key texts, let us isolate all 
instances of energeia in the Enneads. The following table lists all 
occurrences according to the chronological order of the treatises. The 
rubric for the following table is as follows. Each entry states first 
the Ennead and the particular treatise within it. The next number 
contained in parentheses indicates the place of the treatise in the 
chronological order. Next come the numbers for the chapter of the 
treatise and the line( s) wherein energeia occurs. An additional number 
sometimes occurs in brackets to signify how many instances of energeia 
occur on a single line of a chapter.24 
241n this study I have primarily followed the Greek text as found 
in Paul Henry anq H. R. SchwyzeJ', Plotini Opera, Vols. 1-3 (the so-called 
"edi tio maior"); (Paris: Desc lee de Brouwer, 1959-197 3). The translations 
of Plotinus in thls book are my own, but I acknowledge a special debt to 
Leo Sweeney, S.J., David Hassel, S.J. and Dr. Francis Catania for their 
recommendations. The following editions and translations of Plotinus' 
Greek text have further assisted me: 
(1) Armstrong, A.H., Plotinus, "Loeb Classical Library," Vols. 1-
3 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966-1967). 
(2) Idem, Plotinus (London: Allen and Unwin, 1953). 
/. I / (3) Brehier, Emile, Plotin Enneades, 6 vols. in 7 (Paris: "Les 
Belles Lettres," 1924-1938). 
(4) Harder, Richard (continued by Y. Marg, R. Beutler and Y. 
Theiler), Plotins Schriften, 5 vols. in 11 (Hamburg: Felix Heiner, 1956-
1967). 
(5) Cilento, Vincenzo, Plotino Enneadi, 3 vols. (Bari: Laterza 
and Figli, 1949), 
(6) Creuzer, F and G. H. Moser (eds.), Plotini Eneades cum Marsili! 
Ficini Interpretatione Castigate (Oxford: Typographicum Academicum, 1835). 
(7) Henry, Paul and 11. R. Schwyzer, Plotini f pe(a' "Oxford Classi-
cal Texts," 3 vols. (the so-called "editio minor" ; Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1964-1982). 
10 
IV, 7 (2), 82, 3' 4, 20 v, 1 (10), 3, 9, 16, 17, 18 
83, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21 5, 18 
11, 18 6, 45 
12' 14 10, 15 
13, 17, 19 12, 2, 3' 4, 7, 10 
III, 1 (3), 1, 11, 13, 14 v, 2 (11)' 1, 16 
v, 9 (5), 3, 32 II, 4 (12), 3, 5 [2] 
4, 5 [2] I 7 (2] 7, 4 
5, 4, 9, 11 16, 12 
6, 7 III, 9 (13), 1, 18, 36 
7, 9 6, 7 [2] 
8, 10, 13, 14, 15 [2), 8, 1 [ 2 J , 4, 5 
16, 18, 19 9, 8, 19 
10, 14 III, 4 (15), 2, 23 
IV, 8 (6), l, 4, 6 3, 2, 5, 6, 12, 13, 
3, 13, 15 17, 26 
4, 27 [2 J 5, 10, 20, 27 
5, 33 6, 1, 3, 21, 26, 28, 
7, 19, 23 57 
v, 4 (7), 2, 4, 27, 28, 32, II, 6 (17), 1, 56 
35 [2] 2, 17, 21 
IV, 9 (8), 5, 13, 16 3, 2, 3, 7, 10, 16, 19, 
VI, 9 (9), 2, 13 20, 24' 26, 27 
3, 32 v, 7 (18), 1, 26 
7, 10 I, 2 (19), 3, 15, 22 
9, 17' 18 4, 19, 21, 28 
6, 15, 24 
11 
VI, 4 (22), 4, 40 7, 13, 16, 21 
14, 28 [ 2] 6, 68 
16, 24, 26' 30, 34, 46 15, 20, 22 
VI, 5 (23), 1, 6 18, 30 
6, 3, 4, 5 IV, 3 (27), 2, 52 
v, 6 (24), 5, 17' 18 3, 16 
6, 3 [2], 4 [2), 5, 8 6, 32 
II, 5 (25), 1, 1, 2, 3 [2], 4 [ 2] , 8, 13, 14 
5 [2], 8, 9, 26' 27, 18, 12 
29 [ 2 I , 34 22, 17 
2, 2, [2], 4 (2), 6, 7, 9, 23, 20, 28 
10, [2], 16, 17, 18, 25, 30, 31 [2] 
27, 28, 29, 30, 31 [2], 26, 2, 48, 50 
32, 33, 34, 35 32, 7 
3, 2 [2], 23, 24, 26, IV, 4 ( 28), 1, 3, 18, 35 
29 [ 2], 30, 31, 33, 34, 2, 6, 9, 12 
35 [2 J , 38 [ 2] 4, 16, 18, 19 
4, 2, 5, 7' 18 5, 2 
5, 6, 7 [ 2 J ' 14' 20, 22, 8, 4, 14, 44 
23, 24, 26, Z7, 32 9, 17 
III, 6 (26), 1, 1, 10 10, 11 
2, 33, 34, 35, 47' 49, 51, 11, 13, 
53, 58, 60 13, 16' 17 
3, 26, 37 15, 4, 6, 10 
4, 22, 29, 41, 42 16, 18 
17, 11 
12 
26' 28 VI, 6 (34), 6, 36 [2 J' 38 
28, 16, 18' 72 8, 19 
29' 54 9, 28 
32' 27 10, 41, 46 
33, 28 15, 16' 23 
35, 14, 69 16' 39, 40, 51 
IV, 5 (29)' 6' 14, 24' 26, 28 [ 2), 18' 45 
30 I, 5 (36), 1, 5, 6 
7, 4' 6' 9, 13, 15, 16, 4, 3 
17' 23, 33, 34, 38, VI, 7 (38)' 1, 12, 46 
40, 44 (2), 49, 50, 2, 51 
51, 52 (2) 3, 32 
8, 13 4, 35 
III, 8 (30), 1, 21 5, 4 2, 5' 9 
5, 13, 18' 19 6, 15, 17, 18' 23, 36 
7, 19 9' 34, 35, 36 
9, 33 13' 3, 4' 12, 13, 28, 
10' 3 29, 51 [2] 
11, 2, 4' 5, 9' 10 17' 7, 10 [2] 
v, 8 (31)' 3, 20 18' 6, 12, 13, 41 
8, 8 21, 5 [ 2 J ' 6 
v, 5 (32), 3, 23 25' 31 
7, 1 30, 18' 22 
II, 9 (33), 1, 23, 24 I 25, 30, 36 31, 2 
8, 22 34, 5 
13 
37, 10, 11, 14 I 15 [2 J' VI, 1 ( 42), 6, 14 
17 8, 12, 16' 25 
40, 8, 14, 19. 23. 24' 9, 2 [2), 3, 23, 24 
29, 30, 47 10, 13, 14, [ 2 J ' 22, 
VI, 8 (39), 1' 13 [2] 57 
3, 20, 22 12, 7 
4, 5, 24 I 25 I 26 t 27 t 28 t 15, 10 [2] 
32, 37 16' 1, 2' 4' 5, 6, 7, 
5, 3, 9. 10 t 14, 21 15, 16, 26, 31 
6, 21, 31 17' 1, 3 [2], 8, 13 
7, 28, 37 t 47 t 49 I 50 [ 2] t 18, 1, 2' 8' 10, 17' 
51 t 53 19' 22 
8, 11 19' 1, 4, 17, 21, 28, 
9, 5, 21 40, 41 
12, 22, 23, 24, 25 [ 2] t 20, 6. 27' 30 
26, 32, 33,. 36 ( 2] 21, 2 [2 J ' 3, 4' 5, 6 
13' 5, [ 2 J" 6,7,9,10 22, 31, 33 
15' 20 24, 7 [ 2 J 
16' 15, 16 { 2] t 17 , 18, 26, 2, 3, 5, 10 11 
25, 28, 30, 31, 35 27' 22 
18' so, 51 VI, 2 ( 43), 2, 22 
20, 7, 9,. 11, 13, 14, s, 13 [2] 
15 [2], L7, 35 7, 18' 20, 36 
21, 12 8, 9, 12' 14, 16 
IV, 6 (41), 2, 6' 21 t 22 13, 4 
3, 16, 53 14, 17 
15, s, 7 [ 2 J , 8, 9 
14 
20, 2, 5, 11, 21, 22, 24, 17, 26, 28 
26, 27, 28, 29 18, 7 [2], 9, 16 
21, 14, 25 11, 9 
22, 25' 26, 2 7 (2 J , 28, 13, 1, 4 
29 14' 6 
VI, 3 (44), 2, 23, 25 16' 25 
3, 5, 23 III, 2 (47), 4' 24 
4, 35 13, 31 
16' 17, 18. 30 16' 18 [ 31' 19' 22 
22' 6, .32 18, 5 
23' 7, s. 15. 26,. 29 III, 3 ( 48), 1' 4 
27' 24 4, 18' 21 [2] 
III, 7 (45), 3, 13 5, 5, 6' 11, 13 
6, 10 v, 3 (49), 3, 36 
11, 35, 37. 39,. 52 5, 32, 36 [21 ' 41 
12' 3, 7. 8, 9, 18, 24 [2], 42 [2] 
13' 39, 45 6, 6 [2], 8, 15 
I, 4 (46), 2, 12 7, 15, 17, 18 [ 2) , 
3, 5 19, 20, 24, 26 
4, 10, 14 8, 36, 51 
5, 2 10, 17, 18, 20 [ 21, 
9, 11, 22, 23 [2 I I 24, 21 
25 [2), 26, 28, 29 [ 2 J , 12, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
30 [2], 15, 16, 17, 
10, 2, 3,. 5, 8, 12' 16 21, 22, 24, 25 
22. 27 (l]. 19, 31 [ 2] , 26 [2], 27, 
37, 40 
15 
III, 5 (50), 2, 34, 36 15, 32 
3, 3, 11 15, 21, 26 
4, 22 16' 48 
7, 34, 35, 47 I 48 I, 1 ( 53), 2, 7, 8 
9, 47 5, 7 
I, 8 (51), 2, 7, 21, 22 6, 2, 6' 23 
4, 4, 9, 17' 21 
14, 46 11, 1, 3 [ 2) , 8 
3, 25 12, 17 
6, 9, 18 13, 7 
II, 3 (52), 13, 28, 44 I, 7 (54), 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 13, 
14, 12 15, 17, 18, 20 
3, 8 
Sum Total of Instances: 768 
From the above texts we have selected five which contain significant 
information regarding energeia and which are our key texts. These we 
shall take up in the following order: 
Text A: IV, 7 (2), 82, 83 and as 
Text B: V,4(7),2 
Text C: II, 5 (25), 1-5 
Text D: VI, 7 (38), 13, 17-18, 37 and 40 
Text E: VI, 2 (43), 7-8, 14-15 
Let us now examine each of these key texts, aiming ultimately at 
determining how they fit into Plotinus' philosophy as a whole. 
TEXT A: ENNEAD IV, 7 (2), a2, a3 and aS 
The key text that we will presently examine consists of chapters 
92, 93 and gS of IV, 7. 1 Before examining this text, we should briefly 
note the place of treatise IV, 7 in Plotinus' writings and make evident 
the immediate context within which the key text occurs. 
According to Porphyry, IV, 7, "On the Immortal! ty of the Soul," is 
the second treatise that Plotinus wrote.2 In this treatise Plotinus de-
fends the Platonic view of the soul's immortality by exposing weaknesses 
in opposing theories. Seven chapters precede the first occurrence of 
energeia in the treatise.3 In those chapters Plotinus attacks the mater-
ialism of the Epicureans and Stoics.4 He advances a host of arguments 
lchapter a of IV 7 is subdivided into 6 subordinate chapters, 8, 
sl, a2 - sS. Some historical facts relating to how the manuscript of 
chapter 8 was transmitted from ancient to modern times explain its curious 
structure. The archetype of IV 7 contains a lacuna, which fortunately 
can be filled by Eusebius' quotations of Plotinus in the Preparatio 
Evangelica XV 22, 49-67 (which supplies a-84) and XV 10, 1-9 (which 
furnishes as). Ficinus also divided chapter 8 into subordinate chapters, 
apparently convinced the te~t fell into 6 distinct sections. For further 
information, see Henry-Schwy~er, Tome I, pp. ix-xxv and Tome II, pp. ix-
xxvi. 
2Porphyry, "On the Life of Plotinus," chap. 4, line 2S. In A.H. 
Armstrong, Plotinus, Vol. I (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1966-67), p. 15. 
31£ chapter 8 is considered as 6 chapters rather than one large 
chapter with 6 parts, then the first instance of energeia follows 9 
chapters, because it first occurs in a2. 
4 / /.. / / Emile Brehier has clescribed IJ 7 as "le plus elementaire et pour 
ainsi dire 17 plus scolaire qu'ait ecrit Plotin: l'on y trouve de nom-
breaux r~sumes des comments teurs utilise's par Plot in." Plotin Enneades, 
(Paris: "Les Belle Lettres,:· L924-2a), Vol. IV, p. 179. He adds that 
16 
17 
to show that soul cannot be reduced to matter and hence is incorruptible.5 
The initial portions (11-08) of the key text consist of such arguments 
and its last portion (#9-BlO) is a criticism of Aristotle's position on 
the soul. 
" [ 1] If the soul were a body it would penetrate every part. And 
if this penetration occurs. it must accord with other kinds of mixture of 
bodies. But if there is a mixture of bodies, none of the mixed components 
remains in act. Hence the soul would no longer be in act if penetrating 
the bodies; it would be in potency only and thus would lose its being." 
82, 1-5: 
"[2] [If bodies completely interpenetrated there would be no part 
of the one, however minute. to which the other was not present.]6 
Alexander of Aphrodisias and Albinus furnish arguments for 
Plotinus' assault on the Stoics and Epicureans, p. 183. 
/ 5Plotinus depends on Aristotle for a number of these arguments as 
Brehier remarks: "Pour la critique du mate'rialisme stoicien
1
et J'picurien, 
Plotin utilise des arguments traditionnels, arguments d'ecole qui ont 
tr~s peu ~ voir avec la philosophie platonicienne, et qui se rattachent 
pour l'essentiel, aux chapitres II et V du livre I du traite d'Aristote 
~ l'ame.·· 
6This sentence is a c~ndensation of line 5-15. 
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[3] Thus if [soul were a body] it would be divisible into parts, but 
that is impossible: because it would thus entail division ad infinitum 
and thus infinity would be in act and not just in potency."7 
82, 16-20: 
"[4] [The soul cannot be just vital breath-a kind of body accord-
ing to the Stoics--]8 ••. a nature which becomes soul because of external 
circumstances. For that nature or breath, which is inferior, would be 
prior to Soul, which is superior, and Intelligence would be even more pos-
terior. [5] But no, the order should be reversed: if Intelligence comes 
first, the Soul follows; then. in general, what is lower always comes 
after what is higher. according to the natural order. [6] Therefore, if 
their god qua intelligence is later and is generated and has intellection 
only acquired from without, the result would be that [in Plotinus' inter-
pretation of their position] neither Soul nor Intelligence nor God ex-
ists: if a being in poten~y [as would be Soul, Intelligence or God if 
7Plotinus is apparently convinced that the Stoics hold that the 
parts of the body (and therefore of the soul) are infinite in act. 
8In my translation of this part of the key text (114-118) I have 
shifted between using capital and lower case letters for God, Intelligence 
and Soul. When capi tali ?:ed these terms refer to Plotinus' hypostases; 
otherwise, they refer to the Stoic principles. That these terms signify 
different things for Plotinus and the Stoics will become clearer in my 
comments below. In general, I capitalize the first letter of Soul only 
when it refers to the hypostasis, as is customary. Hence, I do not 
capitalize soul when Plotiuus is speaking of the human soul. 
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posterior] should come about, it could not pass into act [and thus come 
about] if a being In act were not prior as is Intelligence. For what 
will thus bring it to act if there were not another prior being? [7] For 
if it will bring itself Into act (which is absurd), this will only happen 
by its gazing upon that which is not in potency but in act.9 Never the-
less, that which always remains itself, even if it were in potency, could 
desire to bring itself into act by itself and this will be better than to 
be only in potency.10 (8] Vhat is prior is superior to and has a nature 
other than body and is a being always in act. Hence both Intelligence 
and Soul are prior to Nature and thus Soul is not breath or body. Other 
reasons have been given by others why Soul could not be a body, but the 
above reasons are enough.•• 
a3, 6-25: 
. a...u.• oJv c/>aul ye 11po·rlpav c/>uu1.v 
.1. - , \ ' ' "i: ' ~ Q ' 
't'UX'lS' E'114£ KGl74 O"Ull'rUXLaS' 'TaS' E5W j'Lj'VOµ.EVT]V • ._,vµ.,.,at.VEI. 
oJv Q.VrOLS' 'TO xrrpo11 7rpW'TOV 1rOLELV Kai 11po 'TOU'TOV ruo 
€>.a'T'TOV, ~II .\Jyot10'l..ll Ef iv, & 8€ VOVS' VU'Ta'TOS' a1TO ~S' tPVxTJS' 
~ \ ' , "H • • I - '.I.. 1:- ,,~ 0711\0VOTL. ye11op.€VO!i. EL 7rpo 1TaVTwv vovs, E~Efi7JS' eoEL 
.1. ' ~ ,. ..J. ' • • • • ., ~ ~ 
't'VX'lV 71"01.UJ.I, fl.TO 'f'VOW, Kat. aLEL TO VU'TEpOV XELpov, IJ1TEp 
'.1.. E' "' ' • 8 ' ' "" ' ' ... • 1TE~UKEJ.I. ' Oll"I' KGll. 0 EOS' avTOLS' KaTa 'TOV vovv VU'TEpOS' 
' ' "', ' ' ... ti ,~, ... ~' Kat ')IEl'V'T]'TOS' KO& ~17Cl.IC7'0V 'TO VOELV EXWV, EJIOEXOLTO av µ.71oe 
.I. \ c:! I - I:'' (} • l E' • I:' I ' .. 
't'UXT)V f.LTJOE l'OW J-'7/CJE EOV E va1.. L 'TO OV~<:Lµ.EL, µ.'Y} OV'TOS' 
I ..., ., I \ .-. I 'I~\ fl/; t t I 
7rpo-repo11 -rou EJ.JEpyec.rt KC11. vov I ')IEVOL'TO I OVOE 'Y'/S EL ELS' EVEp-
,,,.,1 '\ w \ • \ ti f I I I \ )'ELGIV. .JI. yap f'CM'41.. 'TO ayov fL'Y'J OV'TOS' fE'TEpou 11'ap C1V'TO 
' E• I:'' • ' ,, e:. • ' ' ., ,, ~' ' ' 1TpO'TEpou ; I. 0 4tJ7'0 0.1>EL ELS' EVEfYi'ELC1V, O'TT'Ep C1T01J'OV, a./\/\Q. 
Q \ I ' Wt. II t I:' I t I I:'\ ti tJl\E'TT'OV ye 'Tlpos rr. a 5o, o ov ouvaµ.eL, EVEP')IEL'f oE EU'Tat.. 
9since the Nous becomes: energeia and ousia by gazing on the One, 
would it not follow that the One, since it is the source of the nature of 
Nous, is itself energeia and ousia? Perhaps, but I will argue later in 
this chapter that energela and ousia are aligned and therefore the One by 
transcending ousia transcends energeia. 
10Br/hier brackets the Greek of this sentence (to which he adds a 
negative) and considers it to be a gloss. But I follow Henry-Schwyzer 
and take it to be a portion of Plotinus' own text. 
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[9] Chapter 84 bridges the two parts of our key text. In this 
chapter Plotinus, following 'Plato, rejects the Pythagorean doctrine of 
the soul as a "harmony" or right proportion of bodily parts .11 In 
chapter 85 Plotinus considers whether the soul is the entelecheia of 
this body, as Aristotle said. According to that theory the soul is the 
form of the body .12 .After making several ingenious objections against 
llPlato discusses the Pythagorean theory in the Phaedo 85c-86e and 
again at 92a-95a. Simmias speaks for the Pythagoreans, arguing that the 
soul may not be anything in lts own right, but may simply be the tenuous 
product of the body's parts and functions; hence, it is something that 
disappears "once the organism degenerates. The soul is likened to a lyre, 
which plays well so long as it is finely tuned and so long as its parts 
are sound; once worn or damaged, it is a lyre in name only. 
Plotinus basically echoes in chapter 84 the criticisms Plato brings 
against this position. These arguments are really three: (1) that the 
harmony theory of soul is i11co111patible with the doctrine of anamnesis and 
pre-existence of soul (which even Simmias admits is reasonable); (2) that 
the· theory has unac cept.a.ble ethical consequences; ( 3) that the theory 
cannot explain the control of soul over body. 
12In the second book of E!_.Anima, ch. 1, 412 a-413 b 10, Aristotle 
argues that soul and body are two aspects of a living thing, standing to 
one another in the relation of form to matter. His analysis of soul 
rests on the teleological character of his philosophy, which holds that 
all things exist for an end. Now the body must exist for the soul and 
not vice-versa. If soul existed for body, the superior would exist for 
the inferior. It is, then, for the good of the soul that it is united to 
body; the body is necessary for the perfection of the soul. Hence, it is 
only natural that soul is united to body. 
Since the soul is the body's form, it is not, therefore, a separable 
or independent existent, as in Plato's philosophy. This contrast with 
Plato explains why he endea,,ors to make clear that the soul is nothing 
apart from body. The soul Qay oe described, accordingly, as virtually a 
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Aristotle,13 Plotinus states the following: [10] [But if the soul is 
not the ent.elecheia of the body,] what is the ousia of soul? If soul is 
neither body nor any property of body but is rather a doing and making and 
contains multiplicity and is the source of multiplicity, what sort of 
mere aspect of matter or of potency, almost an epiphenomenon of a kind of 
body. 
After describing the soul as the form (eidos) of the body, Aristotle 
goes on to define it as "'the entelecheia of a natural body endowed with 
the capacity for life" or as "'the first entelecheia of a natural organic 
bo9y." (De Anima Beta J., 412 a 27 b...,4: 'n~f lirrt}:' &vT~Af~fi"{ .z, 1T'f~T1 
C:-i.</Mll..,..~.!7vcrL/::.OD JuvA"'1b-4- t'v.tVIY E~oYT&.f /Oto.J7""CY ti€> 0 av "" 
6p\:'.aVilC.OV. I Cl 
ThlS term entelecheia is important because Aristotle uses it throughout 
his writings as a synonym for energeia. Literally it means "having the 
end within" and hence refers to the eidos of the thing (in the case of a 
living thing, the soul) because the eidos is both the formal and final 
cause of a thing; that is to say, both its nature and own standard of per-
fection. It is synonymous with energeia, for we will discover later that 
energeia denotes the reality of every existent, which is its eidos (and 
also its ousia or to ti en einai). 
The distribut'Io~OT these terms, energeia and entelecheia, in 
Aristotle's wirtings has been presented by George A. Blair in his article, 
"The Meaning of Energeia and Entelecheia in Aristotle," International 
Philosophical Quarterly, VII (1967), 101-117. According to Blair the 
term energeia is the older of the two, originating as far back as 
Aristotle's dialogues. Energeia is also more common in Aristotle's 
corpus, occurring 537 times to 116 times for entelecheia. 
Blair also attempts to argue that energeia/entelecheia do not refer 
to the basic reality of every existent. Accordingly, the best translation 
of these terms is not .. act"', but "activity," the form of a thing, in 
fact, being a kind of activity. His account of energeia is the consequence 
of some mistaken notions about Aristotle's use of the word dynamis as 
signifying mainly "'power." For a helpful criticism of Blair's position, 
and a defense of my understanding of energeia in Aristotle, see c.-H. 
Chen, Sophia: .!!!!, Science Aristotle Sought (New York: Georg Olms Verlag 
Hildesheim, 1976), chs. 25 and 26. 
/_ 
13Brehier summarizes these arguments as follows: "1. Un membre mutil~ devrait emporter avec l1Ji une partie de l'ame (7.9); 2. Le sommeil 
serait inexplicable (9-11); 3. La th,orie ne peut expliquer l'opoosition 
d / / ~ e la raison au desir (12-14); 4. ni !'existence de la pensee independante 
du corps (14-18); 5. ni la conservation d'images independantes des choses 
/ 
sensibles (19-23); 6. ni la direction du desir vers un objet non corporel 
(23-25); 7. ni la propagation de l'ame ve'ge'tative d'une plante 1 ~1 une 
autre (25-35); 8. de plus l 1 ame serait divisible, si elle este entelechie 
d'un corps qui est divisible (35-38); 9. enfin on ne peut expliquer 
collllI).ent des animaux se cha11gen t en d 'autres animaux." (Bre'hier, Plot in 
Enneades, Vol. IV, p. 183 .) 
22 
ousia is it in contrast with bodies? Evidently, it is what we call a 
true ousia. Since everything which would be termed corporeal is a becom-
ing and not an ousia (for whatever becomes and perishes is not a true 
ousia), the soul is conserved only through participation in being and to 
the extent it does participate in being." 
as, 43-SO: 
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,. \ I t " I \ t ,\,\ I II HYat l\EYOL"T" a11, ytvoµ.evov Ka' aTTo vµ.Evov, ov'Tws; 
~ \ t t' I • - \ './, t' \ - II r I OE OVOETTOTE OJ.I, P,ETUJ\"fJ'f'Ei OE 'TOV OV'TO!O O'~t:.OJ.'EVOJI, 
8 1 °' t - _\ QI Ka OO'OV av OVTOV fJ-f:TCLl\Qµ.fJavn. 
Comments 
The first step in analy~ing our key text is to show the sequence of 
its principal arguments 11 1.e. 11 its movement of thought. This is as 
follows: 
a. If the soul is a ~ody, it penetrates every part [as the Stoics 
argue]. In this case soul would not be in act but in potency and, 
therefore, would be without Its einai (#1). 
[Therefore the soul's einai is to be in act, not in potency. In 
~hapters 11 and 12 of IV, I this will be reasserted by describing soul as 
a nature which is alive and In act.] 
b. [Again according to the Stoics] if soul is a body, it is present 
to all bodies (#2). 
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c. Therefore soul is divisible .!2. infinitum. This would entail an 
actual infinity. But this is impossible. There is only a potential 
infinity [as Aristotle has shown] (#3). 
d. Moreover, soul is not breath or the sort of nature which arises 
from external sources. (Why? Because then that external source o~ nature 
would be prior to Soul, which would then be posterior and inferior to its 
external source and yet would be prior to Intelligence (#4).] 
e. No, here is the order: Intelligence is followed by Soul. It 
is only natural that the higher is before the lower, [for the higher is 
the cause of the lower (15)). 
f. But if Plotinus were to follow the Stoic position (where god-~ 
is posterior and is thereb1 itself caused [and therefore itself is a 
being in potency], then P lotinian Soul and Intelligence and God [•the 
One] do not exist. Why~ Soul and Intelligence and God are in potency 
and could come into act onl1 if a being in act were prior [but what being 
in act could be prior to Godi None, and.! fortiori Intelligence and Soul 
would not be.] For causing a being-in potency to be in act only results 
from a prior being in act (,6). 
g. [But suppose someone should object:] "God or Intelligence or 
Soul could reduce itself fro111 potency to act" (!17). 
This is an al>surdit)' but let us grant it for the moment. This 
reduction could only occur by God or Intelligence or Soul contemplating 
that which is prior to each in act [and no such object of contemplation 
could exist as prior in the current supposition and therefore God or 
Intelligence or Soul cannot reduce Itself from potency to act]. 
[Plotinus has refuted the Stoics. But he does grant them this:] if 
that which is in potency is eternal and immutable, then it might have as 
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the object of its desire the goal of bringing itself into act and this is 
at least better than to be in potency [without such a desire]. 
h. [But Plotinus brushes aside even that concession by stating 
the general conclusion:] the prior is superior to and is other than 
bodY· Therefore intelligeuce and soul [because superior] are prior to 
nature and bodies. And therefore [Intelligence and] Soul are not bodies 
( #8). 
i. [After rejecting in chapter 84 the Pythagorean view of soul as 
a harmony of bodily parts ( fl9), Plotinus in the initial sections of 
chapter 85 refuses to accept Aristotle's theory of soul as the entelecheia 
of the body. In its final liues he asks:] What is the ousia of soul 
which is neither a body nor the form or entelecheia of body? His answer: 
ousia authentically is that which transcends body, as well as generation 
and corruption, and is that which is [in act--see above #a and #f]. But 
soul is that which is productive power. It is.the container and source 
of multiplicity and is other than body [is in act, see #e and #f above] 
and thus it is ousia by participating in a higher being [in act, which is 
Intelligence--and which, in turn, participates in God] (#10). 
Having shown the movemeut of thought, we must now clarify several 
important issues in order to understand energeia in the key text: first, 
that the components of a mi%ture are not in act (#1); secondly, that an 
actual infinity is impossible (ln-#3); thirdly, that the priority of the 
superior to the inferior is a basic principle of Plotinus' philosophy 
(#4-#6) and is explained through the doctrines of logos and contemplation 
(#7-#8); fourthly, that the soul is not an entelecheia of the body (#9) 
but is an authentic ousia, which of its nature exists separately from the 
body and participates (metal.ambanein) in true being (1110). 
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.!!!!. Components .Qf ! Mixture ~ .!2,! .!.!!. !£!. 
The argument with which P lotlnus opens the key text (Ill) and which 
contains the first instance of energeia in the Enneads is aimed against 
the Stoics. They had explained the relation of soul and body as a mixture 
of two material principles, the one completely interpenetrating the 
other.14 Plotinus objects by arguing that when things are mixed together 
they are altered in such a way that they are no longer in act but in 
potency. Plotinus here is obviously following Aristotle, as the following 
quotation demonstrates: 
Since some things are in potency while others 
are in act, the Ingredients of a compound can 
be in one sense an~ yet not be in another 
sense. the compound may be in act other than 
the ingredients from which it has resulted; 
14A few words on the Stoic theory of soul are necessary• The 
Stoics' doctrine of soul is intimately connected with . their physics' 
according to which reality is one substance, having two principles or 
aspects, one active (~ poioun) and the other passive (~ paschon). (See 
Stoicorum Veterum Frapenta, (hereafter referred to as SVF] ed. H. von 
Arnim [Stuttgart, 1964], I, es, 86; II, 299-303). 
The active principle, the cosmic pneuma, is the source of all life, 
order and goodness; hence, it is at once Soul, Intelligence and God. The 
passive principle is of the same stuff but differs by being less refined 
and by having less cohesion. l t represents the material uni verse as 
unformed or devoid of qualities, The cosmic pneuma performs the same 
function in the cosmos as the human soul does in the body. 
The fundamentals of Stoic cosmology were developoed by the early 
Stoa and accepted by the later Stoics without much modifcation; this is 
due in large part to the fact that after Posidonius cosmological questions 
ceased to interest the Stoics. (See Michael Lapidge, "Stocic Cosmology," 
.!!!.! Stoics, ed. J. M. Rist, [J.erkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1978]' PP• 
162, 168 •) Chrysippus seems to be the primary formula tor of the pneuma 
doctrine (SVF II, 439-462), Plotinus must not have thought that indivi-
dual differences among the Stoics vere noteworthy, for be never refers to 
any Stoic by name. He seems to regard all their views as of one piece; 
i.e., each Stoic is recognj~ed as a faithful representative of the whole 
school. (See Andreas Graeser, flotlnus and the Stoics, [Leiden: E. J. 
Brill, 1972], PP• 1-9.) Plotint1s studieSSt"OIC cosmology and considers 
several aporiai which per ta ic to their· notion of mixture in _II, 7 ( 37) • 
nevertheless each of the ingredients may 
still be in potency what it was before they 
combined .15 
De Gen. I, 10. 327 b Z2-26: 
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It is uncertain what kind of mixture or compound Aristotle has in 
mind in this passage, but it seems to be something like a chemical com-
pound, say bronze, in which the result of the combination of components is 
qualitatively different from each of them.16 Aristotle employs energeia 
to express this difference. What he seems to be saying is this: since 
only that which is in act (energeia) genuinely is (einai), and since only 
a separate or independent thing, whose nature is not absorbed or altered 
by another, is in act, then components of a mixture are only in potency. 
15It is possible that :Plotinus had this precise text in mind when 
wrote #1. We know he had read Alexander's De Miktione, which refers to 
this passage in Aristotle (see Graeser, .!.!!!2.:7 pp. 1-9). 
16Aristotle insists that a true mixture should be homogeneous. "If 
mixing has taken place. the mixture ought to be uniform throughout and 
just as any part of water is water, so it should be with mixture" (De 
~· 32 a 10-13). A gathering of grains of barley and wheat would clearly 
be an inferior type of mixt~re (synthesis) for it would lack homogeneity. 
In some mixtures there is not mutual assimilation. If one component is 
predominant in bulk. there will not be a mutual assimilation but a change 
of the lesser component Into the greater. "A drop of wine does not mix 
With ten thousand measures of water, for its form (eidos) is dissolved 
and changes so as to beco111e part of the total volume of water" (ibid., 
328 a 27-29). ~ 
The insistence on honogeneity shows why he uses energeia/dynamis 
to explain the alteration of the natures of components in a mixture so as 
to consititute the nature of tBe mixture. 
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only when separated out of the mixture are the components in act. 
Keeping this text and similar passages in mind, we can understand 
more precisely what Aristotle means by energeia: it denotes whatever 
genuinely is or is real. In Aristotle this means an independent existent 
with a determinate nature, i.e., an ousia.17 This last term is. often 
translated "substance,"' but ft is better rendered in English as 00entity," 
since "substance," as that word is generally understood, is only one 
sense of ousia for Aristotle.18 Now ousia may denote either the entity 
The Stoics would object to this idea of mixture, preferring a 
different kind of mixture called krasis, in which every componenet remains 
in act. In such a mixture each component penetrates every other, regard-
less of the volume of the mixture or the greater bulk of any component. 
This interpenetration is complete, down to the minutest parts, each of 
which is occupied jointly by every other. Hereby, the nature of each 
component is unaltered. 
For a lucid account of the differences between Aristotle and the 
Stoics on mixture see Samuel Sambursky, The Physics~.!.!!!. Stoics (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959), esp., ch. 1. 
17Metaphysics, Gamma 1, 1003 b 25-27. 
180usia signifies being.£!!.!!. or in the primary sense. Aristotle 
uses it both logically and ontologically. Logically, ousia refers to 
that which is the subject of -predication. This may be primary logical 
ousia, which is the individual thing (tode ti), the logical substrate (to 
hypokeimenon) serving as the subject o~proposition. Then again, ous18 
may be used in a secondary logical sens, referring to the genus or species 
ascribed to a thing. Also ontologically ousia has a primary and a 
secondary sense. Primary on to logical ousia is the ind! vidual thing, 
denoting at once the eidos and the whole complex thing (tode ti), including 
its accidental forms. Secondary ousia is called ousia .... oii1Y-by extrinsic 
denomination; i.e., not because it is an entity (tode ti) but because it 
is a real component of an entity and can be abstractly considered as 
separate. It refers to either the ontological 00 substrate, .. which may be 
prime matter (substrate of substantial form) or substance (substrate of 
accidental form). It ls only in this lattter secondary sense that ousia 
should be translated ••subs ta nee.•• 
For a helpful discussion of the best translation of ousia see 
Jospeh Owens,.!!!!, Doctrine~ Being.!!!_.!.!!!. Aristotelian Metaphysics (1st 
ed.; Toronto: Pontifical Institute, 1957), pp. 65-75; also an article by 
the same author: '"Aristotle on Categories," Review of Metaphysics, 14 
(1960), 73-90, esp., p.77. -
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itself, a concretized or individuated nature, or that by which it is an 
entity, namely, its form (eidos)l9 or essence(~£!._~ einai).20 Hence 
we find Aristotle ascribing energeia not only to a concrete individual 
but also to eidos21 and to ~ l! ~ einai.22 In each case energeia 
denotes whatever is real or causes something to be real. Energeia, 
then, for Aristotle means the reality of every existent.23 
Plotinus' appeal to Aristotle here is remarkably informative. For 
he indicates in his early writings both a familiarity with Aristotle's 
doctrine of energeia and a willingness to use it for his own philosophical 
purposes. 
But Plotinus has not accepted Aristotle's understanding of energeia 
without qualification. and this caution is due to his different account 
of the nature of reality. He can accept that energeia signifies ousia, 
but if he is consistent with the rest of his metaphysics, he cannot apply 
it to the reality of every existent, e.g., the One. Why? Because in 
Plotinus' metaphysics not everything that is real is a being. Plotinus' 
metaphysics is not an ontology, where to be real is to be, but an henology, 
where to be real is to be one. In other words, real! ty is unity, not 
being. In an ontology such as Aristotle's, where to be real is to be and 
to be is primarily ousia. then energeia will apply to every existent, to 
anything real and most especially to his God, the Separate Intelligence, 
19Metaphysics. Zeta 3, 1029 a 29-30. 
20~., Zeta 7, 1017 b 21-22 
21~., Theta 8. 1050 b 2-3. 
22~., Eta l. 1043'b1. 
23Ibid., Theta 3. 104J a 1-2. 
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who is subsistent energeia. The following famous passage from the 
Metaphysics prove this: 
If, then. the manner of God's being is as good 
as ours sometimes is, but eternally, then this 
is marvelous; and if it is better, this is still 
more marvelous; and the latter is the case. And 
life belongs to God. for the energeia of the intel-
lect is life, and He is energeia; and His energeia 
is in virtue of itself a life which is the best and 
which is eternai. We say that God is living, 
eternal and the best; so life and constant duration 
and eternity belong to God, for this is God. 
Meta. Lambda 7, 1072 b 25-30 
But in Plotinus, when energeia signifies ousia, it will have a 
limited application. for beings (ousiai) occupy only part of reality.24 
24Being presupposes f ol"11l and determination. But the One, pure 
unity, is without form or determination. He transcends being. Hence, 
being is only part of reality. It signifies a partial falling away from 
reality because it is no longer sheer unity, but unity-in-multiplicity. 
The following sampling of texts stresses the primacy of unity in Plotinus' 
thought. In VI, 9, 1~ 1 9 even being is based on unity, for what could be 
if it was not one? An army, flock, house and ship are each one and cease 
to be if they suffer disunity. In V, 5, 5, 11, as quantity must partici-
pate in number to exist. so being must share in unity. Being is a trace of 
the One. Indeed, it is prol>al>le that the word, "being" (to einai), is de-
rived from the word, ••one .. (to hen). In VI, 6, 1, 1, evilis proportionate 
to multiplicity, with infini'tY""being completely evil. In ibid., line 19, 
the universe is beautiful not because it has extension but-i;ecause it has 
unity and, thus, does not fall away into infinity. See also VI, 2, 11, 
17 • (See also Leo Sweeney, s. J., "Basic Principles in Plotinus' s 
Philosophy," Gregoriamllll 42 [1')61], 506-516, esp., n. 17.) 
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An Actual Infinity~ Impossible 
In pointing to another difficulty with the Stoic theory of soul, 
Plotinus again draws on Aristotle (112-113). Plotinus argues that the 
stoic theory of complete interpenetration of soul and body entails an 
absurd consequence, an acutal infinity.25 By rejecting the possiblity of 
such a result he clearly follows the tradition of Aristotle, whose view 
on the matter is stated in the Metaphysics: 
But also the infinite and the void and all 
similar things are said to exist in potency 
and in act in a different sense from that which 
applies to many other things, e.g., to that 
which sees or walks or is seen. For of the 
latter class these predicates can at some time 
be also truly asserted without qualification; 
for the seen is sometimes thus named because it 
is being seen. But the infinite does not exist 
potentially in the sense that it will ever have 
separate existence; it exists potentially only 
for knowledge. For the fact that the process of 
dividing never comes to an end ensures that the 
activity exists potentially, but not that the 
infinite exists separately. 
Me ta • The ta & , 10 48 b 9-1 7 : 
25p1otinus realizes a Stoic would protest against his argument (see 
above, Ill) based on mixture (on grounds that the kind of mixture they 
speak of is krasis. the components of which remain in act) and therefore 
he takes up the possibility of complete interpenetration of soul and body 
in this next portion of the key text (112-113). He commonly writes as 
though in dialogue with an imaginary interlocutor, first addressing an 
issue, then following up with replies to likely objections. This type of 
question-and-answer dialogue is particularly noticeable in III, 8 (30) 
and VI, 7 (38). For an interesting discussion of Plotinus' style of 
writing, see R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1972), pp. 42-43, Also see below, n. 42. 
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In the Physics Aristotle again elaborates on the question of 
infinity at length and makes clear his reasons for denying that it can be 
actual. I will briefly sulilCl.arize his reasoning. 
According to Aristotle, infinity can be a characteristic of quanti-
ty, motion and time. It belongs to the latter two, though, because of their 
relationship with the former: motion is infinite if the magnitude covered 
is somehow infinite and time is infinite only as a measure of an infinite 
motion. What, then, is apeiria when found in quantity? Basically it has 
to do with certain conditions of a line. Let AO be an actual line of 
definite length. 
A 0 
Points terminate it at beginning and end and, thus, such a line is finite. 
Because of its definite dimensions, it can be measured, known and de-
scribed. Its extension is related to the terminating points in somewhat 
the same way as matter to form, and the line is itself a composite, so to 
speak, of matter and form. Since perfection and actuality, no less than 
intelligibility, arise from the presence of form, AO is not only knowable 
but is perfect and actual as well. Consequently, the condition of 
finiteness in AO arises from its possession of definite dimensions and is 
aligned with perfection, actuality and knowledge. 
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But how is AO infinite? If AO is finite in so far as it has definite 
dimensions because of its int tial and final terminating points, it is 
infinite inasmuch as it can be conceived without one or other of those 
terminations. Thus AO is infinite with respect to increase inasmuch as, 
no matter what its actual length may be, one can always imagine it as 
without its final point and thus as extending further. AO is also infinte 
with respect to decrease under certain conditions. Thus, no matter how 
small it actually becomes by its initial point receding towards its final 
one, one can always conceive it as smaller, provided that the recession 
through subtraction of parts takes place according to a fixed ratio. 
Thus, let AO be divided at E, C, D, etc. so that AB=l/2 BO, CD=l/2 CO and 
so on. 
A B c D 0 
The subtraction of AB, BC, etc. from AO can go on forever and some of AO 
will always be left. No matter how small that remaining part becomes one 
can conceive of it as still srnaller because it too is similarly divisible. 
consequently, AO is infinite ~ith respect to decrease when viewed without 
the intital point it actually has. 
With what characteristics is such infinity connected? Finitude is, 
as previously suggested, lined with intelligibility, actuality and perfec-
tion because extension in a finite line is related to its terminal 
points as matter and form. Thus form is the source of knowableness, 
actuality and perfection. lu contrast infinity is lined witb a state of 
unintelligibility, mere potentiality and imperfection. An infinite line, 
precisely as infinite, is unknowable because it lacks definite dimensions 
and, thus, cannot be measured or described. Its infinity is merely a 
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potential condition since every line is actually finite because of its 
definite length, though it can be considered as subjected to an endless 
process of addition or division because of the very nature of quantity. 
An infinte line is imperfect when viewed as lacking the determinate 
dimensions it should and actually does have.26 
If the above is Aristotle's view of infinity, we are not surprised 
to find it agreeable to Plotinus, who holds that intelligibility pre-
supposes form. Hence, Plotinus too must deny an actual infinity, at 
least for the realm of being.27 Certainly throughout the rest of the 
Enneads he insists that quantity is only potentially infinite.28 
Plotinus is aware that the Stoics also accept Aristotle's view of 
infinity and, therefore, he knows that his argument against them is 
effective. They clearly could not tolerate such a- serious charge of 
inconsistency. 
The Priority Of The Superior To The Inferior As A Basic Principle Of 
Plotinus' Philosophy. 
Plotinus continues his assault on the Stoics (#4-/17). He here 
26This explanation of Aristotle on infinity has been drawn from L. 
Sweeney, S.J., Infinity E!. .!!2!. Presocratics: A Bibliographical Study 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), pp. 120-121. 
27Here we are clearl1 referring to the universe of being, where 
there is form and intelligibility. It may be that the One, which trans-
cends being, is infinite. For discussion of whether the One is infinite 
see: L. Sweeney, s. J,, ··raflnity in Plotinus," Gregorianum 38 (1957), 
521-535 and 713-732. For a contrary view, see w. Norris Clarke, S.J., 
.. Infinity in Plotinus: A Reply, "Gregorianum 40 (1959), 75-98. For 
Sweeney's reply and ressessment, see "Plotinus Revisited," ibid., 40 
(1959), 327-331; and "Another Interpretation of Enneads VI, 7, 32, "The 
Modern Schoolman 38 (196LJ. 289-303. 
28see especially, vr, 6, 17, 1-3; 18, 1 ff. 
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takes up their doctrine on the generation of soul--that soul is the cosmic 
eeuma having undergone a certain change. One of the most striking 
features about his portion of the key text is Plotinus' constant shifting 
from the Stoics' position to his own interpretation of their position.29 
By presupposing his own position as the basis of his interpreta~ion he 
could be charged with an unfair practice in his criticism.30 But the 
text is still valuable for our purposes because Plotinus again furnishes 
information on energeia. 
His criticism of the Stoics is basically this: they ask us to 
believe something absurd--namely, that the inferior (the cosmic pneuma) 
can produce the superior (pysche).31 This belief violates a basic truth 
about the relation of cause and effect. For something to produce another 
it must have all the per fee ti ons, in some way or other-, which it transmits 
to its product. To deny this is to admit the possiblity of something 
coming from nothing. This conviction about the superiority of cause to 
effect is essential to PlotLaus' entire explanation of reality. It is, 
in fact, the third basic principle of his philosophy, and proceeds from 
prior principles. 
What are these principles r The first we have already mentioned: 
"whatever is real is one.·· 'l'hat is to say, to be real is to be one. Any 
29see n. 6a above. 
30The Stoics could argue that, because they subscribe to a materi-
alist monism, every product of reality can be understood as not really 
distinct from its cause l>ut as just a modification of it. Since every 
product is indis tine t from 1 ts cause, the cause cannot be said to be 
superior or inferior. 
31According to the Stoics,. pneuma brings about both physis (the 
souls of plants) and psyche (the souls of animals). See above, n. 9. 
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item is real because of its unity. A fall into multiplicity is likewise 
8 fall into unreality. So true is this that the more unified something 
is, the more real it is, with the result that what is totally simple is 
also the Primal Reality, namely, the One, the absolutely first and highest 
hypostasis • 
The second principle inserts a dynamic aspect into Plotinus' 
universe, since it implies that whatever is genuinely real must by that 
very fact cause subsequent realities, which turn back to their source out 
of dependence upon it and desire for it. This principle, then, issues 
into his doctrines of procession (prohodos) and of reversion (epistrophe). 
How can this second principle be formulated? Perhaps something 
like this: "Whatever is one, also is good." Obviously, this is an 
immediate sequel to his principle concerning unity, for that which is one 
not only is real but al so Is perfect and powerful. Now whatever is 
perfect and powerful automatically overflows and thereby produces another 
(but lesser) reality, which depends upon and tends back to its cause in 
love. Such is the twofold status which "good" signifies when predicated 
of an item--a reality and a unity in so far as it is both the source of 
subsequents and the term of their love and tendency.32 Further, the more 
32Plotinus frequently makes the following two points both in one 
and the same text and yet also separately: (1) what is perfect gives 
rise to products inevitably, spontaneously, automatically by reason of 
its very perfection and power and (2) each product turns back to its 
source because of desire and love. The following list includes examples 
of both kinds of texts: V, 4,(7), 1, 20s; V, 1, (10), 76, Ss; V, 2 (11), 
1, ls; II, 9 (33) 8, 10s; V~ l (49), 11, ls. Also see V, 1, (10), 1, ls; 
V, 5 (32), 12, ls: Desire for beauty is always conscious in humans; 
however, everything desires and aspires to the Good by a natural tendency 
and innate desire. Hence, the Good is prior to Beauty. Also: V, 7 
(38), 20, 16s. and ibid., 2L, ls: The Good is also prior to Intelligence 
because everything "Se"e'ks the Good and Intelligence is desirable only as a 
good• (See L. Sweeney, S .J., ":Basic Principles in Plotinus' Philosophy," 
n. 18.) 
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unified something is, the more perfect and the more powerful it is, and 
the more aptly it can be designated as good. The result is that what is 
totally simple is also the Supreme Good. For as the ultimate source of 
absolutely all else and as the universal goal of all appetition, the One 
is also the Good. 
Whatever is one, then, is also good--good ~ others by producing 
them automatically and necessarily, good for others as the object of 
their seeking• 
If Plotinus' second basic principle grows out of his first, his 
third closely follows upon the second, since it is concerned with 
determining what relationships exist between the Good and its products 
or, more generally, between cause and effect or, even more generally, 
between what is prior and what is subsequent. How can it be expressed? 
Perhaps as follows: MWhatever is prior is of greater reality than that 
which is subsequent." That is to say, the relationship of prior/subse-
quent is simultaneously a relationship of higher/lower in actual values. 
For example, that which is prior is more unified, that which is subsequent 
is less so. What is prior is more perfect and powerful, what is subse-
quent is less so. The prior is independent, the subsequent is depend-
ent.33 Accordingly, that which is absolutely first is also pure unity, 
total perfection and power, complete autonomy. This is the highest 
hypostasis, the One and Good.34 
33For instance, see II, 8 (30), 5, 13s; II, 6 (17), 1, 56s; V, 9 
(5), 9, 13-14; VI, 9, (9), 5, 16s; V, 2 (11) 2, ls. 
34In this discussion of the three basic principles in Plotinus' 
philosophy I have relied on Fr. Sweeney's article, "Basic Principles in 
Plotinus's Philosophy," pp. 511-512. 
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It is this third principle which according to Plotinus the Stoics 
violate. Hence, the portion #4-117 of the key text is important because 
Plotinus here expresses the third principle as it is applied to the 
A few words on the term "hypostasis" should also be added here. To 
understand what Plotinus means by "hypostasis" it is helpful to consult 
v, 1 (10) which Porphyry entitled, "On the Three Hypostases." There 
Plotinus discusses the Soul, the Intelligence and the One as hypostases. 
In this treatise it is clear that "hypostasis" refers to an existent 
which is the ground or source of its own reality because of its great 
unity and therefore is the ground and source of its own great perfection 
and power. In his article, '"Some Logical Aspects of the Concept Hypostasis 
in Plotinus," The Review of Metaphysics 31 (1978), p. 258, n. 2, John 
Anton has identified four basic features of an hypostasis: (1) as power 
an hypostasis is infinite and non-spatial (VI 3, 8, 35 ff.; VI, 9, 6, 10-
12); (2) as unaffected by what it produces an hypostasis is "undiminished 
giving," suffering no diminution in its reality (III, 8, 8, 46-48 and 10, 
1-19); (3) as independent an hypostasis produces without inclination, 
will or movement (V, 1, 6, 25-27; V, 3, 12, 20-29); (4) as transcendent 
an hypostasis has no knowledge of its products; the One as hypostasis 
transcends knowledge altogether (VI, 7, 39, 19-33); the lower hypostases 
know only the causal principles they contain within themselves (IV, 4, 9, 
16-18; V, 8, 3, 26-27). For more information on the meaning and history 
of the term see Heinrich Dorrie, "Hypostasis: Wort und Bedeutungs-
geschichte," Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Gottingen 
(1955), pp. 35-92, esp., pp. 68-74. Also see R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism, 
pp. 62-63. 
As to the exact number of the hypostases some scholars have argued 
that there are more than three. A. H. Armstrong, for example, in his 
Architecture of the Intelligible World in the Philosophy of Plotinus 
(Cambridge University Press, 1940), p. 102, maintains that there are five 
hypostases: One, Intelligence, Soul, Logos and Nature. But most scholars, 
e.g., Rist, Deck, Anton and Wallis, deny that Nature and Logos are 
hypostases. They refuse Nature mainly on grounds that it is not mentioned 
in either V, 1 or II, 9, where Plotinus devotes special attention to the 
hypostases. As for Logos the consensus follows Wallis, who, relying on 
II, 9, 1, 57-63, concludes: "'Logos is not a separate Hypostasis but 
expresses the relation of an Hypostasis to its source, its products, or 
both" (Neopla tonism, p. 6 8). In this study I accept Wallis' judgment to 
Logos but hold that Nature is an hypostasis. Despite its omission from 
V, 1 and II, 9 Nature 111anifests those attributes defining a hypostasis 
tabulated by Anton above. ln several treatises, especially, III, 8 (30), 
Nature is described as an eternal and productive ousia, undiminished in 
production; for this reason it may be counted among the hypostases. 
Anton (art. cit., p. 259 ff.) insists that the One is an hypostasis-
indeed, the hypostasis par excellence, prote hypostasis (VI, 8, 15, 30). 
But Deck, in his book, Nature, Contemplation and the One: A Study in the 
Philosophy of Plotinus (Toronto: UniversityafToronto Press, 1967), 
takes exception arguing that labeling the One an hypostasis too rigidly 
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order of beings, in terms of energeia/dynamis:35 whatever is in potency 
(capable of being produced) requires something in act (something already a 
being) to produce it (bring it into act). His formulation of this 
principle of the priority of act to potency follows perfectly Aristotle's 
Metaphysics.36 
The priority of higher to lower in Plotinus' philosophy can general-
ly be explained by his doctrines of logos and of contemplation. 
What is a logos? The word appears many times in Plotinus' writings 
but it is never adequately described.37 He seems to mean this: logos is 
describes Him in terms of being. Deck's caution is understandable. But 
as long as one does not identify hypostasis or productive reality purely 
with the productivity of ousia, it seems permissible to judge the One an 
hypostasis. This seems especially sound given that the One satisfies 
perfectly the four characteri sties of an hypostasis - outlined by Anton. 
35strictly speaking, when Plotinus formulates this third principle 
in Text A in terms of act and potency, he formulates it only as it applies 
to the order of beings. In other words, he probably does not mean to say 
that the ultimate or first principle of all reality is energeia, only 
that what is first in being is energeia. We elaborate on this point below. 
36Metaphysics. Theta 8. In this chapter Aristotle identifies 
several ways in which energeia is prior to dynamis. It is prior logically 
since "being capable of something'" is more complex than "being something." 
But it is also prior ontologically. Something is in potency only if it 
can become something in act, but this it can do only if something in act, 
something already real, is there to bring it to act. 
The remainder of book The ta makes it clear that the science of 
metaphysics depends on the priority of act to potency in order to under-
stand the relationship of all beings to their ultimate causes: e.g., the 
realtionship of matter to form and the sensible universe of motion to the 
eternal and separate Intelligences. This priority is essential to 
Aristotle's teleological viev of reality, in which the ultimate explana-
tion of things lies in the ends which they subserve, Le., their final 
causes. But energeia is the end to which dynamis points, and not the 
converse. 
37nonald Gel pi, i11 his article, "The Plotinian Logos doctrine," 
Modern Schoolman 37 (1959-60) 9 p. 315, has tried to remedy this deficiency. 
He defines logos as "an active power identical with the being of the 
hypostasis in which it eicists and ordered to the production of some 
reality lower than itself... Furthermore, "the lower reality which it 
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higher hypostasis present on a lower leve1.38 For example, the 
Intelligence is the One as present on a lower level and hence is the logos 
of the One. The Soul is the Intelligence on a lower level and thus is 
the logos of the Intelligence. Nature is the Soul on a lower level and 
therefore is the logos of the soul. Accordingly, every logos reiates to 
two levels of reality. The Soul relates to Nature below (Nature is the 
logos of Soul) and to Intelligence above (Soul is the logos of Intelli-
gence); Nature to Soul above and to sensible things below; Intelligence 
to the One above and to Soul below. 
Obviously, the relationship of the higher to the lower is in terms 
of logos. But this relationship is further clarified by Plotinus' 
position on contemplation--a doctrine which is suggested in the text (#7-
#8) when he refers to the need of the inferior (the produced) to "gaze 
upon" (contemplate) the superior or source (that which is in act). 
The Intelligence is brought into being by the overflowing of the 
Perfect One. In the first moment of this procession, the Intelligence is 
unformed, indeterminate and dynamis,39 but it turns back out of desire 
produces will always be another logos of an inferior nature, except in 
the case of the final logoi. The final logoi are the logoi of sensible 
form. Since sensible form does not produce any other being, the logoi of 
sensible form terminate the process of universal emanation." 
38The following are informative texts on logos: I, 6, 2, 15-28; 
IV, 7, 3, 31-32; 4, 14-2?; III, 1, 7, 1-4; V, 9, 3, 11-37; 5, 23-26; IV, 
8 ' 6 ' 1-16 ; v ' 1 ' 3 ' 4-16 . 
(To isolate these text I have consulted two works on Plotinus: The 
first, J. H. Sleeman and Gilbert Pollet, Lexicon Plotinianum, [Leiden: 
E. J. Brill, 1980}, pp. 601-613; and the second Donald Gelpi, Logos .!! 
~Cosmological Principle in Plotinus, [Unpublished Master's Thesis, St. 
Louis University, 1958]~ pp. 28-30.) 
39This indeterminate stage is also called "Intelligible Matter" by 
Plotinus (see II, 4, 5, 24-37; III, 8, 11, 1-8). R. T. Wallis briefly 
explains this analogous use of the term "matter": "His [Plotinus'I 
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for the Good and is formed, determinate and energeia (#7). The Intelli-
gence is unable to apprehend the One in the latter's full perfection; it 
therefore fragments its understanding of the One into a world of forms, 
which are the objects of it own consciousness. Hence, the Intelligence 
contemplates the One by also contemplating itself. It is both kn6wer and 
known. But Intelligence ls also superabundant in perfection; it too 
overflows. This overflow also is unformed, indeterminate and dynamis 
and, by turning back to gaze upon the Intelligence, the overflow becomes 
formed, determinate and is energeia. This overflow is the Soul. The 
emergence of energeiai out of dynameis through contemplation is repeated 
again and again as beings overflow until at last being and perfection 
are exhausted.40 
justifies tion lies in Aristotle's description of the soul's cognitive 
powers as 'matter' for the forms they receive (though the term 'intelligi-
ble matter' had already been used by Aristotle in quite another sense; cf. 
Met. z, 10, 1036 a 9-10; z, 11, 1037 a 4-5; H, 6, 1045 a 34-6). Why 
matter must be postulated in the Intelligible world is explained in the 
early chapters of the treaU.se II, 4, where Plotinus is careful to stress 
that it is free from the imperfections of its sensible counterpart; while 
both constitute the principle of indeterminacy within their respective 
worlds, Intelligible Matter does not share sensible matter's unsubstanti-
ality and, of course, should not be regarded as evil (II, 4, 5, 12-23; 
15, 1728; II, 5, 3, 8-19)'" (Neoplatonism), p. 66). 
40The dynamic relationship of the contemplated and the contemplator 
in regard to thehypostases he><pressed inV, 2 (11), 1, 5-22: 
Because nothing Is in [the One], everything comes 
from It. And so that being may be produced, It is 
itself not a beLng. And This is the first producer 
of being. For being perfect, seraching after 
nothing, lackLng nothing, needing nothing, It over-
flows and Its overflow makes another. And this 
product turns back to It and is filled and is Its 
contemplator and this is Intelligence. Since it 
halts and turns to~ard the One that it may see, it 
becomes at once Intelligence and Being. Since, 
therefore, [the Intelligence] is in this relation 
to the One, in order to know the One Intelligence 
41 
one final comment on chapter s3 (114-118). To what extent does 
Plotinus' commitment to the Aristotelian doctrine of the priority of act 
to potency affect his view of the One? It would appear that Plotinus 
is produced and ls the same as being. This [Intel-
ligence], then, ls like the One and produces in 
the same way, pouring out much and powerfully--and 
from this comes forth a form--which in turn over-
flows as did the prior. And this product out of 
being is the act of Soul, which remains as a being 
itself. 
The Intelligence in remaining itself is the 
prior producer. ll11t the Soul makes [something] 
without remaining fixed, but it makes an image 
by moving. And since by contemplating Soul was 
produced, so it overflows bringing forth from its 
its movement another, and this product is an image 
of it and is sensible and is Nature • 
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Further discussion of contemplation as a kind of production will occur in 
Texts B and D. 
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does not intend to apply energeia to the absolutely first principle. In 
other words; the priority of energeia to dynamis correctly applies only 
to the order of beings. This, of course, accords perfectly with our 
prior conclusion that energeia signifies ousia or being. In the case of 
Aristotle, where to be real is the same as to be, there is no difficulty 
in ascribing energeia to every existent. Energeia would apply especially 
to God, who is the supreme being, perfect ousia. But in Plotinus, where 
to be real is to be one. energeia has a limited application. It should 
not be used to describe the One (~God), for He is supremely real but not 
a being (epekeina tes ousias) .41 Of course, these remarks assume that 
Plotinus' use of energeia is consistent with the rest of his philosophy, 
but we can only be certain of such consistency upon completing this 
study.42 
The ~ Is Not An Entelecheia Of The Body But Is An Ousia 
In chapter 84 (1!9) Plotinus reminds us (by recapitulating Plato's 
arguments against the Pythagoreans) that it is the Platonic theory of 
soul which he aims to defend in the treatise. Even though he has used 
Aristotle's arguments occasionally in the treatise, he is satisfied only 
with Plato's theory. Chapter 84 prepares us for 85 in which Aristotle's 
theory of soul is explicitly criticized. 
The first 40 lines of chapter 85 are a series of arguments against 
41Plato, Republic. 509 b; Plotinus, V, 4, 9-10. 
42certain treatises appear contradictory about whether energeia 
should be ascribed to the One. In I, 7 (54) Plotinus says the One 
transcends energeia; in VI, 8 (39), v, 3 (49) and perhaps (implicitly) V, 
4 (7), the One..!..! energeia. We will postpone discussion of this question 
until we take up these treatises. 
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Aristotle's view of the soul as the entelecheia or form of the body. 
These critic isms reveal some thing very important: Plotinus does not 
regard energeia and entelecheia as synonyms. He clearly conceives 
entelecheia as exclusively connected with Aristotle's theory of soul 
-
and not to be confused with energeia, which, Plotinus believes, 'applies 
more generally to all philosophy and is a basically satisfactory 
doctrine.43 
Against Aristotle, Plotinus defends a Platonic theory of soul, in 
which soul is an independent existent, transcending all things physical. 
For Plotinus soul is a true ousia and thus is unlike the soul of Arista-
telien philosophy. The human soul is a true ousia by virtue of its ulti-
mate dependence on and identity with the hypostasis Soul. Aristotle's 
soul is ousia only in a limited sense. Both Plotinus and Aristotle agree 
in calling soul ousia and, hence, energeia, but the former denies that the 
soul is in act only as the form of the body. No, soul is an independent 
being without need of body. The human soul is the manifestation of and 
losos of the hypos tasis Soul, which, as Plotinus says later, "is one 
~ ,t.l ~ / .) nature which lives in act"' (IV, 7, 11, 17-18: 
'(a f i-tr'rl 
/ / ) / --. 
M ltt ~I.) <Yi; 'Y«fff't~ ~ w O"" a. • 
43only once does Plotinus use entelecheia in a way synonymous with 
energeia: IV, 2, (4), 1, 3. He appears consciously to avoid using 
entelecheia at all in later treatises. For a detailed discussion of 
Plotinus' criticism of the Aristotelian doctrine of entelecheia and of 
his aversion to the tem in his own writings, see G. Bruni, "Note 
di polemics neplatonica eontro l'uso e il significato del termine 
entelecheia," Giornale Cri ti co dells Filosofia Italians, 39 (196P.)I' 205-
236; and G. Verbeke, '"Les C?tiques de Plotin contra l'entelechisme 
d'Aristote: Essai '"d'interpretaion de l'Enneads, IV, 7, B, 5," in 
Philomathes, Studies and Essays in Memory of Philip Merlan (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 197D, pp. 194-222. 
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Plotinus' final words In the key text invoke again his logos doctrine 
(#lO) and thus explain his fuller meaning for ousia, energeia and Soul. 
BY being a logos of Intelligence, Soul is a kind of being, since it is a 
one-in-many; i.e., Soul is Intelligence (with which the whole universe of 
being is really identical) as present on a lower level. Yet the Soul must 
overflow so as to produce subsequent beings; hence, it too contains the 
universe of being in its own way; it is just a lower instance of the 
multiplicity-in-unity of Intelligence.44 
By being the Intelligence on a lower level, Soul participates in 
being and thus in Intelligence; it is the logos of Intelligence. Here we 
have a case of Plotinus taking over an important Platonic doctrine and 
adapting it to his own purposes. But his is a more literal sense of 
participation. A lower reality participates in a higher not because it 
..!!!! or shares in the higher reality's perfection, but because it really 
is that higher reality on a lower level.45 
44rn III, 7 (45), 11, Plotinus contrasts Intelligence and Soul in 
terms of eternity and time: 
Instead of being [an unbounded) eternal whole, 
[the Soul} is a continuous unbounded succession, 
and instead of [being] a whole all together, a whole 
which always will be. it comes into being part by 
part. For this Is the way it will imitate that 
which is already a whole, already all together 
and unbounded, by intending to be always making 
an increase in its being, for this is how its 
being will imitate the being of the intelligible 
world (lines 54-58). 
45Plato' s theory of participation, certainly as presented in the 
!_haedo 100 b-102 d, ls base<I on three principles or factors: (1) the 
Form itself, e.g., Tallness or ~eauty; (2) the perfection immanent in a 
thing, e.g., tallness or beaut1; (3) the thing or participant itself. 
The second factor, which 111ay be called the "immanent" or "participated 
perfection," is very important since its mediation between the Form and 
the participant enables the 7ol"lC itself to remain unaffected. This view 
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By participating in being, by being Intelligence on a lower level, 
soul is an authentic ousia, and, most importantly, an energeia. 
SUllllllary ~ Conclusions 
We will now summarize the information Plotinus conveys on energeia 
in our first key text. The opening passage (#1), in which he criticizes 
the Stoic view that soul is mixed with body, is especially fruitful, for 
it indicates what he intends energeia primarily to signify. This meaning 
is implied in his discussion of the alteration of the nature of a component 
in a mixture. If a component loses its einai, i.e., what it is and should 
be, then it is no longer in act. By being linked with einai, energeia must 
denote an individual determinate nature, in a word, an entity (ousia). 
He next shows (#2-13) that the Stoic doctrine of complete interpene-
tration of soul and body entails an actual infinity. He is apparently 
convinced that if the soul completely interpenetrated the body, it would 
be present simultaneously to an infinity of bodily parts; hence, soul 
would be actually infinite. llis denial of an actual infinity no doubt 
follows from the conviction ('which he shares with Plato and Aristotle) 
that being (form or determinateness) implies limit. 
Thirdly, Plotinus employs energeia in formulating for the order of 
beings the third of his three basic metaphysical principles, namely that 
something posterior in reality or perfection depends on another which is 
already perfected, i.e., vhie~ has its own nature (einai: see line 18 of 
of participation is 'based on .a liualism between a world of transcendent 
forms and sensible particulars. Plotinus' doctrine differs because it 
is adpated to a monism, where reality is one and participation is used to 
explain how this One nonetheless pluralized itself on diminishing levels 
of reality. 
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s3). Accordingly, since energeia denotes the perfected nature of a being, 
then the priority of the superior to the inferior among the universe of 
beings is the prio r1 ty of some thing in act to some thing in potency. 
Thus, the priority of energeia to dynamis is central to Plotinus' account 
of the dynamic relationship between posterior, imperfect beings ·and the 
ultimate beings. Ve must, of course, forbid that Plotinus intends the 
priority of energeia to apply to every level of reality, for, it would 
appear, that the One, by transcending being (ousia), transcends energeia, 
and thus could be called energeia only by extrinsic denomination. 
Fourthly, Plotinus' rejection of Aristotle's theory of soul implies 
that he separated entelecheia from the doctrine of energeia. In Aristotle 
the value of the term entelecheia is totally dependent on the worth of 
his psychology; hence, it is to be dismissed with that psychology. For 
Plotinus energeia is a doctrine having a far wider application than just 
the soul. 
Fifthly, from the fact that energeia refers to a complete, perfected 
nature, which is also an otJsia, we can infer that Plotinus intends Soul 
to be an energeia. The Sol!l warrants this description by virtue of its 
participating in the highest ousia, the Intelligence--that being which is 
itself identical with all being. Hence, by participating in Intelligence, 
the Soul is the Intelligence, but on a more imperfect (less unified) level 
of reality. 
What should we say by way of some final reflections? Our most 
important finding has been that Plotinus in IV, 7 implicitly agrees with 
Aristotle on certain basic matters pertaining to energeia. The precise 
extent of this agreement is difficult to determine because Plotinus uses 
!_nergeia for mainly negative or polemical purposes in Text A. It will be 
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easier in later treatises, where he addresses the issue formally and 
explicitly (especially in II, 5, which is Text C), to ascertain the depth 
of his commi anent to Aristotle on energeia. But regardless of the 
Hmi tations of this present text, it is evident that he concurs with 
Aristotle at least on the following points: (1) that energeia designates 
ousia (Ill); (2) that an actual infinity is impossible (112-113); (3) that 
act is prior to potency (://6-17); (4) that soul is act (even though Plotinus 
denies it is entelecheia; g9-if10). 
But even at this early stage in our study, it is clear on two counts 
that Plotinus certainly does not follow Aristotle blindly or after the 
fashion of a disciple. First, if he did accept Aristotle uncritically, 
he would accept entelecheia as equivalent to energeia. Secondly, he 
exhibits a willingness even in this largely polemical treatise to fashion 
and adapt energeia to his own philosophical position. For example, we 
find him using energeta (~4-HS) to explain the priority of supreme 
realities, not because motion of lower realities requires such priority 
but because the imperfections of lower realities require prior and more 
perfect existents. Despite his debt to Aristotle on energeia, then, 
Plotinus is not simply an Aristotelian me taphysician. He relates to 
Aristotle just as he does to Plato on countless other issues. He respects 
their views because he esteems the philosophical tradition, but mainly 
as an inspiration, rather tli.an as a substitute, for his own philosophy.46 
46A. H. Armstrong expresses well the sincerity and honesty which 
characterize the Plotinian philosophy: "He starts by reflecting on his 
experience and trying to clarify it. In doing this his respect for 
tradition leads hirn naturally to seek help from the ancient philosophers, 
but he is never satisfied simply to repeat their statements; they are 
for him helps to further reflection leading to clearer understanding" 
(Plotinus, Vol. Ill, pp. ~~6-297, n. I). 
TEKT :B: ENNEAD V, 4 (7), 2 
Our next key text is taken from the seventh treatise that Plotinus 
wrote and is entitled ~How that which is after the First comes from the 
First; and about the One... In order to introduce this text, 'let us 
briefly note the treatises between our preceding key text {IV, 7 (2]) and 
v, 4, 2. After taking up the question of the Soul's immortality in IV, 
7, Plotinus next investigates Destiny (III, 1 [3]). The subsequent 
treatise (IV, 2 [4]) concentrates exclusively on Soul: "On the Essence 
of the Soul.•• Treatise five is entitled "On Intellect, the Forms and 
Being" (V, 9 [5]). In this latter, an important treatise, he discusses 
the nature of the Intelligence and its relation to the lower hypostasis, 
Soul. Here he describes the Intelligence as a one-in-many, a universe of 
Forms, each of which is identical with every other, each a knower and an 
object known. In the last of the intervening treatises, Plotinus treats 
of the relation of Soul to the physical world: "On the Descent of the 
Soul into Bodies" (IV, 8 (6]). 
Treatise V, 4 (7). which contains our key text, is divided into two 
chapters. Chapter One makes the following relevant points. The One is 
the first and the source of all else {line 8). The very reality of the 
One is to be one. Yet the One transcends being (ousia) and therefore 
transcends language and knowledge (lines 9-10). Because He is the Primal 
Reality, the One is necessarily simple (lines 12-15). He is unique and 
by no means a body (lines 16-21). The product of this First Existent is 
a one-in-many and is produced out of necessity, not chance (line 21-26). 
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The one is all-perfect and all-powerful (pan ton ton on ton dynatotat on; 
lines 23-26). 
Plotinus next proceeds inductively by turning to the world of 
sensibles. Whenever sensible things achieve perfection, he notes, they 
produce others (lines 27-34). How much more, then, should the One. produce 
others out of His perfection (lines 34-36). ·He produces because He is 
without jealousyl and is all-powerful. Because He is perfect, He must 
produce (lines 36-39). His first product, the second of all existents, 
is, like the One, perfect and powerful; nonetheless, this second of all 
existents is less powerful than the One, although it 1s more so than all 
subsequent realities {lines 39-41). 
Chapter Two, which is our key text, opens with an objection: if 
the Intelligence (the second existent) has such great perfection, why is 
not its Producer Himself an Intelligence? Plotinus answers in the 
remainder of the key text. 
"[l) If therefore the producer were itself intelligence, that 
which comes after would be inferior to intelligence, but it ought to be 
linked with intelligence and be like intelligence. But since the pro-
ducer is beyond· intelligence, its product must be Intelligence. 
1Plotinus undoubtedly has the Timaeus (29 e) in mind here, where Plato 
describes the maker of the world as good and therefore free of envy: 
•Ar•Sl>i; ~"• 'T•SQ H oHdc; 
t111l oGh~~ i; •6&fn•n: l rrlf"l:'ral .8dvoc;· uuuu g• lrrllc; 
6v "'",.. ..,, ~.u 1n • i h11lf)Sra y1"toe., "•p•nli}o'• 
lanlf\. 
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"[21 But why is the producer not intelligence, whose energeia is 
intellection? Intellection looks at the Intelligible which is the One as 
contemplated and turns toward it and, itself indeterminate (because it is 
like a seeing), it is (so to speak) perfected and is made determined by 
the Intelligible. (3) Consequently, it has been said the 'Foi::ms and 
numbers are constituted by the indefinite dyad and the One,' which Forms 
and numbers are the !ntelligence. 
" [ 4) Accordingly,. Int el ligence is not simple but is a many and 
manifests composition; it Is indeed an intelligible but is already a 
vision of multiplicity. Hence, it is itself an intelligible, but it is 
also intellection. Hence, it is by nature twofold. (There is another 
intelligible after it,. too.)~ 
v, 4, 2, 1-12: 
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EVEPJIELO. E<M'& 'llOT}tn)' ; J.107)'1tS' OE TO V07JTOV opwaa. KaL 1Tp0S' 
-rotho tma-rpo.ef,eiua. K!Jt a1T' EKElvov 0 tov "<i1TOTEAovµ.EV7J Kai. 
\ f ' I I fl fl "'./. f ,. I t' \ TEl\ELovµ.EV"f} rJ.op,nor µ.ev O.VT7J wa-rrEp o'f'LS', op,1:.oµ.eV7J oe 
f \ - A ...t I • fl • - t f \:' It' V1TO TOV V01)"T"OV. L.J '0 KO.t EtpTJTO.t. EK TTJS' a.opL<TTOV ova.oos-
' """" t ' \- 11111'~ \ f I e I .-. \ r ,.. A \ KO.L TOV EVOS' "T"(J E'CJ7) l(CI.£ Ot a.pt µ.ot. TOVTO yap 0 VOVS'. LILO 
t f \ - 1\\ I 'II\' I e f t ,J. f \ 
ovx a1Tl\OVS) wvia. . rTOIVIO., avv EULV TE eµ.'f'atvwv, V07JTTJV 
I ' \"\ \ f _... ..,~ "E ' .,. ' , \ , µ.eVTOL, KO.£ rTOIV\a. O(JaJJf -r;o71. a-rt µEV ovv KaL aV'TOS' VOT}TOV, 1', ' ' - c- • \:' , "t' "E t' ' ' .!'\ , - • WV\O. KO.£ vowv· CJto CJIJO 'TJ071· OTL OE Kat WV\O T<p p.ET 
• I f 
0. VTO VOT}'TOV. 
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"[5] But how does this Intelligence come from the Intelligible 
[•the One]? [In this way:] the Intelligible remains in Itself and is 
not in want, as is that which sees and thinks [•the Intelligence]~that 
which thinks is in want as related to the Intelligible. (6] The 
Intelligible [the One] is not in such a way as to be without perception 
but It has everything in and with Itself, while totally discerning Itself: 
life is in It, as well as everything [else], and its katanoesis of Itself 
by a sort of synaisthesis [a kind of self-perception through, with or by 
means of another] is Itself and consists in an eternal repose and 
intellection other than that of the Intelligence [i.e., an intellection 
which is not entirely reducible to or equivalent to the contents of the 
noesis of the second hypos tasis]. "2 
2, 12-19: 
'AMO. 7T'W)' cl..110 'TOU VOTJ'TOV 0 vovs o~os ; To 
\ '..J..' f "" I ' t W t ~ I • ' f' """' VOTJ'TOV Ei.y eaVTOU µ.ooJJ JC04 OVIC ov EVOEES' w<nrep 'TO opwv 
' ' - t ~ ... 8' '' ' - f ' ' ""' Kai. 'TO voovv - EJIQEES E fl€jo'CLI 'TO voovv ws 7rpos EKEl.VO 
, " lo , J 1l . ~\ \, " , A I • 
- OVK £0'TW 0 JI OJfCIC.O'V1'}701', Cl.IV\ EO'TW aV'TOV 7TaV'Ta EV 
' - '· ' , .... ,, ~ ' ' - r ' ·, av-rep Ka' avv awcp, 1T«vrf1 o'a.KpLTLKov eawov, ~WTJ ev 
t ""' \ I ' ,.. -.... \ f I 1 '"" 1 \ 
avT<p Ka' 7TaV74 EV 01.IT<fJ, JCO' .,, ICaTaVOTJULS aV'TOV awo 
f \ (}' 'I' • I , ~I \ I r I OWV£1. avvai.a 71aE& OUCT'CI o• t!'i0'7E& a1.01.cp Kai. VOTJUEL E'TEpws 
2Since the precise meanings of the terms katanoesis and synaisthesis are 
difficult to discern in this passage, I have chosen to merely transliterate 
them, indicating in brackets and in our comments later what the expressions 
may mean. 
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" [ 7] Accordingly, if a product occurs while It [the One as 
intelligible] remains in repose within Itself, the product is generated 
from the One whenever It [the One J has to the highest degree what the 
product is. Hence, the product comes out of It [the One as Intelligible] 
when the Latter retains Its own proper character; because It remai~s true 
to Itself, the product occurs. When It remains the intelligible, the 
product becomes intellection. 
"[8] Since the product is intellection and since it is an intellec-
tion of its source (for it has no other source), the Intelligence comes 
to be and is different to soae extent from the intelligible [the One], and 
yet to some extent is that intelligible and is Its likeness and image." 
2, 19-26: 
E,, .. , ,,..,j,,_ ' ,., ou11 µ.wovros a.tn'ov ev a.tn'cp 
I > I 9 "'"' .... I • I ""' _!\ ~ ~ 
ytvE'TO.t, 0.1T aVTOV rotn"O )'lllErai, O'TO.V EICE£VO f-Lat1.Ltrra. 'ti 
• , MI .,. ' - • - • I "(} •t: 0 ecrrt. EVOVTOS" OllV' Clll1"0V EV T<p 0£1CE£<p '1J ei e~ 
' .... ' ' , I J ~ \ I 'E ' atn'OV µ.w TO ')'lVOf-LEYOJI y&IJE'TClt, µ.evOVTOS oe ')1£VE'Tai. 7TEt 
1''1" I I\ f I I .I OtJV EICEWO P.EJJEI. V07]'1"011 J 7<> )11.llOftEVOl.I ')'ti.le-rat VOT)O'tS VOT)O'£S 
~' ... ' "'"' , ~· • t ~ ~\' ' ' ,, oe ovua KO.£ voovaa a~ <> v E)"EVE70 - Cl./\l\O yap ovK EXE' -
• I _!/'\ ' r I \ f' 1 • \ I 
vovs "l'yve-ra.£, a.tV\O O'<>JJ Jl()T}70Y Ka.t o'ov EKE£VO KO.£ µ.£µ.7]µ.0. 
Ka.£ Ei8w,\ov licel.vov. 
"[9] But how does it arise if That remains immobile? It arises as 
an energeia. Now energeia ls either that 'of' an entity or that 'from' 
an entity. The energeia which ls 'of' an entity is that which each entity 
itself is as energefa. The energeia which is 'from' that entity and 
Which must, in every case, follow necessarily from the entity is other 
than it. [10] Take fire as a11 exa10ple: there is a heat which constitutes 
the entity of fire and a heat which comes immediately from the fire 
because the fire acts according to the nature of its entity by retaining 
its constitution as flre. 
53 
"[11] The same situation is found There. [The One] remains in His 
own proper nature even more forcefully [than does fire], but from the 
perfection which is in Him and from the energeia which is present to Him 
[with and through the Intelligence]3 an energeia comes about which 
achieves an hypostasis [=the Intelligence], which thereby achieves being 
and entity from a power which is great--indeed, the greatest of all--and 
all else is I ts effect. (12] If all existents are this [namely, an 
effect of the One], That is beyond all and thus is beyond entity. Indeed, 
if all existents are 1 ts product, the One is prior to all and has no 
equal among all those existents and for that reason It is beyond the very 
being of entity. "4 
2, 26-42: 
'A\'a' --~.. , , , , IV\ ,..,,,,, p.EVOV'T'OS' EKEWOtl )ILVE'Ta' ; 
'E ' ~ ' , .... ' , f ~, , ""' ' I f' I 
vEpyer.a 17 µ.o EO'rL TifS' 0 LJO'LaS' J 7J 0 EK 'T'f}S' OtlO'LaS' EKaO'-
~ \r \""'''tit '' • Toti Ka.c. 71 JJ.EY -rr;s ovar.as- aVTo E<rrLV Evepy~La EKa<rrov, 
r ~' ' ' , ~ .-. ~ .... ' • (} 't. t / r / 71 OE 0.17 EICEC.VFJS', '1/l" CIH ?TaVTr. E1TEO' aL E~ avayK"f}S' E'TEpav 
t' t.-.. 'f ~''"""' 'f I It 
ouuav ClV"iOU' OtOY KCll. E111. 'TOV 'ITVpOS' 7J µ.EV 'TLS' EU'TL auµ.-
' A I , t ,I) I r ~ \ > > t I "~ 
7M7JpOu<Ta 'T7/l" oucm:tJ.J uEpf.1-0'T'f)S' I 7J OE a'TT EKELV7JS' "f/OTJ )ILV0-
1 • ""' 1 ' \ I ,L "'"" t I t """' P.EV"f) El"EP)'OLJV"r(JS EKELl"OV 'M'}V auµ.'f'V'TOV 'TTJ OVO'L<f EV Tep 
I "" 0.. ~' 0 "" I \I I t .., I µ.evew 7rup. VT(U <JT} KaKEr.· JCaL 1101\tl 11poTEpov EKEt µ.evov-
, ""' , - , , ·o , .... , , .... ' , 
"iOS' O.U70U El' 7~ OtKEtqJ 17 El. EK 'T'f)S' EV O.tl'T<p 'TE/\ELO-
' , • I f B" , ' f I 
'T"f}'TOS' KOL C111JI01'CJ7t) fl"Ep')'ELO.S' 7J )IEW7] ELO'a ~p)l.(La V'TTO-
' Q "" W , .."\ ~ I I \ O"TaaLv 11.a.tJouacr.~ «.1"E EK µ.Eya.1171s ouvaµ.Ews, µ.EyLU'T"f}S' µ.Ev 
.,. < - • I r \ t I .,1;\(} t "" \ OLJV 0.1Tacrwv, Et) ro E.VCU Kar. OtlO'LO.V 'II\ EV" EKE£VO yap 
, I , ' .r. V'.... ' ~' I E7l:EKEl.l'O OU<JL(IS .,v. n.ai E"KE£VO µ.Ev ovvaµ.is 7TaV'TWV, 
, ~, ·a , , E· ~, .... , , ·, .... , , 
'TO OE 71 '1/ Ta 7T4J.17CI., ' OE TOV'TO Ta 7TO.V7'a, EKE£VO E-n:'.EK~£V~ 
- ; ti II ti \I\ f \ 
TWV 7TaVTWV. E"lJEKELl"a apa 0 LJO'Las. KO.L €£ Ta 1TaV7'a, 7rpo 
~\ I ~ A 9 \ JI 'II "" ..,. \ I ~'"" 
OE" 71'0.VTCUIJ 'TO Ell Cl LJ 'T(J LO'OIJ EXOV 'TO LS' 'TT0.0'£ 1 KO.I. 'TO. V'TTJ OE t 
t I l ~ ~ r 
E71'El(EtlJC. E 1'41. "MIS ()UCT't<l~. 
3This energeia, whLca in the couplet-language of Text B (see #9) is 
equivalent to the energeja "'of"' the entity, cannot be found in the One 
Himself, who is above being and entity (1112) and is thereby above 
energeia. (See below our i:olll111ents on katanoesis and synaisthesis and our 
comments on the two kinds of energeia.) 
4The remainder of V, 4, 2 contains no remarks particularly relevant 
to energeia. Hence, we 0111it t~e111 from our translation. 
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Comments 
Let us observe the procedure we followed in studying Text A and 
outline the movement of thought in our present key text. 
Why, Plotinus asks at the beginning of Text B, is the Producer 
Himself not an Intelligenc.ei His answer beings with the third line of 
the Text. 
a. If the Producer ~ere the Intelligence, His product could not be 
an intelligence, which would thus he too imperfect to be the first product 
and the second ex is tent. No, the Producer transcends Intelligence and 
its product can accordingly be Intelligence (#1). 
b. But someone might still object: the energeia of Intelligence 
is so great that the Producer should also be an Intelligence. [Plotinus 
refuses to concede but l>eg ins to explain what Intelligence really in-
volves:] Even though intellection is the energeia of Intelligence, the 
second hypostasis is subor4inated to the One which serves as the Intelli-
gible to which the Intelligence turns and which it contemplates. Thereby, 
its original state of indeter111ination becomes determined and it is per-
fected by the One and 'becones Intelligence (#2); the latter's content is 
the Forms and Numbers which. as Plato is supposed to have said, "are 
constituted by the indefinite dyad and the One" (113). Hence, the Intel-
ligence is not simple but e !ltails multiplicity and composition (which 
also is an object of its kno~Ledge and thus] it itself is an intelligible 
as well as an intelligence. Hence, Intelligence by nature involves 
duality (114). 
c. The One is absolutely simple [see V, 4, 1, paraphrased above in 
the context to this key teic:t], l>ut He has a kind of knowledge with and 
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through the Intelligence, which is knowing ~ .!!_• Accordingly, the One 
baS knowledge through "'mediation,"' i.e., through the knowledge of His 
first product, the ~· Since the Nous is the universe of life and 
everything else, the One can be said to encompass life and everything 
through "mediation," i.e.• through His producing and conserving the powers 
and energeiai of~· The One's knowledge is a katanoesis or synaisthe-
sis, a knowledge through or with or by means of another, name.ly, His 
-
l:,ogos, the~· While the One's knowledge is through or by means of the 
Nous, its knowledge and eternal repose is distinct from that of the 
-
Intelligence, for the noesis of the latter, i.e., Nous as thinking 
independently and not as instrument of the One, does not involve the 
One's self-perception (#6). 
d. But how does the Intelligence come from the Intelligible which 
is the One? In this way: the One lacks nothing (although the Intelli-
gence is in partial need because of its way of thinking; #5) and produces 
simply by remaining at rest vitll Himself, by retaining His own proper 
characteristics and reality. Consequently, the One persists as an 
intelligible and His prod11c t cones about as an intellection (#7). As 
intellection and as com te111p la ting the One (see 112), the product became 
Intelligence, which to some degree differs from and yet is the One and 
His likeness and image ( flB). 
e. [Having rooted tlle orig in of the Intelligence in the One's 
immutability and self-persistence, Plotinus now inquires how, since 
production appears to connote change in the producer,] Intelligence can 
arise if the One remains illll'llo~lle. The answer: because the Intelligence 
1s an energeia (see fl1). Nov. energeia is of two sorts: that constitutive 
"of" entity as act; secondly, that issuing '"form" an entity and constitu-
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tive of some other entity (09). For example, the heat of fire itself is 
an !E-ergeia constituting that fire; whereas the heat [of the water in the 
pan on the flame] which the fire of itself naturally gives off is an 
!Pergeia, and yet the fire persists as fire (#10). 
f. Production out of the One may be said to involve a similar 
twofold energeia. The One may even be described as an energeia "of" an 
ousia, provided that one understands such energeia to be ascribed through 
-
"mediation". Accordingly, the energeia "from" the One, that is the single 
energeia which constitutes the entity of the Intelligence, may also be 
described as though it were in fact the energeia of the One, an energeia 
the One would have if It did not transcend being. Thus, the energeia 
"of" the ousia, which belongs to the One through mediation, is the same 
as the energeia "from"' the ousia, which is the completed second hypostasis, 
the universe of einai and ousia (~LI). 
g. Intelligence and all other subsequent existents (see #2) are 
products of the One, because they are energeiai from Him (#11). The One 
thereby transcends all of thea (none of which is its equal) and thus 
transcends being also. In faet, the One is beyond the very being of 
entity (1112). 
The following issues In this key text require clarification and 
comments: the energeia of the Intelligence (Le., its noesis; #2); the 
Intelligence fashioning itself by turning back and gazing on the One (its 
overflow is in two moments: la the first the overflow is indeterminate 
and is equivalent to the Indefinite Dyad of Plato's "Unwritten Doctrines"; 
in the second it is determined and perfected by the One--i.e., the overflow 
acquires content: the Forms and Numbers of Plato; #2-#3); the One's self-
knowledge: katanoesis or synaisthesis (116); the nature of production 
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(lll-115; 117-118); the two kinds of energeia (119-1111); fire as an illustration 
of production and of the two kinds of energeia (1110); the meaning of 
.!.Pekeina einai tes ousias (012). 
The Energeia of the Intelligence 
In Text B Plotinus states (#2) that the Intelligence (=Nous) is 
perfect being, the energe ia of which is intellction (noeSis). This 
description of Nous is important because it implies certain details 
pertaining to the essential structure of the Intelligence and to its 
relationship to the One. 
If our conclusion to Text A is correct--namely, that energeia 
primarily refers to whatever makes an entity be what it is (i.e., a 
certain kind of ousia)--Plotinus in Text B is saying that intellection is 
the very nature of the Intelligence. Other beings, such as the Soul and 
Nature, may have intelligence but only one being authentically is 
Intelligence. In fact, Solll and Nature have intelligence only because 
they participate in that which is Intelligence.5 
Plotinus does not ela~orate on the energeia of the Intelligence in 
the present text, but we need only draw on earlier treatises,6 especially 
V, 9 (5),7 to supply suffic.f.ent details on the subject. 
5That Soul and Nature are intelligent is explained throughout III, 
8 (30). Lesser intelligences~ including man, are there described as 
con templa tors and lo go i of the Nous. 
6p1otinus has given some attention to the nature of the Intelligence 
even in his very first treatise; see I, 6, especially chapters 6 and 9. 
7v, 9 offers suff:kien t informs tion on energeia to justifiably 
qualify as a key text in its right, but because it focuses mainly on the 
.!_nergeia of the Intellige11c~, I prefer to use it in my comments on 
v' 4. 
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If noes is is the essential act of the Intelligence, then the 
Intelligence is perfect as a knower or mind. For a being whose nature 
is to know does not have merely the power to know; it is knowing per .!!· 
In other words, noesis is Its energeia, not its dynamis. Fur thermo re, it 
is eternal, for only a potential knower is in time.8 
In relation to all other beings, Intelligence is superior, for 
other beings obtain knowledge through becoming and time. They are not 
knowers absolutely or essen tlally. As potential intellects they ul ti-
ma tely depend on the Intelligence itself to achieve energeia.9 
8see V, 9, 5, 1-4: '"The Intelligence ••• must not be in potency 
and become Intelligence after unintelligence. If this were the case, 
then we would have to discover another prior Intelligence; instead it is 
in act and eternally Intelligence." 
Of course, Plotinus Is not forgetting that there is an existent prior to 
the Intelligence, but he i.nds ts that this priority is not in time. The 
Intelligence is dependent on t:he One for its reality but is still eter-
nally in energeia. 
9Plotinus identifies tile Soul as a potential intellect in the 
following informative passage {\1, 9, 4, 1-12): "Why then must there be 
something higher than Soul, llnless the Soul itself were prior? Rather the 
Intelligence is prior and other than Soul, and better--better, indeed, in 
nature. For it is not tile case .as some think, that Soul, once perfected, 
produces Intelligence. Fol:' hov would that potency be in act, if there 
were not a cause to "bring it to act? For if this happened according to 
chance, it would not come t() act. For the first realities are necessarily 
posited in act, self-conte111plating and complete. The later incomplete 
things are generated by these prior things and completed by them; and 
they are matter to the pl:'ior producing existent and are completed by 
being formed.•• 
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Since the Intelligence is an eternal act, depending on nothing else 
for its knowledge, it is its own intellectual object.10 It is at once 
subject (~) and object Cnoeton). Transcending time and becoming, it 
is 8 purely intuitive knower 11 for discursive reasoning is the condition 
of a being in potency for knowledge. On this account the lntelli8,ence is 
comparable to Aristotle's Separate Intelligence, Self-Thinking Thought 
(noesis noeseos).11 This is the limit of the comparison, however, because 
Plotinus goes ahead to develop an elaborate explanation of the Divine Mind 
.Ac.4 Tl oJv OEi · l112 .fouxfi av,/va.,, ci.U' oa}1e ci~" 
'lvcu Tl8Ea8a.' _To np~-row ; 'H 7rpiirrov µ~v llOVS' t/nJxfjS' 
• ' .. , S"' .. ~' ... O' ' ET'Epov Ka.' KfJE&'M"OJI. ro • "P' '"o" ,.van 1rpWTOV. v ya.p 
t' I f W ''"• I - \ 8 • - '8 \ 071, CUS' owvra1. .,.v')(11 l'Olll' "T'E/\f<U HO'Cl ')'EVVq. • 7'0 EV ya.p 
'~I t r 9 l .. t ti fl 
TO ovvaµn cvcpy"' ECM"'CU. 1-'-"11 TOU US' tvEpynav a.yoVTor 
• , . • E' , \ , • ~ I ' .!\8 -
a'nou oVTor; ' yap ICC.re. 'rllX'JV, oaEXETO.' µ'I M EW 
•, ' / A ' ~ .. ' • t / '8 8 ' OS' EVEf'YUO.JI. ""'° OE& 74 vpwTCl O'Ef'YE'Cf .,., Ea a' ICCU 
t ~ • . ' '\ "i ~ \ t \ • ·• • . t • t I 
a11poaaEO. Ka' TfAEtO. -ra Cl( a.TE/\.,, 'llUTEpa. 411 . flCUVWV, 
\ , to• • t - .. , . t'' , 
Tf/\fiO VJJ-EVO. OE 'l'la.p Cl&rrWI' "'r'Wll ')'EYfVVTJICOT'WV C1LICT/V 1'0.TE-
\ I A t t \ I \• t I • ' pwv TfAfiOUV'rWll, a ICO"r apxas O.T'E/\T} E)'CVVTJ<IO.V KO.' 
• ' ., ' ., - ' - ' • t ' HVO.' p.Ev Ul\'!jll 11por 1""0 '70c71acL11 TO 1rpwTOJI, ,,,. O.V'M]V 
lµµ.op</>ov cinorEil.c ta8at., 
lOsee V, 9, 5, 4-7: "'If it [=the Intelligence] has a wisdom not 
borrowed [from without], lf it knows something, it knows [it) of itself, 
and if it has something~ it has [it] of itself. If it knows out of 
itself, it is itself what it knows ... 
El 8£ µ..;, E'ITO.KTOV 
' ,,L_ " ., "' 1 r ... ,,. ' " E El TO 'l"POVELV fXEt, El rt JI()(,, rra.p a.VTOV VOC:t, KaL u TL x • 
1 r " ' ~' • ' "" ' .,.t: * ... VOE';' nap O.VTOV (XE'· €' (JtE 'lrtr.p aVTOV KO.L C:5 avTOV ., 
' , t • .... 
atn'Os;' EO"r'LJI a JIC)H. 
llsee Aristotle~ Metaphysics Lambda, ch. 7, 1072 b 20-25. Plotinus 
:aplicitly acknowledges that the Intelligence is comparable to Aristotle's 
tparate Intelligence in his criticism of the Stagirite in V, 1 (10), 9 • 
. 
1
Al.so consult V, 3 (49], 11-llt; V, 6 (24]; and VI, 7 [38], 35-37.) For an 
1~teresting discussiou of how Plotinus and Aristotle differ on the lntel-
"le gence see J. M. Rist 11 "''The One of Plotinus and the God of Aristotle," _vie.!~ Metaphysics 27 (1~7:3) 3 75-87. 
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along mainly Platonic lines. Re combines with Aristotle's description of 
self-Thinking Thought the Platonic doctrine of a world of perfect Forms 
to arrive at a remarkable and detailed conception of the intelligible 
world· In this synthesis the Forms actually become the contents of the 
Intelligence .12 In V,, 9,, 5, i-16,, Plotinus justifies this coupling of 
Forms and the Intelligence by arguing that its objects must be inseparable 
from its nature. 
For if its ousia were different from the objects 
it contemplates,, that same ousia would itself be 
unintelligent and in potency rather than in act. 
These two [•Nous and noeton] are not separable, 
then, from eacli""other. But our custom makes us 
separate these intelligible items from one 
another. What, tben,, ls the act and what is the 
intellectlon, in order that we may posit that 
these are the same as what the Intelligence 
knows? Clearly t~e truly existing Intelli-
gence contemplates the beings [•the Forms] 
and posits thern. It {•the Intelligence] is 
these beings. For it contemplates them either 
elsewhere or ia Itself as its very self. But 
12Several of Plotinus' predecessors had already conceived of such a 
synthesis. Philo of Alexaacf.ria (25 B.C.-40 A.D.) had already made the 
Porms the thoughts of God, as ls evident in his Works (see the "Loeb 
Classical Library" edition, edited and translated by F. H. Colson, G. H. 
Whittaker and R. Marcus, 1? vols., London, 1929-1962, esp. Vol. 5). 
Albinus later (second centru1 A.D.) influenced all of Middle Platonism by 
identifying the contents of the Divine Mind with the Platonic Forms (see 
his Epitome, ch. 9, edited l>y P. Louis, Paris, 1945). For interesting 
discussions on the origin of this doctrine see H. A. Wolfson, Philo 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1947), Vol. I, pp. 229 sq. 
•nd 249 sq. See also R. E. ~itt, Albinus and The History of Middle Pla-
~nism (Cambridge: University Press, 193-rr;-p.-n, who attributes"'tiie 
development to Xenocrates. 
In spite of such authorities as Philo and Albinus, the Issue of 
Whether the Forms should be inside Nous was controversial even in Plotinus' 
day, as is indicated by the fact """that his colleague Longinus held that 
the Forms were separate from the Intelligence. For a discussion on the 
;ontrast between Plotinus and Longinus on the question of the content of 
f~ see A. H. Armstrong, •'The Background of the Doctrine 'That the; 
C~telligibles are not Outside tlle Intellect,'" Entretiens sur L'Antiquite 
-••sique, V: Les Sources de Flotln (Gen~ve: Foundatioi:iliardt, 1960), 
Pp. 391 sqq •• -
elsewhere is impossible. For where is "else-
where" There'? They are then itself and in itself. 
E', \ f \ t I t • .!'\ \ • ~ \ ya.p '1 µ.cv ovaui auTou """'1• 4 01 
-· ,_ .,, ,, ,_,, . ' 
VOi& fTEp4 a.an-av, QV'T7) '1 ova'a QV'TOV 0.VOT}TOS. fO'Ta'. ICCU 
8 I 9 9 I • O' I • tl:!-1 IJllap.1&, OUK El.lfpj'E&C:. au. V XWP&OTEOV OVV O'UOETEpoV 
• , JJ • ·Ee ~, , - • , - • , • • -
curo fle&T£pov. o~ 111 711-"" a.7To Twv wap 'IP.'" K4Kfwa 
.. ' , ,, ,,., _. ' .. ' ' . 
TA'S c7rwo&a's XC11P'1a""· .u ouv '"'PY" Ka' T' voci, wa 
• .. ' ' • .. 8' 8 •H !:!- .. ,_ • - • IKl&Va QVTOI' a 1'01, wµ.1 a; OT}IWV OT' VOVS' CllV 
• • • • ' f~ I •!:' II ' • ovrws voci T(I OV'T'Q KCI& V't'&O"MJULV. .Z:..O'T&V apci Ta Oll'T'O.. 
•H ' • , 8 • • ' , • • ' - ' • ' ya.p ETEpw ' 01/'T(I a UTO. VOT}Uf&, T} IV O.U'T(fl cur QV'T'OV 
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If the Intelligence ls the universe of Forms, it is also (we may add) the 
universe of being, since the Forms are the determinate natures of all 
beings and ultimately every being is a logos of the Intelligence. In the 
final analysis think and being are the same, and Parmenides in his famous 
fragment is essentially correct.13 
Plotinus appeals to the later Platonic dialogues to give authority 
to his conclusion that the Forms constitute the Intelligence. In the 
Sophist (248 e-249 a) Plato a<lmits life and intelligence into the world 
of the Forms.14 Additionally, in the Timaeus (30 c 3-7) he conceives the 
13see fragment 3: .. For it ls the same thing to think and to be" 
(translated by Kathleen Freenan, Ancilla ~ .!h!;, Presocratic Philosophers 
[Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971], p. 42). Plotinus 
cites this fragment several tines: III, 8 (30), 8, 6-8; I, 4 (46), 10, 
9; V, 1 (10), 8, 17-23, .attributing it explicitly in this last instance 
to Parmenides. For a valuable commentary on the fragment see Leo Sweeney, 
lnfinitx ,.!!! l!!! Pre so era.tics, ?• 109. 
14we must not (Plato sa)Js) "be easily convinced that change, life, 
soul, understanding have no J>l.a.ce in that which is perfectly real--that 
it has neither life nor thoug~t but stands immutable in solemn aloofness, 
devoid of intelligence" (Cor11ford's translation; W}> ~AnGil:1..( ,l((v7()n/ 
I< ' lr' . \. . '\. r.Jr ' '- A- / - ' ~ ft. i / 
ltl .)WTV K..~1.- fV~;-r.J" KA.L- 1/cY7c-LV 1 /~CUA)[> 
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world of Forms as a single entity~ the eternal "Living Being. "15 From 
such passages Plotinus draws a conclusion which helps demonstrate the 
great unity that belongs to the Intelligence: the Forms, the noeta of 
the Intelligence, are not just lifeless objects of contemplation but are 
themselves intelligences. Each Form, then, is an intelligible, and an 
intelligence. Accordingly,. Plotinus is able to reply to those who would 
object that introducing Forms into the Intelligence makes it pluralistic 
and imperfect. Its perfection is preserved because now the Intelligence 
is a unity, a universe of kn owe rs, each of which is known by and knows 
every other. Each Form ls a unique entity which through itself expresses 
the whole intelligible cosmos. He also relies on energeia and dynamis to 
explain the relationship of each Form to the All: each is itself in act 
but is all others in potency. l~ 




15This characterization of the world of Forms as a unified whole is 
echoed when Plotlnus refers to the lntelligence as "the All" (to pan; 
e.g., III, 8 10, 16-17). 
16see VI, 2 (43), 10; 1il, 7 (38), 9, 31-38. As an Instance of 
a test prior to V, 4,. let tJS quote IV, 8 (6), 3, 14-16: "In the 
Intelligence there is present the Intelligence itself--a great living 
being potentially everytblng and. beings which themselves are in act but 
which in another sense are i11 potency.•• 
Fr''', ... - .. 
.nCl&. yap IKCI. EIJ '7 '!J 'Y1=' 
Tllia 01011 (~01-1 ~Jya. -rd 
TrEP'E iXf.' 6C.-rEpo1-1· 
, ' - , ~ , 
ro 11111 YOllS' ""P"X"'"' auvaµ.n 
S.1 • , • .. ~ ' .. EIJEPY"'f EICaUTov, a auvaµ.n 
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Plotinus realizes that this intelligible order, in which each part 
is really indistinct from e'l1er other, is not easy for the limited human 
intellect to comprehend. He therefore assists us with several analogies, 
the most noteworthy of which is the parallel between the Intelligence and 
"a self-contained deductive science, like Euclidean geometry, where each 
theorem has its own specific content, but contains by implication the 
whole of the science in question.•• 17 Since each theorem is the foundation 
for all later conclusions, it contains potentially the entire science. 
of course, as R. T. Wallis bas noted, "the unity binding Intelligence is 
closer than the analogy suggests, since the sciences familiar to us belong 
to the level of discursive thought. "18 Despite this limitation, however, 
such an analogy19 is helpful in emphasizing that the Intelligence is a 
unity and that is elements are only logically and not really distinct. 
A final and important conclusion follows from Plotinus' character!-
zation of the Intelligence as the act of noesis: it cannot be the First 
Existent {Ill). As a being the Intelligence is perfect, but it is being 
nonetheless and therefore Is a composite (#4). Intelligence, at the very 
least, is analyzal>le into the d11allty of subject and object. It is a 
unity of logically distinguishable Items. As a one-in-many the Intelli-
gence is dependent and thus h not absolutely first in reality. Only 
pure unity can be self-suffi~ient and unlimited and therefore be First. 
17R. T. Wallis, Neopleton.llsn, pp. 54-55. 
18Ibid., p. 55. 
19other analogies i11cl11de that of individuals within a species and 
of separate species under the genus itself (V, 9, 6, 9-10); also that of 
the seed (V, 9, 6, 10-11), which contains in potency everything that will 
constitute the fully grown plant. 
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That the Intelligence is not the Supreme Reality contradicts a 
common assumption in Greek thought. The great cosmological and metaphys-
ical systems of classical Greece had agreed that perfection consists in 
form (eidos) and limit (peras);20 accordingly, the Intelligence would 
satisfy traditional standards of perfection. Plotinus does not appear to 
be insensitive to this tradition, as is evident in the question with 
which he prefaces the key text: why does not the Intelligence suffice as 
the Producer? Text B may be taken as a response to this traditional view 
and shows that P lo tinus both accepts and rejects the tradition. He 
accepts it as an on tologh t. He admits that the Intelligence is ens 
perfectissimum, even ~ realissimum (where ~ signifies only being). 
But he denies it as an henologLst. For if to be real is to be one, the 
perfect reality must be without multiplicity. Hence the Intelligence 
may be ~ perfectissimurn, but only some thing else can be ~ perfec-
tissima (where~ means reality). 
Plotinus is not wLtho11 t some precedent in breaking with tradi-
tion. He appears to regard bis conclusion that true perfection belongs 
20The Being of Parrnenides is a perfect form, a sphere definite and 
limited, "for powerfl!l Necessity holds it in the bonds of Limit, which 
constrains it round abo11t, because it is decreed by divine law that Being 
shall not be wi tho11 t boundacy. For it is not lacking; but if it were 
[spatially infinite]. it would be lacking everything" (fragment 8, 
translated by Kathleen Freeman,. Ancilla to the Presocra tic Philosophers, 
p. 44). - --
The elements of torn and limit are clearly presupposed as the 
standards of metaphysical periec tlon in Plato. In the Philebus (16 c-d; 
23 c-26 d) he concurs with the Pythagoreans that reality, including the 
Platonic Forms, consists of two principles, the Limited and the Unlimited, 
the former of which brings form and order to the latter. 
Aristotle clearly shares in this tradition by making eidos the very 
real! ty of an existent; eld os causes some thing to be a certain kind of 
being and therefore determines and limits it. See our earlier discussion 
of Aristotle on infinity In Text A. 
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to a transcendent Unity as a refinement of Plato's intuition that the 
supreme perfection (the Good) lies beyond being.21 Apparently, he also 
is indebted to the Middle Platonists who believed that a reality is above 
the Intelligence, which for this reason is one among several Intermedi-
aries betwen man and God.:22 :But undoubtedly Plotinus is the first to 
transform these glimpses of a transcendent reality into a fully developed 
vision. 
In conclusion we may sa1 the t the very energeia of the Intelli-
gence condemns it to multiplicity, which necessarily carries some measure 
of imperfection. As a result, wbLle the Intelligence is a self-contained, 
perfect ousia in its nature as the energeia of noesis, it is nonetheless 
dependent on another reaU t}il' for its emergence into being. How this 
generation takes place is the primary subject of V, 4. To begin to 
understand this process, let us first consider how it is expressed in 
the rather obscure doctrine a ttrlbuted to Plato in ancient times (113). 
Indefinite Dyad.!! First Moment of Nous 
In discussing Text A 111e ~uoted V, 2 (11) ,23 where Plotinus dis-
tinguishes two moments in the generation of the Intelligence: procession 
(lrohodos), in which the pro4uct Ls indeterminate and dynamis, and rever-
21He specifically interprets Plato's Good as the transcendent source 
of the Nous at V, 1 (l 0) , 8. 
22see Albinus, Epitome, ch. 10. Celsus apparently held that God is 
transcendent; see Orlgen, Contra Celswn, VII, 45, translated with commen-
tary by H. Chadwick {Ca11tbrLdge: University Press, 1953). The Gnostics 
especially stress the trauscerl<lence of God along with a plurality of 
Intermediaries; see J. Ro b:111son, The Nag Hammadi Trac ta tes in English 
(San Francisco: Harper and Row, l 977). 
23see Text A, n. 37a. 
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sion (epistrophe), in which the lntelligence is determinate (acquires 
Forms) and energeia. These tvo moments are implicit in our present key 
text (112-113; 115-IJl 0), where Plotinus describes a process whereby the 
Intelligence of its own power becomes energeia. This is particularly 
implied when he likens the rntelligence to a kind of sight (opsis; 112), 
for the Intelligence is in I ts first moment only a power, as is a man 
with his eyes shut, but in its second moment of contemplating its object 
(namely, the Intelligible, the One) it is determined and brought into 
act, just as sight is actuated by its object. In its first moment, the 
Intelligence is only a proclivity (ephesis) or power for contemplating; 
i.e., it is only the dynamls e>r noesis.24 
In the next portion of the key text (//3) Plotinus draws on the 
"Unwritten Doctrines"' (agrapba dogmata),25 which Aristotle and others 
24see v, 3 (49), 12. 
25This exact phrase occurs at Physics Delta, ch. 2, 209 b 14. In 
general Aristotle attributes to Plato an explanation about the origin and 
the status of the world of Forllls that many scholars believe conflicts 
with the content of the dialogues. Essentially, Aristotle says that 
according to Plato's oral teachings the Forms are Idea/Numbers having 
their source in the One and the Indefinite Dyad of the Great/Small (See 
especially, Meta. Alpha, ch. ~; Phys. Delta, ch. 2, 209 b; Meta Mu and 
Nu). For Aristotle Plato~ s explanation of Forms is a development of "the 
~-philosophies·· of Parmenides and the Pythagoreans. The One of 
Parmenides becomes a separate cause that works on the Indeterminate Dyad 
of the Pythagoreans to fsshion the Forms and the phenomenal world. 
The Unwritten Doctrines have generated significant controversy in 
recent years. Scholars have debs ted whether they are genuinely Plato's 
views. Some of the most Impressive Greek scholars are represented on 
both s}des of the controversy. A~ong notable defenders are,Leon Robin, 
#, Theorie platonicienne des idees et des nombres d'apres Aristote 
\ttildesheim: G. Olm, 19o3); CorneliadeVogel, Philosophia, Part I: 
Studies in Greek Philose>phy (.\s sen: Van Goreum, 1970); W. D. Ross, 
!_la to' s Theory of Ideas (Odorci: Clarendon Press, 1951); H. J. Kramer, 
!rete bei Pla ton und Ari stotele s (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1959); K. 
Gaiser-;-F'latons ungeBchriebeue Lehre (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 1968); J. 
N. Findlay, Plato: The Written aud Unwritten Doctrines (New York: 
Humanities Press, 197~ 
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attribute to Plato, in order to explain the cause and moments in the 
production of Intelligence. He identifies the three factors in such 
l)Octrines--(1) the One, (?) the Forms/Numbers and (3) the Indefinite Dyad 
(a()ristos dyas)-and equates them with elements in his own metaphysics. 
-
Critics are Harold Chernise, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and 
the Academy (second edition; New York: Russell and Russell, 1962); 
Gregory Vlastos, ••an Plato's Oral Doctrine, .. Gnomon 41 (1963), 641-55; W. 
IC. c. Guthrie, ! History ~ Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: University 
Press, 1979), Vol. 5, 418-442. For a general bibliograpy on the Unwritten 
Doctrines, see K. Gaiser, Platons ungeschriebene Lehre, pp. 565-71; sup-
plemented in the second edition, pp. 575-77; and Jurgen Wippern (ed.),~ 
problem der ungeschriebenen Lehre Platons (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1972), PP• 449-464 (also includes several reviews). 
The arguments ln support of this interpretation of Plato are legion 
and the limits of our present study prohibit any detailed evaluation of 
the Unwritten Doctrines, but I should briefly mention a few of the more 
common arguments. 
(1) .!'.!!!Authority~ Aristotle. Many argue that is is unreasonable 
to doubt Aristotle's testimony, since a thinker of- his acuteness, who 
studied with Plato personally for many years, would probably not misrepre-
sent so basic a teaching of his Master's as the theory of Forms. Against 
this conclusion scholars, such as Guthrie and Cherniss, have questioned 
Aristotle's reliability because of his peculiar ~ays of interpreting the 
history of Greek philosophy. ..Aristotle is an invaluable source of in-
formation on his predecessors provided that allowances are made for his 
known habits of mind, One of these is a tendency to regard earlier 
philosophers as forming a linear progression, trying one after the other 
to solve the same problems 011 such the same basic assumptions. A striking 
example is Phys. 189b 8-16, where he equates a physical contrariety of 
the Presocratics like dense and rare with the later doctrine of the One 
and excess-and-defect as universal archai. He himself inherited far more 
of the old Ionian spirit than did Plato" (Guthrie, A History of Greek 
Philosophy, Vol. V, p. 421). - -
(2) The testimony of Aristoxenus. Supporters of the Unwritten 
Doctrines cT;im that Arist'Oienus' report (Elementa Harmonica 2, Meiborn, 
122 Mac ran, P. 30) of a lecture which Plato delivered in approximately 
359 B.C., entitled, '"On the Good,•• is an instance of the tradition of 
oral teaching that prevailecl in the Academy--teaching which was mainly 
for the benefit of his most intimate followers and which had precedence 
over his written teaching. ~ut far from supporting an oral tradition, 
objectors argue, it supports uothing more than the occurrence of an actual 
lecture. In fact, it would seen to discredit the significance of an oral 
legacy in the Academy, for Ar:istoxenus reports that the lecture was 
attended by ordinary A.thenia11s, who were upset that Plato would lecture 
~o them on a highly technical philosophical subject--an indication that 
is lectures were not given just for selected intimates. Moreover, this 
~rticular incident appears to be unconnected with routine Academy 
scussions and, hence, is unlikely to ground any conclusions. 
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The one and the Forms of course become respectively the One (the transcen-
dent cause of being) and the perfected Intelligence. However, it is more 
difficult to show precisely hov he incorporates the Dyad into his position. 
This question deserves considerable attention because it bears on the 
status of dynamis in the intelligible world.26 
(3) Support of the Seventh Letter. In this letter (34lb-342a), 
Plato expresses a preference for the spoken over the written word. Hence, 
the Unwritten Doctrines,. since presumably based on his oral teaching, 
supporters argue, more representative of Plato's true views than the dia-
logues. In reply, Vlastos and others argue that an ancient philosopher's 
preference for oral over written teaching (which is not in the least 
surprising for a Greek philosopher steeped in religious and mystical 
traidi tons) does not imply that the former would in content differ from 
the latter, particularly in light of the fact that the dialogues show the 
care and work of a lifetime. 
(4) Evidence from the Dialogues. The more enthusiastic proponents 
of the Unwritten Doctrines-(e,g., DeVogel and Findlay) insist that the 
dialogues themselves intimate, however obliquely, the esoteric doctrines. 
T~ese schola.fs ref;r ~ommonly t~ the,. Phi.lebus_(l6d~, wJ!ere Plato holds 
ioy t,._f tG..-j.1&Y ClUIOV [st!• Tel> v-;\1lfiev~ 7'~ ·v L d~ w VJ ,, • • 
' ....., ,I ' ..... t: / ~y ME-let]v T~V tJ.if~'-1.C'" i'a.L- T{)I) Evl>; j 
a comparison of 16c with 14e, 13a and 19a in the same dialogue is thought 
to indicate that peras and apeiron are the constituents not only of all 
sensibles but also of the F<>rns, Pamenides 157 ff. presumably supports 
the view that the F<>rms are constituted from the One and Plurality. "By 
comparing Theatetus 176e with Republic 506a and the Parmenides, the Good 
is identified with the One. By extending the comparison to include 
passa_ges in the Gorgias, the Symposium and the,, Phaedrus we. maY. conclude 
ha 't/ '" { ~ \. > n' ' ,. ~ > " t t ~v and llTfftk>' '1rl:..l{~ J are the ayc:tc:'eY ai;tc> and the t<ttl<.6\' 1iui'r-oof the 
Unwritten Doctri~es"' (Vlastos, "On Plato's Oral Doctrine," 642). 
But most objectors including Vlastos, insist that these texts at 
best only prove that some of the expressions in the dialogues may bear 
some similarity to terms in the Unwritten Doctrines (e.g., apeiron being 
similar to the Indefinite D1ad). 
While the final judgment on the controversy is probably many years 
away, I suspect more and nore scholars will come to doubt that the 
Unwritten Doctrines are faithful to Plato because mainly "it seems an odd 
perversity to reject or to depreciate a philosopher's ipsiuima verba in 
favour of obscure and contradictory second or third hand reports of what 
he possibly might have said.. ( E. N. Tigersted t, Interpreting Plato 
[Stockholm: Almquist and ~idsell, 1977], p. 83). 
26we will take up the subject of the Dyad again in our next key 
text, II, 5, which in tre.atin13 act and potency discusses intelligible 
matter. 
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In order to fit it into his own metaphysics Plotinus modifies 
Aristotle's conception of the Indefinite Dyad in the Unwritten Doctrines, 
particularly in regard to its nature as unlimited (aoristos) and as 
potency. In Aristotle's account the Dyad is indefinite and in potency 
with reference to what the One produces out of it, but the Dyad still has 
some measure of determinacy insofar as it is the first plurality of two 
things: the Great and the Small (mega ~ mikron) .27 The function of 
the Dyad as a potency is to rec:f.eve form and to pluralize it in such a 
way as to make it double. Por this reason Aristotle refers to the Dyad 
as a duopoion.28 
In the case of Plotinus, however, the Indefinite Dyad is thoroughly 
indeterminate. It is not plurality but the potency or, rather, power 
(the active ground or condition) of plurality, which is the finished 
Intelligence.29 Hence. the Dyad is not a duopoion but a posopoion, the 
potency for any and every determinate plurality.JO 
For Aristotle the Dyad ai>pears to have a purely passive function, 
but for Plotinus it is an active rather than a passive potency.31 While 
27Metaphysics Nu. ch. 4, 1091 o 30 sqq. 
28E.g., ibid., Mu, ch. 7, 1082 a 15; ch. 8, 1083 b 36. 
29For a handling of Plotinus' account of the Dyad see J. M. Rist, 
"The Indefinite Dyad and Intelligible Matter in Plotinus," Classical 
.Q.uarterlz 12 (1956) 9 esp. 100-101. The Dyad may be called a kind of 
"matter" because it is indeterminate and receptive of form. We will 
discuss both intelligible and sensible matter in Text C, II, 5 (25). 
30Rist notices this difference in Aristotle's own text (1083 a 13) 
and argues that this is the sense which Plotinus gives to the Dyad ("The 
Indefinite Dyad and rntelligible Matter in Plotinus," p. 100). 
31The distinction between active dynamis and passive dynamis occurs 
in Aristotle. He speaks of dynamis to produce change in another and 
~namis to be changed by another in the following texts: Meta. Delta, 
ch. 12, 1019 a 15-1020 a 6; Theta,. ch. 1, 1045 b 35-1046 a 11; ch. 6, 
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it may be indefinite, it is not inert, since the Dyad desires to return 
to its source and through this ephes is i ni tia tes of itself the stage of 
reversion. To some extent, then, it causes its own determination. The 
comparison to sight (ops is) in the key text (//2) reinforces this 
interpretation, for the faculty of vision partly makes possible 'its own 
determination. An object alone is not sufficient for vision to occur. 
The faculty, the active power, must be operable as an efficient cause. 
These remarks on the Indefinite Dyad bring us to one final observa-
tion: dynamis appears to be significantly prior to energeia in the intell-
igible world, for in addition to the dynamis of the Dyad, there is the 
infinite dynamis of the One. A twofold dynamis, then, is ground of all 
beings, all energeiai. The perfection of indeterminate dynameis is the 
source of all subsequent realities, which happen to be determinate ener-
geiai. If the relationship of dynamis and energeia is basic to the 
genesis of all hypostases posterior to the One, this relationship clearly 
requires further elaboration, vhich we will supply in our comments on the 
nature of production below and in our comments on the nature of intelligi-
ble matter in Text C. 
The One's Knowledge: katanoesis or synaisthesis 
We have already discusse~ Plotinus' definition of the Intelligence 
as an eternal act of noesls. Let us turn now to a later portion of Text 
B (116) in which he apparently states that the One possesses a kind of 
knowledge (synaisthesis; lea tanoeds). Ve may be surprised at his will-
ingness to affirm kno1o1ledge of the One, because he persistently maintains, 
1048 a 25-b 4. The distinction is also implied in his example of knowledge 
at~ Anima Beta, ch • .S, 4J7 a 11-?9. 
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even in Text B itself ('112) and in the chapter preceding it (V, 4, 1, 
9-10), that the One transcends ousia, description and therefore intellec-
t!on. 
Is Plotinus inconsistent or is there a way to interpret Text B (#6) 
so that his commi tlllen t to the radical transcendence of the 'One is 
unaffected? 
It would seem that there are three possible interpretations of #6, 
only one of which is acceptable. The first interpretation is simply that 
Plotinus here ascribes k.novledge to the One through intrinsic denomina-
tion, i.e., the One in His intrinsic nature is a knower. This inter-
pretation, however, should be accepted only if no other plausible explan-
a tion of the Text is available, for ascribing knowledge to the One in 
this way contradicts Text E itself (112), as we noted above, as well as 
Plotinus' general philosophy of the One. 
The second i nterpre ta tlon is that P lo ti nus ascribes knowledge to 
the One through extrinsic deno111ina tion. Accordingly, the One does not 
have knowledge intrinsically but may nonetheless be called a knower 
because He is the cause of all knowledge.32 As the cause of all perfec-
32Extrinsic denomina tlon (also called analogy of attribution) con-
sists in attributing something to an object not because it belongs to 
that object intrinsically but because the object has a relationship to 
another which has the attrlbute Intrinsically. For example, the wind may 
be called "cold" not beea11se Lt is capable of experiencing cold, but 
because it is the cause of cold in animals. In Plotinus the One is not 
formally ousia but may be extrinsically "denominated" such because It is 
the cause of ousia. In several places Plotinus implies that we can form 
some concept of the deity blf ll:is effects (V, 3 [49], 14, 7-8; VI, 7 [38], 
36, 6-8; VI, 8 [ 39) , 8 , 1 s qci. ) , In every case of analogy there is 
something similar and some thing diverse. In extrinsic denomination the 
subjects are really divers:e but so111e name or term is attributed to both 
of them. In other words, in name they are similar but in reality differ-
ent. 
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tions, including knowledge, the One has all perfections virtually; i.e., 
Be bas all perfections in a transcendent and indeterminate sense because 
Be is the supreme power necessary to produce them. While this interpreta-
tion is an improvement over the first, it is still less convincing than 
the third, which is more specific and addresses the peculiar 14nguage 
(katanoesis; synaisthesis) of #6. 
-
The interpretation we endorse here is this: the One is a knower 
through mediation; that is to say, the One has self-awareness by means of 
the Intelligence. Accordingly, the One knows Himself not through His 
own intellection, for He is beyond intellection, but through the intellec-
tion of His logos, the ~" whose nature is intellection.33 This 
interpretation explains the difference between noesis and katanoesis 
according to whether the Intelligence acts independently as a knower or 
as an instrument. Likewise Plotfnus' selection of the word synaisthesis, 
rather than the simple aisthesis, indicates that the One has experie~ce 
or awareness through the~, on which level aisthesis properly belongs. 
To suggest that other 1clnds of analogy, e.g., eminence and propor-
tionality, can be present In Plotinus' system seems mistaken. For 
if, as we have argued, his thought is a monism, then it cannot accept a 
strict theory of analogy. Analogy requires similarity and diversity, but 
in a monism there is only Identity and negation (reality and unreality). 
For a general explanation of analogy see Leo Sweeney, .! Metaphysics 
.2!. Authentic Existentialism (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1965), pp. 142-
151. For an informative treatment of analogy in Plotinus refer to H. A. 
Wolfson, "The Divine Attributes in Albinus and Plotinus," Harvard Theol-
.28ical Review 45 (1952), 115-134. 
33we should note that, strictly speaking, "mediation" is a kind of 
extrinsic denomination, since It at tributes a perfection to something, 
~ not because it has it intrf.nsically, but because another, which has the 
perfection intrinsically, is related to it. But for the sake of clarity 
•nd emphasis I have considered '"mediation·· separately, for it expresses a 
:pecific type of predication l>y relation: that of instrumentality. The 
_!>us "mediates'' .!! .!!. .ins tru111ent l>etween the One and His self-knowledge. 
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such an account of these terms katanoesis and synaisthesis is in harmony 
with Liddell-Scott, which identifies possible usage for both ~- and 
EJ!}.- as "through" and/or '"with another. "34 
Hence, the Nous as it kuows itself is the act of noesis. The One 
as It knows Itself through and with the Intelligence is katanoesis or 
s~aisthesis. This interpretation has the virtue of agreeing with the 
---
central objective of Text B: to explicate the relationship of the second 
bypostasis to the First. :Furthemore ,_ it enables Plotinus to respond to 
opponents who would insist that the First Reality has intellection. 
Plotinus surely has such an objection in mind in Text B, since his emphasis 
on the One's transcendence cont r:adicts the traditional Greek view that 
ousia, eidos, peras, energeia and noesls must belong to the supremely 
-
real. Plotinus' careful use of qualified language, through the terms 
katanoesis and synaisthesis, suggests that he wants to concede something 
(namely, that the One with qualification is a knower) to the Greek 
tradition without compromising his negative theology, which presumes the 
absolute transcendence of God.35 
1'he Nature of Production 
Let us now examine how production originates from the One in order 
to understand more precisely the generation of the Intelligence, since 
34H. G. Liddell aud R. Scott,. A Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1925), see Vol. l,. p.-883, esp. entry B, IV; see Vol. 
II, P• 1690, esp. entry A, I?. In additi;m to these prefixes th'- Liddell-
Scott lists the separate terns K..d Ta yo tk..J and a-vvo.urG>c1vo,,f,1a 1,. 
as well. They define the latter terms as to "perceive simultaneously" or 
to "share in perception,•• definitions which give further credence to our 
in te rpre ta ti on. 
35see our comments above on the '"energeia" of the Intelligence, 
especially n. 20. 
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the mode of this generation is the principal concern of the key text 
(especially #1; #5-#10). 
For Plotinus productivity is the necessary consequence of perfec-
don, which is identical with unlty. Unity should also, then, entail 
production. That it does so is clear from the basic principle of Plotinus' 
philosophy which we have already identified.36 To him it is inconceiv-
able that a perfect ex:isten t (pure unity) would not communicate its 
goodness outside itself, a view the Schoolmen would later express by the 
words, "Bonum est diffusivUDL suf." Consequently, production is not a 
matter of will but of necessity.37 Any perfection is productive, and 
this is certainly true of the Good, whose perfection is unlimited. As 
Armstrong observes, :Plotinus turns Plato's moral rule, "being good means 
doing good," into a law of the eos111os ,38 Experience itself confirms that 
good begets good. Living l>ei11gs reproduce themselves. Even inanimate 
objects impart something of the111selves (V 11 4, 1, 30), e.g., fire heats 
and snow gives off cold. If such imperfect beings strive to transmit 
their excellence, how could the One who is wholly perfect remain unproduc-
tive (V, 4, 1, 34-36)? 
Does the One lose auy perfect Lon in producing another? Plotinus 
answers negatively (Ill) 11 introdueing the Neoplatonic theory of "undimin-
36see comments on Text A. 
37It is true that in vr, 8 (39) Plotinus does assign will to the 
One, but as we will show Later (in setting up the context to Text E) 
VI, 8 is written for exceptiQnal reasons and is not representative 
of Plotinus' position regarding the One. 
38A. H. Armstrong, ••rtatouic Eros and Christian Agape," Downside 
~view 79 (1961), 105-121. 
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ished giving."39 The one is infinite in power (V, 4, 1, 23-26) and 
therefore is unaffected when He produces. In fact, this is true of every 
hypostasis. Each can produce interminably and without diminution of its 
perfection. Otherwise it would not be necessarily and eternally what it 
is.40 
Production of the Intelligence occurs, as we have seen, in two 
moments: procession and reversion, These two moments are not temporal 
but eternal. The One produces the second existent without "before" or 
"after" since the two moments o:f he ~ express the manner in· which it 
is eternally dependent on the One {Unity and Reality), a dependency which 
is present because the ~ ls composite. Despite this dependency the 
stage of reversion enables the Intelligence to become an eternal ousia 
and hypostasis, thereby sharing (as much as any being can) in the One's 
reality. 
Both key texts studied th111s far indicate that contemplation is 
involved in the two levels of production. In Text A the Soul attains 
determination and becomes an ousla as it turns to "gaze upon" (blepon; 
#7) its ionnediate source, the rntelligence. In the current key text 
(especially #2, 114, fJ5, 08) the Intelligence is at first only like 
undertermined sight until it turus to contemplate the One and is actuated. 
In the first moment of an hypostasis there is only a proclivity 
(e_phesis) for contemplation, an active dynamis to revert back to and be 
informed by an intelligible. .A.s Rist says of the Dyad, the first moment 
in the formation of the second hypostasis, 
39see III, 8 (30), 8, !i6-4B; 10, 1-19; see also V, 5 (32), 5, 2-7. 
40see IV, 3 (Z7), 8, lS sqq.; cf. VI, 9 (9), 6, 10-12. 
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this proclivity may • • • be compared with what Plotinus elsewhere 
describes as unconscious contemplation. In the eighth treatise of 
Ennead 3 he asserts that all thing~, even down to the vegetable 
world, are striving (the word is J.~l~~eAL which brings us back to 
:{qGcrt_5 ) after contemplation. If such an urge is the symbol of 
existence even a111ong inferior beings of the world of., sense, it 
' c. , 
would be foolish to deny it to the substrate ( ro t.nro IC6-l .ME-11o v ) 
of the Second HY,sostasis. The likelihood is that the Dyad or Matter 
betrays in its g rfE~<_S. towards the One that symbol of existence 
shared by all things with tlte smallest claim to reality.41 
In the light of Rist's conclusion production is a transition from power 
or "unconscious contemplation"' to a stage of act or realized contempla-
tion. The stage of perfection or act must (because perfection is pro-
ductive) give rise to another existent, a logos, which itself is a power 
that contemplates its source and brings about another entity; this cycle 
of production must continue until perfection is exhausted.42 
Aware that the human intellect is not truly capable of grasping 
precisely how metaphysical production occurs, Plotinus turns to the world 
of physical production for assistance. He relies on the image of 
"emanation," comparing the outflow of light from the sun to the emergence 
of being out of the One. This is an impressive and helpful metaphor, and 
quite natural for a mystic Lilce ?lotinus, who respects the limits of 
denotative language. 
The metaphor of emanation has special meaning because of Plotinus' 
conception of light, vhich has a kinship with the intelligible world by 
41J. M. Rist, ••The lndefinite Dyad and Intelligible Matter in 
Plotinus," p. 101. 
420nce perfection is exhausted, emanation ends. This would seem to 
imply .that sensible matter, slnee It is perfectionless and unreal, is not 
the result of emanation. At times, however, Plotinus seems to say that 
matter is the last of all em.a.nations {see III, 4 (15], 1). Whether matter 
is not emanated but is the eternal contrary to reality or whether it is 
the terminus of the whole sequence of emanations is a question we will 
take up in Text c. 
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reason of the fact that light is not a product of body (and here he 
disagrees with the Stoics).43 As far as Plotinus is concerned, to describe 
production through the metaphor of light is to draw upon the most perfect 
image available to man. 
Emanation illustrates production in essentially two ways. First, 
it depicts the dependence of the intelligible world on the One: just as 
the sun causes physical objects to be perceptible, the One causes the 
supreme beings to be intelligible. Secondly, emanation illustrates the 
gradual exhaustion of reaU ty Ln production: just as light radiating 
from the sun decreases Ln intensity the further it goes until at last it 
terminates in total darkness, so the effects of the One diminish in 
reality until they end against the total unreality of matter. This second 
point about production follows from the basic principle of Plotinian 
philosophy (which we cited in treating Text A)44 that the prior existent 
is always more real than the posterior. Since Plotinus is a monist, this 
principle reminds us of another basic principle in Plotinus: unity is 
perfection.45 But because the product must necessarily be less perfect 
than its source, the first effect on the One must involve multiplicity 
43The Stoics had argued that light was an outflow from a material 
body, the Sun (SVF, II, 650). But in spite of Plotinus' strong objection 
to the materialism of the Stoics, he is very much indebted to their work 
on emanation, especially to 'P'osidonLus, who even conceived of "undimin-
ished giving." In the end> however, the Stoics are presenting mainly a 
doctrine of emanation that is cosmological, whereas Plotinus' doctrine is 
llletaphysical. Two tielpful articles contrasting Plotinus and the Stoics 
on emanation are R. E. wues ··e1otinus and Posidonius," Classical Quar-
iirq 24 (1930), 198-207, and .A. H. Ar111.strong' s "'Emanation' in Plotinus," 
~ 46 (1937), 61-66. For texts Ln Plotinus see IV, 5 (29), 6-7; cf. II, 
l (40), 7, 26-30. 
44see Text A, passages bet~een notes 30 and 32. 
45Again, see Text .A. 
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(14), which introduces imperfection, i.e., unreality. If this is the 
case, reality is in fact one. Nothing can be truly and adequately distinct 
from the One if it is real. Everything is real only to the extent it is 
the One, but it is disting11isha"ble from its source by virtue of its 
unreality and multiplicity. The effects of the One are distinct 'from it 
as the unreal differs from the real. Plotinus' account of production, 
then, since based on the primary principles of his philosophy, reveals 
that his thought is a monism. There is one central reality to which 
unreal! ty is attached because multiplicity is the necessary consequence 
of the One's overflow. 
So far, we have explainecl production as the formation of energeia 
from metaphysically prior dynameis: namely, that which constitutes the 
first, indeterminate moment of the hypostasis and the One Himself, the 
greatest dynamis of all (QJ2J.~6 ln the next section of our comments 
we will consider in what way Plotin11s explains production as the formation 
of energeia from energeia. 
The Two Kinds of Energeia 
In the key text (119 and Q] lJ Plotinus introduces energeia in order 
to explain production. He distinguishes two types of energeia, one of 
which refers to a "being vhich ernanates, the other to its effect. The 
46we must not assune, after the fashion of Aristotle's theory of 
change, that production for Flotlnus is a transition from a less perfect 
to a more perfect stage of reality, Production is from a prior moment of 
qynamis to a posterior nonent of energeia, but the dynamis, while 
indeterminate, is not imperfect. 'J'he One Himself is indeterminate but 
absolutely perfect. The ind er temi nacy of sensible matter does imply 
imperfection but the indeterminacy of intelligible matter does not. 
See ahead to our treatment of intelligible matter in Text C, notes 45-47. 
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first kind of energeia is that "of" an ousia: the second is that "from" 
an ousia. The former is that which makes an entity be what it is, its 
essence. Such is the meaning of energeia uncovered in Text A and indeed 
appears to be what the word primarily signfiies. However, Plotinus now 
introduces a second energeia: that which follows from the ousia. 
Identifying this second kind of energeia has value for his account of 
production because the enet:'geia ··from" the ousia is not just an ephipheno-
menon or accidental effluence of the primary energeia but a necessary 
emanation from it. 
We have seen that production is the oupouring of an hypostasis, 
which as a self-sufficient existent. infinite in power and undimished in 
giving necessarily diffuses Ltself.47 The perfection which is the source 
of production Plotinus calls the energeia '"of" an ousia, the intrinsic 
act of an entity. This intrinsic pet:'fection gives rise to another act, 
the energeia "from .. an ousi.a.. vh ich. al though generated from and dependent 
on a prior perfection, is itself an ousia. There is the energeia of~ 
(#2) which, since a perfection is productive of another energeia, which 
is the Soul. Just as the Nous produces .a.n act that is the Soul, this 
latter hypostasis generates an act that is Nature, which next generates 
its own diverse logoi. 
What makes these two kinds of energeia relevant to emanation is the 
necessary association between them. The act which follows from the ousia 
does so necessarily. Io i.n,,.olc:e again the metaphor of emanation: there 
is a necessary connection betveem the sun and its light. The sun simply 
47see John Anton, "So1J1.e Lc>git=aL Aspects of the Concept Hypostasis 
in Plotinus," p. 258, n. Z. (S~e IeJ<t A. n. 32.) 
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would not be what it is withollt its necessary effect or property, light.48 
Where there is the second act, there must be the first. By virtue of the 
intrinsic perfection of the ousia, another act or perfection emanates. 
As long as there are ousial, emanation will continue and will be exhausted 
only when ousiai no longer difftJse themselves, when production ends and 
all that is left is the utter formlessness and negativity of matter. 
Unless one reads Text B carefully he is likely to conclude that 
Plotinus intends this rela tlonship of the two kinds of energeia to also 
involve the One. Such a coucltJsion, however, would seem mistaken, since, 
as we have noted repea teclly, especially in our discussion of ka tanoesis, 
Plotinus states in V, 4 that the One is beyond being and hence beyond 
energeia. This refusal to attribute energeia to the One also respects 
our conclusion in Text A that energeia, by virtue of signifying eidos and 
ousia, belongs only to Nous and its logoi. 
The correct interpretation of this portion (#9-#11) of Text B would 
seem to parallel the interpretation we offered for the earlier passage 
(#6) concerning the One's knO\\lledge. There we explained that the One may 
be described as a knower,. provided one understands that that ascription 
comes through "mediation'" (a specific type of extrinsic denomination) and 
not through intrinsic denomination. The One "knows" because He employs 
the~' which is knowing ;per ~' as His means or instrument. The same 
case would seem to apply regarding the apparent implies tion at 1111 that 
the One is the first energela "of"' an entity, producing the first energeia 
"f .. rom an entity, the Intelligence. The couplet energeia tes ousias vs. 
48The closing lines of l,. 7 (54), l support this statement. Also 
see IV, 5 (29), 7. 
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energeia ek tes ousias belongs on all levels of reality except the One, 
-
where there is no energeia because there is no ousia. Yet there is a way 
in which the One may be said to possess energeia: through the relationship 
of the Intelligence to the One. It appears to be on this basis that Text 
B suggests that the One is the first energeia "of" an ousia. The depend-
ence of the Nous, pure energeia, on the One makes it possible to ascribe 
energeia itself to the One: He is said to have energeia present to Him 
(synouses energeias) because the perfection in Him (ek tes !!!_ ~ ~­
iotetos) emanates an energela tes ousias, which is the second hypostasis. 
Through mediation this energeia tes ousias is applicable to the One as 
though He is an energeia productive of the energeia of ~· In sum the 
first energeia "of" an ousia is the same as the first energeia "from" an 
~' namely, the Divine Intelligence. But the One, because of the 
relationship of the Nous to Kin~ may be called the first energeia "of" an 
ousia, an energeia which the One would intrinsically possess if it did 
not transcend ousia. 
Based on the above i.nteI'.'pretation we can admit that Plotinus 
describes the one as energeia (specifically, energeia tes ousias) in Text 
B without admitting energeia iBto His intrinsic nature. Thereby we 
preserve the consistency of Plotinus' general philosophy of the First 
Reality.49 
_ 49we might note another reason for denying that the One is energeia 
~ ousias except through mecl.lation. If the One were such, then (in 
order for Plotinus to be eon.si st en t) He would also have to be energeia 
~ fu ousias, meaning that anotller reality would be superior as His 
cause. Perhaps it is because of difficult texts of this kind, and their 
apparent implication, that drove later Neoplatonists, especially Iambli-
chus and Damascius, to posit realities higher than the One. 
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Fire!.!.!..!! Illustration of Production and of energeiai 
I have chosen to devote some space to Plotinus' example of fire 
(1110-1111) to illustrate how production occurs generally and how the two 
kinds of act relate to one another. Fire is not just one among many 
examples to illustrate emanation. Plotinus has a special conception of 
fire, as is clear from the earliest treatise, I, 6. 
Fire is itself more beautiful than all other 
bodies, beause it has the rank of form in 
relation to the other elements; it is above 
them in place and is the subtlest of all bodies, 
being close to the immaterial. It alone does not 
admit the others; but the others admit it: it 
warms them but Is not itself cooled. 
I, 6 , 3 , 19-24 : 
"'O"° ' ' .. • • ' , .!'\ ' , 1:1{1" l'CCat. TO fTJJP GVTO 1Tapa Ta W\l\a awµ.aTa 
\ , • Ji. ·~ • ' .!'\ \ .. .. .. 1tal\ov, oTi Tczsa• f411ous 7rpos Ta WV\Cl OTo,xoa EX"· civw 
• .. 8 , , , s \ .. .!'\ \ , • • ' 
f.'EV "'ll fUE&. llf17'TOTC.TOV f -rwv «1111\CUV awµ.O.TWV, "'" f)'YVS' 
.. - , ' , 8' • ' ' • ~ , ' ov Tov a.ac.uµ.a-ro1J, ~01"011 t awo ovK uaotxoµ.wov Ta 
•\ \ • ' l1-• .!''I i ~ ,. • , n , ' • .. 0.1\1\0. TO. 0 W'\ACJ CJf,XE'1"(1C. CIVTO. .::7tpµ.o.wtTO.f. yap fKOVO., 
O~ tP0XfT0.4 ~£ "rOVTO 
Here he describes fire all having an affinity to the intelligible world, 
because regardless of itll circumstances, it remains more perfectly what 
it is, being unaffected by other: things even while it affects them. 
Things are altered by fire ~ecause of its heat. This property is 
necessarily connected with fire. In this respect it is like a Form, a 
perfect ousia, for a Form and what is associated with it are connected by 
necessity. Because of the intlnate connection of fire and heat, physical 
fire is the best Image of the Interrelationships of intelligible Forms. 
Physical fire is a participant of the perfect Form of Fire which subsists 
in the intelligible world. Eecause There Heat has an intrinsic, unique 
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and essential connection with Fire, so in the physical world heat and 
fire are necessarily associated. Rist, in an interpretation of II, 6 
(17), 3, 14 sqq., concludes that 
in other things, that is in warm objects, heat is merely a trace, 
a shadow and an image of its real nature, but in the Form bf fire 
that real nature is not merely a quality but a Form and an activity 
which is essentially and necessarily associated with fire.SO 
we may interpret II, 6 (17) in light of the two types of energeia pre-
viously discussed concerning production: what appear as accidental 
qualities in this world in fact have an intrinsic connection with one 
another in the intelligible world, for what appear here as really dis-
tinct exist There as really united; and this is to say that qualities 
here are simply energeiai s uf ferlng greater fragments tion and disunity 
than the energeiai There (the eternal Forms) which they image. None the-
less, in some physical existents, especially fire, there are still evident 
interconnections of energeiai testifying to their profound participation 
in the perfect interconnections found in their archetypes. Fire is an 
energeia "of" an ousia producing necessarily an energeia "from" its ousia, 
namely, heat. By so doing U mirrors better than any other physical 
existent the necessary connec ti()ns of energeiai in the intelligible world. 
Rist sees the influence of Plato behind Plotinus' account of fire 
and the two types of energeia. "'The connection of the Phaedo with 
Plotinus' view of 'emanation' of heat from fire and thus ultimately of 
the hypos tases of the intelligible universe each from a higher principle 
SOI would prefer the word "act'" in this quotation instead of "activ-
ity," because the latter suggests praxis, which according to Plotinus 
is a property of inferior and physical being. See III, 8 (30), 5-6. The 
quotation is from J. M. Rist,. Plotinus: The Road to Reality, pp. 68-69. 
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bas apparently passed unnoticed.•• 51 In particular Rist is thinking of 
the Phaedo, 103 a-105 a, part of which Hackforth translates as follows: 
"Do you speak of 'hot' and 'cold'?" "I do." 
"Meaning by them the same as 'snow' and 'fire?" 
"Why no, of course not."' '0 That is to say, the 
hot is different from fire, and the cold from 
snow.•• ··Yes... "~ut 1 think you would agree that 
what starts as snow cannot ever, as we were saying 
just now, admit the hot and still be what it was: 
still be snow and also hot; on the approach of the 
hot it will either withdraw or perish." "Quite 
so ... 52 
103 c 10-103 dB: 
8 c p/o'd11 T' 11aJ. 1 is 11cd 'fuxpc$11 ; 
•E)'c.iyr. 
";.,· u-irrp )(•01.1a •cl -riip; 
~I ia Al' (Jlri [ Y1.tJJ'· 
'Alt.'A.0 tTfjJUIJ r& n~s T~ 81p~o11 1t11i frcpo11 "' x10110' TO 
'/n!XP~"; 
1'c1'. 
'Alt.Ac ro~• 1• 11iim1 5011eti:' cro&, 0~110Tf x1011a y' ouO'a11 
e ' ' t!I ' • • - ' 8 ''' ot~a.1Af"'I" ro ~rpri-011. ~rTJrf p «II TO&' TlflOO' fll '"E)'°P.f'" 
•• 0 - :'! • 'tJ •• ,,. • CTI t CTEO' 41 OJ!Clfl 1,1,, ;(LtJl•ll Klll tp~Ol'• OAAU TlpUCTlUllTU.; 
TOii ~I ,/AO~ ~ VrflC)(C..p~aCl&ll awcji ~ A1J'oAti0'04&. 
Daw YE· 
That Plotinus is aware of this passage is historically likely and 
is expecially indicated b7 his use of dechomai in the above quoted text 
from I, 6 (1). He builds 011 Plato's theory of Forms in the Phaedo to 
suit his own creative put'pos~, 1o1hich is to explain the production of 
being. In the Phaedo (103 a-105 a) Plato makes a significant statement 
about the nature of Forms: ther intrinisically must remain themselves or 
51~., p. 69. 
52R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo (Cambridge: University Press, 1955), 
pp. 149-150. 
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not be at all, and their necessary effects, like heat from fire, demon-
strate their intrinsic natures. Plotinus agrees but adds that this 
explains the generation of beings from prior ousiai. In other words, 
Plato's remarks are more than just a statement about the fixed, absolute 
world of Forms. The truth of the Phaedo can (for Plotinus) be interpreted 
in the light of the distinction between the energeia "of" the Form or 
ousia and the energeia '"from"' the Form or ousia to arrive at a Neopla-
-
tonic theory of production of the universe. This shows how rich a care-
fully selected image, such as fire, can be in the writings of Plotinus. 
The Meaning of epekeina einai tes ousias 
In the closing passage of the key text (#12) Plotinus speaks again 
of the transcendence of the One. Here he is again expressing what he 
said earlier in the treatise (ch. 1, line 10) that the One is beyond 
entity (epekeina ousias}. But the present text is noteworthy because of 
its emphasis. The One is 11ot merely above entity but above the very 
being of entity (epelceina einai tes ousias). With the addition of the 
word einai Plotinus implies why the One must be beyond the realm of Nous 
and ousia. The very being or constitution of entity is form and limit. 
The Nous is a realm of cl.lversity and division, a one-in-many. But 
according to the principles of Plotinus' philosophy diversity and plural-
ity are aligned with unreality. To be real--indeed to be the sole 
reality--the One must be free of limit and ousia. 
Moreover,the association of ousia with energeia and the identifica-
tion of Intelligence with the first ousia and the first energeia make 
~sia and energeia inapplic.ab1e to the One. If Plotinus' philosophy is 
consistent, he cannot ascribe energeia and ousia to the One through 
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intrinsic denomination. Fortunately, Text B itself protects Plotinus from 
inconsistency, since such passages as 116 and 1111-1112 indicate that he 
attributes ousia and energeia to the One through mediation. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Text B has added valuable information to our study of energeia. In 
particular it makes possil>le a deeper understanding of energeia in the 
intelligible world than does Text A with its limited concentration on the 
Soul. 
Early in Text B (h2) Plotinus defines the Intelligence as a being 
whose energeia is noesis. This brief statement implies a wealth of 
information. First, the Intelligence is a distinct ousia whose life 
consists in eternal contemplation. In this respect it resembles Aris-
totle' s Separate Intelligence (noesis noeseos). Secondly, it con ta ins 
the entire universe of being, constituted by the eternal Platonic Forms, 
each of which is itself an all comprehending Intelligence. Each is 
unique in act (because It is a self-complete, perfect ousia), but each is 
every other Form In potency (because each knows, i.e., possesses cogni-
tively, every other Form). Thirdly, the Intelligence appears to satisfy 
classical standards of perfection, since it is a universe of form and 
limit, and yet because a composite It is not ultimate reality. 
Plotinus' reference to the Unwritten Doctrines of Plato (113) 
suggests something about tlae role of dynamis in the intelligible world. 
Here Plotinus adopts the elements of the Unwritten Doctrines as factors 
in his own account of the generation of Nous. The Intelligence emerges 
from a prior condition of dynamis (which Plotinus equates with the Indef-
inite Dyad) by contemplating tile One so as to become perfected and in 
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energeia· The Dyad is an active dynamis, which turns back to contemplate 
-
the Good, and in so doing is pefec ted so as to become the completed 
second hypostasis. The dyad does not remain itself but is an eternally 
prior aspect of the Intelligence, which expresses the latter's dependence 
on the One (#i). 
The very perfection of the Intelligence, the energeia of noesis, 
apparently compels Plotinus to recognize that the One involves some kind 
of knowledge. But he is still careful to qualify this knowledge, because 
the One transcends ousia and thas transcends the contents (eide or noeta) 
of noesis. For this reason Plotinus attributes to the One katanoesis 
rather than noesis, the former term signifying a kind of knowledge suitable 
for an existent transcending Intelligence. 
What specifically does Plotinas convey by the term katanoesis? We 
isolate three possible interpretations. The first is that the One is a 
knower in His own intrinsic nature. According to this view the One has a 
knowledge so perfect that the mere term noesis is inadequate to convey 
it. Hence, Text B supplies the modified term katanoesis. This inter-
pretation, however, we reject on grounds that it contradicts Plotinus' 
general position on the transcendence of the One (V, 4, 1, 9-10 and a por-
tion of Text B itself (ll?J>· 
The second interpretation is that katanoesis describes the One as a 
knower through extrinsic denomination. But we reject this interpretation 
because it does not address the ~otive behind Plotinus' selection of the 
unique prefixes kata- and syn- in his expressions, katanoe-sis and synais-
l!tesis, for the One's kno~ledge. 
The correct interpretation appears to be a third one: the One 
Possesses knowledge vith or through (hence syn-aisthesis and kata-noesis) 
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the Intelligence, which is knowing~~· This interpretation not only 
saves Plotinus from inconsistency but also accords with the chief objec-
tive of Text B: to elucidate the relationship of Nous to its Source and 
Object, the One. In the case of katanoesis the relationship may be 
expressed as one of "mediation... Through the agency of His logos, whose 
very energeia is noesis, the One possesses a kind of knowledge. 
Production is the process 'by which the unlimited dynamis (1112) of 
the One overflows into greater and greater levels of multiplicity, which 
can obversely be described as entialing less and less reality. Production 
is described through the metaphor of emanation. Every reality is a 
perfection which, according to the basic principles of Plotinus' philoso-
phy, must give off effects. 
Associated with the account of production is Plotinus' distinction 
between two type of energeia Ul'J-!nO). The first is energeia as we 
discovered in Text A: eaergeia as ousia, the intrinsic form of a being. 
The second kind of energela is contributed by Text B. This type of 
energeia does not refer primarily to the energeia of a being (an ousia) 
but to that which is produced out of it. Text B connects these distinc-
tions with production in tlte folloiwng way: the very perfection of a 
prior being (the energeia "-of" its ousia) emanates a second act (the 
energeia "from" its ousia), wltlch as a distinct ousia in its own right 
(an energeia "of" an ousia) generates a subsequent ousia. Production, 
then, continues so long as there is perfection (concentrated in ousiai) 
sufficient to emanate further perfection (energeiai "from" ousiai); where 
the emanation ends, the perfectlonless being-in-potency (~ dynamei on)53 
53This technical expression Plotinus employs in II, 5 (25) to 
denote the sheer receptivlt1 (passive potency) of sensible matter. This 
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of matter begins. 
In the passage (Ill) on the two kinds of energeia Plotinus appears 
to apply energeia to the One. Eut we conclude that the couplet "energeia 
•from'/energeia 'of' the ousia" 'belongs on every level of reality except 
the One, who must transcend energeia since He is not ousia. Nevertheless, 
there is an energeia from the One, which is the ~' the energeia of 
noesis. By virtue of the dependent connection of this product with the 
one, the First Existent is said to have an energeia itself. In other 
words, energeia belongs to the One through mediation: energeia is present 
to or with It (synouses energeias) but does not constitute It. In this 
unique case the energela from the One, which constitutes the energeia of 
the~' is attribt1 ted to tbe One as though it could properly belong to 
the First Existent. Ia a word, the Nous is the energeia that the One 
would have if It did not transcend ousia. 
Plotinus' words at Ill are very elliptical, but attention to 
linguistic subtleties (e.g., synouses) indicates attribution through 
mediation (as with katano"isis and synaisthesis) rather than through 
' intrinsic denomination and 11aves P lo ti nus again from serious inconsis-
tency. 
These two types of energe ia ( .. of'" and "from" ousia) are admirably 
demonstrated by the example of fire, which of all physical bodies Plotinus 
believes is closest to the tmm terial world. Fire and its property, 
heat, are connected by neceudty and thus illustrate well the nature of 
production, for the genera tlon of subsequent from prior beings is the 
term and its correlate v11L Ile discussed in Text C, which encompasses 
every chapter of II, 5. 
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generation of energeiai which proceed from prior energeiai. Because fire 
is what it is, fire is act ( the energeia "of" its ousia); from this 
perfection there necessarily emanates a second act, heat (the energeia 
"from" its ousia). Fire silllply would not be what it is without its 
essential property heat. 
Finally, it is difficult to exaggerate the importance of the closing 
passage of Text B, which declares not only that the One transcends entity 
but that He transcends the very being of entity. This brief remark 
supports our conclusion in Text A that the One transcends energeia because 
He transcends ousia. 1 t also supports our interprets tions in Text B 
regarding katanoesis and energeia as inapplicable to the One: rather 
such terms can apply to Him only through mediation, a specific kind of 
extrinsic denomination. 
Some additional remrks may be made in finally assessing Text B. 
Plotinus is faithful to Aristotle in his use of energeia both here an~ in 
Text A. But in both passages be Is using Aristotle's central conception 
of energeia to explicate his own Neoplatonic philosophy. In Text A this 
is mainly to illumine the Soul. In the present Text it is to grasp better 
the intelligible world itself and the production of being. This ampli-
fication of his use of ener,geia to intelligibles makes it clear that 
energeia is at the heart of his metaphysics. It is not merely a notion 
that he borrows from Aristotle. Energela contributes to his own unique 
explanation of reality and therefore deserves considerable attention, 
Which Plotinus explicitly gi~es it In our next key text. 
TEXT C: ENNEAD II 5 (25), 1-5 
The importance of our present key text is indisputable. It is an 
explicit study of energeia and entitled "On What is in Potency and in Act." 
It is the twenty-fifth treatise that Plotinus wrote, belonging to his 
"middle period," in which, according to Porphyry, he wrote works of the 
highest quality.l 
Although Text C may be of high quality, it has several dimensions 
which make its exegesis difficult. It presupposes more than a passing 
acquaintance with Aristotle's conception of how energeia and dynamis 
apply to the physical universe and, more precisely, to prime matter. 
Secondly, it restricts our .attention almost entirely to sensible and 
intelligible matter in Plotinus. Accordingly, nothing is said of whether 
energeia is applicable to the One and relatively little is directly said 
of energeia with reference to the Nous itself. Moreover, Plotinus pro-
ceeds in a technical and abstruse manner2 and the result is a series of 
highly condensed and elliptical pages. 
Finally, II, 5 seems to have little or no connection with treatises 
lPorphyry, "On the Life of Plotinus," p. 25. 
2rhe language Plotinus uses in II, 5 is very austere and lacks some 
of the lyrical flourishes of other treatises from Plotinus' middle-period--
for example III, 8 ( 30) 1 l 0, iwhere the Source of real! ty is likened to 
an inexhaustible spring and to the roots of a tree. Another notable 
example of figurative language is the image of the dance, which he employs 
even in the early Enneads (VI, 9 [9], 8 and 9). In several middle 
treatises, IV, 4 (28), 33-35; VI, 7 (38), 7, the procession of being from 
the One is itself compared t() the movement of a dance; and in III, 6 
d(26), 2, Plotinus corn pares tile parts of the soul to assigned parts in a ance. 
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which chronologically precede it. V, 6 (24) deals with the One as trans-
cending noesis, Intelligence and Soul. VI, 4 (22) and VI, 5 (23) are con-
cerned with the omnipresence of Soul. In IV, 1 (21) Plotinus speaks of 
soul as intermediate between Intelligence and the physical world. In 
treatises which are directly prior to IV, 1 he takes up disparate.topics, 
many of which seem to be unrelated to the core of his metaphysics--e.g., 
I, 3 (20), which is on dialectics; I, 2 (19), on virtues; V, 7 (18), on 
whether there are Forms of individual existents; II, 6 (17), on quality;3 
I, 9 (16), on a soul's departure from the body in death; III, 4 (15), on 
daimones; II, 2 (14), on circular motion; III, 9 (13) which is a collection 
of notes on miscellaneous topics. 
An exception is II, 4 (l~), which concentrates on both sensible and 
intelligible matter. Manifestly, it thereby is relevant to Text C and is 
directly adjacent to it in Porphyry's arrangement of the treatises. 
Hence, let us use II, 4 in 11 et ting up the con text of our present key 
text. 4 
The treatise opens (l I, 4 ch. l, 1-10) with Plotinus' observation 
that for Aristotle matter is a ··substrate'" (hypokeimenon) and for Plato 
it is a '"receptacle"' ( hypodoche) of form, but that they disagree 
when describing the nature of 111atter and its relationship to the physical 
3This treatise, which we cited in discussing fire in Text B, does 
contain some helpful inform tion on energeia but it is more suitable to 
examine it with reference tociuaUty inTextE (VI, 2). 
4Like Text C II, 4 is a rather technical treatise which addresses 
Aristotelian concepts. "'The treatise is a good example of Plotinus' 
method of work at its most professional and technical, a close and critical 
discussion of the views of tl:ae Stoics and of Aristotle. As often, he is 
Particularly concerned to carcy through a critical rethinking of Aris-
(totle' s doctrine designed to s ilapt it to Platonism as he understood it'" A. H. Armstrong, Plotinus, Vol, II, p. 104). 
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and intelligible worlds. At the close of chapter one (lines 15-19) 
plotinus introduces the question of whether there is intelligible matter. 
In chapter two he assumes the role of an imaginary adversary who objects 
as follows: "If the being of matter must be undefined and shapeless 
and if there is nothing undefined or shapeless among the excellent beings 
There, matter is not There.. (lines 2-5). Also the fact that the 
intelligibles are simple and eternal makes matter unnecessary (ibid., 
lines 5-8) .5 
He replies to these objections in chapter three. First of all, the 
indeterminate and shapeless can be There if it is open to determination 
and formation from prior and more perfect realities. For example, Soul 
is open to such a perfective process from the Intelligence and the logos 
(lines 1-6). Secondly, realities in the intelligible realm are composite 
but in a different way from existents in the sensible world. Logo! There 
are composites of matter and form., of potency and act, and by their act 
they make Nature itself be col!lpo site as 1 t actuates and forms lower 
things.6 In such sensible existents matter is always receiving different 
forms successively as one form pushes another out. As a result nothing 
lasts and matter is constantly changing. But in the eternal realities 
matter always remains the salTle and always has the same form. In fact, 
5The adversary a111plifle s this last objection with the following 
criticisms (lines 7-12): (1) that which becomes requires matter but not 
that which always is what it is; (2) it is unreasonable to posit matter 
There either as produced or as eternal; for if produced, what would 
produce it; and if eternal, It vo11ld be among the primals and what is to 
Prevent us from allowing that t'hey all exist by chance if matter exists 
There? ( 3) also would not lnte 11 ig ible compos 1 tes be bodies if matter 
unites with form There? 
6This statement seerns to anticipate III, 8 (30), 3-4, where Nature 
causes and forms all vegetal life. 
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matter There has all the forms at once and thus cannot change. Conse-
quently, matter There is never without form inasmuch as it contains all 
forms. Indeed, matter here is never without form either, although it has 
forms only successively (ibid., lines 6-18). 
Plotinus continues to discuss intelligible and sensible matter in 
chapters four and five, which make the following important points. 
Intelligible matter is that which the Forms have in common and which, as 
their substrate, receives morphai and thus differentiates them (ch. 4, 
lines 2-7). Matter is the unity in which the many Forms constituting 
intelligible reality exist and which thereby becomes varied and multiply 
shaped.7 Yet of itself it is shapeless and undefined and is none of the 
things that are on it and in Lt, as one discovers by mentally abstracting 
from intelligible matter lts variety, shapes, logoi and intelligibilities 
(ibid., lines 14-20). 
Someone can l>ecome aware, Plotinus continues, that both sensible 
and intelligible matters are somewhat similar. If one advances into a 
corporeal thing un ti1 he comes to its depth and darkness, there he reaches 
matter, whereas the light in such a thing is its form and logos (ch. 5, 
lines 4-12). Likewise, an intelligible reality also entails both form 
and matter. This last is a darkness, which receives a defined and intelli-
gent life from the form.3 In contrast, sensible matter is defined 
7The intelligible world. is not just sheer plurality but is unity-in-
diversi ty. lntelligi ble 1r1a tter makes it possible for the separate Forms 
to belong to a common universe. In III, 8 (30), 10 Plotinus says that 
anything at all must have a ~nLty. Intelligible matter is the perfection 
that provides unity for the Lotelligibles. 
8The Indefinite Dyad (L.e., intelligible matter in the first moment 
of production from the Que) Ls not yet an Intelligence but is alive as a 
desire and a formless sight (apsis). It wills its formation and energeia 
by turning to behold LtsS011rce{seeV, 3 [49), 11). 
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but is not alive or thinking end is, indeed, a decorated corpse (ch. 5, 
lines 4-12). 
Intelligible matter is a true substrate because shape There is true 
shape, whereas sensible matte!:' is only an image of a substrate because 
the shape it receives is also only an image.9 Matter There by underlying 
Form is ousia. Rather, matte!:' There, together with Form imposed on it, 
makes a whole which is an illuminated ousia (ibid., lines 12-23). 
Such chapters in II, 4 furnish the context of our current key text. 
Before taking up that text, let us summarize the informs tion on intelligi-
ble matter which these chaptel:'s have provided. 
First, intelligible matte!:' 
(a) is indeterminate and undefined because it is open to determina-
tion and form from high reeli ties; 
(b) is a component in intelligible realities or logoi; 
(c) always has the same Form and, in fact, possesses all Forms; it 
is never without Fol'Jll and therefore never changes (ch. 3). 
Secondly, intelligible matter 
(d) is the substrate which Forms have in common; 
(e) is the oneness in which these Forms exist and remain; it is a 
oneness which is of its elf shapeless and undefined despite the Forms in 
and on it (ch. 4). 
9The inferiority of sens Lble form seems to be reasserted later in 
the treatise (ch. 12, line 1 si.). Form is doomed to become size because 
matter is so unstable. The cha1>ters on sensible matter (6-19) peak in 14-
16, where Plotinus identifies matter with privation and evil. Ultimately, 
the sense-world is a '0 phanto111 on a phantom" (III, 6 (26], 7, 24) and both 
matter and the whole sense-var ld have the being of non-being. "The being 
Of these is the being of things that are not" (III, 6, 6, 32-33). This 
judgment, of course, follows from Plotinus' Platonic conviction that the 
sense-world is only an image of the intelligible. 
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Finally, matter in the intelligible realm 
(f) is darkness itself, and yet together with Form it is a part of 
8 living and intelligent reality; 
(g) is a genuine substrate and not merely a phantom and once 
informed comes close to being an ousia by helping constitute an illuminated 
ousia (ch. 5). 
-
such then in summary is the context which II, 4 provides and now let us 
turn to II, 5, which is our key text and which will view matter explicitly 
in the light of energeia and dynamis.10 
[l] "One speaks of being in potency and being in act; and one speaks 
of act as something within real beings. We must consider then what is 
being in potency and what is being in act [and what is simply act and 
what is simply potency]. [2] Is to be in act the same as act, and if 
something is act, is this in act, or is each ['act' and 'being in act'] 
different or is it not necessary for being in act to be act? 
I I, 5 , 1 , 1-6 : 
A • ~ \ ~ I It'\ t I 1' \I eyn·cu -ro p.Ell CJ~11a.p.e1., TO OE EV,Epyuq. E LVQ.£. /\E)'E'TQ.£ 
t'E' \ , ,. • .. ... ~ I ... I ' 
0 TL 1(0.L f.11(p)lil4 Ell" 'TOC.. ova£. 4-ICETrrEOV OVll 'TL 'TO 
C!i I ' I " • , ·A ' t ' - ' I • ovvaµ.EL ica.L .,., -ro ill"Epyn~. pa 'TO av'To 'T<p EVEPYE'9- Ewa.c. 
e11 ,.,~, ,, - ,, , ..., 
'1J El1EpynC1., ICOI El 'T"L. E'7T&ll EllEPYELa, 'TOtJ'TO l(Q£ EllEPYELq., '1J 
n •1 \-·I~ t ti \1/ 
E'TEpov £1<0..'T"EfJO'oJ ICC.• "TC> EJ,lfEfJYE''t 011 0 VIC a.vayKTJ ICQ.£ EVEp-
yuav E Tvcu ; 
10There are three 111aln reasons for my choosing the entire treatise 
as the key text. (1) Each chapter contains important and new information 
on energeia; (2) the treatise is brief enough to make presenting it as a 
whole possible; (3) by presenting the entire treatise I can make clear 
how each chapter builds organically on the one before it. 
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[3] That there is being in potency in sensible things is evident, 
but we must consider if it is in intelligible realities. [4] Now only 
being in act is There. And if being in potency could be There, it would 
always only be in potency, and if it were eternal, it would in no way come 
to act because [it is prevented] from coming into act by not being in 
tfme.11 
1, 6-10: 
·o.,., FJ-El.I O~J,J Ell TOLS' a.lCT8TJTOLS' TO ovvaµ.n, 
~ _, , ~ \ I I - .. ' ·H . .. ' OTJ"OV' E' OE ICQJ. Cl' 'l"'O&S' l'O'l')'l"'O,S', CTKf1TTEOV. EKEI. TO 
I I I • "1" '~ ~ ·~I I ti EVEPYELft. J&OVOV Ka' ., El7T' -r;o QVVa.µ.n, -ro "vvaµ.n µ.ovov au, 
• t \ .f. t ~ f "' !!'8 t t I - o I 1((111 a.n :1> OVOE'11'0-r'E ClV' U\ O& .,S' EVEpynav ':~) OU X,POVq> 
E~E ipyEa9a,. 
[5) But first what do we say being in potency is, if indeed [as is 
the case] being in potency ought not be spoken of [There] simply at all? 
For there is no being in potency without its being potency of something. 
[6] For instance, bronze is ia potency a statue. For if nothing would come 
from it or upon it and if it did not become something after what it was 
llThe following translations have assisted me in translating this 
passage. Harder-Theiler: ··una was das Potentielle angeht, so ist klar, 
daB in der Sinnenwelt vorkonm t; ob es aber auch in der geistigen Welt 
ist, muB gepruft werden, Nwa, es gibt dort wohl allein das Aktuelle; und 
wenn es dort das Po tentielle geben sollte, so ware es ewig potentiell; 
und wenn es weig ware, so kame es nie zur Aktualitat, weil es durch die 
Nicht-Ziet davon fern gehalten wird." (.Plotins Schriften, Band II 
[Hamburg: Felix Weiner, 196?], p. 89.) Brhllier: "II est clair que des 
etres en puissance se trot1vent dans les choses sensibles. Y en a-ti-il 
aussi dans les choses lntell igi bles, ou celles-ci ne contiennent-elles 
d I\ A que es etres en acte'i Si elles contenaient un etre en puissance, il 
\ 
resterait toujours, seulelilent en p171ssance; il ne passerait jamais a 
l'acte, pui~ue, la-'bas~ auc11ne operation ne s'effectue dans le temps. 
(Plotin Enneades, Ir, p. 76.) Flelnus: '"neque unquam proceda t in ac tum 
propterea quam minime per:sga tur. •• (In Creuzer and Moser, eds. Plotini 
!_neades cum Marsilii Fieinl Interpretatione Castigata [Oxford: Typograph-
icum Academicum, 1835], p. 8:1 .. ) 
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and it could not receive anything, it would be solely what it was. [7] 
Jut what it was, was already present [There] and not going to be. What 
other, then, could it have been after what was already present? Such a 
thing would not be in potency at all. [8] One must then speak of some-
thiDI in potency as being able to become another after what it ,1ready 
is, either remaining along with its production of the other or giving 
itself over to that which it could be and being destroyed itself. (9] 
ror the bronze is in potency a statue in one sense, and in another sense 
water is in potency bronze and air is in potency fire. 
l, 10-21: 
IA\'\ I I \ ~ I - \ I • J':l.J\114 T& ECTT& TO ovvaµ.E£ 1TpW'TOV l\(IC'TEOV, (£ 
~\ I ~ I ~ - \ f \ - \I 8 t \ " \ 011 -ro ov1>aµ.n oEC. J-"'I a?Tl\WS' AEyEa aL · ov yap EO"T£ To 
owuµ.n p.7JOEllO) EfVCI&. Orov Suvaµ.u civop£clS" 0 xa"--
IC 0 S" 0 EL yap 1'7J0E&I e~ a ~OU µ.T}0 1 f"/1' 1 ath-cfi µ.T}0 1 Eµ.EAAE 
e \ ., Q ()a " ~ ~I t ~ I I 8 .. " • µ.T) EV EUEU'7QL µ.E () ,,1-1 J-'T/O EJIEOEXE'TO yoea '1£, 11" a.JI 0 
~., l'ovov. ·o &£ ~I', .;;s71 1Tap7jv 1ea.l ovK lµ.eAAE' Tl oJv 
·~ I .!'°\ \ I \ I I I 0 • I ~ " EOVVCl'TO a.1\1\0 p.ETa. -ro 11a.pov ClV'TO ; v 'TOLVVV .,11 av 
~ I .,f - I \ ~ I .. "\ \ "~ - \ OU11'1p.EL. ~Ee. 'r'O&l.IVI' -ro ovvaµ.EL 'TL 011 (11V\O 17017 -rep 'TL 1((1£ 
t:V.,\o µ.n' a.v"T'o SJ11<1.a9a,, i;ToL µ.111011 µ.eTa Tou EKE"ivo TTOLE"iv 
.. I ' ' , , .. ~ , .J.B ' ' ' ~ I \ I T} 7rapexo11 cu1-ro EK£~1''fJ o ovva"T'aL 'f' a.pEv a.vTo, ovvaµ.eL 1\E-
8 _!"\ "\ I I ~ I I ~ \ r \ I j'EO' aL. WVICIJS' yn.p ro cc 0 1J 11 a.µ. E L a. v 0 p L a S" 0 x a I\ IC 0 S" ,, • 
..!"\ ' ' ·~ ~ J - ' ' ' • • ' -WV\WS' 'TO uowp OVYClp.Et ;(a.t\ICOS" l((lL 0 a17P 'TrVp. 
(10] "If being in potency is of such a nature, then can it be called 
the potency to what it will become; for example, is bronze the potency of 
the statue? (11] Well, if potency is taken according to production [•an 
operative power], certainly not. [12] For potency, if taken in the 
productive sense, would not be said to be in potency. (13] But if being 
in Potency is said to pertain not only to being in act but also to act, 
then Potency would be in potency. [14] But it is better and clearer to 
•peak of being in potency with reference to being in act, and potency in 
reference to act. 
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[15] "Being in potency understood in such a sense is like something 
which is a substrate to affections, shapes and forms, which it is going 
to receive by its nature.12 .And indeed it strives to come to them and 
treceives] some for the best and some for the worse and [these latter] 
ipoil them [i.e., the things which are constituted by that subst~ate and 
the affections, shapes, etc. it receives and] each of which is in act and 
is other [than the substrate] .13 
1, 21-34: 
ToLoiJrov 
(!\" \~I T \ ~, \I ~· < ' 077 OV 'TO ovva.µ.•' a.pa. JCQ' ovva.µ.tt; /\f)IOL'TO o.v "ITpOt; 'TO 
• , f" • "I , ~ , - • ~ , "}'J' • EuoµEVov, CLOY o X<ll'\JCOS' ou110.µ'r 'T'OV a.vopLO.V'TO!i ; -:i, fL 
\ f ~ / \ • A \ f3 / ·~ A t \ µ.ev 7/ ouvap.LS' KCl7a -ro Toc•w "o.µ a.voL'TO, ouoaµ.ws· ov yap 
• ~I f \ • a \ Q I \I .. T) ovvaµLr '7 Ka'7a. -ro 1IOLHV Aaµ.,..,avoµ.EVT) 1\E'f'OLTO av 
~ , E' ~' , ~ " ' , ' , • , OVV<J.f.Lf.L. 'L OE 'T'O au11a.µn µ1} µ.ovov "!Tpo> 'TO f.VEpyctf!. 
\ I ~, \ ' \ ' 1 I II .-, \ ~ I 1\f.j'f.'T<lL, (U\J\Q. ICO..L 7rpOS' PEp)'Eta.11, f.LT) av ICaL. ovvaµ.L~ 
~ I B •\ ~' • ..I.. , \ \ ~ , \ 
ovvaµet. (AT&ov iJE Kiit aa.'f'ea-repov TO µ.ev ovva.µeL "!Tpo> 
\, ' \ ~\ ~~ ' 11 ,, ''" 
'TO E11Epyetr:-, '"I" OE ovvaµ.&11 'fTpot; f.VEpyna.v /\E'f'ELV. J 0 
\ ~ \ ~ , A • • f f '8 \ µ..:v OT] ou11a.µn 701.0tl-rOll Cl.Jrrr7Ep V1T'OKELµevov 'TL "/TO. EC1L 1<aL 
,J.• I W\' OI I\'\ ~Ill \ ',J • .. \ µ.op't'aL> ICO.L Etofac11, 11 J'-EAllEL oEXEO'ClO.L Kat "ITE't'V1<£Y' TJ 1<aL 
·~ ''8 - ' ' ' • . . Q ,, \ (! \ C1'77fVOEL El\ nv, 1(0..1. -ra. p.Ell c.ur -rrpo> 'TO ,_,El\'TLC1'TOV, Ta OE 
''' '"' ''""' .. ., ' 1TpOS 'TO. XEt.pCJJ JCal "VJl-aYT&Ka O.V'TWV, WV f.KaC1'TOV 1<aL 
lvepy~l~ l'1'T~V crx\o. 
/ 
12"Affections •• is my tra11slation of the Greek rra G7 . Admittedly, 
this is not wholly satisfactory because of the emotional connotations of 
the word but it still see111s the least defective among such alternatives 
's "in~luences," '"passivities"' sud "'experiences." Also: the term 
llTroKU.Mtvc V' is a participle vhich I translate as a noun, "substrate," 
in order to make clearer what Plotinus means by the term. 
13My translation here tis 'based on Br/hier: "ou qu'il s'efforce de 
•aisir en lui,/visant tantbt l la forme la meilleure pour lui, tant6t ~ 
des fo~es inferieures qui le ~ltJuiront, mais dont chacune est en acte 
et differente de lui" (Plotin l:D11eades, II, P• 77). 
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[16] "We must consider [sensible] matter: whether it is being in 
to the things which are formed [and simultaneously] is something potency 
else in act, or is nothing in act. [17] And in general do those other 
· things which we say are in potency themselves remain when receiving the 
form and come to be in act, or is 'being in act' predicated of the Jltatue, 
'the statue in act' being opposed only to 'the statue in potency.' But 
'being in act' will not be attributed to that of which 'the statue in 
potency' was used. [18) rt this is so, being in potency does not become 
being in act, but out of the former, being in potency, comes the latter, 
being in act. [19J Being In act is neither matter nor the form imposed 
upon it, but is the composite. [20) And this is so if a different entity 
would come into being, for example, a statue from bronze. For the statue 
is another entity because it is the composite. [21]· But in the case of 
those things of which nothing remains [e.g., water when it becomes bronze--
see #9 above], what was in potency was altogether different. 
2' 1-15: 
TT ' ~ \ •"'\ , ' • I • 
,,Hpr. 0£ tjs UA1]S aKE'TT"rf.OV, f.L f.TEpov T£ Ol!O'a 
t I ~ I , \ I A ,J~ -. .. 1~\ ~ I EVEPYELq_ ouvaµ.n eaTc. ""P">" a. µ.op'l'ovTaL, "} ovoev evepyELq_, 
\ .. ' I \ • \ " I\ " , ~ ' ' Q I \ "'to KaL 01\W> JCaL Ta a.Via. Cl. fl("'(O µ.Ev ouvaµ.EL l\a.,..oV'Ta TC> E LOOS 
\I t>\ 9 J ' t11 't I ' KQL p.EllOV"TIJ. a V'TCl. '"'EP"'/ELf? j'LVETaL, 7] TO EVEPYELq_ lea.Ta. 
TOV O.voptuJITOS ;., x~iO(TQ L aY'TLTLfJeµ.Evov µ.ovov TOV 
t I 1 ~ I t I s I 1 ~ I _!'\I t Ellcpyetq. avoptaJl<l"'OS 7po I"' rov v11aµ.e' a.vop,aV'Ta, a.IV\ ov 
-roii EllEpyc{~ KO'TTJJ'Of.J()Uf-1.~0v Ka-r' EKElvov, 1<0.8' oo TO 
t' ' • ~ \ •\ I E' ~ ' • • . to I 
<JIJvuµEL o.11opLaS £1'f.J'ET(), r. OT) OV'TW>, ov TO ovva.µ.E£ 
' t I _l \. ,9 9 - ~ I II I )'U'ET(l.£ EVE(Jf'Eiq.' W\I\ £1( TOU ovvaµ.fL OV'TOS' 1TpOTEpov 
' ' ' • i * R~ ' ' , ' ' , I E)'EVf.'TO TO £),IEpj'ELf? IJ<n~po'V. at yap O.VTO TO EVEpyELq. 
.. ' ,/.. I t 0 ., \ !:' \ l!:' \ t t 
OV TO CTtJJIO.fJ.1fJOTEf.J()"'• 0 ~x "} Ufl"TJ, TO OE E OO> TO E1T 
. - }' ' - ~ ,. . ' ' , , . , av-r77. Ute. TOVTO JJ-~Y, n E'TEpa ytyv0£'7'0 OlJO'La, 0'0V EiC 
_ ' - I !:' I _!"\ ~ I I I 0 \ .J. I ~ XW\KOIJ a.vopta)' wv.11 yo..p avar.a wr To crvvaµ.'f'oTEpov o 
• !:' I 'E I to I - •\ • I ,J. I • ' a.vopLa). TTL oE "T'WI" 01'WS ou µ.Evov-rwv 'f'a.vEpov, wr TO 
Swd J.A.E L 1TO vrcI 110.a,11 eT~/)O'V ~I'. · 
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(22] "But when the grallllJlarian in potency becomes so in act, then is 
no~ being in potency somehow the same as being in act? For Socrates is 
the same when wise in potency or wise in act. (23] Accordingly, is it 
the same when the ignorant man becomes knowledgeable? For he was 
knowledgeable in potency. [24] It is only by accident that the ignorant 
man becomes knowledgeable. For he was in potency knowledgeable not in so 
far as he was ignorant (his being ignorant was accidental to him) (but by 
reason of his soul] and the soul having itself the right disposition was 
in potency and thereby became knowledgeable. (25] Well, then, does he 
remain in potency, [i.e.,) ls he in potency a grammarian when already a 
grammarian [in act]? Nothing prevents this and let us present it 
differently: there [at first] he is only in potency, at a later time the 
potency has the form. 
2, 15-26: 
'A'''. • t' I 1V\ oTa.v o ovvq.µ.u ypa.µ.-
' ' I I t •o ' ~ I .- t ' µ.a.TLKO-; EllEP}'Et~ f"Et'irTaL' EVTO.V a TO avvaµ.EL 'Tl'WS ov l(Q.L 
t I \ 1 J • r-o \ ~ I ~ I f t \ \ EVEPYH<t- TO a.1.1To • yap avva.µ.EL ... wKparrys o a.vTos 1ea.L 
' ' ,J..' 'A' .,. 'f, I ' I EVEpyELCf cro.,.,o). (J ovv KO.£ 0 0.VETTLO"T7)µ.wv E'Tl'LO"T7]µ.wv ; 
A I \ ... • ' ·H ' Q Q ' • , 8' ~ vvaµ.EL yap T)'ll E 171.0"1"7/ j.1.UJV. KO.TO. crvµ.JJEJJ7JKOS 0 a.µ.a. TJS 
t I o· ' " • (J' t' I t I ~\\\ E'Tl'tarryµ.wv. u ya.(J :J a.µa. 'T]S ovvaµfL ETTtO"T7]µ.wv, aN\CL 
f3 f3 , • - • .ll - ... • t' , .1. , e· • , croµ E TJKEL <IVT'fJ a.µ.11.un fLVaL, .,, OE 'f'VXTJ Ka a.vrryv 
t ~I W I~ I ... ~ \ t I £71'LTYJOELWS EXOVO'a 'T"O ovva.µ.EL 1711 uTTEp KO.L £TTLO"T7)µ.wv. 
"E ... 'r ' S ' ' t- , ' 
'Tl. o vv er 'ti ':tee. 1"'0 vvaµ.£L, Kat. ovva.µ.n ypa.µ.µ.a.TtKOS 
.. ~ • .. '"H 't'' ' I ' .!'\ \ I 
"JOT) ypaµ.µ.a.'T&Ko~ cuJ.1. ovatv KWl\Vfl. K0.1. W\/\OV Tpo'Tt'ov· 
t - \ ~ I I • -o t' \ - t' I t I EKE&. /t.EV ou11a.p.n µ.0110"1, Ena.v a. oE '"JS ovva.µ.Ews EXOV""]S 
TO tl3o~. 
(26] "'If then being in potency is the substrate and being in act is 
the composite, the statuep what should the form imposed on the bronze be 
called? (27] It is not a mistake to call the shape and the form the act, 
by Which the statue is ln act and not merely in potency; the shape and 
forui are not act simply [and subsistently], but the act of this thing. 
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[2B] But we should perhaps more properly speak of yet another act, the 
act opposed to the potency [or power] that brings it about. [29] For 
being in potency has being in act through another [the bronze becomes an 
actual statue through the sculptor], but for the potency [•operative 
Power] what it can do by itself is its act. [30] For instance, [the act 
of one's moral power] is his moral habit and the activity named after it-
e•S•, courage and courageous deeds [are the act of a moral person] .14 
These things then are such. 
2, 26-36: 
E , + , ' ' ~ ' ' f , ' ' O&IV EO"T't .,.~. µ.o a~vaµ.u TO V1TOK££fl-EVOV, TO 
~· > r ' ,I. I f 1 ~ I ' 'f'~ ' 1 ' o EVEPYf'~ -ro C11.Nt1..1-''r'o-repov, o avap£as, TO f LCJ05' TO ETTL 
- ~' - , .. ,, "H • ,, ' • I Tov XCll\KOtJ 'T'L a.11 A£f'Ol'T'O ; ovK aToTTov '"1" EvEpyuav, 
et• 9 , '"' ' ', ~, ' ~ Ka. 1]11 EVEPJ'EL~. fOT& K«t. ov µ.ovov ovva.µ.u, '"}V µ.op'f"'lv 
\ \ ~ \ I 1 f \ • t ,. ~ \ \ \ -~ KaL TO fLaOS' /\fyei:.1o1. oux _a.1TAW5' fVEpyE£aV, W\1\0. TOVOE' 
· Jvlpynav· lrr£t .ic:al l.'M7111 f.11lpy£,av Taxa KVpLWTEpov civ 
). , " , 'S .... ~ I ... ' I t I cyoLµ.E"v, "n')Jf aJf'T'i. E-ro&.1 'T"'?J ovvaµ.£• T1J ETTa.yovan EvEpyna.v. 
,,, \ \ ~ ~ I \ Iii I II I ~\ \ .., ~ \ 
.1. o µ.Ev ya.p ov11aµ.E' TO £vepyeLg. EXELV Trap W\l\OV, T"!J of 
~ I M ~ I I Ii .- f t I • •t \ ~ avv~µ.n 0 CJtJJl(LT41. rap a V"75' 1) EVEpyna. OLOV E~ LS' KaL .,, 
t ' ' ' , , , , ~ , ' ' ' ("\ 'r e KO.T O.V'"}V AEYO!-'£~ E&.1Epf'E'a., a.vop•a KO.L TO aJA.1.JL,ECT O.L. ,,,_ \ .... 
J a.vTa µ.£11 0 VII 0 Lf7'(1/ ), 
(31] "Now we must speak on the topic in preparation for which we 
have discussed these previous lllStters: in what way there is being in act 
in the intelligible existents and whether each intelligible is only in 
act or is act and if act ls all and if being in potency is There also. 
(32] If indeed matter is not There, in which being in potency could be, 
or if nothing is There whlcll llS going to be other than what it already 
is, of if nothing is There vhich by changing into another and remaining 
14rf we may also use tile illustration of the sculptor, his act is 
his artistic talents, whi~h are also his operative powers. It is these 
PGwers which make possible the perfections and shapes in the statue but 
Which themselves are recipients of perfections from the operations of the 
sculptor. See comments belov. 
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itself generates something else, or proceeding out of itself gives being 
to another in place of itself, then among those beings that are eternal 
•nd not in time there is nothing There in which being in potency can be. 
3, 1-8: 
or; 8' El·~ica Ta.ii-rm 7'fJc>Elp17Tm, viiv AcKTEtW, (11 TOLS' 
.., - t 9 I \I \It I I 
vmJTOL) 11(1)~ 'TTC>TE 'T'CJ cYepyetr.t llt"j1 ET<lL KQL EL El'EP/'EU,L /J.01'01' 
",,, .. ,,,, , 't' 
T/ ,.-u1 eil'Ef>)'EIC1 f.1'«.1J"T"'(JI/ Ktll u H't.pyuu '7TUl"7'11 KILL EL TO 
~ I t .,. '0 ~ I I ., I .., 1 .. ' ~ I I 
OUl'•lfLH litll•C:L. >1 UJf f·l.'r}"T"'f 1'1 I/ (1't:I t.1' ?J 7'11 IJUVllfLt:L, /LT)TE 
'\ \ - 9 4 .. \ w;: , I ~· " f' I\\ TL fL£11\EL TWI' (l(fl, c> (J.1} 7)<1.t} HTTL, /L"IJU ETL /J.l:.Tll JU. / Ul1 
I "\\ • I ft I .., ""' tt I f -
E 1~· "''' o 1) ILH'•>.,, E7Ej)Ull "TL yt:vvc,t "I/ t.,, L<TTtLfLEl'Ov t: llUTOU 
tBwKEV uAA '!-' dvr· uiirot; E rvu&, OVIC U.11 ELT) EKEL TO Suva1LEL 
t 'f' t - II \ 1- t I t I 
Ell <tJ EUTt, "T"'WI' OV'T"CUl.J K<lC. ULUWa, OL' XPOVOI' EXOVTWV. 
[33] "If then someone vere to ask those who place matter There 
among the intelligible existents, whether being in potency is not There 
too in regard to the matter There-for even if matter There is of a 
different sort, there will nonetheless be in each thing something like 
matter, something like form and the composite--what will they say? The 
something like matter There Ls form, since even the soul which is form 
could be matter to another. [34] Then is it in potency to that other? 
Certainly not; for that [other] would be its form and form would not 
afterwards come to it separate ti except by thought; and thus soul has 
11atter [and Form is there all along] inasmuch as it is thought of as a 
duality, but both are one nature, just as Aristotle says the fifth element 
is immateria1.15 
15Armstrong remarks 111 a footnote to his translation that "Aristotle 
~ever actually says this: j t may perhaps be taken as i111plicit in De 
~e~ A. 3. 270 a-b, where he argues that the celestial substance 'the 
dy 'that moves in a circl~' 11JUst be ageless, impassible, without any 
IOrt of quantitative or oqu.a.U ta tive change. Possibly Plotinus depends 
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[35] "But how are we to speak of the soul? For it is in potency 
living whenever it does not yet exist but will be, and it is in potency 
musical, and is other things that it is not always but will become; hence 
there is being in potency ia the intelligibles. But should we conclude 
that there is being in potency in the intelligible world? No. Tpe soul 
is not these things in pot ency but is the potency of these things. 
3' 8-22: E'L 
.,. ' ' ' .. - ' 0 , , ... •\ 
'Tl) OUI' l(Q.L E7T~ "T"CllJJ V07J'TWll 'TOlJ) T~ E/A.EllOU) KUKEL Ul\TJV 
" , , , \ \ ~ , ' \ flll'\ ' 1 -
EpoLTO, Ee. ~7/ Ku.Ket. 7(> uUllUfLEL Ka'Tt.L n7v U1\1711 -rryv EKEL -
I I 0 W'\ \ I r ff\ > \ \ > ti I,/.." r I ' 
KUL yap EL Cli'l.i\cJI' 'T'P0'7T'IJll 7/ lJ/\7/, (J.1\1\ EO''TaL f'f' EKUO'TOV TO 
I t tf\ • ~' t I'' ' ~ \ ,l I I µ.Ev w~· VAT), 'T'O #1€ wt; Eti"io.;, TU O( UUllQ/L'f>O'Tt:.pov - 'TL 
I • "fl • I f •\ t' ..., ,.~ I 1 ' \ \ f. 
Epu11au• ; KU.C. TU W) IJl\7/ EKEL Et.00) fU'TLV, £1TEL KQL 77 
,/, \ t'~ " I " " . " •\ 0 t - \ 
't'VX'] EID•)) 01• 7rptJS- E'TEpov tlll ff.11/ lM'TJ. L'KOUI' 1Tpo;; 
, ... , ~ , ·1r ., ·~ , .,. , - , , , 
f'Kt:u·o KUL OIJl'UJHL ; - ou· flOO)' yup 7711 '1lJT1/) K'1L OVI< EL) 
• ~I ' .. ~ • • 1r ~ \ I\\> " \ I \ 
VllTcp01' Of 'TU HOO) KCl.C. OV ,'(Wpci:,ETUL Of U1\1\ 7} 1\0}'C,IJ, Kac. 
., "\ " I ~ \ - I " .J ~ \ I OIJ'TWS' IJ117)11 E_'(OI", W) OC'71'1\0l'V VOOIJ/LtVOV, a1L<11w •JE JLLll. 
.I.. ' " ' • A '' ,J ' ' ' - ,, ~ 'f'VO'L')' OLOV Ka.~ •"JfHUTVTl£1\1)~" 'l'lJCJL Tfl 1Tc/L1TTOV <:TllJfLtL CIU1 OV 
ETVu.L. n~pL 8£ 1/J1•x-ifr; 7r'CJj>; JpoUJLtV : LluvaµfL yU.[> {cpov, 
• I I\' t'-1 ' I ~ I \ \ "~\ 
o-rav µ.7]1TW, µEA1 77 <Je. 1<CLL µ.ouutK1J ouvaµ.EL 1<aL Ta u1 1\a 
• I • ' '.,. • ' ' ,.. \~I 
oua ytVfTO.'- o v1< aE' (JIJ<JO. • WUTE KaL EV VOTJ'TO c.~ TO CIVVO.f'Ei· 
·s 0 t' ' • ~'\ \ \ ~ I t ,/, \ I 
ov otJl!«f.LE~ Ta.trr<1, C1.11Aa ovvaµ.t~ 71 't'VX7J 'TOV'TWll. 
[36] "But how is beiug in act There? Is it like the statue is in 
act, namely, a compo11ad of both matter and form, because each intelligible 
reality has already received form? Rather we should say because each is 
a form and is perfectly what it is. [37] For Intelligence does not come 
from a [passive] potency to think to the act of thinking-- for otherwise it 
would need something before it not in potency [i.e., it would need pure 
here on some Peripatetic colIDeatator on this passage, who drew the con-
clusion that Aristotle thought that the quintessence was without matter 
because he states so clearl1 that it is absolutely unchanging, and there 
is therefore no need to pos tu late any matter in it to be the substrate of 
change" (Plotinus, Vol. Ir. pp. 162-63). Aristotle explicitly states 
that his fifth element haa 111Stter in !!!.!!·• Theta, 8, 1050 b 22. 
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or eternal act before It] ~but the All is [already and permanently] in 
it• For something in potency desires ~o be brought into act by another, 
in order that it become something in act. But that which has itself of 
itself so as to be eternal, vo~ld be act. [38] So all the primals are 
act• For each has what it needs just from itself and eternally, apd this 
is true of the soul which is not in matter but in the intelligible. And 
the soul in matter is an act of another sort--such as a plant-soul, for 
this is act, [i.e.,] what it is. 
[39] "But even though all things There are in act, are they all 
also act? Why not? If indeed it is well said that the nature There is 
sleepless and life and the l>es t life, then, the noblest acts would be 
There. And all beings There are In act and are act and all are lives and 
that place is the place of life and that place is the origin and spring 
of true sould and Intelligence. 
3, 22-40: To 
~' , , ..... ~A , • , ~ , , ,,,L' 
oE EVEPYEL~ '17WS e1en ; pa. ws o a.vopLaS -ro uvva.µ.'t'o-rEpov 
EVEpyElq., OT& 'T'O .. r&os Cl<O.O'T'OV a'1T'EtAT'JtPEV ; • H O'T'L E too) 
I #\ • • 1\T - \ ' ' ~ ' lKa.crrov 1<a£ 'T'E/'\flCll" o ecn-L • ..1-vovS' yap OVIC EiC ovva.µ.EwS' 
.., \ ' ,., .,,. 'I t I • .., 
'T''T]S' KO.'T'Cl "T'(J 01..0V 'T'E l'OE&V ELS' EvepyELO.V 'T'OV VOELV -
_!I'' \ I " I - • t ~ I ~ ' a.N\OV ya.p Cl.I' "PO'T'EP"U 'T'OV OVK EK ovva.p.EWS' OEOL'T'O -
, • • • - ' - T' \ ~ ' Q I\ • I ill «V a.tn~ -ro .,,a... o yap ovva.µ.n JJOVl\ETO.I. E-repov 
1 \8 I t • II ,, e • t I I I ETTEi\ ov-ros ns- oepyei.a.11 ayEO' a.L, Lva. EVEPYEL'f YLV'T]'T'O.L 
• ~,. • ' t • - \ , \ • " - ' I E a. 
-ri., o o ~ a.vTo fTCJ.fJ cnrrov TO a.eL OVTWS' EXEL, 'T'OV'T'O Evepy ' 
civ ErTJ. DC.no. 0~1.1 Ta 7rpiZrra. Jvlpyna· lxn yap o 8EZ 
,, \ ' , - ' ' , ' .. !. \ ~ ' • f ' ' 
.EXE&ll ICO.L 1T!Ap <1vrws.i "a' QE£. K«~ 't'VX"l OT] OV'T'WS' .,, ,.,..,, EV 
., ~ \ \, . - . 
Vl\1} 1 WV\ £11 T~ l'OT)"T'q,. 
KCLL ,; Ell v>in 8£ lliT} lvlpyELO.. 
1" t ,,L , • • ' ' • • t t A\ \t OLOll TJ 't'tn'&K'TJ. e'l"cp7cit1 yap KO.' O.vrt} 0 EO"T',V. nlV\ 
' , ~ ' \ • • I ~ \ I • ·H EvepyEL'f µ.EJJ Tal"ra iccu ovrws, EVEPYE£O. oE 7Ta.VTa. , 
- E' ~ • ~ ' - • I I ~ .J. I " .. 1TWS' ; 'I. 01} KG.!'WS fU.fJ..,,TC.L fJCE&VT} TJ 't'VO'LS' a.yptnrVOS' ELVO.I. 
\ ,. \ \ J' I , ' t __!\' "' .. 1 ...., Ka' ':.WT} ic:a' ':tCJ.J7r np~rTrr]. Cl& ICWV\LO"T'O.I. a.v ELEV EKE L 
', U", , .. ''I ' I ' EVE pyeta.£. n.a& O'cp7n ~ rlpa KO.I. oepyna. TO. 'ITQVTQ. KClL 
r'', .,. , ,,,.. , ,,,.,.,' 
'JtWCll. TO. 11'Cl.J."rQ. KC4 c roTOS' 0 fl(fl, 'T'07TOS' fO"T'L ':IWT]S' Ka.I. 
O.px7J Kai ""1n d.A"lHciis i/J11~> -re ica.L 11ov. 
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[40] "All other things~ then, each of which is something in potency, 
that is, which already is but is said to be in potency to another, has 
being in act as something else. [ 41] But when we speak of [sensible] 
matter, which we say is in potency all beings, how is it we can say it is 
something in act in real existents? For if so, it would not be all beings 
in potency. [42] If then it is not a factor in beings, it itself 
necessarily cannot be. Bow then could it be something in act and not be 
8 factor in beings? [ 43 J But though it might not be a factor of the 
beings which come about on it, nothing prevents it from being something 
else, if all beings need not be in matter. 
4, 1-10: 
,,, I ' " .!'"\ I I • ~ , , • ,, 
i a. IJ-& ov111 CZN\O. 7T'a.lf'T"a., oaa ovva.µ.EL 'TL EO"TLV, EXEL 
' ' • , ,. .!'"\ \ " -~ .. • ..!'\ \ ~ ' ICCIL 'TO EV~P'Y"'!o Hll'Cl& W\AO 'TL, 0 TJOT/ ov 11pos W\1\0 ouvaµ.u 
1' \ ' I s I - \ I " "\ " UVQ.L l\(')"f'T'll&. "Tiffi~ E "'' /\Eyoµ.EV1']S ELVaL Ul\T}S", TJV 
110..V'Ta. Swap.El ).lyop.01 Tel ov-ra., 11WS" EO"TLV t:l1TELV 
t I ,.. Iii 4f ·~ \ t I \ 16 
EVEPYELq. r& -rwl' OIJ7UIV fti'Cl&.; .no7J ya.p ov 110.lf'T"a. Ta. oVTa. 
~ I " 11J 1:'9t p ~ \ - " t I ~· " OUYa.µ.n 0.1' HT]. LJL 011),.1 j.l."1fvEV 'TWll Oll'TWV, a.va.y1C"71 µT}o 01' 
I ' • TT,. .. • ' , ., ~' .. II 0.tln]Y 10.'4& • .l.JUI) C) LJIJ Clll E11Ep)'EL9' 'TL ELTJ p.TJOEV 'TWV OV'rWll 
" 'A' \' t ~ ~ - .., • ,, , ft I I ' 
ovaa.; f\A OVQEIJ '7UJl' ()J.l"TWV av E'T) 'TOV'TWV, a. i'LVE'TO.L E1T 
t - .!' \ \ ~ I ·~ I \ f " " ~ \ I \ CIVrfJS, W\J\O QE "r'C. OVOEJ! KUll\VH ELVO.L, ELTTEP /J.T)OE 110.V'TO. 'TO. 
~ I \ -. •\ 
Oll'T'O. ETTL '77} UArJ, 
[44] "Because it is none of these things on it, and these are 
beings, it is not a being. (45] ~ut certainly it would not be a form, 
since it is imagined as sorn.ethiug without a form. So then it could not 
be numbered in them [i.e., .a.111ong the Forms]. So it will not be in this 
way also. If then It is not it1 both these ways, then it will not be all 
the more. [46] If then It has escaped the nature of true beings and cannot 
attain to those which are said to be falsely, because it is not even a 
Phantom of logos as these are, in what kind of being can we know it? And 
if in no sort of being, what vould it be in act? 
4, 10-18: 
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•H, ' ~' ·~, • , -p.Ev 0'7 OVDEV EO"r' TOtrrwv TWV 
', ' ... - to' "' , .. ~ " O' ' ~, E1T O.VT"!f, 'T'avra. OE OVTCl, µ.'1 ov av E''l'J· v µ.EV 0'1 
avEl8Eov TC. fJG.llTa.,oµ.IV"r] EtOOS' tiv ftTf ov Tolvvv ova· EV 
• , • I ll JJ , M ' .. .. ' , .. ·E • EICE,VO'S' OV a.p1.r1fJ-T}ll €' 1'J• 7J OV a.pa. ICQ.' TO.V'T''!J fO'TQ.,. 1T 
.. J.. ., ' .. .. ' , ' .. " E' ~ ' a.1.1 .. f'w a.pa /.IT} ()II 0 ucra 111\UOVWS' /JT'/ ov EO'TO.,. ' 0'7 
',/. , , - • ~' e - .. .I. , • 
'JTE'f'EVJIE J-'EV '"]V 'T'W~ C&JS' a.J\T] WS' OVTWV 'f'vaw, ov 
8uva.Tal ~£ '"''ICEtTfJa.1. ou8E TWV tPEV8wS' >.Eyoµ.EVWV Elva.,, 
• 0 \ " 8ciA ,\ I t \ t - t I "' .. O'Tt µ.'1 E IV f..1-0. oyov EO"r'V WS' TO.V'T'O., EV T4V4 T<p EUI0.4 
.. • ~ , . E' §:! I • ~ ' - • , .. • , .. 
civ a.. O'T) • c. oE EV P."JOEVt. T<p E 4V0.4, T4 a.11 EVEPYE'9- f4TJ ; 
(47) .. How, then, do we speak of it? How is it the matter of beings? 
Because [it is they I in potency. Then because [it is they] already in 
potency, is it already what it is going to be? [48) But its being is 
only an announcement of what it is going to be.16 It is as though its 
16In III 6 (26), 7, 16-27, after describing matter as non-being, 
Plotinus describes lt also as an "announcement": .. It always presents 
opposite appearances on its surface, small and great, less and more, 
deficient and superabundant, a phantom, which does not remain and cannot 
get away either, for it has no strength for this, since it has not received 
strength from intellect but is lacking in all being. Whatever announce-
ment it makes, therefore, is a lie, and if it appears great, it is small, 
if more, it is less; its apparent being is not real, but a sort of 
fleeting frivolity; hence the things which seem to come to be on it are 
frivolities, no thing but I> ban toms on a phantom, like some thing in a 
mirror which really exists in one place but is reflected in another; it 
seems to be filled, and holds nothing, it is all seeming... (Except for a 
few changes I follow Arlllstrong's translation, Plotinus, II, 241-43.) 
' \ t I ' \ 1...J..1 r -ICC14 TO. fVO.VT44 a.n E'f' EQ.U'TOV 
<f>aVTa.,01.J.cl'oJ1, i.mcpov Ka.i µ.Eya. 1ea.L '1TTov 1ea.i µ.a».ov, 
,, \ - , • • J ~ ,\ • , '~· .. ,J. , E#\1\ELiTOV "re K(U. V'f'1f(PE'X""'· <(LOW ov ov µ.Evov ova a.v 'f'EVJIEW 
~ I t~, \ 't~, ,.. 't I • \ t \ \ 
avvaµ.Evov' OVaE ya.p (JIJQE 'TOVTO 4oX1JE4 0.Tf µ.71 'UXVV 7rapa. 
A \ Q , ~ '\ ... .. • •'I ' '· J. - "' • I JIOV 11.a,..,osi, a.A;'\ GI EtvlEL'l'EI. TOV OVTOS' TrO.VTOS' yEvoµ.wov • 
.dLo 1TQJI 0 av E"11'C.Y)'EMT)"1"0.I. i/JevOeTa.1., ICdV µ.Eya. </>a.VTa.u8fj, 
, • .. ,..,, 3. , ' ' ' .. ' - • µ.ucpov ECF'TI, KO.JI IZ-OA"'""'· 11TTOV EO"r4, l(Q.4 TO OJI O.VTOV EV 
,J. I t JI I 1' I ,J. - "8 \ \ 
.,,avraao 0111< 01' E07'"' 0 'OSI TTa4yv40ll 'f'EVJIOV' 0 EV ICQ.£ TO. 
• ' - • • ,b I:! - , "t! ,\ ' •t! , \ EV O.VT<p E)l"Yl.f'l'E'CWmr. gQJCOVVTC1 TT0.4yv4a., uaw a. EV E40Wl\q.J 
s - f t ~ \ ~\\ .-. ~t' I ~\\ .-Q.T(XVWS'' W)' El' KC2"r'<J7T"TP'!' 'TO W'V\axov wpvµ.wov W'V\0.XOV 
J.. r' ' ', • t! - '" •t!• ' 
'f'a.vra.i:.oµ.EJ1011· 11<4'. rrip.r"a.µEVov, ws ao1ee1., 1ea.4 EXOV ovae111ea.1. 
801eouv -rel:. rd1rra. 
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being were postponed for that which it will be. [ 49] So its being in 
potency is not to be sornething, but is to be in potency all things. [50] 
And being nothing of itself but what it is, matter, it is not in act at 
all. For if it will be something in act, it will be what it is in act, 
and thus will not be matter. Accordingly, it would not be matter absolute-
ly but only as in the way bronze is. [51] Accordingly, this would be non-
being, not some thing other than being, like motion.17 The latter rides 
on being, as if coming fLom it and yet being in it; but the matter is as 
if cast out and completely separated from being and unable to change 
itself; but matter is always as it was from the beginning--non-being. 
[52] It was not anything in act from the beginning, since it stood apart 
from all beings nor did it become. For it has not been able to take even 
a tinge of color from the things that wanted to slip into it. But 
remaining directed to something else, it is in potency to what comes 
next. 
5, 1-17: 
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Intelligible matter is also an '"announcement" but of eternity and perfect 
being (III, 7 (45]. 3, 25). 
17Motion (kinesis) and Otherness (heterotes) are properties of 
intelligible ma tteL. (See I I, 4, 5, 28-29, which we quote below in our 
comments on intelligible 11JBtter.) Sensible matter is also other than the 
source of being 1>11t b 110 t e motion, for motion in the sensible world is 
caused by Soul. 
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[53] When the realities had come to an end, matter appeared, and 
was caught by the things that came into being with it, and took its place 
as the last of these. [5lt] So, being caught by both [the sensible and 
the intelligible], it coulcl belong in act to neither class of realities; 
it is only left for it to be In potency, a sort of weak and dim phantom 
unable to receive shape. So it is in act a phantom; so it is in act a 
falsity; this is the same as 'that which is truly false'; this is 'what is 
really unrea1.•l8 If then it is non-being in act, it especially is not 
being; it is really non-belng.19 [55] That, then which has its truth in 
nonbeing is very far from being in act among beings, for if you are deal-
ing with things which exist as falsity and if you take away their falsity, 
you have taken away their entity; and if you bring things to act which 
have their being and entity In potency, you have destroyed the cause of 
their being, since tlleir being vas in their potency. [56] If then we 
18see above n. 16 and n. 9. 
191 base my translatjon of this sentence on Ficinus: "si ergo in 
actu non ens, mag is j taque non ens: atque non ens enter" (Creuzer and 
Moser, eds., Plotini Eneacles c11111 Marsili! Ficini Interpretatione Casti-
J!l~, p. 85). Also see ElarcleMheiler, Plotins Schriften, Band II, pp. 
99-101: "Ist sie also alct\lell ein Nichtseiendes, so ist sie in umso 
hoherem Grade nichtseiencl. uncl also wahrhaft nichtseiend." 
no 
t keep matter as indestructible, we must keep it as matter. One must ~s . 
IBY it would seem only that it is in potency in order that it may be what 
it is' or else one must refute these arguments." 
5, 17-36: 
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Comments 
In order to comment intelligently on Text C, let us first trace its 
lllOvement of thought. II, S consists essentially of three parts, in the 
first of which (chapters l .and 2) Plotinus works out the meaning of four 
\. J / J/ 
crucial notions (being in poteucy [ ro u)la.,.f,tH ov] .!!• being in 
' > / ,)/ '- r/ c > / 
act (ro tVtff(&Lf ~YJ; potency [ 7 011Yt1,"~J .!!·act 17 ~'J)tfyHaJ>. 
ln the second part (chapter l) he applies that fourfold conception to the 
intelligible realm and,, finally (chapters 4-5), to sensible matter. Now 




a. Plotinus beings by announcing (#1) that he aims at studying the 
four conceptions: being in potency .!!· being in act; potency itself vs. 
act itself• 
b. This study he i ni ti ates through several ques tions-e ~g., is 
being in act the same as act or are they different (#2)? is being in 
potency found in the intelligible realm (#3)? 
c. There are several reasons why one should answer the latter 
questions negatively. Eeing in potency There could never come into act 
(#4). It would need to be tbe potency of something (to take an example 
from the sensible world, bron2e is in potency to the statue cast from 
it), which would have to become something other than what it was (#5-#6). 
But this is impossible Tltere, because becoming cannot occur in the 
intelligible world (17) no matter whether what is in potency remains as 
part of the new product (e.g., bronze remains in the statue) or disappears 
and loses its own nature (e.g., water ceases to be water in bronze, and 
air in fire; #8-#9). 
c. Plotinus next in~uires whether being in potency may be called 
potency (e.g., is bronze, which is the statue in potency, the potency of 
the statue? #10). Tlte ansver is ··no'" if dynamis refers to an operative 
power (literally: he dynm.is ~ ~ poiein; flll-1112) but "yes" if it 
refers to a passive potency and ii being in potency pertains not only to 
being in act but also to act itself (#13). But it is preferable to keep 
the original contrast: being in potency .!!.• being in act; potency .!!.• 
act (#14). 
d. When being In potency has reference to being in act, then it is 
like something underl1ing and naturally receiving pathe, shapes and forms, 
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which it even strives to obtain and which constitute, together with it, a 
being in act. This last can be good or deficient depending on whether the 
forms received are good or harmful (#15). 
e. In order to clarify further his four crucial notions (see above, 
#a) he investigates matter in the sensible world. [Prime] ma~ter is 
being in potency to the things which, together with the forms received, 
it constitutes. But of itself ls matter being in act (#16)? More gener-
ally, does such [secondary] matter as. bronze, which is the statue in 
potency, remain in act when the statue comes to be and is in act {(117)? 
No, being in potency does not become being in act but is that from which 
the being in act (e.g., statue) comes (#18). Being in act is neither 
matter nor form but is their compound (#19), which is different from each 
component and yet either contains them (e.g., the statue has both bronze 
and shape; #20) or absorbs them (e.g., the bronze absorbs or destroys 
water; fire absorbs air; (#?I). 
f. Plotinus next focuses the question of whether being in potency 
also is being in act in the finished product upon the case of the grammar-
ian or, more generally, upon the case of anyone passing from ignorance to 
knowledge (#22-#23). When an ignorant person becomes knowledgeable, that 
by which he was in potency is his soul (#24). Yet the latter remains in 
potency [to knowledge other than grammar through its operative powers and 
to writing and speaking grallllllatically through its operative habit of 
grammar; (#25)]. 
g. Having studied being in potency and being in act, Plotinus now 
turns to act and potency as such. The form or shape which causes the 
bronze to be a statue is act~not act in an absolute or subsistent sense 
but as immanent in sone particular thing (126-127). Such an immanent act 
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has come about by that which is other than (par' allou) both the being in 
patency (e.g., the bronze) and the being in act (the statue)~[namely, by 
the sculptor, who through his operative powers of intelligence and 
artistic talen~s reduces the potency in the bronze to act (the form of 
the statue)]. But ~actw can also signify the operation, as well, as the 
operative habits, which en operative power (dynamis) produces of and in 
itself (par' autes) [e.g., the actual casting of the bronze by the sculptor 
through his operative powers, which thereby acquire artistic habits, 
which in turn perfect those po we rs I . Or, again, in the case of a moral 
agent acting courageously, his energeiai are his courageous conduct [which 
issues from his practical Intellect and will] and the virtue of courage 
[which he acquires through such conduct; (#28-#30)]. 
Part Two: 
h. Chapters one and tvo (if l-130) have prepared us for chapter 
three, which is the second and most important part of the treatise, for 
here Plotinus inquires how the four basic notions (see #a, above) apply 
to the intelligible reallll Cf31). 
i. He beings b)1 consicf.ering whether being in potency applies to 
the intelligible realm. One 111ust answer negatively whether one posits 
matter in the intelligible real~ or not. If one denies that matter is in 
the intelligible world [and certainly sensible matter is not There], then 
being in potency cannot be There, because intelligible existents are 
eternally what they are; hence it :is a universe without change or becoming, 
in which one thing does not ~ecome another (#32; see also #3-#4 and also 
#c, above). But even :if one .adm.its fas Plotinus does] matter into the 
intelligible world [not sens:i~le natter but matter of a different sort--
so-called "intelligible matter"), there will still be no being in potency 
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There. This is the case even though at first sight one would seem to 
find in each intelligible thing something like matter, something like 
form and something like the composite. Being in potency, however, is not 
There because the something like matter There is really the active power 
of the intelligible nature seeking to acquire further perfection.a. For 
example, the Soul is one formal nature but has matter to the extent that 
it can acquire further energeia (#33). 
Is soul then in potenc1 to those perfections which are distinguish-
able from it? No. tf soul were in potency to them they would be its 
form, but soul is already form and such perfections are distinct from it 
only by abstraction. The soul and its perfections [are really one nature 
and] are only mentally separable (~34). 
j. At this point Plo tinus considers potency -in the relationship 
between the intelligible wrld. and the human soul. Before the human 
soul exists, it is only in pot ency alive, is merely in potency musical 
and is solely in potency to other such attributes before it has attained 
them (#35). Do such potential situations introduce being in potency into 
the intelligible realm? Ho. The soul is not .!!!_ potency to such perfec-
tions as life and music but.!!_ the potency (•operative power) of acquiring 
such things (#35): it acquires such perfections through itself-Le., 
1ar' autes (See above. 129 and ~g). 
k. Plotinus next considers how being in act is There. Intelligible 
existents are in act but not in the same manner as are sensible existents, 
for a sensible existent is an obvious compound of matter and form (e.g., 
the bronze statue), whereas an intelligible existent [is a perfect union 
of two components, it] is truly one form [or nature] and is perfectly 
What it is [a true ousia), For example, the Intelligence is perfect 
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and eternal and not dependent on a being in act to bring it to knowledge, 
for it is itself always knowing and is always in act (#36-#37). 
m. Next he asks: are intelligible beings not only in act but also 
acts? Yes, because each is eternal and perfect. And this is true also 
of soul--both souls In matter (e.g., a plant-soul is act by being ~hat it 
is) and, especially, souls outside of matter, which are self-sufficient 
and eternal (#38). The intelligible realm constituted 
by Intellect is a place of supreme life and noblest acts. Everything 
There is in act (#39). 
Part Three: 
n. Having explained how the four crucial expressions apply to the 
intelligible world, Plotinus returns to the sensible world and, specific-
ally, to sensible matter. He observes that a being in potency, since it 
already exists, has being in act as something else [although it still can 
become another] (#40). Some beings in potency are in act because they 
already exist as something deflnite, but they are in potency nonetheless 
because even though they are alc-eady something in act, they still can 
become another (e.g., bron~e is already in act as bronze [a determinate 
being] but it is in potency to becoming a statue). Is this also true of 
prime matter in the sensible world? Can it be in potency all things and 
also be something in and oi itself, i.e., something in act (#40-#41)? 
No, because if it were in act or even in genuine factor in real beings, 
it would in fact belomg to the class of real beings and not be in potency 
all of them (#41). 
o. If it is not in real beings and not in act, how can it be at 
au (1141-1142)? If we admit tlla t not everything that exists is in the 
class of beings that come to be on matter, then we may say that matter 
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still in a way exists (#43). But it is still true to say matter is not a 
being because neither is ft one of the things that come to be on it nor 
is it a form (#44-#45). And since the beings that come upon it are them-
selves only images or shadows of true from and logos, we have all the 
more reason to declare that matter is very remote from being, (1146). 
P• But if matter is not a being, how can we speak of it? We speak 
of it [as having "being•• only in a very limited or weak sense--] as in 
potency to beings: it is the 111atter and potentiality for all beings. 
But this brings us back to our earlier question (#41; see also #m, above): 
is matter of itself something [in act] in addition to being in potency 
all things (#47)? 
Again we should reply negatively, for matter [unlike bronze which is 
already something in act before being in potency in relation to another] 
is not already something but always is only what it will be (#48); matter 
is always to be in potency--ia potency in an absolute sense (#49). He~ce, 
matter is not in act at all C'SO). 
q. Matter, then. is non-being but not in the way that motion is not 
being. Motion is merely other than being because it is a mode of being, 
but matter is non-being in the sense of being the opposite of being (#51). 
It is impossible for natter to be any of the beings that come upon it and 
it is totally unaffected by them [because non-being can have no relation-
ship with being) (#52). 
r. Matter itself ex is ts l>elow the eternal intelligible existents 
and even the mutable sensible eidstents. It could be considered the 
least real of the latter cl.ass of things, but in reality it belongs to 
neither class of things, since it is only a dim phantom of reality (#53-
#54). We speak of 111atter and FOSit it in reality, but it is ultimately 
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not a being and not real. We may express it paradoxically: matter 
is truly false and really unreal. It has reality only in the minimal 
sense that it is in potency all things; the very entity of matter is to 
be in potency and if you take this away from it, you take away what little 
being it has (#55-#56). 
The following issues mt1st be clarified and discussed in detail in 
order to grasp the ft1ll importance of this complex treatise: the meaning 
of the four key notions: being in potency ~· being in act and potency 
vs. act; the application of these four expressions to the intelligible 
world; the nature of intelH.gLble matter; the nature of sensible matter. 
The Meaning of the :rot1r Basic Notions 
One of the most important features of Text C is that is does not 
treat simply of he energeia and he dynamis but, in the interest of a more 
subtle and complete analysis, adds to these the notions ~ energeia ~ 
and to dynamei ~· It h a 1so significant that Plotinus separates these 
expressions into two sets: he dynamis as the correlate of he energeia; 
~ dynamei ~ of to energeia .£2!• By insisting that this order be re-
spected (1114), Plotinus indicates that each term has a distinct and 
technical meaning. Indeed, bis 11se of these terms is obviously careful 
throughout the treatise. Be fore we study to what philosophic purpose 
Plotinus puts these terms, let 11S uncover the meaning of each. 
(1) Being in potency C..!;E dynamei ~). Early in the text (115-116) 
Plotinus defines being in potency: something which can become something 
else after what it already Ls. :ror example, bronze being in potency 
because it can become something else--say, a statue; so, too, is water 
because it can become something else such as air or even bronze (06-#9). 
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In the first instance bronze retains its essence but acquires additional 
form through an extrinsic agent (the sculptor); in the second, water 
actually loses its nature, acquiring from outside another essence (18-
#9). From these helpful examples we may infer that something is in 
patency when it can receive either accidental or substantial form from an 
extrinsic cause• Hence, being In potency is obviously dynamis in the 
passive sense-the capacity to be formed by another {par' allou; #29), 
1.e., to receive perfection purely by the agency of another and to be a 
substrate (#15).20 
That Plotinus follows Aristotle in this description of being in 
potency is indicated on several counts. First, the Greek expression .!2, 
dynamei .2.!!. is the precise phrase which occurs in Aristotle in his frequent 
remarks on pass! ve dynamis .2 L Secondly, Pl otinus' r-epea ted comments on 
bronze (#6-#9; #17; 120-121; ,26-127; #50) echo Aristotle's common use of 
chalkos and andrias to illustrate being in potency.22 Thirdly, Plotinus' 
comment early in the text (03-,SJ that being in potency cannot belong to 
the intelligible world on g:rou11d s that no change occurs There, coupled 
20of course, in the case of water becoming bronze or air, i.e., in 
substantial change, the natur-e of the thing is lost in the change (#8) 
and, therefore, prime matter remains as the substrate and not the thing 
itself. 
21The following texts are instances of to dynamei on in Aristotle. 
De~· Gamma, 317 b 16; Meta. ~eta, 6, 1002"};° 33; Gamm"'i'; 4, 1007 b 28; 
Theta, 8, 1050 b 8; Lanbda~ LOTl I> 19, Nu, 2, 1089 a 28; in this last 
text to dynamei on is expllcUly identified as the principle of change. 
Arist0tle does not use the eJCpress ion as formally as Plotinus, however, 
because occasionally It exp:res se s active potency in his writings: see 
- .!!!~. Theta, 3, 1047 a 2.5; Delta, 7, 1017 b 1-10. 
22For example: l!_ ~· Alpha, 10, 328 b 8-14; Pol. Alpha, 8, 1256 
8 
.s;..10; De Part. An. Alpha, L, &tiO b 23-29; Meta. Derta, 2, 1013 b 6 
•qq.; PhyS. Beta, 3, 195 a .33 sqq.; De~·~· Alpha, 18, 724 a 23-27; !hl!· Alpha, 7, 190 a 25-27. 
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with his examples of substantial and accidental change in bronze and 
water (118-119), signals that being in potency functions as the principle 
of change for his philosophy just as it does for Aristotle's. Being in 
potency is the basis for change because it can acquire form successive-
ly.23 Fourthly, Plotinus' account of sensible matter as being in.potency 
.E!! excellence has its basis in Aristotle's theory of prime matter, 
although they differ on a few central points (see below our comments on 
sensible matter).24 Finally, Aristotle's distinction between prime and 
second matter also appears in Ennead II, 5, when Plotinus separates 
prime matter from other kinds of being in potency (1116-1117; 1150).25 
Matter, for Plotinus, because it has of itself no form but is in potency 
all forms (/141), 18 being jn potency in an absolute sense, but other 
existents, such as bronze, .are in potency in a relative sense: while 
already formed existents, they may acquire further perfections from an 
extrinsic cause. Because they are like matter in their receptivity for 
form, being in potency in the i::e la tlve sense may be called "the matter" of 
23Here I am tbinking of substantial or accidental change, and in 
the latter case of either q11alitative or quantitative change. Movement, 
another kind of accidental change, ls change in place but not of form. 
24Aristotle does ho1<1 that prime matter is pure receptive potency 
but he also maintains, unlilce Plotinus, that it is real. He allows that 
it unites with form to co1111>riae one nature, whereas Plotinus prefers a 
dualism of matter an<I form to Aristotle's hylomorphism. 
25Prime matter Is fornless and Incorporeal being in potency, where-
as second matter Is a c:<>rporeal, sensible thing which can still be 
shaped. Aristotle se1>arates the two kinds by the expressions prote hyle 
and hyle eschate: Meta. Theta,. 7, 1049 a 26; Delta, 4, 1015 a 7; Eta. 4, 
1044 a 16-23; Delta, 3 1 l<lL'4 b 3.2; Phys. Beta, 1, 193 a 29; and espe-
cially, Meta. Lambda, 3, Ul&9 b 35-1070 a 2. Plotinus does not use 
the expression eschate hyle, his references to second matter, such as 
bronze, being implicit and tieteniined by the context of his discussion, 
but he does refer to prate byl'e at II, 4 (12), 6, 14 and VI, 5 (23), 11, 
37. 
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the forms that perfect them. This is not prime, but "second", matter.26 
(2) Being.!!..!£.! (!2 energeia ~)· Being in act is the contrary 
of being in potency (114). While being in potency refers to any existent 
disposed to receive fon through the agency of another, being in act 
signfiies any existent com.pleted by form ( #17). Plotinus, however, is 
careful to demarcate being in act from the completing form itself (#19). 
The form is a component of being in act. The latter is constituted of 
matter or substrate (which ln the sensible world is being in potency)27 
and of form. Hence, unlike its contrary, being in act describes not only 
sensible things but lntelligf.bles as well, for existents There are also 
composites. They differ from sensible composites, however, because their 
components unite so intimately as to constitute one complete and perfect 
nature; in fact, it is only tltrough metaphysical thinking that one can 
distinquish separate elements in the intelligible world (#33-#34). 
With the exception of prime matter, being in potency is already 
being in act but is in potency to what it may yet become (1140; #50). 
This is why earlier we d.lvided absolute (prime matter) from relative 
(second matter) being in potency. Bronze is an instance of being in act 
26Even intelligible beings (although they are not beings in potency, 
as we shall discover), be~ause they may receive perfections from prior 
realities, are called "matter'" (033). 
27 Since being 111 act eidst s 111 the intelligible world, where no 
being in potency exists, one may question why Plotinus insists (#14) that 
being in act is, properly speaking, the contrary to being in potency. It 
should just as reason.ably be set down as opposite potency itself (he 
!!Ynamis). But there Is no real difficulty in making being in act the 
Opposite of both potency aud beiug in potency; it is Plotinus' inductive 
approach in the treatise that leads him to stress that being in act is 
contrary primarily to being i11 poten~y, for he begins his study with the 
sensible world where being l1:1 act results from form and a substrate, 
1'hich is being in potency. 
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which is also in potency. Bronze qua bronze is a definite thing (being 
in act), but it is also in potency because a sculptor may shape it so it 
will acquire additional (and accidental) form (#6, #20; #29). 
The relationship of an entity to what it can become~i.e., the re-
lationship of being in potency to being in act--compels Plotinus .. to ask 
the following important question. In the transition from being in potency 
to being in act does the former become the latter or is the resulting be-
ing in act different from the prior being in potency? Does the former 
truly become the latter or does the latter merely come out of the former 
and become an altogether different being (#17-#18)? 
Plotinus' answer requires some careful distinctions. First, he 
answers in regard to second matter. If the original being is considered 
in and of itself, I.e.,. as a being in act, then,· it is necessarily 
different from the product it Is said to become. Why? Because every 
being in act differs from every other since each is a unique product of 
matter and form. But if the prior existent is considered not in and of 
itself but relatively to that i orm it will acquire, i.e. , as being in 
potency, it is partly identical with the resulting composite. In this 
sense it is correct to say the ])rior becomes the latter, for it remains 
as the substrate, which, together with its new form, constitutes the com-
posite. The exception to this vo11ld be those cases in which the nature 
of the being in potency is tot ally lost in the change from being in 
Potency to being in act (i.e., in substantial change of water into bronze; 
18-19; 1121) .28 
28Although the prime m.atter of the prior being, Plotinus would 
tgree, remains as the ultimate substrate of the being in act. 
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Secondly, he suggests en answer with regard to prime matter. Like 
sec~:md matter prime matter is both different from and partly identical 
.nth the resulting being In act. depending on one's point of view. From 
the standpoint of its nature 111atter is certainly altogether different 
from the composite and, Indeed .. from anything in act because it i·s never 
in act as anything (#50) but is purely and eternally in potency all things 
(#41)· But insofar as it is the substrate on which forms may exist, it 
remains in the product as a component (see below on the nature of sensible 
matter). 
Again, Plotinus appears to follow Aristotle. ~ energeia on is a 
frequent expression in Aristotle.29 In addition, Plotinus' implied 
reference to accidental and substantial change in explaining whether and 
in what sense being In potency remains after change Indicates that he is 
working consciously under the influence of Aristotle's philosophy of 
change.30 
29De Gen. An. Beta. l. 73~ b 21; Meta. Eta, 6, 1045 b 21; Theta, 6, 
1048 b SiDe--Gen:-Alpha. LO, 327 b 23; De Gen.!!!_· Alpha, 22, 730 b 21. 
Plotinus' caretUl separation of 1£. energeia on from he energeia could be 
based on Aristotle's conception of ousia. Aristotle holds that ousia in 
the strict sense applies to the composite of form and matter-form and 
matter being ousial in less preferred senses. Respecting Aristotle's 
distinctions Plotinus may have designated ousia in the proper sense with 
the expression !2, energeia !.e. .and may have reserved he energeia for 
secondary ousia or e!.dos-the co111ponent of 12. energeia ~· (See Aris-
totle's~· Delta, 8, 1017' b 10-25; Eta, 1, 1042 a 24-33. 
30Aris totle maintai as that in every change something changes and 
something else remains the sa10e. ln substantial change the substantial 
form is lost and replaced by another while the prime matter of the original 
thing remains. In accidental change (specifically, quantitative and 
qualitative causes) an accidental foI'!ll or shape is lost (e.g., growth and 
change of shape) and replaced by another while the substantial form 
remains. In motion. the third type of accidental change, an entity 
remains the same but cha11ges In place. See Phys. Alpha, 7, 190 a 30 -
190 b 10. 
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(3) !£! (he energeia).ll Plotinus tells us that act designates 
form (#27). This accords with our findings as early as Text A, where act 
denoted ousia or eidos. As we confirmed also in Text A the identifica-
don of act with eidos agrees with Aristotle's use of energeia.32 
It will help us better prepare for J:!! dynamis if we briefly summarize 
how act relates to being in potency and being in act. Act is that which 
being in potency receives and for which it is substratum. In its relation-
ship to act being in potency gua being in potency is really (and perhaps 
ironically) impotent to acquire act. Act comes to being in potency 
extrinsically (par' allou; 129) .and this will prove important when next 
we consider how act relates to potency itself. 
Act unites with the substratum and thereby produces a composite, a 
being in act. Being in .act differs from act as -whole differs from 
component part. Nevertheless, at times Plotinus, focusing apparently on 
the formal unity of an intelligible being in act, uses .!!.!. energeia and to 
energeia .£!!. interchangeably ( ~J L-/39). 
In addition to he energeia standing for form, the key text suggests 
that in certain cases it alsc !lleans activity. Our comments on he dynamis 
will explain why and where Text C uses he energeia as activity. 
( 4) Potency (~ dyn.a111is) • Potency, the correlate of act (he 
energeia), is a very important notion in Text c. On the one hand, 
3lsince it is helpful to uni!erstand act in II, 5 before treating 
the more complex notion of p<>tenc)il 1 ny remarks on act precede those on 
potency. 
32Because energeia denotes form and ousia, to study ontology is to 
•tudy energeia. This explains wh)il auy discussion of the One is omitted 
from II, 5, for since Ee transce11ds ousia. He is excluded from any formal 
discussion of energeia. 
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being in potency is passive dynamis, I.e., that which is formed by another 
(par' allou; 1129); on the other, potency itself is active dynamis, the 
capacity of an existent by virtue of its own perfection (par' autes; #29) 
to produce and to receive act. The difference between being in potency 
and potency itself is expressed in a few elliptical and cryptic sentences 
in the key text (1128-130; 135-1137), but these brief remarks are fundamental 
for understanding the en ti re tr ea tis e. 
We can grasp rnore precisely the meaning of potency through the 
following analysis. Eeing in potency receives form from an agent that is 
not in potency but is (operative) potency since the agent has the perfec-
tion and power to impart form to another. Now if we reflect carefully on 
what an agent can produce, it is evident that the agent's powers are not 
in every case aimed at tile prodt1ction of a being in act from a being in 
potency. The agent's powers 111ay generate operations that also perfect 
these powers themselves. An agent's acts or activities (depending on 
whether the agent is a sensible or an intelligible existent)33 may term-
ina te not only in an ex tr ins k product but also in an intrinsic one. In 
other words, the operation of the agent not only effects a new form in an 
external object but also is a new forlil in the operative power of the agent. 
The difference may be expressed to terms of an agent's transient and 
immanent operations. In the first ease the agent's operation terminates 
in an extrinsic object because it makes a transition from the agent to 
another (a being in potency) and thus ls called transient. In the second 
33The word "activity'", witll Its suggestion of praxis, should not be 
applied to intelligible being eccord.ln.g to what Plotinus tells us in III, 
8 (30), 4-6. Here Ile explains bov in llurnan affairs praxis is really 
.!heoria but of a very dim and ~eak sort. Theoria is the only appropriate 
perfection attributable to Nous, since praxis is relegated to the sensible 
order only. 
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case the same act of the agent originates and terminates in the agent's 
own operative powers. Rather than collllllUnicating act merely extrinsically 
the agent's powers also Intrinsically or immanently affect themselves.34 
Plotinus assists us ln understanding potency in a passing and impli-
cit allusion to the sculptor (ka.ta !2, poiein; #10-#11). The sculp~or has 
an active dynamis to act so as to perfect (1) an extrinsic object, the 
bronze; or (2) an intrinsic object, himself. In both instances his tal-
en ts and artistic judgment are the active powers which bring about act. 
But in the latter instance (?) they are also the recipients of perfections 
or energeiai because the active povers belong to the sculptor who is per-
fected by these acts. One and the same agent is both the origin of act 
(active dynamis) and the terminus of act (energeia). This observation is 
important, for it explains how lntelligibles may receive perfections and 
yet not be in potency. Instead, they are active powers able to perfect 
themselves further in act (~34; ~35; #37; see below our next section of 
comments). 
Plotinus' additional examples of knowledge (1122-1125)35 and moral 
341eo Sweeney, 5.J., in!_ Metaphysics .2f Authentic Existentialism, 
explains transient and illllllanen t opera tlons in connection with efficient 
causality: "carving Is such an acti 'Ii ty as to perfect something which is 
other than the agent itselfJ and hence is called 'transient' activity. 
But other activities (for e:xa111ple, assimilation of food, thinking) perfect 
the agent himself and are cal led 'l1111Danent'. Efficient causual ty involves 
both sorts, since even the latter produce something new (for example, 
increase of size, concepts and propostions), although this is within the 
agent," P• 288, n. 12; also see P• 233, n. 24. Of course, it is also 
illlportant to recognize th.at a transient activity from another point of 
View may be called Immanent. lhis is i111portant for our interpretation of 
the key text in which the sculptor himself is perfected by the exercise 
of his talents and artistics skills, which also perfect the extrinsic 
object, the statue. 
351n this passage/of the key text Plotinus uses T~ Svv:ME-l ~V 
Ulltil line 25 where d1.1ya-«cw_> appears, the shift in expressions may 
suggest that being in potenc1 can apply to such an entity as soul only if 
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conduct (1130) further explain how one and the same agent is both source 
and recipient of act. Knowledge is a ~erfection of an agent, the human 
soul (#24). As the soul. an active power, acts to acquire knowledge, its 
power as a knowing agent acquires content and is perfected. The active 
power for knowledge and the act of knowledge both belong to th~ soul. 
Finally, there is the example of moral conduct. Moral habit is an 
operative power (kata ll pole!n) for particular operations or moral ac-
tivities (#30).36 As moral acts perfect and give content to moral habit, 
the agent's moral power becomes strengthened. By being both power and 
recipient of moral act, the m.oral agent is a good example of how the 
source of active dynamis is also ultimately the recipient of the energeia 
of immanent operations. 
In summary, he dynamis is the active power of- a living agent. A 
living agent is the meeting-place of both active dynameis and the energeiai 
that follow from them. For eica111ple • the sculptor through his talents 
and the moral agent through his habits are the producers (~ll poiein; 
#11) of specific operations (activities) but are also the recipients of 
specific perfections (acts) that result from those operations. In essence, 
the agent has energela through his own active power. In our next section 
of comments we will show how this convergence of he dynamis and he energeia 
used in the stipulated sense Cpoillted out earlier in the Text, #10-#14) 
in which it is the contrary of act and really equivalent to potency CJ!! dynamis). So the change na1 be intentional on Plotinus' part, and 
is perhaps a way to prepare 11s for chapter three ( #33-#37) where he 
makes it clear being in potency cannot in the strict sense apply to 
intelligibles. 
36It is important to note that really there are two sets of acts 
involved in moral conduct. First, there is the activity which is brought 
about by the active power; and, secondly, the perfection or..!£! (•habitus) 
the agent receives from its activity. 
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in one and the same agent has important consequences for Plotinus' 
explanation of production in the intelligible world. 
Applies tion of the four expressions to the intelligible world. 
In chapter three of II, 5 (1131-039) Plotinus leaves off studying the 
meanings of the four expressions themselves and considers whether .and how 
they apply to the intelligible world. Hence, the initial two chapters (#1-
#30) have been preparatory for the remaining three, which study matter, 
first, in the intelligible world (chapter three) and, secondly, in the 
sensible world (chapters four and five; 1140-1156). Chapters one and two 
have studied potency and act Inductively by drawing on examples from the 
sensible world. Thus, they prepa~e us for the heart of the treatise, 
chapter three, which shows how the four key notions apply to the 
intelligibles. 
(1) Being in potency (.!£. dynamei ~). Plotinus concurs with 
Aristotle that being In potency has no place in the intelligible world.37 
Chapter three of II, 5 (133-'134) simply reiterates what Plotinus says in 
the first chapter (13-/15) since being in potency is the principle of 
change, it could serve no purpose and therefore has no place in the immut-
table world of intelligible beings. At one point (#33) Plotinus' imagin-
ary objector protests that since one intelligible being may receive form 
from another (e.g., Soul fro111 Nous) and since therefore this intelligible 
being is matter to that othe~. tllen being in potency must also belong to 
the intelligible world, rn ans~ering this objection Plotinus different!-
37Meta. Theta, 8 11 1050 b II. 
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ates potency from being in potency. Intelligible matter receives perfec-
tion but solely because it is operative power to cause and to receive it. 
For example, Soul, in that metaphysically prior moment to being formed by 
Nous, is still an urge, an active power, to revert back to its source.38 
---
soul in its relations to its source is "matter" (1133; 1136) but not inert 
or powerless. Potency but not being in potency belongs to intelligibles. 
Being in potency is limited to the sensible world because it explains how 
beings which lack perfection and power depend wholly on the agency of 
others to acquire form. Thereby, being in potency explains how becoming 
occurs. 
(2) Being in act (~ energeia .£!!). Being in act refers to a 
composite of matter and form and since composites here are really only 
images or phantoms of composites There,39 being in act certainly applies 
to the intelligibles. In telligll>le beings are composites because matter 
and Form constitute them. l!ut the matter There, while a substrate for 
Forms, is an active power and not a principle of change (see below on 
intelligible matter). Moreo11e r, intelligible matter genuinely unites with 
Form and, thereby, constitutes a single, perfect nature (1134) .40 A 
sensible composite, on the other band, is only a poor image of the 
intelligible because the inpass ible nature of sensible matter makes the 
composite' s components unable to truly unite (see below on sensible 
38see v, 2 (11), l, v, 1 (10), 3; III, 7 (45), 11, 1-20; III, 3 
(48), 21; II, 3 (52)J 17, 15; [, 7 (54), 2, 6. 
3911, 4 (12), S; also LS, 
40ye may recall II, ~' S where intelligible matter helps constitute 




We know that In sensibles matter and form are really distinct. 
Matter repels form and never in any cons ti tu ti ve way unites with form. 
But the key text states clearly that intelligible matter and form are not 
really distinct. This is the Intent of Plotinus' words that "th~ matter 
There is really form" (Bl3). 
Hence, intelligil>les are co111posites only in a logical and not a 
real sense. That aspect of them which ls intelligible matter is really 
identical with the whole, the Intelligible ousia or form. Further, it 
is distinguishable from the form only by philosophical analysis. 
Accordingly, as being in act, intelligibles differ in .two important 
respects from sensibles: (L) intelllglbles are not composites of being 
in potency and of act, but only of potency (active power) and of act; (2) 
the components of intelligil>les are logically, not really, distinguish-
able. It follows, finally, that Plotinus does not hold an Aristotelian 
hylomorphic theory, for sensible existents reflect a Platonic dualism of 
form and matter (where Matter actually repels form and is as non-being to 
being) and intelligil>le existents are unitary ousiai without really 
4lnr, 6 (26), 9, 35-17: ··so that if anything is affected, it 
cannot be matter but must be a co111posite ••• '' 'AvayK7J Tolvvv, !L 
, • ..\ _..,, "\ " .J. , .. ., T' ~a'!Xo', P.TJ VAT)V, u.tV1<1 rt rnrva.µ.~ou.pov T'/ Ol\WS' 1To,\Ac1. 
oµov !LVat; 
~., ch. 11, 29-3L: "so that its participation would not be, as people 
think, by being affected. but of another kind, so that it onlv seems 
ff • I • • - \ .f', • • e ' I\\ t .. I a• ec ted "wCM"f o vx OV'r'CIJ;" 71 µ.e':ta. ·"'l"f"ti' ws '!l!.o·r.:~ ?Ta OVC11JS', a1v' E'TEpoS' Tpor.os 
OLov ~OKEtv;ibid •• ch. 14, 2.9: '"m.atter re111ains and receives nothing, but Ch k to > 'll \ I II f I \ t ~ \ ~ e_ I I 
ec s the approach as a repellent base a.tVc" Ef..&.EtVEv 7J a.v'M"/ ovafvaE'ia.µEVTJ, c:LU' 
f7J'f.m.,oA • I ~ • •'I I b I 7 
--1\ vaa 'M']V 7rpoooov cus Eopa rJ.f:(tJfl1JtJP,EJ1"'1I ibid., ch. 10, 25-2 : "for matter 
is existing precisely as 111atter, it ts not possible for it to be altered 
!~so far as it is matter. l>llt It m.llst stay as it is"E7TEt&n TO £lva.1. Tij 
u".,., • , • ,. ~ ., • .,,. ., ~ .1 "' A e e· • ., . , 
ii EC7Tt TO ova.1. u UiA.1]. OIJK '<n"' (l.!J'T"Tlll WV\OC.OVC1 .a.I. Ka. 0 'Tl. V/\'1] (C1'T&,V, 
..!\ \ \ I - • ·1-
q/\l\Q. µ&uv • 
(See below-~ur comments on sensl~le cn.atter.) 
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distinct constitutive princlples. 
(3) Act (he energela). Every intelligible is an act because 
determined and defined by a perfect Form (#36; #38-#39). This realm of 
pure act is the universe of Nous and is Plotinus' equivalent to Plato's 
world of Forms and to Aristotle's Separate Intelligence. This. is the 
universe of true being and, therefore, of true act. What is act There is 
more perfect than what is act here (139; #46). Act here is a logos and a 
phantom of intelligible act. The difference between perfect intelligible 
acts and imperfect sensible acts rests mainly on Platonic rather than 
Aristotelian reasons. In other words, Plotinus does not separate the two 
realms because the one req11Lres the other in order to be in motion. Yet, 
for Plotinus sensible energeial ln their very reality are inferior to and 
dependent on intelligible acts. 
(4) Potency (he dyuamb). The key text admits potency to the 
intelligible world whLle refusing to admit being in potency (1133-113 7). 
The reason is that intelllgLble beLags are able of their own power to act 
and to receive act. This e icplanatLon is basic to Plotinus' account of 
the emergence of hypostases. 
We have already seeu this to be true in Text B where Plotinus 
identifies the One as the s11prellle Dynamis of all reality and conceives 
the Indefinite Dyad as at1 active dynamis which, by its disposition to 
receive form, makes the produc t1on of being possible. Now we shall see 
how Text C helps us to better a1>preciate in what way dynamis is operative 
in Plotinian metaphysics. 
Specificially, when,. tllrough the examples of sculptor, knowledge 
and moral conduct, Plotiuus' explanation of potency in chapter two (#16-
#30) is connected w:ith his ol>servat:ion on the same subject in chapter 
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three, we can apprehend more securely his theory of production and his 
general account of the relationships which intelligible realities have to 
higher ones. 
In our earlier comments we discovered that an agent is really both 
active power and energela., because he ls the source of operations that 
perfect himself .42 In other words., the agent is the origin and the term 
of certain types of operations. For instance, the moral agent's habits 
are powers which acquire content (energeia) through activities (another 
sense of energeia) that follow from these powers. The fact that dynamis 
and energeia belong to the same agent has important consequences for an 
analysis of production of reeli ties, for this production consists in an 
active dynamis reverting back in contemplation to its source so as to 
acquire determination or content and thereby becoming energeia. In 
ontogonic and cosmogonic procl.uction every reality insofar as it is an 
active power emanates another reality. This other reality is the 
manifestation of the prior existent's opeation, although this other 
reality is better expressei:I as an operative state.43 This operative 
state is itself an acti11e power (t.e., the dynamis of intelligible matter), 
which, through the act of reversion acquires content or energeia by 
42see comments on potency <he dynamis) when discussing the meaning 
of the four basic notions, 'l'lle sl taa ti on is really more complex than 
stated here. For instance, the active powers (will and habits) of a 
JIOral agent which cause operations, whlch are energeiai, are also them-
selves energeiai. ·But for our purpoties it suffices to speak of them here 
solely in reference to their C>perations, and thus we can set up a paral-
lel between them and the operative power which overflows from the One and 
- the Nous. 
-
43The word "opel'ation.. suggests '"activity'" or "praxis'" and thus 
should not be ascribed to the stages of intellection in production. 
Cf• n. 32a. 
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contemplating its source. Of course, as happens in this sort of pro-
duction, this content or energeia, which is itself an active power, 
overflows and produces still another operative state. In this last state 
we have also the two types of energeia set apart in Text B. The produc-
tive reality is that energeia "of'" the ousia; because this ener.geia is 
also an active power, it generates still another energeia (that "from" 
the ousia). This latter in its first and indeterminate moment is an 
active dynamis but then becomes, in its second moment, an energeia. This 
entire procession continues 11n til content is exhausted, until all that 
remains below is the pure passi11:i ty of matter. 
In sum, II, 5 Is important because behind its brief remarks on he 
dynamis is a complex doctrine of act and potency which explains the 
procession and reversion of intelligible existents. 
'Ihe Nature of Inte 11 ig ible Matter 
Some attention to intelligible mtter is necessary if we are to 
grasp the importance of chapter three of II, 5 (1132-#39). We already 
have touched on this topic vhen in Text B we treated the Indefinite Dyad 
and when in our remarlcs on 11 1 ti CJ 2), 1-5 we set up the context of our 
present key text. 
From these earlier cl[.sc:ussions we know generally that intelligible 
matter is an active dynamls. Ondefined and shapeless in the first moment 
of its existence (as the Indefinite Dyad), it receives shape and form by 
turning to contemplate its So11rce and remains as the substrate of these 
real! ties. 44 As a dynallll s i t .acci ui res eon tent or Forms and truly unites 
44Here we are obvloud)' thllllcing of the intelligible matter of 
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with these energeiai so as to form a single nature. 
Unlike sensible matter, which is in the final analysis unreal (see 
below our comments on sensible matter), intelligible matter qualifies as 
8 genuine reality, since it Is, in fact, the first product of the One. 
In fact, as that which in the first moment of production emanates from 
the One, it may claim status as the most real of all existents subsequent 
to the One. Its indeterminacy, rather than denoting imperfection as does 
the indeterminacy of sensible ma tter,45 may signifiy kinship to the 
perfection which transcends heing,46 
Intelligible Matter, the first effluence from 
the One, possesses by Its very indeterminacy a 
kinship with the One which the Forms do not possess. 
As we read in Enn. 2.4.3, Matter "there" is every-
thing at the same time. It has nothing into 
which it can change, for it already possesses 
everything. This indeterminacy which can, on its 
return to its Source, yield any one of the eternal 
Forms, has of itself something more akin to the One 
than have these later determinations. The Forms 
are perfectly vhat they are; they are perfect being. 
Intelligll)l.e Matter has a shadow of the superiority 
of ;(, irr~ t:E0-'1 In its potential of becoming all 
Real Beings.47 ~-
~· All intelligibles, such as Soul and Nature, have intelligible 
matter but the Indefinite Dyad seems restricted to the first moment of 
~alone. This restriction is no doubt due to the tradition from which 
Plotinus acquires the concept of the Indefinite Dyad and which proposed 
it as contrary to the One. Therefore, in Plotinus' philosophy it should 
belong on the level of the first emanation. 
45The indeterminacy of 
contrarei ty to perfection ancl 
not one among forms; in fact, 
(ekritheisa; #51) of reality, 
gives out. 
sensible matter is the result of its 
being. It is impotent and imperfect and 
It ls alien to form. It is an outcast 
the emptiness or sterility where being 
46This will, of course, seem peculiar to a philosopher whose 
metaphysics embraces only 011tology, :Sut it is quite acceptable to an 
l!._enologl_, where to have perfection something need not be determinate but 
only have unity. 
47J. M. Rist, "'The Indefinite Dyad and Intelligible Matter in 
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Granting the unique nature of intelligible matter, we may ask why 
plotinus posits this reality in the first place. Why is he convinced 
that intelligible matter ls necessary for his metaphysics? One answer 
is found in II, 4, where he says that if there are Forms, each must have 
a characteristic dis tinguhhing it from every other and each must have 
something in common with every otber.48 Rist mentions this and a few 
add! tional reasons in an inf arm tlve statement. 
The distinguishing characteristic is, says Plotinus, the feature 
of shape (Mof f'{ ). .And ff they have shape, he continues, there 
must be something to receive the shape--plainly this is the common 
element mentioned above--and this 'something' must be matter or 
substrate. The conclusion ls backed up by a second argument which 
suggests that, si.nce the world of sense is an image of the Intelli-
gible World and ls based on matter, there must be matter in the 
Intelligible likewise. A third argument holds that an ordered 
system involves both Form and a place wherein Form may be lodged, 
while a fourth-most relevant to the present discussion--adds that, 
since in a sense the 1 ntelllgible \lorld is diversified, there must 
be a basic shapelessness which can be the 'unity' which accepts 
diversification, and that this 'unity' must be Matter.49 
Another very important reason for intelligible matter has been identified 
by John Fielder in bis ar tlele, ••cborismos and Emanation in the Philosophy 
of Plotinus ... 50 For Fielder intelligible matter is necessary for the 
production of diversity~ division and limit in reality. Whether we are 
thinking of intelligible n1tter In the production of Nous or of Soul, 
this matter is a necessary precondition for the generation of a different 
Plotinus,'" 105-106. 
4811, 4 (12)' 4' 7-8 .. 
49J. M. Rist, "'The [1uleflnlte Dyad and Intelligible Matter in 
Plotinus,'" 104-105. 
50This article is contained :in The Significance of Neopla tonism, 
Vol. One of Studies in Neoplatonism: Ancient and Modern, R. Baine Harris, 
ed. (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press. L976), pp. 101-120. 
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level of reality· 51 Indeed, the same is true of sensible matter. Its 
contrarei ty to the reality of Nature makes possible the generation of 
_!2goi which it receives (for example, plant and animal natures). Matter, 
whether sensible or intelligible. is characterized by Otherness and 
Movement since it is other than and moves away from prior real! ties. 
Plotinus mentions how Otherness and Movement pertain to intelligible 
matter in II, 4. 
For Otherness There is always and that which 
produces (intelligible] matter; for this is 
the principle of matter, and it is the first 
Movement. For this reason Movement, too, was 
called Otherness, because Movement and Otherness 
came about together. The Movement and Otherness 
which came from the First are indeterminate 
and need lt to detet:'llline them; and they are 
determined when they turn to it. But before 
the turning matter, too, was undefined and the 
Other ••• and unill1J111inated from the Fi~st. 
For if light comes from the First, then that 
which receives the Light before it receives it 
has everlastingly no Light; but it has light as 
other than itself. since the light comes to it 
from something else.5l 
51Ibid., p. llt.. 
52II, 4 (12), s, 28-39. 
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This "otherness'" which characterizes all beings,53 is what differen-
dates every hypostasis from its source. Otherness is a movement away 
from the source but is also a movement back toward its source, in which 
it receives diversity and produces, thereby, the plurality of beings. 
Without this otherness there vo~ld be multiplicity, no unity-in-diversity, 
no unreality associated with reality. As Deck remarks if intelligible 
matter were not present the Nous would "be the One.54 Because it is Other-
ness, intelligible matter in I.ts first moment is aptly identified with 
the Indefinite Dyad, whi.ch was, according to the Platonic Unwritten 
Doctrines, contrary to the One and necessary for production. 
It is noteworthy the t Plo tfnus speaks of intelligible matter in two 
ways: first, as the "Indefinite Dyad;' and, secondly, as "intelligible 
matter" proper. The Dyad is intelligible matter in the first moment of 
production-- i.e., not as substr-aturn of forms but as active dynamis which 
proceeds out of the One in order to revert back to Him and be completed. 
Plotinus uses "intelligible 111a tter"' proper to express the active potency 
that remains after the stage of reversion in the Nous and every other 
hypostasis. This is the intellf,gil>le matter that occupies his attention 
in II, 5. Whereas the Indefinite Dyad applies strictly to the first 
moment of the overflow of Intelli.genee, intelligible matter may apply to 
the receptivity of any hypostasis. [n other words, Soul and Nature also 
53rn a comment on Ir. 4, 1 (), Rist explains how otherness describes 
matter both here and There. ".A.11 beings, that is, everything associated 
With any kind of matter, po1Ssess 'otherness'; intelligible matter is 
'other' than the One, that is than what is 'beyond Being', matter 'here' 
is other than BeiOB'" ("':Ploti11us on Matter and Evil," Phronesis, 6 
[1951], 155-156). 
54John Deck, Hature9 Conteatplation, and the One (Toronto: Univer-
sity of Toronto Press. 19()1) • p. 116. -- -- --
i ntelligible matter.SS have 
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As we have already shown Plotinus weaves into his doctrine of 
intelligible matter an intricate theory of act and potency. Intelligible 
matter is a substrate unlike sensible matter; both are characterized by 
otherness and are necessary for the generation of being but intelligible 
matter is an active dynamfs that becomes a living act. The role of 
dynamis in the intelligible realm is explained by intelligible matter, 
which, therefore, has an important place in Text c. 
The Nature of Sensible Matter 
The final two chapters of lI. 5 (14C'r#56) are considerably helpful 
for understanding one of the most elusive subjects in Plotinus' philoso-
phy: sensible matter. In these passages '"he conceives of matter in the 
sense-world as a potentiality which never can be actualized, an essential 
negation, 'that which is really unreal'; this paradoxical conception is 
stated more clearly, perhaps. in the last chapter of this treatise than 
anywhere else in the Ennead s .... 5~ A few words on matter will help us 
appreciate its paradoxical nature and its status as a being in potency, 
which makes it especially relevant for our study of energeia. 
Text C tells us essentially that prime matter is in potency all 
things (1141; #49) and yet is nothing in and of itself (#41; 1144; 1150; 
#54). If prime matter is in p()tency everything, then it cannot be, for 
I 
55There is no mention ()f the Dyad in II, 5 because Plotinus is 
_ :-inly interested not in the One. nor in the first moment of emanation, 
ut in the fully formed Nous. the Soul and physical existents. In other 
WOrds, he is mainly interested in the e111anations to the extent they are 
acts and not potencies .. 
56Here I quote Armstrons~ Plotinus, Vol. II, p. 153. 
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once it becomes something (defined and determinate) it no longer is 
everything in potency--i.e., lt is no longer prime. matter (#41; #50). 
As the potency for all forms prime matter cannot be, for to be is to be 
form (#45); i.e., prime matter must be eternally different from form to 
be able to receive all fo?'llls (~SZ). Moreover, because form denotes act, 
matter is not act and because it ls never a complete or composite entity 
matter is never in act (045; 150; 152). It is also true that matter is 
not potency as active dyt1amis because it does not acquire perfection 
through its own power (par'autes), for lt has nothing in and of itself.57 
consequently, prime matter may only be described as being in potency--and 
this in the perfect sense: an everlasting capacity to receive form 
without itself ever belng a form. 
Prime matter is in potency all things and therefore is the princi-
ple of change. Change follows 11pon its nature because, unlike in tel-
ligible matter, sensiDle matter does not have all forms at once but only 
successively.58 Forms come to aud depart from matter while it remains 
(#52). Hence, Plotinus' matter, like Aristotle's, is the ultimate 
substratum which is permanent in change.59 We must be careful, however, 
not to exaggerate the sinllarity between the two thinkers. Plotinus 
accepts that prime matter ls absol 11te being in potency and the principle 
of change but rejects Aristotle's position that this matter is real (#54-
#55). Consequently, he must also disagree with Aristotle that matter 
571n II, 4 (12) .. 8., ~-11 he describes matter as something com-
pletely without quall ties aad in the same chapter (lines 23-26) says 
that anything at all which ~atter may have comes through form. 
5811, 4, 3, 6-13. 
59physics Alpha, ~ .. L9? a 15-33. 
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unites with form to comprise a true ousia.60 Plotinus prefers a Platonic 
to an Aristotelian view of matter when assessing the relationship of matter 
to form. Form and matter differ as do being and a phantom of being (1146). 
Matter is an outcast (ekritheisa; 051) of reality and is separated from 
the perfection of being (c:horistheisa; 1151). As a result it can never 
unite with form, for: how can the unreal add anything to the real? 
Plotinus' theory of 111atter reflects a dualism between matter and form and 
is alien to Aristotelian bylomorphism. 
Although matter is forever separate from form and being, it still 
has a kind of nature which is its otherness, its separation from being. 
In Rist' s words: 
This "otherness'" is Its nature ( ~,:,,...l..~ ), a 
nature which ls not essentially quantified 
but continually admits a flux of changing 
qualities. Plotinu.s finds no difficulty in 
the idea of entities being unqualified, for 
he says '"Is not Quality itself unqualified?" 
(2, 4, 13). If this is so--and nobody disputes 
the existence and discus.sability of Quality--
then the mere absence of qualities does not 
rule out the potential "existence" of matter, 
or prevent its "poss es slon"' of a nature. 61 
Matter is, then, a paradoldc:al existent which must be reckoned with in 
any successful philosophy, and yet it is not among the beings which are 
the object of the philosoJ>her:'s nethod, for prime matter is and is not. 
In this paradoxical view of matter Plato appears to have influenced 
Plotinus. In the Sophist Jl'lato dis tlnguishes between two kinds of 
negation, concluding that "not being something" is not the same as non-
60Metaphysics 2eta, S, 103~ a 34-35; 1033 b 18-19. 
156. 
61J. M. Rist, .. Plotlnus on Matter and Evil," Phronesis, 6 (1961), 
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existence.62 To say that something ls non-being may mean that it is 
simply other than being, and not that it absolutely is not.63 In other 
words, matter has no belng but still has some kind of existence. 
Matter's nature as non-being makes it a unique existent and diffi-
cult for the philosopher to understand, for if he treats matter as another 
being (i.e., as a form) he wlll never grasp it.64 The philosopher must 
prepare his mind for non-being rather than being. To do tnis he must 
abandon ordinary reasoning and adopt the "bastard reasoning" to which 
Plato referred in the Timaeus.6S This thinking does not originate in the 
intellect but comes about in an illogical and mysterious way. One must 
employ "another intellect which is not intellect," an intellect that is 
devoid of all form and being. Intellect must leave its own light, as it 
were, and go outside '"to e:x:::perience something contrary to itself." It 
must deny itself and become lntellectless in order to see matter which 
62see Sophist 257 b: "Vhen we speak of 'that which is not', it 
seems that we do not mean solllethi.ng contrary to what exists but only 
something that is different . . • So. when it is asserted that a negation 
signifies a contrary. we shall not agree, but admit no more than this--
that the prefix 'not' indicates something different from the words that 
follow or rather from the things designated by the words pronounced after 
the negative" (F. M. Cornford translation). 
63I, 8 (51), 5, 3 ff, 
64Plotinus implies i.n II, 7 (37) that the Stoics fail to under-
stand matter because the1 regard it as an authentic being, and, in fact, 
as the only being. 
65For Plot in us' comrneo ts on the "bastard reasoning" of Plato's 
.!.!maeus, see II, 4 (12). 1?. 34-3.5: "that which wants to be a thought 
about matter will not be a tllought but a sort of thoughtlessness; or 
rather the mental representation of i.t will be spurious and not genuine, 
compounded of an unreal part and wi.th the diverse kind of reasoning. It 
Was perhaps because he ha<I observed this that Plato said matter was 
apprehended by a 'spurio11s reasonlng'." (See Timeaus 52 b 2.) 
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exists outside being.66 
This description of matter as non-being brings to mind an interest-
ing and important question. lf matter receives form, does it not attain 
to being by this association? :Plotinus answers negatively. To under-
stand why he answers thus, we need to examine how matter relates to form. 
Matter retains Its nat11r'e as non-being, despite its connection 
with form, because it is impassible (apathes).67 Plotinus actually 
says that matter has contact (ephaptomene) with form and participates 
(metalambanein) in form but is unaffected by this contact or participa-
tion.68 "It was not anything In act from the beginning, since it stood 
apart from all beings nor did It become. For it has not been able to 
take even a touch of color from the things that wanted to come into it, 
but remaining directed to something else it is in pQtency to what comes 
next" ( #52). Plotinus' doctri11e of impassibility is his philosophic 
explanation of the eternal dualism between matter and form. Matter never 
admits and actually repels foni69 and for this reason, if one speaks 
) '11 correctly' form is not in matter c ev {.) i r; , ' .C/j ) but on it (err~ v11,7) .70 
66I, 8 (51), 9. 
67The impassibility of soul a11d matter is the subject of III, 6 (26). 
On Plotinus' objective in thi.s treatise, R.. T. Wallis writes that "his 
aim here is to preserve the soul from substantial change and emotional 
disturbance in answer both to the Sceptics' charge that a being subject 
to these cannot be l11mortal 'I. L. z. 9-13, III. 6. 1. 28-30) and the 
Gnostics' admission of sin and lgnoC"ance into the spiritual world" 
(.!!_eoplatonism, p. 74). Of eourse, in order to accomplish these aims 
Plotinus must first discuss the impassibility of matter; this is why the 
chapters on matter in III, 6 precede those on soul. 
68vI, 5 (23), s, is-22. 
69nI, 6 (26), 14, 251-35. 
70 J ~ ~/~ An example of ~rrl v..itrJ 
beauty of bodies are acq_ui rett:f 
!latter ••• " 
is fou11d in V, 9, 5, 2, 13-14.· "The 
the)' are in them as the forms are on 
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Plotinus commonly uses the analogy of the mirror to illustrate the 
way in which matter receives and yet repels form.71 The mirror relates 
to its image in much the way as matter relates to form. The mirror re-
ceives its image but does not unite with it. The mirror and image are 
not identical; the Image is merely on the mirror and not in i·t. The 
same is true of matter and form; they do not unite; form is merely re-
fleeted on matter.72 
The nature of matter brings to mind the question of its origin. 
Basically, there are two alternative answers to this question, as Brehier 
explains: either "'it Is a term distinct from the realities which proceed 
progressively from the One, and it may set Itself against these realities" 
or "it is the last term in the procession of the realities, that is to 
say, the sterile stage in which the productive force which has proceeded 
from the One at last dies out. ••73 
There is no simple answer as to which of these views Plotinus ac-
cepts. It appears that he accepts each of them at different times in the 
development of the Enneads.74 For example, in the following early text, 
III, 4 (15), 1, matter under the guise of absolute indefiniteness is 
71That matter receives and repels form is one way to express the 
paradox of matter. Other iways are that it is real and unreal (#54); 
everything (in potency) but nothing (in act; 1152). 
72The analogy of matter as a rnirror occurs in several places in the 
Enneads; see especially. lII, <; (26). 7, 22-23; IV, 3 (27), 11, 6-14. 
/ / 
73Emile Brehler, The fhilosophy of Plotinus, tr. by Joseph Thomas 
(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 180. 
74This judgment, of ccllarse, 111ay offend those who deny that Plotinus' 
Writings, because wrl t ten after be had become 49 years of age, and 
Presumably, had reached pllUosC>pbicsl maturity, do not significantly 
develop (e.g., A. H. Arms troag~ Plod.nus, Vol. I, p. vii; R. T. Wallis, 
!_eoplatonism pp. 44-45). 
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explicitly linked with the chain of emanations which has its source 
ultimately in the One. 
The expressions of some realities came into 
existence while the realities themselves remain 
unmoved, but soul was already said to be in motion 
when it generates the sense-perception which is 
its expressed form and the power of growth which 
extends also to plants. For the soul has the power 
of growth when it exists in us, too, but it domi-
nates because it has, so to speak, become isolated. 
Does this power of growth, then, produce nothing? 
It produces a thing altogether different from 
itself; for after It there is no more life but 
what it produces is lifeless. What is it then? 
Just as everything which was produced before this 
was produced shapeless, but was formed by turning 
towards its producer and being, so to speak, 
reared to matarity by it, so here, too, that 
which is prodaced is not anymore a form of 
soul--for it is not alive--75but absolute 
indefiniteness. 76 
According to this text, then, matter is the last emanation of real! ty; it 
75Matter is not alive and is, therefore, separate from the effects 
of Nous, which we saw are living thoughts. Matter is not thought and 
life and, therefore, contributes nothing to real! ty. This is why in II, 
4 ( 12), 5, 4-12 he calls the corporeal world a .. decorated corpse ... 
Even though it is nothing more than a decorated corpse the sensible 
world is the best possl'ble i111Sge of the intelligible and, therefore, is 
still to be appreciated (II, 9 [33], 4, 22-23). The sensible world is 
still beautful (V, 8 [31), S, 7-:23); even the plants here are the fairest 
image of the Plants There (Vr,? [37), 11, 6-17). 
76rrI, 4 (15), 1, 1-l:l: 
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11 the end of perfection and the level of sheer imperfection. 
Plotinus never explicitly states that matter is posited eternally 
t he contrary to the perfections which proceed from the One, but 
•• 
certain texts imply as much. For example, in the very late treatise, I, 
8 (51), he describes matter as evil, and because it is evil (i.e., the 
opposite of the Good) 1 it would itself not seem to qualify as one among 
those things that have their source in the Good. 
The intellect is the first act of the Good and the 
first ousia; the Good stays still in Himself, but 
intellect moves about Bim in its act, as also 
it lives around Him. And Soul dances round 
Intelligence outside. and looks to it, and in 
contemplating its Interior sees God through it. 
"This is the life of the gods, .. without sorrow 
and blessed; evil Is nowhere here, and if things 
had stopped here there would not have been any 
evil, only a First and a second and a third 
goods. 77 
Evil, then, is non-being; it is oat side of being, and yet not like the One 
which is supra-being, but as infra-being. Evil is non-being in the sense 
of a privation. Evil exists as tlte absence of something (a particular 
form) that ought to be in a particular place. Something is evil, then, 
accidentally--not because o:f wlla t It Is but because of what it ought 
to be but is not. But if evil is au accident, it still makes sense to 
771, 8 (51), 2, 21-ZS: 
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it is something-something which must exist in the first place so as 
to exist in another. In spite of its status as a privation it is still a 
something~an accident but not an ousia. 
For if evil occurs accidentally in something else, 
it must be something itself first, even if it is 
~ot ousia. Just as there ls absolute good and 
good as a quality. so there must be absolute evil 
and the evil derived from lt which inheres in some-
thing else ••• So that which underlies figures 
and forms and shapes and measures and limits, 
decked out with an adornment which belongs to 
something else, having no good of its own, only a 
shadow in comparison to real being, is the ousia of 
evil (if there really can be ousla of evil); this 
is what our argument discovers to be primal evil, 
absolute evll.78 
78rbid., ch. 3, 23-40: 
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So if there is an absolute good that is the cause of all good 
things, there must be an absolute evil that explains all evil things. 
fhe insistent contrast of evil to the One and the identification of matter 
with evil would seem to support the conclusion that matter does not 
emanante from the One. This view appears supported by texts from Plotinus' 
middle period, such as III. 6 (?6), 14, 29-35, when he describes matter 
as repellent of form. 
The most plausible conclusion concerning the origin of matter is 
that Plotinus was constantly reassessing his position throughout his writ-
/ ings. Support for either al terna ti ~e stated by Brehier may be found in 
the Enneads.79 
Plotinus is more definite on his view of the nature of matter. It 
is non-being; pure passive potency; without form and without a determinate 
nature; privation; impassible; evil; nothing in and of itself, only a 
phantom and an announcement of what It may become. 
SUI11m.ar :r ~ Con cl us ions 
Obviously, II, 5 is at the heart of our study because it formally 
examines energeia and explains. although abstrusely and elliptically, how 
it applies to Plotinus' entire ontology. 
First, the treatise illU1Di11es energeia by constrasting it with 
three related expressions: dynamis, _!£ dynamei .2.!!. and 12, energeia .2.!!.· 
!nergeia here primarily me.ans fan or ousia, which corroborates what we 
79My comments on sensible mat: teT rely heavily on 
!_lo tin us on the Origin of Matt er (M. A. Thesis, 
Of America: washingto11 9 D. C,,. 197 3) ~ which is a 
lllatter with an extensi11e bib Uography. 
William J. Carroll, 
Catholic University 
definitive study of 
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concluded in Texts A (IV, 7) and B (V, 4). This is not, however, the 
onlY sense of energeia in Text c. lI, 5 indicates that energeia may 
sometimes mean "activity... This Is implied in Plotinus' brief remarks on 
moral conduct (#30): energela aay refer (1) to the content or character 
received from such conduct (this Is energeia in the sense of form, 
perfection or ousia) or (2) to the operation or "activity" or the moral 
agent whereby he attains energeia in the first sense. 
What do the three other expressions mean? Dynamis is active power~ 
the capacity of an existent by Itself to produce and receive act. To 
energeia ~refers not to that component of something which is act, i.e., 
form, but to the whole being-the composite of matter and form. The 
matter of an intelligible c.0111.posi te is a dynamis which has perfected 
itself and, thus, has acquireci energeia. The substrate or matter of a 
sensible composite, however, Is not dynamis but !2. dynamei ~' which I 
have translated "being in potency.'" 'lhis is passive potency--the capacity 
of an existent to be formed 1>1 an extrinsic agent. Passive potency in 
the purest sense is prime m.tter, which never truly admits act but is 
eternally in potency and always other than form. 
Text C proceeds inductivel1, first drawing on instances from the 
sensible world to explain the meanings of the four expressions. The 
examples of the sculptor, of knovledge and of moral conduct illustrate.!!! 
_!!ynamis and he energe::ia; braaz:e and water illustrate !2. dynamei ~ and 
.!2. energeia on. This concentration on the sensible world is preparatory 
for chapter three ( '3 l-#39), in which Plotinus considers how the four 
expressions describe the ::intelligible order. 
Since Plotinus' :reaso ni 119 i.n II, 5 is ellipical and oblique, we 
have relied principally on our c ()!Dlents to make clear how chapter three 
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builds on the prior chapters. The instances of the sculptor, as well as 
of the human soul in kno1o1led,ge and moral conduct, show that the same 
agent is sometimes the source and the term of operations, for he can 
exercise active powers so as to receive acts. In other words, an agent 
by his own powers is perfected immanently when he receives act from those 
powers. He perfects another Ca being in potency) when his operations are 
transient--i.e., when he imparts act from himself to another. Plotinus' 
examples of sensible agents serYe to explain, I have argued, how on the 
metaphysical level an agent's active dynamis (intelligible matter) brings 
about through reversion its o1'ln energeia. 
Intelligible matter is an otherness (heterotes) and motion (kinesis) 
away from its source (e.g., the Indefinite Dyad from the One). Sensible 
matter is also an otherness but is ultimately unreal. In the case of 
either intelligible or sensible matter, the otherness therein is necessary 
for the production of some subsequent level of reality. 
Unlike sensible matter, intelligible matter is real, although 
inferior to its source. lndee<I, in the case of the Indefinite Dyad, 
intelligible matter is perhaps nore real, i.e., more like the One, than 
any subsequent reality. 
As active power in telligf ble matter is an authentic reality that 
unites with form to comprise an ···111uminated ousia." In this respect it 
differs profoundly from sensl~le matter, which, because impassible, 
never unites with form. Consequently, the entire sensible world is really 
only a phantom of the true ou sla i There and is ultimately "a decorated 
corpse." 
Sensible matter is excl11ded from the processions of lives and 
thoughts from the Intelligence. 7be intelligible realm is pure act and, 
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hence, is the realm of life. It is being at its most complete. Like 
sensible matter the One is not life. But unlike sensible matter, the One 
is distinct from life because It is the source of life and not because it 
is the receptacle of life. The Intelligence is life in the truest sense 
because it is thought that comprehends all being in a single eternal 
moment. The Soul is life in an lnfe rior sense because it manifests its 
life successively or in time. 
Sensible matter is separate from life and being but still has a 
nature. Indeed, if the philosopher fails to grasp its nature, his system 
will contain grievous errors. The nature of matter is non-being; it is 
the being in potency of that which can receive all forms (successively) 
but never by itself any form. Thus, prime matter is eternally in potency 
because impassible-i.e., incapable of being affected by form or being. 
Prime matter is privation, sterility, non-being and ultimately the 
same as evil. Becau.se it is the principle of evil it is likely that 
Plotinus prefers that it not be <=onnec ted with the chain of emanations 
from the One but that It be simply posited as the eternal opposite to the 
emanating perfections of reaU ty, It is, then, the darkness upon which 
the light of emanation finally plays out. On this question of the origin 
of matter, however, Plotinus suggests varying views and his thought 
appears to change throughout his writings. 
In conclusion Ennead II. 5 ts an important treatise which discloses 
how energeia is import.ant for Flot in us' metaphysics. The treatise also 
•hows how dynamis is significant if ve are to properly understand energeia. 
/ .Pznamis explains how an age11t a<=qul:res energeia and this is crucial in 
I explaining the network of dyna111ei and energeiai in the intelligible world. 
r . l It is in his viev·of dya....is that Plotinus departs from Aristotle 
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in Text c. Aristotle does not apply dynamis to the intelligible world 
and certainly not to any theory of ontogeny and cosmogony. Plotinus, on 
the other hand, must adapt dynamts to his own philosophic vision of 
reality. He makes dynamis central to the intelligibles though he follows 
Aristotle by insisting, at the same time, that intelligibles are acts. 
One final observation: the One is absent from Text C. Plotinus 
tells us something significant b7 so omitting the First Reality. The 
one, we may assume, has no place ia a treatise on energeia if, as we have 
concluded earlier, He transcends fom~ ousia, being, that is, energeia. 
The One is not mentioned in Text C because the One is necessarily excluded 
from any metaphysics describing the world of energeia. 
Our next key text studies the One closely, however. It will help 
us appreciate the complex way in ~hich Plotinus relates the One to energeia 
in his philosophy while 10aia ta ini ng that the One transcends energeia. 
TEXT D: EHNEAD VI, 7 (38), chs. 13, 17, 18, 37 and 40 
We take our next key text from the long and complex treatise which 
porphyry entitled "How the Multitude of the Forms came into being and On 
the Good. "l This work centers mainly on the nature of the Intel'ligence 
(chs• 1-14) and its relationship to the transcendent Good (cbs. 15-42). 
It is rich in its use of "'eoergeia",. the word (or some form of it) 
occurring 44 times. 
VI, 7 belongs, like Text C (rI, 5 [25]), to Plotinus' middle period, 
although chronologically it occurs thirteen treatises later. The trea-
tises between II, 5 acd Vl,. i do not add significantly to our knowledge 
of energeia and therefore deserve only brief attention before we take up 
Text D. 
III, 6 (26) immediately follows II, 5 chronologically and is en-
titled "On the Impassibility of rhings without Body." We referred to 
this treatise several times in Text C because it contributes to Plotinus' 
theory of sensible matter. III, 6 uses the term energeia often but adds 
no new information on the subject,. reiterating that energeia signifies 
eidos and ousia. 
-
Treatises IV, 3 (27), l'J, Ji (28) and IV, 5 (29) were, before the 
editing of Porphyry, the second ~art of one long work on soul, the first 
part of which consisted of [ll,. 6 just mentioned. III, 6 considered how 
the human soul is unaffected ~y bodily experience, whereas the subsequent 
three treatises explain how the hypo stasis Soul and all posterior souls 
lPorphyry, "On the Life of Plotinus ;· p. 20. 
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originate from the Intelligence. IV, 4 in particular describes the 
ascent of the human soul to levels of Soul and of Intelligence. IV, 5 
contains some remarks on energeia and emanation, which clarify Plotinus' 
doctrine of production.2 All three of these works affirm (as does Text 
A) that soul, whether the hypostasis or a lesser soul, is act. 
The next treatise that Plotinus wrote, III, 8 (30), is among the 
most important in his entire cot:'pus and is entitled "On Nature and 
Contemplation and the One.'" Jn this work he explains that contemplation 
is the basis of all production. The Intelligence results from its 
eternal contemplation of the One and, in turn, produces all subsequent 
lives and acts by its contemplation.3 
V, 8 ( 31) , ··On the Inte L1 ig ible Beauty," explains in Platonic 
fashion how the world of Fons is perfect beauty. V., 5 (32), "That the 
Intelligibles are not out side the Intelligence and On the Good," is 
informative on the nature of the Intelligence and the primacy of unity 
but contains little on energeia. Hor are the remaining five treatises 
directly relevant to out:' study. '.lvo of them are purely polemical: II, 9 
(33), "Against the Gnostics," and n, 7 (37), "On Complete Intermingling," 
which is an evaluation of certain cosmological views of the Stoics.4 VI, 
6 (34), "On Numbers,·· expt:'esses a JDetaphysical theory of numbers that, 
while interesting in itself, has little bearing on energeia in the 
2see Text B, n. 44. 
3several passages i11 III, S (esp. ch. 8) contain some noteworthy 
observations on life and the nature of the Intelligence, to which we will 
refer later in our co!Jllllents. 
4we referred to this tt:'eatise in Text A, n. 12, when commenting 
on Plotinus' use of energeia in his criticism of the Stoic doctrine of 
mixture. 
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intelligible world. The remaining treatises are not, on the whole, 
metaphysical in content, as their titles indicate: II, 8 (35), "How 
Distant Objects Appear Smalr'; r, 5 (36), "'Whether Well-Being depends on 
£Xtension in Time." 
Now we are ready to examine VI, 7 itself. Since we do not encounter 
the first part of the key text until its chapter thirteen, our first task 
1.s to construct a brief synopsis of the Initial chapters so as to under-
stand how the key text relates to the development of the whole treatise. 
In particular this synopsis will help us to eventually relate the first 
part of the treatise (chs. 1-14), In which Intelligence is defined as 
energeia, to the second part (chs. 15-42), in which energeia is denied 
of the One. 
Philosophers err (Plotinus 'begios) by assuming_ that Plato intends 
his account of production in the Timaeus to be understood literally 
(ch. 1).5 A literal interpretation of the Timaeus obscures the unique 
nature of the divine Intellisence by likening it to a human craftsman. 
When the Intelligence knows its own contents, it knows the eternal rea-
sons for all beings. In other words, it knows simultaneously a being and 
its why. In this respect it differs from human intelligence, for which 
(as Aristotle shows) ltno-wled.ge of a thing and knowledge of its why often 
differ (ch. 2).6 
5Taken literally the Timaeus Implies that the sensible world is the 
product of divine planning. :B.ut this is impossible (Plotinus argues in 
chapter one) because planning or reasoning must proceed from premises im-
mediately known. But neither sensation nor intelligence can account for 
such premises in the <livine Intelligence, for sensation does not exist 
before sensation is produce<! e11d, If intelligence provided immediately 
known premises about the sense-world, sense-knowledge would be a science. 
6p1otinus' discussion in chapter two is based on the Posterior 
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If the Intelligence knows perfectly and embraces everything, then 
there is nothing produced in the sensible world that does not first exist 
in the intelligible world. But this would seem to imply serious 
difficulties, for many aspects of the sensible world seem imcompatible 
with the intelligible world. First, how can sense-powers exist ,in pure 
Intelligence? This question presents no difficulty if one remembers that 
the product must be inferior to the producer. Accordingly, it is not 
necessary to assume that, because intelligible existents are the princi-
ples of sensible existents, the imperfect characteristics of the latter 
belong to the former. While both the producer (the intelligible existent) 
and the product (the sensible existent) are knowers, they are not equal 
Analytics Alpha, ch. 13, 78 a 22-78 b 3. There Aristotle expll:J.,ins that 
certain types of knowledge do not immediately disclose the why (~{crl- ) 
or cause of a thing,. but recitJ::l.re an :inference to discover it. "Knowledge 
of the thing differs from knowledge of the thing's why. To begin with 
they differ within the same science and in two ways: (1) when the premises 
of the syllogism are not i111rn.ed ia te (for then the proximate cause is not 
contained in them--a necessaey condition of knowledge of the why of a 
thing); (2) when the premises are llllmediate, but instead of the cause 
the better known of the two reciprocals is taken as the middle; for of 
two reciprocally predicable terms the one which is not the cause may quite 
easily be the better known and so become the middle term of the demonstra-
tion." This second kind of reasoning Is inductive and he contrasts two 
examples showing under what conditions the why of a thing can and cannot 
be proven. ''Thus (2) (a) you rn.tght prove as follows that the plane ts are 
near because they do not twinkle: let C be the planets, B not twinkling, 
A proximity. Then B is predicable of C; for the planets do not twinkle. 
But A is also predicable of E, since that which does not twinkle is 
near--we must take this truth as having been reached by induction or 
sense-perception. Therefore A Ls a necessary predicate of C; so that we 
have demonstrated that the planets are near. This syllogism, then, 
proves not the why but only tliat the thing is: since they are not near 
because they do not twinkle, °hllt,. "because they are near, they do not 
twinkle. The major and 111::1.ddle of the proof, however, may be reversed, 
and then the demonstration will be of the why. Thus: let C be the 
plane ts, B proximi ty , A not tw Lnkl::l. ng , Then B is an at tribute of C, and 
A--not twinkling--of B. Consetuently, A is predicable of C, and the 
syllogism proves the why, s::l.11ce its middle term is the proximate cause." 
(I have followed, except for a few adjustments, W. D. Ross in this 
translation, Aristotelis 01>era (Oxford: 1908-52] Vol. , pp. ) • 
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as knowers, for the product :is merely an image or logos of the producer. 
sensation and sense-powers are the consequence of the production of 
imperfect knowers and therefore do not belong to the universe of Forms or 
perfect knowers (chs. 3-7). 
Secondly, how can the Forms of irrational beings exist .. There? 
Unlike sense-powers irrational beings (or rather their Forms) can exist 
in the intelligible world. First, the Forms of beasts are lives and 
perfections and, theJ:'efore, compatible with the Intelligence. Indeed, 
forms qua forms are equal, for every form is really the whole of the 
intelligible world (ch. 9). Secondly, if the Intelligence did not admit 
an infinite plurality of foms and did not comprehend all beings in a 
single, living moment, it would be deficient and there would be no ground 
for the sense world (ch. lO). For the same reason that the Forms of 
beasts inhabit the intelligible world, the forms of plants and elements 
do so likewise. They are perfections and lives and are compatible with 
the Intelligence (ch. 11). 7 
Overcoming these misconeept:l.ons about the Platonic account of 
production has shown that the lntelligence is a perfect knower and a 
universe of diverse forms, teening with life (ch. 12). This brings us to 
the initial portion of the key text, where it is shown how the Intelli-
gence as a unity-in-multiplicity involves energeia. 
Section One: 
"[l] For intelligence is not simple, nor is the Soul which is 
7Plotinus actually argues In ehapter eleven (lines 17-71) that the 
elements have a kind of lite, as is: demonstrated by the variety of surface 
and subsurface chemical changes end the growth of metals deep inside the 
earth. 
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from it, but all beings are multiple insofar as they are simple [i.e., 
beings are multiple in inverse proportion to their simplicity]. [2] And 
they are such [•simple] not Insofar as they are composites but to the 
extent they are principles and to the extent they are acts. [3] For the 
act of the last [intelligible] is simple as a fading-out [of ac~], but 
[the act] of the first [intelligil>le is simple as the totality of] all 
acts.8 
VI, 7, 13, 1-4: 
"'Ecrn }'ap o~r J.1oii~ ci.11..\.oii11, oJ-re 'ii le ai}rov i/;vx~. 
~ \ \ \ I\ , " r \.A • ~ I • \ I e 
Ul\l\a 'rTOLKLAa. 11a.11Ta. () "'P l:l!f "a, rovro oE OUqJ µ:11 uv11 e-ra 
\fll t' ,. '' ,,,,_ \ \ t I f Ka£ OaqJ apxa' ICQI OU~ fll~p}'etCJ.L. ~ OV fLEll yap EUXaTOV TJ 
t I f .. \I f \• a~\ f A 
EllEPYELO. ws C.1' ATJ'i'OVO'O a-irn71, 'TOU 11E 'ITPW'TOIJ 'ITauai. 
" [ 4] The Intelligence moves with a movement that one expects to 
find in multiple beings vhic:h are forever the same, and certainly its 
unity is not the same as something [divisible] into parts, but is every-
thing together, since something in parts is indeed not a unity, but is 
divisible into an infinity.9 [5] And do we say that [the Intelligence] 
is from something [i.e., has an origin] and in addition [moves] toward 
something as to a termt [~) But then is what is between the All [and its 
term) like a line or like something else such as a body, homogeneous and 
unvaried? [7] But what would be the value of that? For if there were no 
change nor if anything l>rought it into a life of diversity, it would not 
/ 8the translation of this last sentence (113) agrees with Brehier: 
"L'acte de l 1Qtre qui oc:c:upe le dernier rang dans le monde intelligbile 
est simple; mais l'acte de l'gtre ci.ui occ:upe le premier rang c'est tous 
les actes" (Plotin, Vol. 6, fart 1, p. 83). 
9see Text A, collllllents cu infinity. 
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be act, for in no way is such a condition different from the absence of 
energeia. [8] And if [its} movement were of this sort, it would be only 
--
8 
single life and not the whole of life. [9] And it is necessary that 
life be all and be all-encompassing and that nothing be without life. 
[lO] The Intelligence must move its elf into everything, or rather have 
aJ,ways been so moved. 
13, 4-16: VOVS' 
I ..,. "f I ' \ t\ \ TE ICLVOVfLEVOS' KLVEt.TO.I ~EV waatJTWS' KQL ICQTQ TQVTQ l(QL 
• I I , f t ' 1' fl t I .J\ \ \ I 
OfLOLa an, ov !J.fV'T"O' "rllV"T"Ol.I Ka& EV Ti EV fLEpfL, a./\/\Q '7TUVTQ • 
• ' ' ' 1 - 1"' •• ''\' ' ... " f'7TEL KaL T'O El.I !-"£per. (IV Cl1')( El.I, aN\a KaL TOlJT'O 0.1TELpov 
t' ' 'A \ II 8 I .J. .. \ ' • ' ' OLO.LpOVfLEVOll. 1T() 1"i.l'OS' f ya.~EJJ av KO.L 7r'QllT'WS' ETTL TL 
• ti T' ~· t• - ~ • I ... WS' E<TXO.T'Ol.I ; 0 ()£ J-L~1"0§ II 17(11J ci.pa WU'l'Tf.P ypaµ.µ.T], .,, WU1T€p 
• - • I ' • ' ·, .A'\ ' ' ' fTEpov UW/-LCI op.o&op.epES' "rl l(QL Cl7r0LKU\OV ; IV\Q TL TO 
I • E' \ ~ I • If:.-\\ ' t' ' ·~ ' 
cuµ.11ov, ' yap p.Y)oep.~o.i.- •xe' E~llA/\aY'l11 µ.T}oE TLS' EsE')'fL-
, \ t \ J'" f I t~, • t I ti t ~ \ 
pEL a.vTo fLi ro 1:111i.- E-repO"rT}i. ouo 0.11 E11~oyELa ELTJ • ovoEll 
\ 'IA f ' ' \ 9 I ~ ,J.. I }""" ya.p 411 11 "T"Of.llV'MJ l((ITCL"7CIO'S' f.1-71 EVEpyno.S' oLa.,,EpOL. ~a.II 
I t'}. " I I A • t'I .. • KLllTJO"LS' Oli' IJ '10L411'1"1J, 011 'lTOVraxws. !-"0110.XWS' 0 av ELT} 
Cw~' s,, 8£ '7Tavra '~I' Kai 1'al'TaxdOn1 Kal ou8£v µ.~ C~v. 
'E', ... ·IJ i:::- ~"' ~l -e 7n 7r'QVT'(I OllV Kl.J."E&OVCH 11e&, f'-4/VIOY Uf;" ICEKLVTJa aL. 
"(11] A simple existent [•the Intelligence], if it moves, is only 
that [which is moving or knowing}, and either it does not advance into 
anything or if it does advance it [in a sense] remains and, thus, is a 
duality.10 (12] But if one is the same as the other [i.e., if the first 
•ember of the duality Is the same as the second], the unity remains and 
there has been no advance.LI [13] Eut If there is a difference [between 
10Br{hier translates tilis sentence as follows: "Si c'~tait un 
terme simple qui se m.e~t, elle ne c:ontieudrait que ce terme unique; ou 
bien elle m~me ne procede pas, ou l>len, si elle procede, i1 y a autre 
chose qui reste immobile; 11 ya alors cleux termes" (Plotin, Vol. 6, Part 
2, P• 84). Richard Harder re11ders lt as follows: "Ferner, entweder 
bleibt er er selbst und scllreitet :zu nichts hinaus, oder, wenn er 
hinausschreitet, ist er als :Ble:tbender etwas anderes: folglich Zwei" 
(Harder-Theiler, Plotins Schrjften, ~a11cl III, a, p. 283). 
)1Again Br/hier: "sl le sece>nd est le m~me que prtctdent, 
!'unite reste, et il n'y a pas eu veritablement procession (Plotin, Vol. 
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them], the original unity has advanced with differentiation and has 
produced out of a certain sameness and difference a third unity.12 This 
generation out of sameness and difference is a product that has a nature 
which is same and different. And it is not a particular different 
something, but it is an all which is different, for [=just as] its sameness 
is an all. [14) Since it is an all which is the same and an all which is 
different, it is not something that lacks other things. It has a nature, 
then, that introduces difference into the All. [15) If all these different 
beings were before it, it would be influenced by them. [ 16) But it is not 
subsequent to them, it produced all of them, or rather was all of them. 
13,16-28: 
'A-
.,, \ov·,, t'~ • • • • ' • ' .. • ' ' • I\ o.1 EL KtVOLTO, EKELVO µ.ovov EX€L • KQL 77 avTo KaL ov 
•Q I It' I " I llQ ,!'\ \ I • t' I \ 
wpov,.,71 US' OVOEV, 71 £t TTpov,.,71, W\1\0 µ.Evov • WUTE ovo. KQL 
I t \ ..., t I I t' \ t \ I\ e I t'I 
U TQ.VTOV TOVTO EK£LV<p, µ.EVEL EV KQ.L OV 'ITpOE/\111\V EV, EL o 
• A \e \ I I \ t I I t ""' ETEpov, TTpOT)I\ E µ.ETQ ETEPOTT)TOS' ICQL E'n'Ot71aEv EK TQVTOV 
' ' ' , . ,., , ~' . . ... ' TWOS' KQL ETEpov TPLTOV EV. .l EJIOµ.EJIOJI 071 EK TQ.VTOV KQ.L 
f I \ I ,J..1 II 1 \ \ • l 
ETEpov TO ')'EJ10µ.E11011 .,..vaLV EXE' Ta.VTOJI KaL ETEpo11 E va.' • 
• ~\ t I ~\\ \ • fl \ \ \ t \ t .,.. 
ETEPOJI OE ov TL, W\/\Q. 'ITQ.JI ETEpo11. KaL yap TO TO.VTOV QVTOV 
A ll""' ~ \ I \ " \ .... W t II • t TTQV. a.v OE TQVTOJI ov KQL 'ITQ.V ETEpOJI OVK EUTLV 0 TL a.no-
\ I A I I ,,f,.I II II I\ .. I .. 0 
l\EL7TEL TWJI ETEpw11 • .... vu'" apa. EXEL E'"' 'ITav ETEpoLova aL. 
E t \ 9 II \ I .,.. \ fl I -~ I " ' µ.Ev OVJI EUTL 'ITpo Q.VTOV Ta ETEpa 'ITQVTQ, 77071 'ITa.axo' a.v 
f I I - t ~\ \ ti • \ I t I """\\ 
V7T QVTWJI. u OE µ.71 EUTLV, OVTOS' Ta. 7TQVTQ. EyEvva, fl-0.1\/\0JI 
8E TQ 'n'clJITQ. ~II. 
"[17) These beings could not exist except as actuated by the 
Intelligence, which actuates always [so as to produce] one being after 
another, as if wandering down every path but wandering [always] within 
i tself--such beings the Intelligence, since real in itself, generates 
6, Part 2, p. 84). Harder-Theiler: "Und ist dies Zweite mit dem anderen 
identisch, so bleibt er immer noch eines und ist nicht hinausgeschritten" 
(Plotins Schriften, Band III, a, p. 283). 
12A triad is evident here: sameness, difference and the synthesis 
of sameness and otherness. 
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by its wandering. This wandering which it has by nature is in real beings 
who travel along with its wanderings. [18] But it is always itself. And 
its wandering is stationary. Wandering for it is in the plain of truth, 
from which it does not stray. 
"[19] It has and embraces everything and makes for itself and for 
its movement, as it were, the place where it moves. [20] And this plain 
[of truth] is varied, so that traveling about in it may occur. [21] If 
it were not in every respect and always varied, [that is] if it were 
simply without diversity, it would stand still. [22] But if it stood 
still, there would be no intellection. And thus, if it stood still at 
all, it would not have intellected. [23] But [in fact] if this were the 
case, it simply would not be. It is, then, intellection. [24] And its 
movement completely fills all being, and all being is wholly intellection 
and encompasses all life and [produces] eternally one being after another. 
[25] It is something which is the same and different, and it is ceaselessly 
separating out different beings and making them manifest. [26] And its 
entire journey is through life and is entirely through living beings, 
just as for a traveller over the earth everything which he traverses is 
earth, even though earth admits differences [as to countries, cities, 
etc.]. And so it is with the life [of the Intelligence]: that through 
which it passes is itself, although it is always other and not itself. 
But always it has the same passage through what is not itself because it 
does not change; rather it is present to all differences precisely in the 
same way and according to its sameness. [ 27] For if there were not 
something that related to the different beings in precisely the same way 




' t ' Q VK ECTTLV O.pa Ta oVTa E lvat µ ~ voii (vEo- Y'Jaa~oS', Ev£pY71aaVTOS' \ r \ e I - \ I \ t a?J-rw 
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fTI\ •"I I I - - t - \ I n - t'I t I t ' 
,\avaa8aL auv0£ouawv Twv ouatwv TaLS' a.uTOU TTl\avatS'. aVTayou o a.uTOS' E~TL 
1T 1' .. , ' ' 'H t' ~ ' ' , - • - - ' ' 0 'a .. TT E o 'w 11.lvouaav ovv £XEL TTJV 1Tl\QV1JV. Ot TTl\O.V1J a.UT~ EV T~ TT}S' al\1} EL ~ • I 
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'T01TOV, ICQ.L 0 T071"0S' 0 QV'TOS' 'T~ OU TOTTOS'. OLKLl\OV Of. f.CTTL TO TTf.OLOV TOV'TO, LVQ 
t' 'I I t' \ \ \ - ,- t \ I\ e I \ , ' tA " 1eai OLf.1.LOL. EL OE f'TJ KQ'TQ 1TaV ICQL au 1TOUCLl\OV, Ka oaov fl.1} 11"~LIC. ov, f.CT'TTJKEV. 
E' ~· " 1 .. • , • "' 1 , ' ~' ... '~· " ' 0 f.CT'TTJKEV, ov VOEL. wa'Tf.. KaL, EL EaTTJ, OU Vf.V01JKEV. EL OE TOUTO, ovo f.CTTLV. 
,, EaTLV oov voTj~LS'. 1} OE 1elv71atS' miaa 1TA1Jpoiiaa ovalav 1Taaav, Kai ~ miaa ovala 
- r ' ' a - - ' • .!'\' ' ' .!'\' ' ... ' -voT]aLS' TTaaa ~w11v TTEPLl\ar-.ovaa. TTaaav, KaL fl.ET Q/\1\0 Q.f.L '11\/\0, Kat "o TL QV'TOIJ 
I I \ .!'\ \ \ t' - t \ \ .!'\ \ I .J.. I n- t' \ t' \ r - f Ta VTOV. KaL W\1\0 I KaL otaLpOVV'TL an TO WV\O ava.,..aLV£TaL. aaa OE Ota ~WT]S' TJ 
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" t' .l. ' " • - K ' • - • ' r 1 t- • 3. • , , .. t', , , .!'\ , yij, 1eav ota'f'opaS' EXTJ TJ Y7J· aL EKEL 11 µEv ~WT], OL •t>. 17 a1J'T7}, OTL oE a.Et a./\/\17, 
t • t , 'A ' t'• .. \ • \ t' \ - • • - t' ,, "' .. ' I 'Q 
ovx 11 aVTTJ. EL o EXWV TTJV avT11v ota 'TWV OVK av'Twv ou:1oooov, on fl.11 aµE't-"• 
I • . ~\ \ \ I I • \ \ t I• t \ \ \ \ \ ~\ \ ci>J.a avvf.aTL TOLS' WV\OLS' TO waaV'TWS' KaL KO.'TO. TO.V'TO. Eav yap µ.11·1TEpL TQ WV\a 
\ f I \ \ \ t' \ I "" I \ \ 1 I \ f 1 I 
'TO waaV'TWS' KO.L KaTa Ta auTa, apyu 7TQVTT} KO.L TO E~EO~EL~ KO.L ;? ~,!IE..QYE!q 
ovoaµou. 
"(28] These other beings are, in fact, itself; thus, it is every-
thing. If it is truly itself [•the Intelligence], then it is every~hing. 
But if it is not everything, it is not [in fact] itself. (29] But if it 
is everything and everything is it, because it includes all beings and if 
it is without nothing because nothing is incomplete in this total! ty 1 
then there is nothing belonging to it which is not different. For this 
reason both the other and this Intelligence complete each other. (30] 
For if it had no difference but were the same rather than different, that 
would lessen its own proper being since it has not brought about the 
completion of its own nature." 
13, 51-57: 
"Ea-r, OE Kat Ta ci>v\a 
QVTOS', wa'TE mi.) avro). Kat EL1T£p O.V1"0S', '7TCiS', ·El S( µ.~. 
, , , E' ~ ~ .... , , , - • ' ' ' OVK O.V'TOS'. ' o .. 7TO.S' a.vroS' KaL 1TO.S', O'TL TO. TTavra, KaL 
,~, t • ' \ ... ' ' , 't'' • OVO(V ianv, 0 TL fl.'1'/ UVVTEl\EL ELS' TO. '7TO.VTO., OVOf.V EaTLV 
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• - • ' .!"\' • .!'\ \ " ' - ' - E• , C1VTOV, 0 ·n ,.,.T} WV\O, LllC1 W\1\0 011 ICQL TOVTO UVVTEl\TJ· ' yap 
\ W\ \ .! \ \ \ .!"\ \ t r t\ I t - \ t I 
'µ.71 Ql\l\0 1 WV\Q W\i\~ 'TC1VTOV1 fl\QT'TWO'Et QV'TOV 'TTJV OVO'LaV 
·~ I t r t I\ t - .J.. I LOLQll OV TrapEXOJ-Lf.VOV EtS" O'VllTf.l\ELC111 QVTOV 'f'VO'LV. 
[Plotinus closes the first part of the treatise (chs. 1-14) by 
employing an analogy common to the Enneads. The Intelligence is .compar-
able to an organism, which is a unity of diverse parts and functions. 
Each part of an organism has its own nature but exists for the good of 
the whole. The unity of the Intelligence is even greater because its 
parts are really identical with one another (ch. 14).] 
[Part two of the treatise (chs. 15-42) aims to answer the following 
question: what is the nature of goodness which appears in the intelligi-
ble beings? Plotinus begins by explaining the origin of the lntelli-
gence from the Good.13 The nature of production forbids that the 
Intelligence is the Good, upon which the Intelligence depends for its 
being. The Intelligence results from an eternally prior moment in which 
it is an active power, a sight; this sight needs an object and it turns 
to behold the Good, which it cannot completely grasp. The inadequacy of 
its vision turns its objects into multiple forms, which are the essential 
contents of the Intelligence and the eternal reasons for all successive 
existents. The Intelligence unites all this multiplicity into one nature 
and thus it is a cosmos of sameness and difference (ch. 15). In addition 
to these stages of active power (formless sight) and reversion to the 
object (determination of that sight), there is a vision of the illum-
I 13of this second part of the treatise Brehier says the following: 
"l' on aborde une des oeuvres qui font le mieux comprendre la nature de 
11 mystique de Plotin; la transcendence du Bien au-dessus de toute 
determination, !'union de l'ime avec le Bien au-dessus de toute con-
naissance, tels en sont les deux motifs essentiels" (Plotin, Vol. 6, 
Part 2, pp. 51-52). 
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ining light of the Good,14 which is simultaneous with the stage of 
determination or fragmentation of the object {ch. 16).15] 
[The next section of the key text begins with chapter seventeen.] 
Section !:!2.= 
"[31] But how do the beings [•the Forms] in the Intelligence and 
the Intelligence itself arise if these beings were not There in That 
[•the One] which fills nor indeed in that [•the .lisll!§.] which is filled? 
For when it was not yet filled, they were not [yet in it]. But is it not 
necessary that the giver have what it gives? [32] But it is necessary in 
these matters that the giver be thought of as superior and the gift as 
inferior to the giver. For such is the case in the production of real 
beings. [33] For first there must be something in ac~; and the posterior 
things are potentially whatever is prior to them [and in act]. [34] And 
the first transcends the secondary things and the giver transcends the 
gift because it is superior. [35] If therefore something is prior to act, 
it transcends act and thus transcends life. [ 36] If then there is life 
in the Intelligence, there is a giver of life who is greater and of more 
worth than life. (37] The Intelligence has life but not because it 
requires a giver who has plurality. Its life is a certain vestige of That 
14The question of the precise nature of this light present to the 
Intelligence is what Plotinus aims to answer in this second part of the 
treatise. 
15chapter sixteen slightly amends the account of conversion {epis-
.!_rophe) to the Good found in chapter fifteen. In chapter fifteen the 
Intelligence is, at first, a formless vision which beholds the Good and 
secondly, becomes a vision of the forms {its own contents). In the fol-
lowing chapter, however, out of the initial stage of formlessness comes 
8 twofold vision: first, a vision of the infinite vari,ty of forms; 
secondly, of the illumining light of the Good. {See Brehier, · Plotin, 
Vol. 6, Part 2, PP• 53-54.) 
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[=the Good], but it is not the life of That [=the Good]. [38] As life 
looked towards That, life was indeterminate. [39] But after life looked 
There it was determined [i.e., bounded, made distinct], but That had no 
determination. [40) For as soon as something looks at the One it is de-
termined by this and takes into itself boundary and limit and form. [41] 
And [in this case] the form was in the shaped; but the shaper was without 
shape. [42] And the limit was not external, as if it were some thing drawn 
around a magnitude; but the limit was that of the totality of life There; 
the boundary was diverse and infinite, as radiating out from such a nature 
[i.e., from the One who is infinite]. [43] Life was not that of something 
definite, for then it would be defined as already an individual. [44] 
[While it is not defined as an individual thing,] yet it is nonetheless 
defined. It is defined then as a certain unity-in-multiplicity. [45] 
Each item of the multitude is also defined. [46] The whole Intelligence 
is defined as multiple through the multiplicity of life, and yet it is a 
unity by virtue of its limit. 
17, 1-25: 
'A\ 'a' - ... ' ' ... ' ' , • ,, IV\ 1TWS' T'aUTQ. EV aUT''tJ #CQ.' (1VTOS', OU#C OV'TWV 
t A ' ,,,.., \ I t~I 'f' I t ,.. "" \ I 
f#CE£ EV -rep '"""f/PWUaVT'I. OtJO au EV 0.VTctJ T'tJ '1Tl\7]pouµ.EVctJ ; 
·o , ' · ' - · r "H • • ' • TE ya.p p.T)1TW E1Tl\'f/pouTo, OUK E XEV. ou1e avayKT/, o
\' It' • w ~ \ \ \ \' • t • I \ \ 
.,.,S' o'owa,, 'T'OV'T'O EXE,V, al\l\a OEI. EV TOLS' TOLOVTOLS' TO µ.EV 
01.Sov µE'i{ov voµ.l,ov I TO S€ s,86µ.Evov EAa'T'TOV TOU s,s&v-
'T'OS. TOI.a~ yap ii y(vEOLS' fll .TOLS' 0Jc11.. llpwTOV yap 8EL 
\ • I l I ~· • f'. I:: I \ I 
'T'O. EVEp"}'EL~ £ va' I Ta 0 UUTEpa ovaL r>"JIQ./J-6 Ta 'trpo 
t .-. ' \ ,,,. t-\ t I """' ~ I \ -O.V'T'WV. Ka& TO "'PWTOV 0£ f'trEICELllQ. TWll OEUTEpwv ICaL TOU 
~ !:! , I ~ \' \ • , ~ - , E" I !>LOOfl-EVOtJ TO 0&0011 £1TEIC£&VO. 1111' 1Cp0'T'TOV yap. L 'TL TOLVVll 
I I I ti t I fl \ j 
EllEf"jE&aS' wpo-rEpov, £1TEICELVQ. EVEf'YEL~, WUTE ICQ.L ~1T-
I r - '=' • " ,. ' , • • !:! ~ ' "!:! ' E#CEWQ. •""71>· ~' OtJV 1:iW"f/ EV TOU'TctJ, 0 OLOOUS EOWICE µ.ev 
Cw~v, KaJJ..lwv 8£ Kal TLµ.u.UTepoS' Cw~;. Elxev oJv Cw~v 
I t ·~ • I\ • \' \' I I ~ f )' I II ICQ.L OUK fQE&TO 1101.ICLl\OtJ TOU QLOOV'TOS', ICaL 'Ill 11 1:iWT} LXVOS' 
t I t t I r I n I t • I t' Q\ I 
TL EK£LVOV, 01.JIC EKfLVOV ':>WT). poS' EICELllO µ.ev ouv tJl\E-
. ' ~ f3' '·'· ~· • - • •r • • • 1TOVC7Q aop&U'T'OS' .,v, 1\£.,,aaa 0 EICEL wp1.1:.£TO £KELI/OU opov 
, " E 'a' ' ' " '~ - ' 'r , ouK EXOVTOS'. v11vs yap Trpos £11 .,., 1.oouua op1.1:i£TaL 'TOVTctJ 
• ,, • • - • • • ' r!:! • • ' r~ 1((1, '"X" EV a VT1J opov icaL 1TEpas 1((1£ E OOS' 1((11. TO E OOS' 
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• A .I.. f) I \ ~' .I.. A ,, .I.. :l. 'O ~' ,, EV T<p µ.op't'w EVTL, TO oE µ.op't'waav aµ.op't'ov ,1v. oE opoi 
t we_ (J f '() () I _! \ \ t :J. I t I OVIC E,w CV, OLOV /J-EYE EL 'ITEpLTE ELS', WV\ 'IV 7J'aCTT]S' EKEL· 
VTJS' -rijs- {wijs- opOS' 7roMijs- Ka2 a71'Elpov 0 UC1TJS'. ,:,S' civ 
\ I .J.. I t \ ,/, I z I :J. I -~ o napa. 'TOLaVTTJS' 't'VUEWS' EKl\aµ.,,aCTT]S'. WT] TE ,,v ov TOVOE 
II \ " I I I II~ _! \ \I ti I 3, II 
wpLU'TO yap av WS' aToµov "JOT] • WV\ wpLaTO J-LEVTOL • ,,v apa. 
• (J A • • I \\ A .. ~· \ • opLa E Laa WS' EVOS' TLVOS' 'ITOIV\OV - wpLaTO 071 KQ.L EICO.aTOV 
TWV 110.\.\wv - a,a µiv TO 'ITOAV -rijs- {wijs- 110.\.\ci &pia8Eiaa, 
~ \ ~ \ .. \ .. ti OLO. OE av TOV opov Ev. 
[[47] What then is this 'defined unity'? It is the Intelligence. 
For determined life is the Intelligence. [48] But what is its 'multipli-
city'? It is the multitude of the intelligences. All [the contents of 
the Intelligence] are intelligences. [49] On the one hand, there is the 
totality of the Intelligence; on the other, the many individual intelli-
gences. [ 50] But is the whole Intelligence that has each intelligence 
identical with any one intelligence that it has? 16 [ 51] But then it 
would embrace solely one king of thing. [ 52 J If then they are many, 
there must be differentiation [in the Intelligence]. [53] Again, then, 
how does each intelligence have differentiation? It comes to have differ-
entiation because of what it is in itself and how it relates to the 
whole. [54] For the totality of the Intelligence is not identical with 
any of the individual intelligences. 
17, 25-32: 
T l .. \ .. • , () • 11.T A • L ovv TO (( Ell wpia .,, I) • .lYOUS' • opL-
() • r ' - ,.,,, ~ ' ' ' ' ' • N' ' ' ,. CT E iCTa yap t:.WTJ VOVS'. ' ' OE TO (I 1TOIV\a I) ' OES' 1TOIV\OL. 
n ' .,. ' ' r ' "" - r ~' • """' 'O aVTa ovv VOES', ICQ.L 0 µ.Ev was VOVS', OL OE EKO.aTOL VOL. 
~\ ,. ... fl I , t \ • 
OE WO.S' VOVS' EicaaTOV WEPlEXWV a.pa. TaVTOV EKO.aTOV 
• 'A\ \t • .. A E' .. \ \ , ~ .I.. ' 
'flEPLEXEL ; /\1\ EVQ. av WEpLELXEV. L ovv 'flOIV\OL, oia.,,opa.v 
8Ei Elva•. na;.,v oJv 1TWS' EKaaTOS' 8ia.cpopciv EUXEV ; • H EV 
Tqi Ka2 Efs- o.\ws yEvf.a8ai ElXE '"iv 8ia.t/>op&.v' ou ycip 
1 ' • ... "" ' .... Ta uTov o~ovovv vov TO nav. 
,... ) ' )61 follow Ficinus in translating the phrase afes.. TtAvTov' 
Tl"'f'-cX..(;.l: "numquid uelut eundem continet unumquemque." 
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"[55] The life of the Intelligence was a universal power and the 
vision which then occurred There was the power of all beings, and the 
generated Intelligence is 1 tself the mani fes ta tion of all these beings. 
[56] And the Intelligence is placed over these beings, not so that it may 
be established, but so that [through its vision] of that which is without 
form [i.e., the One) it may establish the form of the first forms .17 
[57] And the Intelligence becomes as a light to the Soul, just as the One 
does to the Intelligence. (58] And whenever the latter determines the 
soul it makes it rational, giving to it a trace of what it has itself. 
[59] Intelligence then is a trace of the One. [60] And since the 
Intelligence is a form and in going out [from the One] is made plural, 
the One is formless and shapeless, for thus it makes form.18 [61] If the 
One were a form, the Intelligence would be a logos. [.62] It is necessary 
that the First be utterly without plurality, for its plurality would make 
it dependent on another existing before It. 
17, 32-43: 
\ 17Here I basically follow the Br/hier translation "L' Intel"ligence 
siege en eux, non pas pour y trov~r un fondement, mais pour etre le 
fondement des ~tres premiers grace a la vision qu 'elle a de ce qui est 
sans forme" (Plotin, Vol. 6, Part 2, p. 89). 
18of this precise text (#63-/164) Rist remarks as follows: "The 
only possible conclusion from this passage must be that a logos is the 
representative of something determinate and informed. It must not be the 
representative of the One, but only the representative of Noas. It must 
be connected first and foremost, as at 5.1.3.13, with the representation 
of the Forms at the next level of reality, the level of Soul" (The Road 
~ Reality, p. 85). While this may be for Plotinus the strict 'Or pre= 
ferred sense of logos, 1 t is nonetheless true that he elsewhere uses 
l!?&os to refer to '"the representative of the One" (See esp. V, 1 [10] 6, 
48ff •; VI, 4 ( 22) 11, 16). Logos appears, in addition, to refer some-
times to the seminal reason of a thing--the productive principle or form 
of something as it exists eternally in the Intelligence (see earlier, n. 
8). 
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• ~.,.. I t I I t • I • • \ • t OV'T'WS' 'f"WS' f&S' C1V'Tl7ll, WS' EICUllOS' US' VOllll ICU& OTO.V KO.£ 
• • I \ ,/, I \ \ ,. ~ \ t ,. • fl 
0117'0S' op&UTJ rtp• .,.11)('1Y, l\Oy&K7JY TrO&E' 0011s a 11T17 cuv EUXEV 
,, "I • , .. • , • , ~ 1 • .. r~ 
&XJJOS'. XJJOS' OIJV ICO.L VO'IJS' EICE&VOll' ('7T(L Ot: 0 110115' E OOS' 
' • 1. • ' \ '8 ' .. ,, .I. ' ' ~ • ICO.& fJI ~X'tt1a£L 1((1£ 1Tl\11 n, flCE&VOS" aµ.op'f'OS" ICO.& O.llE&OEOS' 
• ' ·~ .. E' ~· " ' - r~ ' .. " .. OVTW yap E&OOWO&EL. L 0 .,v EICUVOS' E OOS', 0 VOVS" .,v a.v 
A&yos. • ESec. OE To TrpwTov µ.1] TroAo µ.T]Saµ.ws Elva.&· ciV1jp-
' "' ' \\ t .... , • .. ' ' ""' TT}'TO yap O.ll 'TO 1TOl\IJ O.VTOU OS' ETEpo11 a.v wpo Q.VTOll. 
"[63] But in what way are the contents of the Intelligence like th~ 
Good?l9 Is it because each being is a form or all are beautiful or 
what? [64] If something comes from the Good, it has in every respect a 
trace and type of That from which it comes, just as fire is a trace of 
the fire from which it comes and sweetness is a trace of the sweetness 
from which it originates.20 [65] Now life came into the Intelligence 
from the Good--for the Intelligence originated out of the act from the 
Good and--the Intelligence exists because of the Good and the beauty of 
the Forms is from There also. [66] All these things--life, intelligence, 
form21--are like the Good. [ 6 7] But what do they have in common? For 
the fact that they come from the Good is not enough for there to be 
19Plotinus obviously regards this question as equivalent to the 
alternative formulation: "what is the nature of that light which illu-
mines the intelligible world?" This seems correct, for his answer in 
chapter thirty-six--that the light or goodness There is the Good Itself, 
who is, at once, immanent to all beings (as their internal reality) and 
transcendent (as the indeterminate source of determination, Intelligence 
and being)--adequately solves both formulations of the question. 
20see Text B, comments on fire. 
21In this passage Plotinus divides the intelligible order into three 
distinct acts, the first of which is prior, atemporally, to the second 
and the second to the third. These acts are life, Intelligence and form 
(See Brehier, Plotin, Vol. 6, Part 2, p. 54). 
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identity [among them). [68) For there must be something common in them. 
For what may be produced from something might not be identical but rather 
diverse according as difference comes about in multiple recipients, since 
that which is given to the first act is different from that which is 
given by the first act.22 And that which these [prior acts] produce 
here is also different. (69) But there is nothing to prevent that each 
thing is good, more or less according to its own difference. [70] What 
then explains the highest good? 
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"[71] But before [we know what explains the highest good], it is 
necessary to know whether life is good, life in and of itself, life 
contemplated in its simplicity and stripped bare of all other qualities. 
[72] And surely the life which results from Life is something different 
from such life There. [73 J But again what is [the goodness of] this 
latter life? It is the life of what is good. But it is not the life of 
the Good itself, but rather the life from It. [74] But if in that life 
22rn other words, the first act, life, is different from the second 
act, Intelligence, and from the third act, form. 
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there should be something form the One and this life is truly life, and 
if we must affirm that nothing worthless may be from That; life in and of 
itself is indeed good. (75] And [if] indeed we are to speak truthfully 
about the Intelligence, we say it is good [because] it is from the First. 
[76] And it is evident that each form is good and is like the Good. [77] 
Every form must have something good, or something common [to all] or 
rather something different. whether as the first or as the second of 
things in a series. [78] It follows that we have established that each 
thing here has in it something and, because of this fact, is itself good. 
For life is not good absolutely [i.e., without a cause], but we say that 
life is truly what it is because it is from the Good; this is also true 
of the Intelligence; one must see a certain identity in them. 
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"[79] When, siven a.11 their differences, we attribute sameness to 
[the contents of] life and Intelligence, nothing prevents us from holding 
that this sameness eic:ists in their very entity, and yet this sameness 
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~ay be considered apart in one's thought. [80] For example, life [mentally 
separated] from a man and a horse brings about [the notion of] animal; 
also heat we may derive from water and fire. The genus [of animal or of 
heat] belongs primarily [to the first term in the above examples] and 
secondarily [to the other terms]. Each part [together] or each separate-
ly, then, could be commonly called 'good'. 
" [ 81] But then does this establish goodness in their very entity? 
[82] Truly each as a who le is good, but not like the goodness which 
belongs to the One. (83) How then? As parts [of the Good]? No, the 
Good is without parts. [84] The good itself is a unity, but each [plural] 
thing may have unity according to its own manner of being. [85] For the 
first act is good and the limit associated with the first act is good, as 
well as the union of the act and the limit [i.e., th~ resultant entity]. 
[86] And the first act is good because it comes from the Good; the second, 
because it is an ordered All out of the prior good; the third because it 
is a union of the two. [87] [These lesser goods] are derived, then, and 
are not identical [with one another], just as out of the same person 
issue speech and walking and other characteristics, all of them rightly 
there. 
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"[88] Here [==in this world] goodness depends on order and rhythn. 
But what accounts for goodness There? [89] A certain answer is possible: 
here the good is derived wholly from outside because the ordered is 
different from the orderer, but There they are the same [and therefore 
good in and of themselves]. 
"[ 90] But why are they good in themselves? For it is not just 
because they derive from There that we must profess our belief that they 
are good. True, we must agree that beings [There] have worth because 
they derive from the Good, but we nonetheless should undertake an 
explanation of how they are [intrinsically] good--i.e., to comprehend that 
by which they are good.23 
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23The question of the intrinsic perfection of real! ties keeps the 
interest of Neopla tonlsts long after Plopnus. / Proclus, in particular, 
refines the issue through his notion of du Burro er- ra ro V • This notion, 
usually translated "self-constituting," refers to that perfection which 
a reality (or, more precisely, a participant) receives from a monad 
directly or immediately (such as what soul receives from an intelligence, 
intelligence from a being or a being from a henad) and which intrinsically 
constitutes the participant's nature. Such a perfection is "self-consti-
tuting" because It is an immanent cause. 
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[Having now rejected various solutions to the question, "what is 
the goodness present to the intelligible beings" (ch. 18; #66-184), 
p!otinus proposes and rejects two additional solutions (ch. 19) .24 He 
proposes yet another in chapter twenty:] the Intelligence is itself the 
Good. But several difficulties follow from this solution. First, analy-
sis of the desire of the soul shows that this position is untenable, 
because the soul's love for the good has priority over any desire for 
intelligence. Moreover, the soul values the Intelligence because it 
conducts the soul to the Good; the soul is not content to end its search 
with the Intelligence. Thirdly, intelligence is one among many goods, 
the desirability of which is variable. Consequently, the Intelligence 
depends on something prior for its goodness (ch. 20).] 
Proclus contrasts these authypostata with a perfection which a 
participant receives from a monad indirectly or mediately (as soul from a 
being [through the mediation of an intelligence] or an intelligence from 
a henad [through the mediation of a being]) and which belongs to ·the 
participant only intermittently or transiently. 
Several publications help clarify Proclus' notion of authypostaton. 
First, I recommend. Leo Sweeney, "Participation and the Structure of Being 
in Proclus' Elements 2.f Theology," in .!.!:!! Structure ~ Being: A !!.£:. 
Platonic Approach (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 
1981), pp. 140-55 and 177-81. This paper is particularly helpful in 
explaining the relation of authypastaton to metechomenon ("participated 
perfection'") in J.roclus. Also see: John Whittaker, "Proclus' Doctrine 
of the .>A. '(S Y1T'O t TATA( Geneve: Foundation Hardt, 197 5) pp. 193-238. In 
addition consult E. R. Dodds, .!.!:!! Elements ~ Theology (Oxford: 1933; 
reprinted, 1963). 
24These two arguments are brief. Perhaps the good is simply any 
object of desire. :Rut in that event the good becomes an extrinsic condition 
of being and not the very cause of its being. Also objects of desire are 
variable and therefore the good would not be common to all beings. 
Perhaps (Plotinus continues) we should follow Plato [Republic 352 
e] and assume that the good of a being is its virtue. But we understand 
what virtue is because of its contrast to vice; since there is no vice in 
the intelligible world, we cannot know what virtue means There. Also 
Virtue is an addition to a being, but an intelligible is simply what it 
is, without anything extraneous. 
172 
[If the soul will appeal to its own internal experience of love for 
the Good rather than the method of intellection, judgment and analysis, 
it will see clearly that the Intelligence is inferior to the Good. The 
Good alone can provoke indubitable and essential love of the soul (ch. 
21)• Following Plato's '"amorous folly" of the Phaedrus (251 c)~25 one 
can further explain why the Intelligence is lovable, for an object may be 
loved not because of what it is itself but by virtue of the light that 
shines upon it. The Intelligence is illumined by the light of the Good 
and is therefore lovable (ch. 22). The love of the light that illumines 
the Intelligence is not like desire that dissipates and distracts the 
soul. It is an experience of that reality which is most interior to the 
Intelligence and to all beings (ch. 23).] 
[Before directly answering the question, "what is that in the 
intelligibles which m.ake them good?," or, as he now puts it, "what is the 
nature of that light which shines on the intelligibles, "26 Plotinus 
devotes six chapters (24-30) to solving seven aporiai, which pertain to 
the relationship of any being to the good.27 With these aporiai dissolved, 
25In the Phaedrus Plato speaks of the love of an object because it 
reflects the light of Beauty itself; the lover appreciates sensible beauty 
because it causes a recollection of intelligible Beauty--that Beauty 
which makes beauty possible. For Plotinus the beauty and goodness of the 
intelligibles is the result of the light of the Good; intelligible goodness 
and beauty make possible an ascent to the Good, which transcends the 
intelligible order altogether (see chs. 32-36). 
26As early as chapter sixteen (lines 21, 24-31) Plotinus identifies 
the Good with a light which illumines the intelligibles and thereby makes 
them good. Prior to chapter twenty-four he refers to light in this sense 
several times (ch. 17, lines 36-37; ch. 19, lines 19-21; ch. 21, lines 13-
17; ch. 22; ch. 23, line 1). 
27Here follows a list of these aporiai and their respective solu-
tions. (1) Is the Good itself good as the good of a certain being or 
as the good of all beings? As the internal reality of each and every 
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be addresses the central issue again.] 
[The internal experience of the soul testifies that the light which 
radiates on the intelligible beings has its source in the most lovable of 
objects (ch. 31) .28 This source cannot be the Intelligence, for the 
Intelligence admits of some measure of imperfection, however min~te, and 
being, the Good is good of all beings (ch. 27). (2) Is the Good desired 
because of that which is received from It or for the sake of the enjoyment 
it provides? Since the Philebus (21 c and 65a) has shown that the good 
is neither intelligence nor pleasure alone but their mixture, it is not 
incorrect to say the Good is desired for the joy It may bring us (ch. 
25). (3) The above two aporiai each entails a difficulty: (a) the first 
implies that the good for a being consists in that which it receives; 
Plotinus answers affirmatively, but with a qualification: the good of a 
being is its form (that which is received) but the source of that form, 
the Good, that which all desire, is transcendent (ch. 27); (b) the second 
requires that we determine whether it is the Good or something else that 
makes us have enjoyment; Plotinus replies it is the Good, for we desire 
something, seek pleasure in something, only to the extent it is good (ch. 
29). (4) Is the Good itself good by virtue of what it is intrinsically 
or because of something added to it? Of course, the Good is all-perfect 
and thus is good intrinsically (chs. 28-29). (5) Is the Good simultaneous-
ly the good of itself and of others? Ultimately the question makes no 
sense because only that in need or with desire can seek the Good; the 
perfect Good, however, has no needs or desires (ch. 25); if the question 
were to make sense. we would answer that the Good is indeed the good for 
itself, for It is the indeterminate ground of its own perfect reality 
(ch. 41). (6) Is the Good and the good for all of nature? Beings seek 
the Good by acquiring form; however, because matter is alien to form, it 
is excluded altogether from the Good (ch. 28). (7) Does one actually 
want to know that the Intelligence is good because the transcendent Good 
is present to it or merely because it brings us pleasure and self-love? 
Plotinus' answer is twofold: first, the desire for the Good is other 
than sel~love (because true love of our own nature consists in desiring 
union with our source; ch. 27); secondly, that the Intelligence brings us 
pleasure does not imply that we do not seek the Good (rather than the 
Intelligence), since we have already seen (ch. 25) that we quite reasonably 
seek the Good for pleasure (ch. 29). (In this summation I have largely 
followed Br~hier, Plotin, Vol. 6, Part 2, pp. 56-60.) 
28Plotinus cle scrfbes this experience of the Good by recou1}t1ng 
characteristics of the soul in love from t~e Phaedrus, which Brehier 
summarizes as follow': ••impression d' une lumiere et 1d 'une vie p7us grand qu'elle venue jusqu'a elle; choc de la rencontfe; desir passione; ~fort 
P~~ !miter ce qu'elle voit; mepri~ des beautes sensibles, souil~ees 7t 
per ssables; affermissement de son etre PfOpre et sentiment de sa realite, 
tels sont les caracteres de cet 'tat superieur" (~., P• 60). 
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therefore requires a perfect source, whose simplicity precludes any attri-
butes belonging to the intelligible order.29 · Consequently, the Good 
Itself is the source of the intelligible light and is beyond form ( chs. 
32_;33) .30] 
(Because the Good transcends form and Intelligence, the soul is not 
content to know Its products. It experiences joy and absence of disquiet 
not through intellection but through union with that light which illumines 
Intelligence but which has its source in that which is beyond Intelligence 
(ch. 34). Reflection and cognition are preparatory stages for ascent to 
the Good, but It can be reached only by abandoning cognition (ch. 35). 
Finally, we can explain the light present to the Intelligence which causes 
its worth: it is an illllllediate intuition with which we may unite but 
which no reflective determination can replace.31 This light is the 
radiance of the Good Itself (ch. 36).] 
[Having explained that the light present in the I~telligence is 
the radiance of the Good which is beyond form, being and noesis, Plotinus, 
in the remaining chapters of VI, 7, replies to certain objections which 
maintain that the Good must have knowledge. We pick up the key text with 
29Plotinus is here inspired by the Parmenides (137 c-142 a) to de-
velop what Dionysius the Areopagite would later call "negative theology," 
which consists in denying of the One every trait that presupposes 
determination or ousia. Accordingly, in chapter thirty-two Plotinus 
argues that, since Its products are form, the Good is without form. 
30p1otinus ~so introduces beauty in chapters thirty-two and thirty-
three and, as Brehier observes (Plotin, Vol 6, Part 2, P• 61), makes 
beauty appear as an intermediate between the Good and the forms. 
I 31Brehier describes well the culmination, of Plotinus' quest in 
chapter thri ~y-six: "Qu' est-ce que cette lumiere que le Bien rayonne 
sur la pensee? On volt main tenant c~tte soluti'\n; elle est dans un 
intuition immediate qui nous ideftifie a cette lumiere et que ne saurait 





"(91] Those who attribute knowledge to Him [the Good] have not 
supposed that He thinks about the inferior existents coming from Him, 
although some say it is absurd that He not know other things. [92) But 
those who hold that he does not know anything else still give Him self-
knowledge, finding nothing nobler, as if by intellection He could be made 
more majestic and could be stronger by thought than by being what He is 
in Himself. (93] But intellection [itself] is not valuable unless it is 
from Him. [94] For in what is His value--in His intellection or in 
Himself? If His value is in intellection, He will be of less worth; if 
in Himself, He is perfect prior to intellection and is not perfected by 
intellection. [ 95] But if He is act and not potency, He must have 
intellection. But if Re Is such an entity that eternally knows and this, 
they say, is His act, they admit that He is a duality--namely, entity and 
intellection. Accordingly, they would say He is not simple but rather 
something else has been added to Him, (96] just as to the eyes are added 
the seeing which is act, even though the eyes are always seeing. (97] 
But if they say He is in act because He is act and intellection, then 
being intellection He would not intellect, just as movement is not itself 
moved. What then? 
"[98] But are not the beings There said to be entity and act? (99] 
We agree that beings are many and yet are also different, whereas the 
First Existent is simple."' 
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[The source of intellection itself (Plotinus continues) does not 
intellect. It has no prior which can be its object of knowledge. Hence, 
it must be beyond knowledge so as to be the source of knowledge. The 
absence of knowledge in the Good is not a privation. He is without 
knowledge because He is too perfect to be a knower (ch. 37, 19-31). 
Moreover, the One is beyond knowledge because He has no desire and, there-
fore, does not seek an object. For Him to be a knower would mean that 
He would seek Himself as a prior reality, which is absurd, since He is 
the First Existent. While He is without noesis, He is not without a 
transcendent and indeterminate kind of self-awareness (ch. 38). Thought 
is based on form and sameness and difference, which the simplicity of the 
Good excludes (ch. 39). Our key text closes with the fortieth chapter of 
VI, 7.] 
"[100) That there must be no intellection in the Good is evident to 
those who are in touch with this nature. [101] It is necessary to be 
persuasive in these discussions, if indeed words may convey the matter. 
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one must mingle persuasion with the necessity [of demonstration]. [In 
other words, it is now necessary to complement the method of demonstration 
employed in earlier chapters with the method of persuasion.] [102] Hence, 
it is necessary for knowledge that all intellection be from something and 
be of something [i.e., have an object]. [103] The Intelligence is the 
combination of the substratum from which it comes [•itself in the moment 
of active potency] and the objects of which it thinks. [104] And by such 
8 determination of substratum, Intelligence becomes act, and it completes 
what is in potency There, while it does not produce anything. [105] For 
it is what it is only when completed. For if the intellection is united 
with entity and that entity, then the entity could not be in that from 
which it comes. For it would not generate anything which is already 
there in it. [106] But it [=the prior potency or substratum] is a 
power for production and produces out of itself. (107] And its act is 
its entity. And it is with and in entity. And its intellection and its 
entity are not different [except in thought.] [108] And it is a nature 
which knows itself and not another; for its intellection and its entity 
are not different except in our way of thinking about them as that which 
is intellected and that which intellects; thus, the Intelligence is a 
plurality as has often been observed. (109] And this is first act, which 
brings an hypostasis into being, and it is the image of another, which is 
something so great that entity ls produced. 
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"[110] If the Intelligence were the Good and not from the Good, 
then it would be nothing other than the Good and not be of itself an 
hypostasis. [111) It is first act and first intellection, and thus there 
is neither act nor lntellection before it. [112] If then one goes beyond 
this entity and this intellection, he does not come to [another] entity 
and intellection but comes to something wonderful beyond entity and 
intellection--this something bas in itself neither being nor thought but 
is free in itself and of itself from these factors so that it has no 
need of them. [113] For there is no giving of act before act is produced, 
because otherwise it would be already [act] before it was produced. 
[114] Nor [can there be) intellecting which produces intellection. For 
already there would be in tellec tion before in tellec tion comes to be. 
[115] For it is altogether true that intellection, even of the Good, is 
beneath the Good. (116] Thus, intellection does not belong to the Good. 
I do not mean that the Good escapes intellection [by the Nous]--for such 
intellection is a f act--but that in the Good there is no intellection. 
[117] Otherwise, the One would be the Good together with something less 
than itself, namely, the lntellection of itself. [118] But if intellec-
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ti on is beneath It, then lntellec ti on and entity would be on the same 
level. [119] If intellectlon is better [than the Good], then its intel-
ligible object is beneath it. [120] But intellection is not in the Good; 
it is less than the good and it is through the Good that it has worth. 
[121] And thus intellection is different from the Good; for the L~tter is 
pure and free from other beings and from intellection. [122] The Good, 
since free of intellectlon, is purely what it is and it is not restricted 
by the presence of intellection; [hence], it is not impure but is one. 
[123] And if someone makes this [the Good] at once an intellection and a 
thought, [then] he rnakes it entity and thought united with entity, and 
thus makes the One be Intelligence itself. Thus, one must find another 
before [or above] the One. For this act and this intellection are either 
the completion of another substrate or co-hypostasis existing before the 
One. And thus the One would have another nature which would very likely 
be intellection i.e., [the [ntelligence]. 
40, 21-49: 
E,1 ~· ~ t I I \ t t 1 I t~t .. ,!<\ \ .A 0 •1"' EJCEtl.l01' JC04 P.TJ 0.1T EK£LJIOV, ovo a.v WV\O .,., T/ 
• ' 3 I .. .. '..J... • - • , ~ TT , EKf£110tJ 'JI'' Ka.i. OUK 411 fy fO.TJTTjS vrrot:rraC!LS ,,v. .1.1pWTTJ 
~\ • • t I' \ I I t "' II CJ71 ovua ctt1'T1] «1'£fJ'YE'a KaL '"PWTTJ V07JC1LS OVK av EXOL 
II t f ' t "" II I Jiii Q I OV'TE OJEpyE&C.V' 1Tf>O CL'l.ITTJS OV"T'f V07JC1W. JYJf'T'Qr'O.LVWV 
, """ - ,, '' ,, ' ' TOWVV "T'H" a:rro ra UT?~ T7}S OVC!LO.S ICaL V07JC1EWS OV"T'E E1TL. 
t I fl"~ 91 t 9 \ I ...!.\\I t I "l t I OVC!LO.V 'I~ El. Oll'T f1T' V'07fC1LV I WV\ f 1T f IC f L v a "1!:. (L 0 v C1 Las 
t I tol e I ft I II t ,,.. 
KO.I. V01JaECJJ~ E17& "T'' a.up.at:rrov, 0 P.'T]'T'f EX€L fV aVT(f) 
I I I I ~"\\I II II t \ l,J..,I f ,.. 
ovaLav P."J'TE 1'07rC1&1J. Cl.IV\ Et:n'LV f p TJ µ. 0 v avro fy EaVTOV 
- •t • • ·~' ~ , 0 ' ' • , , Tcuv es a1'1'ov ovoo oeoµ.&ov. v ya.p evepyrJcras Trpo-
• I • J ·~ \ .. ~ \ I e Tepov ey0V710~ f"l'EPj"eLa11 · 'T]O'T] yap av ,1v, 1rpw yevecr a.L • 
t ~ \ I • I • ·~ \ ._ I ' ovoe v017aar E')JO"Y'f}t:T£ vo71uw • TJO'T] yap a.v VfVO'T]KfL, 1rpLv 
, e J ·o 1 • • ' ' • ' e -)'fVEC1 0.£ 1'01JatlJ. AW~ yap '1] V07JC1LS, " µ.ev aya ov, 
... • ... • • ... 8 ..... • ,, ~, , XE£pov CIV'l"'Otl · CJJcrre ov 'r'OV aya ov av E£1] • l\Eyw oe ov 
• • e .. ' • ' • ... ' , e' .. · Tov aya 011, ovx Cl"!'"' !-'-'? t:UT' vo71cra£ -ro aya ov - Tovro yap 
ti ~ ... ,, fl 9 t .-. ... t L]... 't 9' ti I • M 
Et:rrw - G.1V1 Cl"I'"£ ~ 01"CfJ 'r'f' a.yau(f) OllK av E£7] vo71crLr • 1J ev 
ti e • \ ' ll ~ ' \ ti\ t """ t I t -. fO"'T'O.L oµ.ov 'T'O ayallOLI ICC1L 'T'O El\C1'T"T'OV aV'T'OV, '1] V07JC1Lr avrov. 
E• ~· .. .. ' A ' I .. ' • , I E' ~· £ Of X€1.pDI' £0"7'£1t, Op.OV 'T] VOTJC!LS Et:n'O.L KaL '1] OVC!La. L Of 
1<p!'irro11 ~ 1'01f01i. TO VOTJ'TOV xe'tpov lt:rra.L. Ov S?i lv .,q, 
• e ... • ~ ~,, \ "' .. ... ' ~ ' ... ' • e · aya 'f' T} 1'01JU'S', O XE 'POV OVC!a KaL OLa TOV'TO 'r'O a.ya OV 
•e. 6 ... • , LJ • ti • ... LJ ' • ... • Q~&C.U f4<7Q fTfPWrJ& av £1.7] Qtn'OV, Kar1a.pov fKU.VO W<7TTE'p 
"' .!'\ \ ' I "' I ,J,. "' V" e \ t' \ • I 
'TWV a.N\WV Ka& Clll"T"IJS Q't'f LC7Q. .na a.pov OE' ov V07J<7E'WS 
I\ "' I • I t t' ,. I "' I fl.ll.LKpivws fCM"&V o f'7T&V, ov 1rapaTrOoL1:.oµ.Evov 'TTJ V07J<7f& 
, .. " t\ \ ' • ., E' to I ' TrapOV<7TJ, CIJS' P."7 fl./\LICPLVE'S Kat. E'V E'LVaL. ' OE' 'TLS Kai. 
"" • - \ I '"" \ t I \ 
'TOVTO aµ.o. voow JCCU voovµ.Evov Tr01.f4 KO.L OV<7LO.V KO.I. 
.1 • - • I \ • t \ "' e I\ Va7J1TLV O'VVOVaa.v "11 OVaL~ Kai. Otn'Wi' QV'TO voovv f/\f4 
.,. ~\ \ ~ I \ I \ t - I I • 
TrO&f&V, CU\llOU Orf'/<7£TQL 1(0.L 'TOVTOV Trpo QV'TOV, fTrE'&'11'E'p TJ 
t I ' f , 1' ~\ \ f I \ I " fVE'p'YfiQ KCU "f JIO'l')'1'L) TJ W\l\OV V1TOIULUE'VOV 'Tfl\f&W<7LS 'rJ 
CTVVV1rOaTa.u1.s- o~ua 7rpo a~s Kai at}n] cL\A77v EXE& 
</>vaLV, V Kat 'TO JJOftl' ftlCOTWS. 
180 
"[124] For it has an object that it intellects, because there is 
another prior to it. (125] And (consider] when it knows itself: even in 
its self-knowledge it has that [prior] object and it is out of that other 
that it contemplates itself. [126] Anything which has nothing prior to 
it or with it from which it originates--how can it have intellection and 
how can it know itself? For what could it seek or desire? What would be 
its power? Would its power not be external to itself in knowledge? 
[127] I mean consider whether the power which it knows is different from 
the power by which it knows. If these be one, what is there to seek?!'32 
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32In chapter forty-one Plotinus continues the argument that the 
Good cannot intellect becauge intellection is a response to need and is 
consigned to inferior existents so that they might live better. He closes 
the chapter by repeating his negative theology: predicates imply imper-
fection and therefore cannot describe the One. In chapter forty-two 
Plotinus concludes the treatise with two final statements: first, he 
Presents the order of the highest realities (the Good, the Intelligence, 
the Soul); secondly, he invokes the authority of Plato (Letters 312 e) to 
justify excluding the lntelligence form the First Existent. 
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Comments 
Now we must undertake to express clearly and concisely the movement 
of thought in Text D. The inf tial twelve chapters of Text D explain 
that, because everything in the sensible universe originates from the 
intelligible, the intelligible world is a universe of infinite variety. 
After these chapters we enco1,J[lter the first of several passages which 
comprise the key text. Taken together these passages fall into three 
sections. Section One (ch. 13) explicates how and why the Intelligence is 
a sameness-in-difference (unity-in-multiplicity) and is, thereby, act and 
encompasses all beings. Section Two (chs. 17-18) describes how what is 
prior passes from dynaDis to energeia and thus gives rise to Intelligence 
and makes evident its dependence on the Good. Section Three (chs. 37, 
40) replies to those who o"bject that the Good is Intelligence and act. 
Section One • 
a. Every being is multiple in inverse proportion to its degree of 
simplicity. This is true of the Intelligence and also of its product, 
the Soul. [Since simplicity denotes perfection or reality,] a being is a 
principle and an act in proportion to its degree of simplicity. [Because 
all intelligible beings are principles,] the first and the last of them 
are simple. But the act of the last being is simple as a diminution of 
act or being, whereas the act of the first being is simple as the totality 
of all acts (#1-#3). 
b. What kind of totality is the first of the intelligibles [•the 
Intelligence]? It cannot "be a collection or something separable into 
[really distinct] parts, for such is not a true unity. But the Intelli-
gence is a true unit "because its [act or] movement takes place in itself 
and is, thus, forever the same (#4). 
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c. But the Intelligence cannot remain perfectly the same, for its 
movement must have a beginning and a terminus, between which there must 
be diversity; otherwise, there would be no distinct stages in its [life 
or] movement and, consequently, there would be no act. Moreover, if its 
movement were uniform, it would be without differentiation and, therefore, 
it would not encompass all lives and acts. Instead, it would be only a 
single, undifferentiated life. In order for there to be a totality of 
lives, the Intelligence must move through all beings (#5-#10). 
d. The movement of a simple existent retains its unity but in one 
of two ways: either by not advancing into anything or by so advancing. 
If the latter kind occurs, the Intelligence is a duality, a unity-in-
difference. If the former kind of movement takes place [where the one 
member of the duality is really and logically the same as the other], 
there is only pure unity and no true movement (#11-#12). 
e. If there is duality• sameness and difference issue from the 
original advance and out o E this sameness and difference another unity 
results (e.g., the Soul is a totality which results from the Intelligence]. 
But this product is not a pure unity but is also a sameness-in-difference 
and a totality. For also as a sameness present to differences it encom-
passes multiple beings. In other words, its nature, too, is to distin-
guish beings in a whole (~13-~14). 
f. The differences wb Leh the Intelligence encompasses are [in 
nature] either prior or posterior to it. If they were before it, the 
Intelligence would be Influenced by them. But in such a case they would 
be its source, [but it is absurd to hold that simplicity can be caused by 
diversity]. The multiple beings have no explanation without the Intelli-
gence (#15-#16). 
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g. Consequently, the Intelligence is the principle of all beings. 
Its movement and act produces all beings, one after the other. Its 
movement is analogous to a wanderer who journeys to many places, except 
this wanderer never strays outside itself. It is the same as the places 
to which it moves; it is the space for its own movement. It is as 
though all the places in its wanderings travel along with it. Since it 
never journeys outside itself, its wandering may be called stationary. 
It wanders in a plain of truth, from which it. cannot stray (1117-1119). 
h. This plain of truth has differentiation; otherwise, there could 
be no movement through it. Vi thou t differences, then, there is no 
movement [or act]--simply, a cessation [of life and] of being. Moreover, 
without movement there could be no intellection; hence, there could be no 
Intelligence and, therefore, no being. Intellection, as a result, must 
move everywhere, producing and encompassing all beings. To repeat: the 
Intelligence is the same and different. It is forever distinguishing and 
manifesting beings [ through its movement and act] • I ts movement through 
all lives may be likened to a traveller over the earth: he journeys 
always on the same earth but to many different places. The Intelligence 
is the same as the 111any differences to which it moves, for there can be 
no act if sameness is not foc:-ever present to all the different beings 
(1125-1127). 
i. If the vecy nature of the Intelligence is to be sameness-in-
difference, then all beings are It and it is all beings. If it Is not 
everything, then it cannot be itself. It must encompass all differences, 
or else it is imcomplete in 11Sture (1128-#30). 
[In summary: Section One argues that act involves simplicity-in-
multiplicity, which clescrl'bes the Intelligence, a simple existent that 
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embraces all beings, each of which, in turn, is an act because each is a 
simplicity-in-multiplicity. The Intelligence actuates all beings because 
it is a kind of movement that, through reversion, completes itself. This 
completion or determination results in the plural! ty of beings. As a 
movement present to the plurality of beings, the Intelligence is a same-
ness-in-difference. Hence, act is the completed movement of the Intelli-
gence, that is, sameness-in-difference.] 
Sec ti on Two. 
[After showing in chapter fourteen that the Intelligence is like an 
organism, i.e., a unity of parts and functions, Plotinus begins the second 
part of the entire treatise, which considers how the Intelligence relates 
to the transcendent Good. ln chapter fifteen and sixteen he explains 
that the Intelligence is a sameness-in-difference because it origins tes 
out of an active power, which contemplates the perfectly simple source 
and, thereby, brings about its own determination.] 
a. [Someone might object as follows to Plotinus' account of the 
origin of the Intelligence:] How can a real! ty that is differentiated 
originate from pure simplklt)J [for is not all production from "like to 
like"]? Must not the cause 1lave or be what it gives? [Plotinus replies:] 
In the production of real l>eings the giver or producer is necessarily 
superior to the gift or the product. [Hence, it is possible that the 
cause is unlike the result by virtue of its superior! ty] (1131-1132. )33 
/. 33Brehier notes that Plot!.nus has Aristotle in mind during this 
line of reasoning. Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of production: one 
in which the cause has the same nature as the effect (e.g., man begetting 
man); the other in whicli tile cause is totally unlike the effect and 
greater in power (e.g., tile sun genera ting man). The mis take of the 
above objection, Plot!.nus Insists, is the presumption that all production 
is like the former (l?lotlu, 1'ol. 6, Part 2, p. 54). 
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b· Moreover, that which is in potency requires a cause which is in 
act• But if the product, that which is at first only potency, is first 
act and its cause is superior to and unlike it, then that cause transcends 
act and life. The Intelligence has life because it originates from some-
thing that is more perfect than life. Hence, life is unlike its source 
in nature and is only a vestige of that source [•the Good] ( 133-1137). 
c. Life was originally indeterminate but was limited and made 
determinate by reversion back to its source in contemplation. But that 
source is superior to and unlike its product and is, therefore, without 
determination. The One determines another but remains Itself indetermin-
ate (1138-1141). 
d. What is the nature of this limit [•determination or form] that 
the Intelligence has'Z It does not have an external limit, such as a 
magnitude would have [for such limitation is imposed from without and 
would make the Intelligence a passive potency]. Its limit is, instead, 
internal: as the totality of life the Intelligence is limited by intrinsic 
distinctions and forms and thereby encompasses infinite differences as it 
images (as best it can) its Infinite source (#42). 
e. [As proven already (Section One lie, #h-#i)] the Intelligence is 
a life that must encompass all Jives, or else it is incomplete and there 
can be no being or act. lts limit therefore is not that of a single, 
defined life [cf. #8], but it is determinate nonetheless as a unity-in-
multiplicity, the totality of all lives (#43-#46). 
f. But what precisely is this .. defined unity .. [this unity-in-
diversity]? As the lntelligence it is a unity; as having multiple forms 
and intelligences as Its contents and objects it is a multiplicity (#47-
#49). 
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g. Is the Intelligence the same as any one of the intelligences it 
bas as an object? No, since in that case the nature of the Intelligence 
would be destroyed, for it would not be the totality of different beings 
but only a particular being. Each intelligence or being exists because 
of its relation to the whole Intelligence [i.e., each difference is 
what it is because of the sameness which is the Intelligence] (#50-#54). 
h. In order to be the totality of all intelligences or beings, the 
Intelligence was, as we have seen [Section Two, #c], at first an 
indeterminate, active power and then was determined and became the uni-
verse of [acts] forms or be in.gs. And it is prior to all the different 
forms, not so as to be one among them [see Section Two, #g], but so as 
to be their principle i~ofar as it is an image of the formless One 
(1155-1156). 
i. The Soul relates to the Intelligence, just as the Intelligence 
relates to the One. rt is a llght that illumines the Soul, just as the 
One illumines it. Moreover, the Soul has a vestige of the Intelligence 
in that it intellects also [although discursively], just as the Intelli-
gence has a vestige of the Good [in that it is good, although in multi-
plicity]. But the Good [as we have seen, Section Two, #a-#b] transcends 
the Intelligence. Whereas the Intelligence is form and determinate, 
the Good is formless and l11determina te. If the Good were a form, the 
Intelligence would be a logos. (For the Intelligence to be a logos the 
Good would have to possess the reasons for all things, but that would 
make It multiple.] The Good, however, must be absolutely without differ-
entiation, for if different!.ated, It would require something prior, on 
which it would depend for determination (#57-#62). 
j. How is the lntelllgence like the Good? Because it has form or 
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beauty? Or is there another reason that it is good? We know, of course, 
that it is good because it is a vestige of the Good. All these [acts], 
then, are vestiges of the Good: life, intelligence and form (1163-116 7). 
k. But it is not enough to hold that these realities are good 
because they have a common origin in the Good. We may still ask: what 
is intrinsically present to each that makes it good? This is a difficult 
question, which can be answered only by discovering in these distinct 
acts [namely, life, Intelligence and form] a common characteristic which 
makes them good. These realities [life, Intelligence and form] are 
distinct; the first act can be different from its results, since it may 
produce perfections which become manifest in diverse recipients. 
Nonetheless, to the extent that each is a trace of the Good, each is good 
in proportion to its own difference. We must now investigate what 
constitutes the good of the highest beings (1168-1170). 
m. [It may now be asked:] if it cannot be known in what the 
goodness of the intelligible world consists, how can it be known to be 
good at all? It is obvious that the intelligibles are good because of 
their origin. [Their common origin does not indicate what instrinsically 
makes them good, but it does demonstrate that they are good], for what is 
without worth could not come from the Good [Section Two, llj]. Thus, life 
is good and also Intelligence and form are good (1171-1178). 
n. [But now someone might object:] If Intelligence, life and form 
are distinct from one another [and they are distinct logically], how can 
there be some thing (namely, goodness) common to them? [Would not their 
separate identities be destroyed if they were in some respect the same?] 
No, each retains its entity~ for the mind [through abstraction] may 
identify something common to diverse things; e. g., the notion of life 
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may be derived from different animals--horse and man; heat from water 
and fire (#79-#80). 
o. The very fact that their goodness is mixed with differentiation 
demonstrates that they are unlike the Good. [Nonetheless, they are good, 
and thus, must share in the Good in some way.] Do they share in ~he Good 
as parts of the Goodi Certainly not, for the Good is without parts. 
They share in the Good in that they have a trace of unity [and to have a 
trace of unity is to have a trace of the Good, since the Good is the One] 
in their plurality. For example, the first act [=life] and the second act, 
limit [=Intelligence] are good, as is the completed entity [=the order of 
forms] resulting from these prior realities. None of these goods, however, 
is the same as the Good becau1Se each is derived from that dependent on the 
Good (1181-#87). 
p. Again, the original question recurs: what is present to the 
intelligible beings that accounts for their goodness? Obviously, in the 
sensible world it is order and rhythm that constitute goodness. But what 
accounts for it in the intelligible world? For it cannot be rhythn and 
order and constitute goodness There, for the good here is derived from 
outside because the ordered is different from the orderer, but no such 
separation exists There. Thus, goodness is intrinsic to the intelligibles 
and the question remains: what is this goodness? (#88-#89). 
q. So the search for vhat makes the intelligible good must continue. 
Their derivation from. the Good explains that they are good but does not 
explain what intrinsically nake1S them good (see immediately above, #m; 
#90). 
[The central points co11cerning energeia in Section Two are as 
follows. Since the Intelligence is first act and first life, the cause 
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of the Intelligence is beyond act and life. If act requires sameness and 
difference (as demonstrated in Section One), then the One, which is 
without difference, must transcend act. Nevertheless, as the source of 
the realm of sameness and difference, i.e., of the Intelligence, whose 
nature is a threefold act ( Uf e, intelligence and form), the One is the 
source of act (and is act through extrinsic denomination). Furthermore, 
the acts of the Intelligence are good, despite their inferiority to the 
Good, for they are vestiges of their source by_virtue of their sameness 
or simplicity. The One is present to these acts as a kind of light, the 
precise nature of which occupies those chapters intervening between 
Section Two and Section Three.) 
Section Three 
[Plotinus has searched for an answer through chapters nineteen to 
thirty-six to the question,. '"Vha t is the nature of the light present to 
the intelligible realities that makes them good or desirable?: He finally 
answers this question in chapter thirty-six: the light present to the 
intelligibles which makes them good is an immediate intuition of that 
reality internal to all existents; it is a direct experience of the real, 
which transcends cognitiou and Intelligence; it is union with the radiance 
of the Good itself, who transcends act and Intelligence.] 
a. [The Peripatetics .and others object to Plotinus' conclusion that 
the Good, while the lllumiulng source of all knowledge, is not Himself a 
knower on the following gro11nds: I While it may not be a perfection for 
the Good to know other thin8s, it is a perfection for Him to know Himself, 
for self-knowledge is the suprene perfection (#91-#92). 
b. [Plotinus replies as follows:] But intellection, even self-
intellection, is not the suprerne perfection. Intellection only has worth 
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because of the Good. The Good is without intellection because He is more 
perfect than intellection. If He is more perfect than intellection, it 
is a mistake to think that knowledge will add to His perfection. As all-
perfect and the source of all perfection, intellection has perfection from 
Him (1192-1193). 
c. [The matter may be considered in this way:] What accounts for 
the perfection of the One'? Is it Himself or intellection? But if His 
value consists in intellection, He admits imperfection [for intellection 
implies duality and dependence]. He must be prior to intellection to 
make intellection possible, Hence, He is prior to intellection and not 
perfected by it (//94). 
d. [The Peripatetics object again.] Is not the Good pure act, 
rather than potency, and therefore Intelligence? [Plotinus replies:] 
But if He is Intelligence~ Be cannot be the First Existent, for intellec-
tion implies duality (intellect and object). While it remains a simple 
existent, the Intelligences may be analyzed into a duality. Its parts 
may be eternally united (j11st as the eyes and their act of vision are 
always together) but are logically separable (1195-1196). 
e. Consequently, to insist that the One intellects and is act and 
yet retains His perfection as simple is to admit that He is an intellect 
that does not intellect, j11st as movement does not move. No, intellection 
is incompatible with the perfection of the Good. Intelligible beings are 
entity and act and they differ from the Good (1197-1199). [In the remainder 
of chapter thirty-seven and in chapters thirty-eight and thirty-nine, 
Plotinus further arg~es that the One must transcend noesis, energeia and 
ousia, for if the One does ~ot transcend the intelligible world, the lat-
ter cannot exist. The One ltas no need of noes is because He is perfect and 
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therefore free of desire. He seeks nothing. Intelligence presupposes 
sameness-in-difference, which the pure simplicity of the One excludes.] 
f. There are two ways to know that the Good is beyond knowledge. 
First, we know this through mystical union with Him. We can enter into 
this Reality and associate 111i th Him only if we leave behind .noes is. 
secondly, we may know His transcendence not mystically but philosophic-
ally, al though this is far less satisfactory and has value mainly to 
persuade those who have never: enjoyed mystical _experience with the Good 
(#100-#101).34 [But let us attempt this philosophical explanation.] 
g. Knowledge must come from a prior power and have an object. 
Knowledge is the determination of a prior power, which may be called the 
substratum for knowledge (and also for form, limit and act]. Knowledge 
is the determination of this su'bstratum, but the resulting entity is not 
altogether different frorn the indeterminate, prior potency: through 
determination one and the same ed stent becomes completed [or actualized]. 
In other words, out of this pri.or potency the Intelligence becomes itself. 
In conclusion, this potency [=the first moment in the production of the 
intelligible world] is prior: to intellection, entity and act, for these 
are all the same (hl02-ll07). 
h. The Intelligence admits plurality, however, even if its 
intellection, act and [entity] are all the same, for these are logically 
distinct. [As unity-in-multi.pH.city and the completion of the active 
power for intellec tion,) the [n telligence is the first act and second 
hypostasis (#108-#109). 
i. The Intelligence [s sarneness and difference and, therefore, is 
34see Text B, comments on katanoesis. 
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derived from a prior existent. Since it is entity, that from which it 
derives (and of which lt is merely an image) is beyond entity. Since act 
is the same as entity, the source of the Intelligence is also beyond act. 
As completely transcendent 11 the Good is perfect, self-sufficient and 
First Reality (#110-#113). 
j. The Good is beyond act because He is unproduced [and yet is the 
ultimate source of all production], while act is produced out of a prior 
potency. Intelligence is act, produced from and by potency, and therefore 
beneath the Good. Consequentl1, the Good, although He may be the object 
of the Intelligence, does not Himself intellect. If He intellected, He 
would be imperfect; He would be a unity-in-multiplicity, for intellection 
and entity are together (0113-,118). 
k. [Let us consider another objection.] Perhaps intellection is 
prior to the Good. [Plotinus replies:] This is absurd, for in that case 
intellection would have its object posterior to it. Intellection, then, 
would exist before that which Dakes. intellection possible, for intellec-
tion requires a prior object that it may actuate its own potency for 
knowledge. Consequently, intellection exists and is good because of the 
Good which exists before it (lll~-1122). 
f 
m. It follows that the Good is simple and perfect because removed 
from and unmixed with lntellection. Intellection, then, is imperfect; 
i.e., it is dependent on a reality before it (because it is an active 
power requiring an object so as to bring itself into act). So if the 
Good is Intelligence, He nust have a prior object, for there are only two 
alternatives: the Good is deternining principle for the Intelligence or 
He is Himself Intelligence and requires a principle. The ref ore, the 
First Existent cannot be Intelligence (#123). 
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n. Furthermore, if the Good were intellection, He would need and 
seek something. But if He ls the First Existent, He could only need and 
seek Himself. He would be His own object for knowledge; He would have to 
be His own prior. But this is absurd, for the Good would have to exist 
before He in fact eldsts in order to be the object He seeks [i.e., the 
result would have to be prior to the cause] (#124-#127). 
[Section Three in essence elaborates on the findings of Section 
Two. Contrary to Greek philosophical tradition,_ the One is not Intelli-
gence, because He is not a duality or sameness-in-difference. 
quently, He is not act.] 
Conse-
Presenting this movement of thought has shown how Text D contributes 
in important ways to Plotin~s' doctrine of energeia. In general Plotinus 
has argued the following: the intelligible world, the world of sameness-
in-difference, in which the kinesis of the Intelligence manifests all be-
ings, is the world of energeia {Section One), which the One, since it is 
perfectly simple and without difference, transcends (Section Two and 
Three.) 
We must now study the following issues in Text D to further refine 
our knowledge of energeia: first, the role of kinesis, ousia, tauton and 
heteron in the intelligible vorld; secondly, the nature of life; finally, 
the transcendence of the Good over energeia. 
Ousia, Kinesis, Tau ton and Heteron in the Intelligible World 
Plotinus' description of the intelligible world in Text D (especial-
ly 111-1130; Section One, #/a-Ii) relies heavily on four notions: entity 
(ousia), movement (kinesr.s>, sameness (tauton) and difference (heteron). 
Plotinus employs these noti()DS so as to explain how, by generating and 
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encompassing all beings, the Intelligence is a unity-in-multiplicity. 
Since as a one-in-many the Intelligence is energeia, a knowledge of these 
four notions is important for our study. 
The conjunction of these four expressions in Text D reflects the 
influence of Plato's Timaeus,35 where Plato depends on them .(except 
that he uses thateron for Plotinus' heteron) to explain the formation 
of the World Soul. Hence, in order to understand how these expressions 
figure in Text D, we must first summarize how they belong to the Timaeus. 
Plato's relevant remarks begin at 30 a. When constructing the 
sensible universe, the Derniurge realized that, if the sensible world was 
to be beautiful, intelligent and good, i.e., if it was to be a worthy 
image of the eternal living All or the world of Forms, it must contain 
soul. Since the soul is superior to body, the Demiurge desired that soul 
rule body (34 b-c) • This precedence demanded that soul be composed of 
three ingredients: o~sia, tauton and thateron, each in a state intermed~ 
iate between sheer indivisibility of the Forms and divisibility of 
things;36 that these three be 'blended into a sort of unity (35 a); that 
this unified whole be m rked off into divisions measured by nwnbers 
forming two geometrical proportions and corresponding to the intervals of 
a musical scale (35 b-36 bJ. The Demiurge next cut this whole lengthwise 
and bent it round into circ.les, of which the outer belongs to sameness, 
the inner to difference ( 3~ b-d). He set these circles in locomotion, 
35Explana tion of how these four notions reflect the influence of 
Plato's Sophist will be pos t~()ned until Text E (VI, 2 [43]), which presents 
Plotinus' interpretation of all the megista gene (ousia, kinesis, stasis, 
tauton and thateron). 
36rn other words, the components of soul are intermediate between 
that which is always .. seli-sa111e'0 (the eternal Forms) and that which "be-
comes and is divisible•• (bodies). 
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for, unless they move, they cannot constitute soul, whose very nature is 
to be everlasting self-movement.37 The visible manifestation of this 
movement is the plane ts (plane ta) and the stars (astra), whose local 
motions are regular and thtls make possible time (36 e; 38-a-e). But 
there is also an invisible counterpart of this locomotion of the World 
soul. As invisible participant of reason and harmony, as the best of 
existents brought into being by the best and eternal beings, the Soul has 
true knowledge of irnmuta1>le beings and true b~lief of sensible beings 
through the moving circles of sameness and difference (37 a-c).38 
In summary the Timaeus tlses our four notions in the following ways--
~: the World Soul is an ousia because the Demiurge fashions it 
according to the divine exemplars so as to be a distinct existent with a 
definite nature; taut on and tha teron: that nature is specifically cons ti-
tuted by two circles,. an inner circle of difference and an outer circle 
of sameness; kinesis: Soul is kinesis in two respects: first, as the 
principle moving 1 tself cognitively through the circles of sameness and 
difference, which thereby forms the heavenly bodies, including the 
"wanderers" or plane ts, and imparts to them their circular locomotion; 
secondly, as an intellection of the intelligible All and the sensible 
All through the circles of sameness and difference.39 
37Plato does not litel:'ally mean that the Demiurge set the Soul in 
locomotion, for already in t~e Phaedrus (245 c-246 a) he has defined Soul 
as the eternal self-moving ex is tent necessary for all cosmic movement. 
This position is expressed again in the tenth book of the Laws (893 b-895 
a), where Plato identifies ~ou1 as the cause of all other kinds of kinesis. 
38For this distillation of the Timaeus I am indebted to L. Sweeney, 
Infinity in Plato's Pbile1>us: A Bibliographical and Philosophical Study 
(forthcoming), Ch. l\1: ••par ticipa ti on of Things in Forms," pp. 89-140 
(typescript). 
39The necessary association between soul, kinesis and intellection 
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Now before explaining how :Plotinus applies this exposition to his 
conception of the intelligible world and ultimately to energeia, we must 
first ask how such application is possible in the first place, given 
that Plato in the Timaeus focuses on Soul, whereas Plotinus in Text D 
focuses on ~· The answer appears to rest with Plotinus' doctrine of 
logos, according to which what constitutes an inferior being also 
constitutes, except in a 111ore perfect way, its superior. Accordingly, 
since Soul as a vestige of~ (~58) is defined as ousia, kinesis, tauton 
and heteron, the Intelligence may likewise be defined. 
Let us begin with kiriesis to explain how Plotinus adapts these 
notions to his metaphysics and relates them to energeia. Plotinus is 
able to ascribe kinesis to the Intelligence by accepting Plato's defini-
tion of kinesis as lntellec ti on. If kinesis defines Soul, which is 
imperfect intellectioa (#57-t58), then kinesis may certainly define Nous, 
which is perfect intellection. This judgment, that kinesis is intellec-
tion, would seem the only feasible interpretation of Plotinus' remarks 
describing the life and the act of the Intelligence as a "movement" which 
manifests everything (~4-i18;t'JO;ll9). Since Plotinus maintains consis-
tently throughout Text D (e.g. 11 it24;1195;fl97;11111) and elsewhere in the 
Enneads (e.g., V, 9 [5); v. 4 (7]; III, 8 [30]; III, 7 [45]; V, 3 [49)) 
that the life and the act of the Intelligence is intellection, it must be 
assumed that he also intends kinesis to mean intellection. This assump-
tion seems especially confil'llled by the observation that, if the movement 
of the Intelligence were sto1>ped. there would be no intellection (#22). 
With the knowledge of kinesis as intellection, it becomes possible 
Plato stresses in the Sophist. 248 a-251 a, on which we will comment in 
Text E. 
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to explain precisely how kinesis is operative in the intelligible world. 
If kinesis is intellection. the word will express the operative states 
of the Intelligence in the same way that "intellection" does. In other 
words, kine sis is simply an alternative way of expressing the role of 
intellection in the intelligible world. This is the key to understanding 
bow kinesis relates to energeia, for just as intellection is described as 
undergoing the moments of prohodos or dynamis and epistrophe or energeia, 
so kinesis may be identically described. 
We have already vi tnessed when discussing intelligible matter in 
Text Chow kinesis relates to dynamis. There we quote II, 4 (12), 5, 28-
39, where Plotinus describes the overflow of the One as kinesis. We in-
terpreted this remark to mean that without kinesis nothing posterior to 
the One can exist. Indeed, we concluded, following Fielder,40 that kine-
.!!! is the necessary condltio11 in the production of every hypostasis. 
Based on what we now lc:now of kicesis, we realize that by affirming the 
necessity of kinesis in II, ~ Plotinus is simply affirming the necessity 
of intellection. More precisely, the overflow of kinesis produces 
intelligible matter as an ac:tive dynamis, which in turn produces actual 
intellection, and is thus the first necessary stage in the generation of 
every hypostasis. 
While Text D does not altogether neglect kinesis as dynamis (as 
implied in /15) it focuses r:n.ai nly on reversion and therefore kines is as 
energeia. To explain exactly how kines is relates to energeia, Plotinus 
introduces the notion of ousia i11 Text D (#17;#24). And in this discus-
sion he exhibits further reliance on the Timaeus by likening kinesis to a 
40John Fielder. •chorisDos and Emanation in the Philosophy of 
Plottnus " 114 T C 50 , p • ; see eJC t • a • • 
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.. wandering" (planethentos) as it actuates all ousiai.41 These ousiai 
are the energeiai which terminate this wandering of ~ ( #17). Hence, 
ousiai or energeiai are necessary to the extent that reversion is neces-
-
sary in production, for they mark the end of production, the finished 
hypostasis. If kinesis terminated in procession, the universe of beings 
would remain forever in potency (#55;/1106,#107). That is to say, if 
there were no impetus (ephests)liZ beyond the initial movement from the 
One, the universe of beings would remain indeterminate and there would be 
no act (117). Only as de terminate is kines is the actuation of lives and 
being (119-#10) • 
This distinction betweeu ~as intelligible matter and~ as be-
ings or acts also explains how sallleness and difference relate to kinesis in 
Text D. We discovered the close relationship of heteron with kinesis in 
the same passage from II, ti to which we referred above. There (II, 4, S, 
28-39) Plotinus states that not only kinesis but also heteron is necessary 
in production. That difference must define kinesis in procession follows 
from the fact that, if an existent moves from its source, it necessarily 
separates itself or becomes distinct from that source. Difference, then, 
is a necessary characteristic of intelligible matter or active dynamis. 
However, text D makes It ~lear that what constitutes difference in 
procession constitutes sameness in reversion. This follows since intelli-
gible matter in revers ion vha t remains constant, common and present to 
all beings or acts UIZ6-D30). Indeed, it is intelligible matter which 
41In fact Plotinus uses flanethentos (or some other form of the 
verb planao) eight times in se~en lines (1117-#19) of chapter thirteen. 
42Plotinus conne~ts kiuesls with ephesis at III, 9 (13), 9, 4. For 
Other remarks on ephesis see Ill, 8 (30), 7, 5; 11, 23. 
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makes the ousiai possible, for they are (logically posterior to it 
(#15-#16). Hence, what constitutes difference in reversion must be 
opposed to intelligible matter in the duality of Nous. Accordingly, 
beteron refers not to Nous but to the multiplicity of beings that deter-
mine~· Since these beings are forms or acts, difference must.signify 
energeia in reversion. 
So far we have considered sameness and difference separately. 
Taken separately each denotes one of the dual aspects of the second 
hypostasis. Sameness denotes Nous or active dynamis (that which is 
determined); difference denotes Noe""ta or energeia (that which determines). 
But sameness and difference, since they are only different aspects of a 
single existent,43 may be taken together as defining a unified whole. 
Understood in this way, sameness and difference define the universe of 
intelligible beings and therefore define energeia itself. Thus, we 
discern one of the illlportan t i indlngs of Text D: to be energeia is to be 
sameness-in-difference. 
If one reflects on how Plotinus interrelates these four notions, 
ousia, kines is, tau tou end he teron, one must observe that kines is is 
central. By integrating all the other notions with kinesis, Plotinus 
defines kinesis as energeia and thereby exhibits how creatively he 
interprets his predecessors, for the union of kinesis and energeia 
represents a synthesis of l><>tll Plato's and Aristotle's conceptions of 
intellection. This synthesis is remarkable since Aristotle's conception 
of intellection as energe:ia w<>uld seem at first to be altogether incompat-
ible with Plato's conceptlo11 of lntellection as kinesis. According to 
43How the various as1>ec ts of Nous are logically distinct ways 
of expressing a single reality will be explained in Text E. 
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the Stagirite kinesis cannot mean intellection, for, if so, it could be 
ascribed to the Separate Intelligence. This ascription, however, is 
forbidden by Aristotle's ontology, according to which what is supremely 
real is perfect and complete and, therefore, i11D1lutable and i11D1lobile 
(akinetos). For Aristotle kines is implies mutability, imperfect.ion and 
dependence and therefore cannot belong to the supreme existent, the 
Separate Intelligence.44 Accordingly, ~ is energeia, not kinesis, for 
energeia signifies perfection and completion.45 
Since Plato and Aristotle are at odds on the nature of intellection, 
how can Plotinus logically coabine their conceptions of intellection in 
Text D? Plotinus achieves the synthesis by employing kinesis and energeia 
in complementary rather than conflicting ways. He uses Platonic kinesis 
to explain the emergence of ~ in reality and Aristotelian energeia to 
explain the nature of that existent as a completed or perfected hypostasis. 
In essence, kinesis and energeia do not conflict in Plotinus' conception 
of intelligence, because he combines them in such a way as to express 
different aspects of a single existent. 
This union of Plato and Aristotle results from Plotinus' refusal 
simply to mimic Plato's conception of kinesis in the Timaeus. Plotinus 
is willing to transcend Plato and apply kinesis to the intelligible world 
44This view of kinesis contrasts dramatically with Plato's, accord-
ing to which kinesis :is so perfect as to exist on the same level as the 
eternal Forms (see Sophist~ 243 e), 
45see Physics Theta, esp. ch. 5 (256 a 3-258 b 9); Metaphysics 
Lambda, chs. 5-7 (1071 a 1-1073 a 12). Also see the following works from 
the secondary literature: J. ~. Skemp, The Theory of Motion in Plato's 
~ter Dialogues (Amsterdam: Bakkert, 1967); p. 33, Ii: 2; J. t-:-Ackrill, 
Aristotle's Distinction between energeia and kinesis" in New Essays on 
.tfato and Aristotle (New York, 1965), pp. 121-141; PhIIlp Meriaii;' 
Aristotle's Unmoved Movers,•• Traditio IV (1946), 1-30. 
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itself, the world of Forms. And it is his motive behind this elevation 
of kin'Fsis to the intelligible world that explains why he is attracted to 
.Aristotle's doctrine of energeia. Plotinus realizes that Aristotle's 
' theory of potency and act provides him with a means to explain what Plato 
cannot help him explain: the relationship of the~ to the tran~cendent 
Good. From a Plotinian point of view Plato cannot explain this problem, 
because he does not fully realize that a sound metaphysics must be an 
henology. Once one fully understands that to be real is to be one, 
however, then he will reali z:e that ~' since it is a one-in-many, is 
dependent and therefore relates to the One as product to producer. It is 
this relationship of product to producer that makes Aristotle's conception 
of~ appropriate in an otherwise Platonic explanation. Since, accord-
ing to Aristotle, production in general consists in a movement from 
indeterminacy or potency to determinacy or act, the production of the 
~ (Plotinus concludes)46 111ay likewise be said to consist in such a 
movement. The Aristotelian conception of Nous as energeia, then, per-
fectly defines for Plotinus the final stage in the production of ~· 
Thus, Plotinus achie11es a synthesis of two positions so as to 
explain how the Intelligeuce is a one-in-many. He achieves this synthe-
sis through a long and cOill.plex discussion based on the multiple relation-
ship of four notions: kinesis~ ousia, tauton and heteron, which Plotinus 
extracts for his own spedal purposes from Plato's Timaeus, a dialogue 
whose influence on 'leic:t D 1dll further appear in our next section of 
comments. 
46Aristotle himself, of course, does not explain Nous as emerging 
into act out of potency, because the Nous of Aristotelian philosophy is 
the first existent. Hence, ~ is simply eternal, independent· act. 
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The Nature of Life 
Plotinus' treatment of life (zoe), which we have already glimpsed 
in prior key texts,47 is central to his conception of the intelligible 
world, and occupies the attention of several important treatises.48 VI, 
7 figures among these important treatises because it explains how life 
relates to the universe of beings, to the One Himself and, most important-
ly, to energeia. 
Text D introduces life along with kinesis (#.7-#9). This association 
is not accidental, for the second existent can only be kinesis if it is 
life (#24;#50). This judgment, that Intelligence is life, has the 
author! ty of Plato, who elevates life to the same level as the Forms in 
the Sophist, and of Aristotle who attributes life to the Separate 
Intelligence in the Metaphyslcs.49 Moreover, this judgement would seem 
to have inductive support, for, since the best lives in the sensible 
world are intelligent 1 the perfect union of life and intelligence would 
seem to be necessary in the intelligible world.SO 
If the Intelligence is life, life must consist of two distinct 
stages, identical with the moments in the production of the Intelligence. 
Life, therefore, is dynamis or energeia, depending on whether one con-
siders Nous as indeteTIDinate or as determinate (#7; #41-#42;#58). Intel-
ligible matter, ~ as dynamis 9 is life because it is an undertermined 
47see Text B (06) and Ie~t C (#35;#39). 
48For example, see Vl~ 9 (9), 9; III, 8 (30), 8-10; III, 7 (45), 
3; S; 10-11; I, 4 (46) passim. 
49For Plato, see Sophist,. 248 e; for Aristotle, see Metaphysics 
Lambda, ch. 7, 1072 b 13-29. 
50Plotinus argues preelsel~ this point at III, 8 (30), 8, 1-8. 
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perfection empowered of itself to contemplate the One (#42;#58).51 Life 
in its first moment is itself a power dependent on another power, the One 
( 11126-#127; .£!... 1136). But it is the completed ~' ~ as energeia, 
that is life in the most defiuite and perfect sense (#50). 
~is truly actual because it actuates all beings (#9;#24;#58). 
Its nature would remain forever a potency, incomplete and imperfect, if 
it did not actuate and make manifest all beings (1117;#24;#30). Life, 
then, is complete act to the extent that it actuates and encompasses all 
Forms. Since every Form ls itself a~' every Form is a life. Hence, 
by comprehending all Forms, the~ comprehends all lives. Accordingly, 
Nous is not a single or Individual life (#8) but is the totality of all 
-
lives, because it is the actuation of all lives. The intelligible world, 
thus, may be said '"to l>oil with life. "52 
This account of the ~ as all-encompassing life has implications 
regarding the production of all beings posterior to ~· If Nous is 
life and if its own infinite contents are lives, then all inferior beings 
are lives as well, for all perfections posterior to ~ are what they 
are as its logoi and ichne(ISe). Because all logoi of the Intelligence 
must themselves be contemplations, they must also be lives. For this 
reason the procession of all beings below the intelligible world is a 
procession of gradually diniuishing lives. Plotinus expresses this point 
51Later Neoplatonists (e.g .• Proclus, Platonic Theology, VI, 9, 
365), partly because of the iufluence of the Chaldean Oracles, hold that 
life (strictly speaking) Ls only dynamis or the second existent as 
indeterminate, and is (as indete!"lllinate) a separate hypostasis; once this 
second hypostasis undergoes revers ion or is in energeia, it should no 
longer be considered life but the third hypostasis, Intelligence. 
52vr, 7, 12, 23; vr, 3 (?3). 12, 9. 
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when contrasting the Intelligence with its logo! in III, 8 (30). 
For the other lives [•those less real than the Nous] 
are thoughts in a way, but one is a growth-thought, 
one a sense-thought and one a soul-thought. How, 
then, are they thoughts? Because they are logoi. 
And every life is a thought, but one is diumer than 
another, just as life [has degrees of clarity and 
strength]. But this life [•the life of~] is 
clearer; this ls first llf e and first intelligence 
in one. So the first life is thought, and the 
second life ls thought in the second degree, and the 
last life is thought in the last degree. All life, 
then, belongs to this kind and is thought. But 
perhaps men may speak of different kinds of life, 
but do not speak of different kinds of thought 
but say that some are thoughts, but others not 
thoughts at all, because they do not investigate 
at all what kind of thing life is.53 
53III, 8 (30), 8, 14-24 (following mainly Armstrong's translation). 
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Plotinus, before taking u~ the qu~stion of the impassibility of matter, 
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it is completely, it has no need of anthing for its preservation an~ being 
but is cause to the other beings, whieh merely seem to be. If this is correct, 
it must necessarily be in life, and in perfect life; or, if it falls short 
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In sum the universe is a hierarchy of lives because it is a hierarchy of 
thoughts and acts. 
The Intelligence is supreme in this hierarchy of lives because its 
intellection is perfect. !t ls perfect because it comprehends all beings 
at once. In a late but important treatise, III, 7 {4S), Plotinus comments 
on this all-embracing life so as to distinguish the energeia of~ from 
the energeia of its principal logos, Soul. The multiple aspects of~, 
i.e., entity, sameness and difference, movement and rest, are really 
identica1.S4 They reflect the unity of an existent whose life or energeia 
is eternity. While a person may analy~e this existent into multiple parts, 
eventually 
one puts it all together again into one, so as 
to be only life, compressing the otherness in 
these intelligible realities [•ousia, sameness, 
differences, movement and stability], and seeing 
the endlessness and self-Identity of their act, and 
that it ls never other and is not a thinking or 
life that goes from one thing to another but is 
always the selfsame without extension or interval; 
seeing all this one sees eternity in seeing a life 
that abides in the same, and always has the all 
present to it, not now thls, and then again that, 
but all beings at once, and not some beings, and 
then again others, bat a partless completion.SS 
S4In, 7, {4S), 3, 1-10. 
SS11I, 7, 3, 10-18 (after Armstrong). 
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Thus, the act of the Intelli.gence ls life as eternal and represents the 
Plotinian equivalent of the ••eternal living being" of Plato's Timaeus.56 
Soul is less perfect than the Intelligence and therefore cannot 
encompass all beings at once. Its intellection is not intuitive but 
discursive and thus must manifest its acts successively. 
For as Soul presents one act after another, and then again another 
in ordered succession, i.t produces the succession along with act, 
and goes on with another thought coming after that which it had 
before, to that which did not previously exist because discursive 
thought was not in action, and Soul's present life is not like that 
which came before it,57 
Because it manifests its life successively, Soul is time. And just 
as Nous is the equivalent of Plato's ••eternal living being" (to autozoon), 
the Soul is the equivalent of the "'moving image of eternity" .58 
If eternity ls life at rest, unchanging and identi-
cal and already unbounded, and time must exist as 
an image of eternity (in the same relation as that 
which this All stands to the intelligible All), 
then we must say that there is, instead of the life 
There, another life having, in a way of speaking, 
the same name as this power of the soul, and 
instead of intelligible movement there is the 
movement of a part of Soul; and instead of same-
ness and self-identity and abiding, that which does 
not abide in the sal1le but does one act after another, 
and, instead of tbatwhich is one without distance 
or separation, an Image of unity ••• for this is 
the way in whlc.h it 1o1ill imitate that which is 
56Timaeus, 37 d. 
57rII, 7 (45), 11, 3.>-"40 (Armstrong). 
58Timaeus, 37 c-33 c:. 
already whole, already all together and unbounded, 
by intending to be always making an increase in its 
being of the intelligible world. But one must not 
conceive time as outside Soul, any more than eter-
ni ty is outside real being. It is not an accom-
paniment of Soul nor something that comes after 
(any more than eternity There) but something which 
is seen along with it and exists in it, as eternity 
does There [with real being].59 
Thus, both Intelligence end Soul as lives are energeiai. 
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They 
differ, however, because one Is energeia and life in a perfect sense, 
whereas the other is a participant in energeia and life. The one is 
energeia so perfect as to comprehend reality in an eternal "now". The 
other is energeia in a less perfect way, and therefore is destined to 
comprehend reality as best l t can--in successive moments or in time. 
So far we have explained life only as it relates to beings, but 
59ru, 7, 11, ti.>-62 (Armstrong). 
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Text D also considers how life relates to the One. In the course of that 
discussion Plotinus explains that the One is not life but instead trans-
cends life. Since the One transcends life for the same reasons that He 
transcends act, it will be simpler to combine our exposition of the 
transcendence of the One over zoe with out discussion of his transcend-
ence over energeia • 
..!!!!. Transcendence .2f_ ~ .2.!!!:. .Q!!!_ Energeia 
The single most important finding in Text D is that the One by 
transcending life transcends energeia ( #35). This, of course, follows 
from the fact that life, as defined and determined, is energeia. Although 
VI, 7 is not the first treatise to explicitly state that the One trans-
cends energeia,60 nor is it the last,61 it is the first of our key texts 
to do so. Thus, Text D corroborates our conclusion reached in every prior 
key text that the One transcends energeia. 
Plotinus' reason for cl.en:;ing energeia and zoe of the One is that 
both imply plurality and therefore are incompatible with the pure simpli-
city of the One. The One cannot be life, because life is intellection, 
60of course, the transcendence of the One over energeia is implied 
wherever Plotinus remarks that Jle transcends ousia or Nous {e.g., I, 6 
[l], 9, 37-41; V, 4 (7), L, 10; :Z, 38-40; VI, 9 [9], li";"""n; V, 1 [10], 
8, 7-8; I, 2 [19], 3, 31; r, :3 [20), S, 7; IV, 4 [28], 16, 27; III, 8 
[30], 9, 2; VI, 6 [34], S, 37; V1, 2 [43], 3, 7-10; 17, 18-22; III, 7 
[45]' 2, 8; v' 3 [49] I 10, 5; L1 I 2-28; 12, 47-48; 17, 13-14; I, 7 [54]' 
1, 8). But the first tr ea ti se where he explicitly argues His transcendence 
over energeia is III, 9 (13), ~' 8-12; followed eleven treatises later by 
V, 6 {24), 6, 3. Here we should also mention that against the above 
texts which deny energeia of the One stands VI, 8 (39) which repeatedly 
affirms energeia of the One. This treatise, however, is not a realiable 
representation of Plotinus 1 doctrtne of energeia, as we will explain in 
our context to Text E. 
6lsee I, 8 (51), 2, 1-9 an~ r, I (54), 19-20. 
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which implies duality. The One also cannot be energeia, because energeia 
is life or intellection as determined. Because of their plurality life 
and energeia depend on a prior existent. But since the cause of first 
life and first act must 'be purely simple, the cause is beyond life and 
act. 
By arguing that the One is totally dissimilar to energeia, Plotinus 
must reconsider the common Greek philosophic assumption that every pro-
ducer must be like its product. Plotinus refers. to this assumption while 
responding to an imaginar1 interlocutor, probably a Stoic, early in 
chapter seventeen (#31-137). His response invokes the peculiar character 
of his monistic metaphysics. In an ontology the producer in every case 
must have the same nature as the product, because determinate being 
follows upon determinate 'being, nature upon nature. But in a henology, 
in which there is onl1 one reality, there must be a producer, namely, the 
First Ex is tent, which is unlike its pro duet, since the product admits 
multiplicity or unreality. Io II18ke the One like His product would be to 
regard Him as a being, for the very notion of likeness has its basis in 
ousia, and would destroy His uni~ue nature and His pure unity. 
Plotinus' denial of energe ia in the One is simply a corollary of 
his negative theology, whlch forbids positive ascriptions of the One 
because they are based on ousia or unity-in-multiplicity. Since energeia 
is equivalent to ousia, i.e., sal1leness-in-difference, energeia is some-
thing the One cannot be. 
S11111mary and Conclusions 
Let us close 011r treatnent of Text D with a careful summary. Text 
D is a study of energeia in E11nead VI, 7 (38), a long and difficult 
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treatise consisting of two parts. Part One (chs. 1-14) of VI, 7 is a 
detailed examination of the nature of the Intelligence; Part Two (chs. 
15-42) is an examina tlon of the relationship of the Intelligence to the 
Good. Within this two-part treatlse fall three separate sets of passages 
which contain very important information on energeia. These $ets of 
passages we label "Sections'"62 so as to avoid confusing them in our 
references with the two general '"Parts" of the treatise. Specifically, 
Section One (ch. 13) falls vi thin Part One of the treatise; Sections Two 
(chs. 17-18) and Three (ch. 37,. lines 1-19 and ch. 4) fall within Part 
Two. Let us begin by summarizing the context which prepares for Section 
One. 
In the opening twelve chapters of VI, 7, Plotinus interprets Plato's 
Timaeus to hold that Divine lntelligence (=the Demiurge) knows and 
encompasses the eternal Forms, the reasons for all beings. This implies 
that everything in the sensible world first exists in the intelligible 
world. Plotinus answet"s two lmportant questions in order to explain 
precisely how the Nous is the <:ause of all sensible beings. First, how 
can sense-knowledge exist ln the intelligible world? Plotinus answers 
that, while sense-knowledge .!I!!.! sense-knowledge cannot exist There, sense-
knowledge can exist Thet"e in the sense that all the principles of know-
ledge, which make sense-knowledge possible exist There. In other words, 
sense-knowledge is a logos of the Intelligence and thus has its source in 
the intelligible world. 
Secondly, how can the Fons of irrational animals, plants and 
62we found it convenient to label these passages "Sections" when 
charting the movement of thought ln Text D. 
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minerals exist There7 Plotinus replies that the Forms of all things are 
perfections and therefore are compatible with the nature of the Intelli-
gence. Furthermore, all Forms .!!:!!. Forms are intelligences, regardless of 
the qualities or imperfections of their participants, and are therefore 
one in nature with the Intelligence. 
By answering these questions (chs. 1-12) Plotinus demonstrates that 
the Intelligence is a perfect knower whose nature consists of an infinite 
plurality of noeta or Forms. The Intelligence_ is a single nature that 
comprehends the reasons for all beings. Chapter thirteen (Section One) 
aims to explain how this unity-in-multiplicity is energeia. This explan-
ation centers around four notions: kinesis, ousia, tauton, heteron, 
whichPlotinus acquires from Plato's Timaeus. In that dialogue Plato 
employs these four notions to describe the formation of the World Soul. 
According to Plato the Demiurge formed the World Soul so that it would be 
the best existent in the sensi"ble universe. This superior! ty required 
that soul be composed of three ingredients: ousia, tauton and thateron 
(which Plotinus renders as heterou). The Demiurge blended these ingredi-
ents into a whole. He cut this unity into two strips, bending them round 
into circles, an inner circle of difference and an outer circle of 
sameness. He next set these circles into cognitive motion and thereby 
produced the circular cycles of the celestial bodies, which make time 
possible. Through the circles of sameness and difference, the Soul has 
both true knowledge, since it apprehends the eternal Forms, and true 
belief, since it knows all sensible beings. 
Plotinus adopts these four notions of the Timaeus and boldly 
elevates them to the intelligible world. Accordingly, kinesis, ousia, 
tauten and heteron 'become no longer merely constituents of Soul but of 
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Nous as well. Plotinus ls justified in so elevating these notions by 
----
authority of his doctrine of logos. which maintains that Soul is simply a 
less perfect instance of the Nous itself. Hence, if kinesis, ousia, 
tauton and heteron are cons ti tutlve of Soul. they are constitutive of~· 
-
Kinesis in particular belongs to ~ because ~ is intell~ction. 
If, according to Plato. Soul is iotellection because of its eternal self-
motion, then, Plotinus concludes. ~ as pure intellection and cause of 
soul is certainly self-motion. That Plotinus intends kinesis to signify 
intellection is confil'11led by several passages in Text D, where the movement 
of ~is identified as the cause of all beings. Since elsewhere Plotinus 
describes intellection as the cause of all beings, we may assume that in 
Text D he intends to link ltinesls with intellection. This connection 
explains how kinesis relates to dynamis and energeia. Since kinesis is 
so closely linked with the role of intellection in reality, then kinesis 
relates to dynamis and energeia precisely as intel~ection does. 
In Text C we witnessed hov klnesls relates to dynamis. Quoting II, 
4 (12), 5, 28-39 , we disco>Jered that kines is as intellection is first 
indeterminate and potential before becoming determinate and actual. 
Moreoever, since intellectlon is necessary in all production, we concluded 
that kinesis as dynamis is a uec.essary condition for the production of 
every hypostasis. 
Text D complements these remarks from II, 4 by explaining how 
kinesis is energeia. Essentially. !tinesis becomes energeia by moving 
from indeterminacy to deteninacy. 1Vhat is first only active power in 
R._rohodos becomes complete ac.t r.n eplstrophe. To explain exactly how 
!.!nesis becomes energeia • re:x:t D introduces ousia, the second of the 
four notions from the Timaeus. Plotinus states that the movements or 
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"wanderings" (planethentos, a word that echoes the planets of the Tim-
aeus) of the Nous actuate all 011siai, all intelligible beings. These 
---- ~~ 
ousiai are the energeiai which complete the Nous. By contemplating its 
source the Nous produces the universe of beings. This contemplation 
constitutes the stage of reversion, without which all beings. remain 
forever in potency. 
Section One introduces the remaining Platonic notions, tauton and 
heteron, to further explain how Nous is dynamis and energeia. Heteron 
has a wider application than tauton, since heteron applies to both 
procession (dynamis) and re~ersion (energeia). We have seen how heteron 
belongs to procession in the same passage from II, 4 which we cited above. 
In that passage (ch. 5, 28-3 ()) Plotinus states that he teron is a property 
of kinesis in the first moment of an hypostasis, because, if an existent 
moves from its source, it is necessarily different from that source. 
Heteron in procession is therefore another name for intelligible matter 
or active dynamis. 
Text Dadds to the discussion in II, 4 by demonstrating that heteron 
in reversion no longer refers to intelligible matter or dynamis but to 
form or energeia. The form of intelligible matter is actually the infinite 
plurality of beings. These ousfal constitute difference because they are 
opposite the unifying nature of intelligible matter. 
What then constitutes sameness? Whereas difference characterizes 
intelligible matter in process ion~ sameness characterizes intelligible 
matter in reversion. This is because intelligible matter is that which 
is common to all Forms. Intell Lgi ble matter is sameness in the sense 
that it is eternal intellectlon present to all beings. 
214 
The separation of sameness and difference is the result of phil-
osophical analysis, rather than the result of any!!.!!. separation. The 
Nous is in reality one nature, a unified existent. Accordingly, the~ 
-
is neither sameness nor difference but sameness-in-difference. Since the 
Intelligence as a whole is pure energeia, sameness-in-difference·may be 
taken as the very definition of energeia. 
Of these four notions, klnesis, ousia, tauton and heteron, kinesis 
appears to be fundamental, for, in the final .analysis, the remaining 
three notions represent various aspects of kinesis. In fact, these other 
notions relate to kinesis so as to define it as energeia. By integrating 
these notions with kinesis in this way, Plotinus achieves a synthesis of 
Plato's and Aristotle's conceptions of lntellection. This would at first 
seem impossible since Aristotle's Separate Intelligence is pure energeia 
because it is purely i!JIJllol>lle ( ak.!.netos). Plotinus, however, achieves 
the synthesis by emplo:;d.ng Aristotle's and Plato's conceptions of in-
tellection in complementary rather than conflicting ways. Platonic 
kinesis explains the generation of~ and Aristotelian energeia explains 
the completion of~ .as an hypostasis. Plotinus is willing to incorpor-
ate the Aristotelian notion of energela so as to explain the relationship 
of Nous to the transce11dent Good,. a relationship which Plato does not 
-
explain because his metaphysics is not a fully developed henology. As an 
henologist, however, Plotinus reall:es that ~, since it is a one-in-
lllany, must be dependent on the One as product to producer. Accordingly, 
Aristotle's theory of euergel.a. beco10es a valuable way for Plotinus to 
explain the final stage in tme prod~ction of Nous. 
In addition to these four i~partant notions, kinesis, ousia, tauton 
and heteron, Plotinus introduces in Section One of Text D a fifth notion, 
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zoe, which also reflects tbe influence of Plato' Timaeus. Plotinus asso-
-
ciates life with kin'i"sis in Text D. This association is necessary, be-
cause, if kinesis is intellection, then kinesis must be life. Hence, the 
Intelligence as perfect kinesls is perfect life. This conviction, that 
Intelligence is life, not only has the authority of Plato and A~istotle 
but also empirical support, for the best lives in the sensible world are 
intelligent. 
If life is intellection, then life must consist of two stages, just 
as intellection does. Life in Its first stage ls active dynamis and in 
its second, energeia. Life is dznamis or energeia depending on whether 
one considers intellection as lndeterm.lnate or determinate. In its 
initial stage, as indeterminate, life is an active power that proceeds 
from the Power of all beings, the One. By contemplating this original 
Power, life achieves Its complete~ stage and is act. Only as act is life 
fully realized and determined. Thet'efore, energeia is the most perfect 
kind of life. 
If life is the same as ~, then life is energeia as it actuates 
all being or Forms. Since every Fon is itself a ~' every Form is 
also a life. Hence, Nous is JUe not as a particular life but as the 
universe of all lives. Preen this conclusion follows a remarkable 
observation: if Nous is life, then all beings, from Soul and below, are 
lives, because they are logoi and vestiges of ~· Since the sensible 
world is a grads tion of ia telligenc es, it is also a gradation of lives. 
Moreover, because to be a11 intelligence or life is to be an act, the 
sensible world is also a hierarc~y of acts. 
Beyond the sensible wot'ld ls the source of all these gradations of 
lives or ects, the~ itself, rile Nous is their source because it is 
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perfect life and act. Its perfection lies in encompassing all beings in 
a single moment. Hence, the Intelligence is eternity and the equivalent 
of Plato's autozoon, "the eternal Uvlng being" of the Timaeus. 
Soul, the principal logos of Nous , is inferior to its source and 
therefore cannot comprehend all 'beings at once. Its life or act must 
manifest itself successively and thus in not eternity but time, equivalent 
to Plato's "moving image of eternity"' of the Timaeus. 
Life is the last important suDject to ill~mine energeia in Section 
One. Three chapters intervene be tween Sections One and Two of Text D. 
The first of these chapters (ch. 14) doses Part One of the treatise. In 
this last chapter Plo ti nus cone ludes that, as a totality of lives, the 
Intelligence is like an organism, a unity of diverse parts and faculties. 
Thus, Plotinus concludes Part One hy stressing that the Intelligence is a 
unity-in-multiplicity. 
Chapters fifteen and sixteen introduce Part Two of the treatise. 
These chapters explain that the Intelligence is dependent on the One as 
product to producer. In partic~lar they state that as an active power or 
sight the Nous requires the One as its cognitive object. Without a prior 
object the Nous would remain forever in potency. 
This brings us to Section Two, chapters seventeen and eighteen, 
whose chief points are reiterated in Section Three, chapters thirty-seven 
(lines 1-19) and forty.63 These sections focus on the single most impor-
63rn the eighteen chapters that span Sections Two and Three, Plotin-
us explores the relationship between the Intelligence and the Good by 
asking a specific question: what is the cause of the goodness present to 
the intelligible beings? Before answering this question Plotinus devotes 
seventeen chapters to considering various possible solutions. In chapter 
nineteen he proposes and rejects two of them. First, he considers whether 
the intelligibles are good because they are simply desirable. This solu-
217 
tant finding of Text D: the One transcends energeia. By transcending 
energeia, of course, the One transcends intellection and life. All three 
-
of these aspects of Nous presuppose duality and therefore are incompatible 
- . 
with the pure simplicity of the One. An existent that has some measure 
of multiplicity cannot be the first existent, for multiplicity ·is the 
same as perfection. Bence, without a perfectly simple prior existent 
(i.e., an existent which altogether transcends multiplicity), the Nous 
would have no cause~ ln other words. the One must transcend energeia for 
energeia to exist. 
It is the nature of his henology that forbids Plotinus to attribute 
energeia of the One. 1 f the 111 tima te source of reality must be pure 
unity, then all products of that Source must be wholly unlike It because 
they admit multiplicity. !'b11s, ?lotinus cannot wholly accept the tradi-
tional philosophic principle that the producer must be like its product. 
He admits the truth of this principle for the universe of beings (where 
nature follows nature) but denies it for all of reality. There is one 
producer, namely, the One. that nust be totally dissimilar to its products. 
tion must be rejected since desire has to do with something outside any 
good being. Secondly, he rejects the possibility that the good of a 
being is the same as lts virtue. Virtue ls posterior to the nature of a 
being and therefore cannot l>e the "Jery cause of the good of a being. 
Chapters twenty to twenty-three consider whether the Intelligene is itself 
the Good. If this were true, the lo"Je of the soul would be content with 
knowledge alone, but instead the soul aspires to a higher good than 
knowledge. 
After considering several aporiai (chs. 24-30), which aim to clarify 
how any being must relate to the goad. Plotinus reiterates (chs. 31-35) 
that the intelligible world is not sufficient to explain its own goodness. 
Again, this conclusio11 turns 011 t.he earlier observation (chs. 20-23) 
that cognition i.e., union with ~ous, does not satisfy the soul's love. 
Hence, what causes goodness in the-iitelligibles is that which transcends 
Intelligence altogether. The ca11se of goodness is the illumination of 
the Good Itself, which makes possible an intuition of reality that no 
cognition can replace (ch. 36). 
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Without this original dissimilarity, the universe of beings cannot exist. 
As a closing observation it appears that Plotinus develops energeia 
as he does in Text D to help accomplish the over-all task of the treatise, 
which is to distinguish the Intelligence from the transcendent Good. 
This means that energeia is a vay of reinforcing Plotinus' negative 
theology. In other words., enerseia is introduced in VI, 7 as a way of 
expressing what the Nous is and what the One cannot be.64 
Ultimately, what 11eparate the Nous from the One is the former's 
nature as a plural existent. Specifically, Text D explains this plural 
nature by relating energeia to fot1r specific aspects of ~: kinesis, 
ousia, tauton and heteron. Text D, however, does not exhaust Plotinus' 
comments on these four notions. In a later treatise, VI, 2 (43), he 
again discusses them (along with a fifth notion, stasis), but mainly 
under the influence of Plato,s Sophist rather than the Timaeus. To see 
how this discussion develops .and how it involves energeia, let us now 
turn to VI, 2 as our Text E. 
64This emphasis on aegat::l.~e theology explains why Plotinus is 
careful in Text D to avoid. de!lcrl'bins the Nous in ways that suggest too 
close a similar! ty with the One . This caUtTon even leads him to deny 
(ch. 17; #61), contrary to other treatises, that the~ is a logos of 
the One. Plotinus must avoid such a way of explaining the relationship 
of Nous to the One because It would threaten the very task of Text D. 
Thevery notion Oflos~s ::l.inpL::l.es ::l.ritelligiblity, which Text D argues the 
One must transcend. Tbus, ::l.n rext D Plotinus must restrict logos to the 
universe below the Intelligence. [a other treatises, where the interests 
of negative theology are not as pressing, be is willing to apply logos to 
the ~· See n. 18. 
TEXT E: ENNEAD VI, 2 (43). chs. 7, 8, 14 and 15 
Our final key text is taken from VI, 2, the forty-third treatise 
in chronologica1 order. VI. 2 was originally the second part of a single 
project, which Porphyry entitled "On the Genera of Being" and divided into 
three treatises, VI, 1 (!iZ), VI. 2 (43), VI, 3 (44).1 Although these 
three treatises originally formed a single composition, they are not all 
identical in purpose and scope. 'Wbereas VI, l and VI, 3 are mainly 
polemics against the Stoics and Aristotelians on the categories of being, 
VI, 2 is a constructive exposition of Plotinus' own position on the sub-
ject. Specifically, VI, 2 aims to demonstrate how the five supreme genera 
of Plato's Sophist are the logically distinguishable constituents of the 
intelligible world. 'l'his demonstra tlon is especially rewarding for our 
purposes because of the relationship of energeia to each of these genera. 
Only four treatises Intervene between Text D (VI, 7 [38]) and Text 
E. Two of these may 'be dismissed as irrelevant. II, l (40), "On the 
Universe," is mainly a cosmological treatise and fails to even mention 
energeia.2 IV, 6 (41) is a psychologLcal study, "On Sense-Perception and 
Memory,•• and yields nothing new on energeia. Of the remaining two 
treatises, VI, l (42), of course, is important because it introduces the 
' .... ., ·" .J~ 
entire discussion 7TEf l TL»V l€vi.; ).! rou c¥Tos and speaks of energeia 
often. But in spite of its imp<>rtance. VI, 1 will not be treated as a 
lProphyry, •0 The I.Ue of Plotin1Js,"' p. 21. 
2VI, 8 (39) will be discussed io the subsequent paragraph. 
2L9 
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key text. The reason for this rests primarily in the purely negative 
intent of the treatise. Since VI, l is a polemic, it is relatively 
unreliable as a source of Plotinus' own views concerning the categories 
of energeia. Any positive Lnformation it contains is negligible. Hence, 
we shall subordinate relevant points from VI, 1 to an investigation of 
VI, 2, which is a direct and positive presentation of Plotinus' views.3 
The remaining intervening treatise, which also happens to be 
immediately subsequent to Vl, 7 ('l"ext D) in both chronology and Porphyry's 
arrangement, is VI, 8 (39), ThLs composition, entitled "On Free Will,"4 
would seem to demand the closest Lnspection, because at first glance it 
appears to constitute one of Plotinus' most important treatises on 
energeia. The treatise not only abounds with instances of energeia, the 
word occurring 66 times in 21 chapters (compared with 44 occurrences in 
the 42 chapters of VI, 7) ,5 but also it uses energeia in ways and contexts 
alien to most other tre.atLses. J'or instance, consider the following 
remarkable passage frorn chapter seven (lines 46-54): 
The hypostasis [of the Good] would be, so to speak, 
the same as HLs act, for there would be no differ-
erence; hOltl could there be a difference [in 
3Likewise we must sul>or1Una te relevant points from VI, 3, which 
seeks to resolve some of the sporiai that Plotinus sets up in VI, 1 
concerning Aristotle's categories. Both VI, 1 and VI, 3 appear to argue 
that sensible ousiai are transitory sud thus utlimately unable to support 
a genuine theory of categories. "N'one tbeless, Plotinus allows that sensible 
ousiai have at least 1110men tary ll ta1>lli ty and can admit certain predicates, 
namely, the first five of .Arist()tle' s original ten categories. By no 
means, however, could the Ari stote Lian categories, even if reduced to 
five, ever apply to intelligible ousiai, as VI, 2 makes clear. 
4Porphyry, "The Life of J>l()tinus,'" p. 21. 
Sconcerning the number of till'le s energeia appears in any treatise, 
II, 5 (Text C) is the most t:'emrka ble. Energeia occurs there 61 times 
in five brief chapters. 
the Good], if there is no difference in the 
Intelligence. The act [There) belongs as 
much to the being as the being to the act. 
Thus, "acting according to nature" does not 
apply [to the Good}, for neither act nor 
life, so to speak, Issues from His entity. 
But the entity accompanies and is associ-
ated eternally with act, and out of both He 
makes Himself and is self-complete and 
[dependent on] nothing.6 
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Here, in spite of his repeated statements throughout the Enneads that the 
One is not ousia and energeia, Plotinus unabashedly attributes both traits 
to the One. 
A passage from chapter tventy (lines 9-15) is even more extreme. 
For one should not fear that we posit the first 
act [•the Good] to be without entity. On the 
contrary, His set Is posited, so to speak, as 
His very hypostasis. [f any hypostasis 
were without act, then the principle of 
all beings would be imperfect and the 
most complete would be incomplete. And 
if act were added [to entity}, unity would 
be destroyed. If then act is more per-
fect than entity, and the First is most 
perfect, the First is act.7 
6The translation is mine. 
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This passage not only further violates Text D by affirming energeia of 
the Good, but it also offends another central conclusion of our study by 
separating energeia from ousia. 
These are only a sa111pllng of 111any such passages in VI, 8 ,8 and 
therefore we must answer the following question before taking up Text E: 
why is VI, 8 not a key text--i.ndeed, a most important key text? The 
answer lies in the peculiar purpose of VI, 8, which is not disclosed 
until chapter seven of the treatise. At lines 12-15 of chapter seven 
Plotinus refers to a group of thinkers outside his own school9 who 
endorse a certain .. presumptuous discourse"' (tolmeros logos), consisting 
of two assertions offensive to Plot in us' position on the One: "[the 
Good] is what He is b1 chance~ and only by chance, and is not master of 
what He is;" and, secondly, ~[since] It is not by Himself that He is what 
He is, He is without freedom or ar~itrium,10 and either acts or does not 
·'-o',....,,,.,v n,,,_E10'". E,' ~e' r ~ " • I 
.. ,,. ., .... ., 11 .. , r  11rroO"'T<1criv avEv £vcpyELC1S 'TLS 
BE'L-ro, ;>J..,7"]s ~ G.px1J JCa~ ci.rEA~S' i7 -r£>.EtOTclT7J '7TC1<7WV 
• u , , e , • , • " ... E' ~ 
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'T£'A£LOT£pov ~ hlpyna ~r o Jcr[11.~. 'T"EArnha-rov S£ To 
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Bconsider, for eKa.mple, cm. l? (lines 22-37); ch. 13 (lines 5-11); 
ch. 16 (lines 12-18); ch. 20 (lines 34-39). 
9rhat these thinkers are/outside his own school I take to be the 
c - I / 
meaning of the Greek phrase e-rep ,.,gt£.,., t!"'rME!J• 
> ) / 
lOFor the prepositional phrase e,.,,-) a..ur1 , translated literally as 
"it is for him," there is no single corresponding word in English. The 
Phrase means freedom of choice or free-will, which is easily translated 
into the German Verfugung, bnt r shall follow Ficinus, who translates it 
as arbitrium. 
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act on account of necessity. ••LI Plotinus' task in VI, 8 is to refute the 
"presumptuous discourse,•• and expecially its first assertion, although 
Porphyry's title wrongly suggests that Plotinus focuses on the second.12 
In essence the '"discourse"' presents Plotinus with a dilemma: either 
the One has a cause and a determinate nature and, then, He is be.ing and 
not the transcendent principle of being; or the One does not have a cause 
and a determinate nature and, then, He exists only by chance.13 
Now, one would expect Plo tinus to make short work of this dilemma 
by invoking negative theolo,gy.Llf [nstead, he takes a far more elaborate 
route by invoking the noti<>n of will. He presumes that by granting the 
llThe Greek is as foll<>w s: 
• ., f _,, ' 
OV'TWS EXEiV, WS' EXEL, KO.I. 
' .. ,. .. . , 
OVK ovaa ICVp'a. "r'OI/ ~ EUTtJJ, ooua 'TOV'T'O ·o EO"TLV ov 'l'Tap1 
t ... ., ' ·~ ,~ ... w ,, ' 1 ' ' ... 0.trr7]S' 01.l'TE' "r'O ff'IE1'r;JE(JO&V CIJJ EXO' OV'TE 7'0 E7T avrn 
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7TCi,OVO'Q 1] /J-'f} 1TOt.DtJUO, Ci ~1-'0 '}'KO.O"TO.L 7TOL!LV TJ p:ry 7TOLE LY. 
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Brehier expresses the two assert ions thus: "l' Un n' a d' au tre origine que 
le hasard et n'existe que :par accident; l'Un ne tenant pas son etre de 
lui-meme n'est pas Ul>re et fait ne'cessairement tout ce qu'U fait" 
(Plotin, Vol 6, Part 2, I>• 1L9), Harder-Theiler writes as follows: 
"dieses Wesen sei in seinern Zustande nt1r von Ungefahr, babe nicht Vollmacht 
uber das, was 1st, sel das, was es lst, nicht aus sich selber und besitze 
daher weder Freiheit nocb fre:ie Verfugung, indem es tue oder nicht tue, 
was zu tun oder nicht zu tlln es ,ge:zwungen sei" (Plotinus Schriften, Band 
IV a, p. 19). 
12Br/hier makes this <>hser11a tlon, ibid •• 
13Ibid., p. 122. 
14An appeal to negat:i"e theology would be appropriate because, 
according to Plotinus' general pod tlon on the One, the "discourse" is a 
false dilemma, assuming mistakenl1 that the One is subject to the attri-
butes of ousia, to which alone chance and nature can apply. 
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One a will, he can show that the One has a raison ~.'atre and is free.15 
In order to do this, however. he must violate negative theology, for will 
would seem to belong properl:17 only to an intellect .16 This abandonment 
of negative theology allows Plotlnus to ascribe not only will to the One 
but also energeia. But why d.oes Plotinus follow this more difficult 
course when he could dismiss the "d.lscourse" abruptly? Apparently, he 
regards the "discourse" as so important that it demands refutation on its 
own terms. Since the ••c1.1scourse •• ignores negative theology in its 
description of the One, Plotinus himself is willing to ignore negative 
theology in order to refute the "discourse." 
But why does Plot:inus invest the "discourse" with such importance? 
It is in answering this question that we can begin to see why VI, 8 is 
not a key text. The answer appears to be that PlC!tinus perceives the 
"discourse" as a Gnostic threat within his own school.17 That the 
"discourse" would interest !'lotlnus' students is not surprising, since to 
some degree it resembles Plotlnus' OWll view concerning the One.18 Hence, 
15To accomplish this a certain period of preparation is necessary, 
for the will is primarily a hUill.an faculty and considerable explanation is 
required to grasp how it can belocg to the One. Accordingly, VI, 8 
divides into two parts. Part One (chs. 1-6) investigates human will and 
arbitrium and in what sense these notions may be ascribed to divine 
beings; Part Two (chs. 7-2LJ investigates will as ascribed to the One so 
as to reply to the ••presumptuous discourse.•• 
16Plotinus argues this in chapters three to five. 
17In a forthcoming article, "'two Views of Freedom: A Christian 
Objection in VI, 8 (3~J I 7. u-1.s. .. A. H. Armstrong argues that the 
"preswnptuous discourse" hae orthodox Christian rather than Gnostic 
authorship. For our purposes the origin of the "discourse" makes no 
difference. Our point stands: vr. 8 was written in response to an alien 
philosophical threat within flotlnus' own school. 
18Tbis resemblance co11sists in the fact that the One is without 
cause and nature and he11ce would seem to exist by chance and to be without 
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it is possible that careless students might regard the "discourse" as the 
logical outcome of P lo tinus' own theology. Plotinus himself is aware of 
the resemblance and personally struggles against the persuasive logic of 
the "discourse," as he admits ln chapter twelve (lines 2-3): "Take hold, 
my soul, lest you be foully persuaded by these reasons and fall into 
uncertainty. "19 Plotinus realizes that the Gnostic position is close 
enough to his own to cause profound intellectual distrubance or confusion, 
which Brehier likens to a kind of vertigo,20 It is to avoid this vertigo 
and to safeguard his disciples that Plo tinus has written the entire 
treatise.21 
It is this personal and pedagogical purpose behind Plotinus' 
refutation of the "discourse" that disqualifies VI, 8 as a key text. In 
order to safeguard his students from Gnosticism (or some such alien 
school), Plotinus is willing to suspend momentarily his negative theology 
and to describe the One in positi11e terms, including energeia. That 
Plotinus is conscious of stt'a ini ng language beyond the limits of sound 
philosophy is evident in his constant qualification of sentences with the 
/""I 
" adverb D l l> 1/. In fact, he exp lid tly regrets his abuse of language at 
the opening of chapter thit'teen. 
We must iutrod~ce these names [=e.g., energeia, 
kurion, ousia] t<> vha t ve are seeking, though 
it is not accut"ate to do so; let us say again 
that, speaking aecut"a te ly, we must not admit 
arbitrium. Only a st~dent thoroughly familiar with Plotinus' view of the 
transcendence of the One could dis tlng11 ls h Plotinus' theology from the 
Gnostic error. 
/ 20Brehier, Plotln, Vol. .. t., Part~~ p. 122. 
21 Ibid. 
even a logical duality in the One, but we are 
using this present language in order to per-
suade our opponents, though it involves some 
deviation from accurate thought.22 
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In this quotation Plotinus is, in effect, asking the reader to excuse the 
aberrant nature of VI, 8, because it is written primarily as a refutation 
and not as a statement of bis own position, and therefore be also 
disqualifies the treatise for our purposes. A treatise inspired mainly 
by the interests of pedagogy and refutation is not likely to furnish 
reliable insights into its author's own position. Hence, contrary to 
what one might originally expect, VI, 8 is not Text E. Let us now turn 
to VI, 2, which is rightfully text E. 
Having criticized Aristotle and the Stoics in VI, 1,23 Plotinus 
endeavors in VI, 2 to defend the ?latonic theory on the genera of being.24 
This defense, of course, requires Plot in us to adjust Plato's theory to 
his own unique vision of the Intelligible world. Since the relationship 
22 Translation mine. 
'A»..' el Kat Tel.. oJ.1'5jJ.rLTO rawa l-rraynv 8ei OOIC 
op8ws TOV t·rrrovµli,1011 I 7'Ml-I" czv Aeyla9w, ws Ta µ.£v 
t 8 .., # • -I 1' ' s· f • 9 I ~ I op ws EL/YT/TO.I, o·n C>U '1~1-1J7(CIJ.1 ov WS' HS' E1TLVO,O.V ovo, 
Ta 8( viiv -rijs -:rec.e() v~ ;ir:l.pc.1.1 1(0..r ·n -r7a.pa.vo'T]TEOV EV 'TOLS' 
,\oyOLS'. 
23Plotinus criticizes tile Aristotelian categories from chapter one 
through twenty-four oi Vl, l; Ile criticizes the Stoic categories from 
chapter twenty-five through tbirty. 
24Plotinus makes 1 t clear frolll the opening lines of the treatise 
(ch. 1, 1-5) that his task Is to defend his conception of the Platonic 
.!!_egista gene. ..After having e:uDined the position concerning the ten 
categories [of Aristotle} an~ mavlng spoken of [the Stoics], who reduced 
everything to a single gee 11s , pl acing as subordinate to this unity its 
four forms, we should next aake evident our own opinions on the subject 
[of the genera of being]• striving to show the agreement of our convictions 
With the opinion of Plato.~ 
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between the Platonic genera and energeia does not begin to appear until 
chapter seven of VI, 2, it is necessary first to summarize important 
points in its opening six chapters. In this summary we will emphasize 
bow Plotinus perceives the fundamental role of the genera in the intelli-
gible world so as to simplify our task of relating them to energeia. 
Before defending the Platonic division of being into five supreme 
classes (Plotinus begins), the meaning of the expression "genera of being" 
must be determined. Accordingly, there are several questions to answer 
at the outset. (1) ls being comprised only of a single genus or of 
several genera? (2) If several, are the genera also principles?25 (3) 
Is being truly a primary genus or Is it a species of a higher genus, 
whose other species is becoming?' Plotinus answers this third question 
immediately, declaring it al>surd, for it would entail that reality and 
unreality, being and non-being, are of the same kind (ch. 1). 
Plotinus' answer to the first question is that being is comprised 
of several genera, which are the 1110s t universal Forms. His answer to 
the second question is that the genera are principles, for they are the 
constituents of intelligible l>e:ing. Eut these answers (Plotinus goes on 
2 5From lines i 
logical possibilities 
to its genera. 
to 13 of cllap ter one Plotinus considers all the 
concerning the relationship of principles of being 
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to say) entail certain difficulties. How do the genera relate to one 
another so as to constitute being? Do they relate as a mixture of really 
distinct elements? If they are a mixture, does this imply that separately 
each is only in potency and not an independent act? Most importantly, 
does not admitting a plurality of genera destroy the unity of bei~g? And 
can unity be retained except by admitting a superior genus to which all 
the others are subordinatedr lt certainly is not permissible to explain 
the various genera as the result of differences added to being, the 
supreme genus. If being were a single genus, multiple beings could not 
exist, for differences must be added to a genus extrinsically. This last 
difficulty consists of a dilelililla: if there is no supreme genus, being 
loses its unity; if there is a supreme genus, being loses its multiplicity 
(ch. 2). 
How can this dilemma be overcome1 The solution lies in positing as 
the source of the geneTa of be!.ng a unity which is not itself a genus. 
This unity is the One Bimsel f • vho transcends being and nonetheless is 
the cause of being. As the product of the One, being is a unity; in 
fact, being .!.!. unity, but 011ly 011 a diminished (more multiple) level 
of perfection. As a manifestat!.on of the One, being is really a whole, 
and yet it is analyzable into distinct genera. The genera of being 
are the logically distinguishable constituents of intelligible being 
(ch. 3). 
As unities of distinct parts bod1 and soul are useful analogies for 
grasping the unitary b11t dlYeTse cltaracter of intelligible being. The 
body is a whole, whose lnsepera'i>le components, entity, quantity, quality 
and movement, are distinguishable by a'i>straction. The same is true of 
the soul. The soul comprehends multiple logoi, all of which are really 
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identical with, but logically distinct from, the soul. The soul is itself 
a logos of ~ and, accordingly. reflects in its own way the five genera 
of being (chs. 4-6). 
It is in identifying certain genera in soul that Plotinus makes the 
transition to identifying genera in the Intelligence. Here our k~y text 
begins• 
"[l] What factors, then, and bow many are observable [in soul]? 
[2] We have already discovered entity and life in the soul. [3] Entity 
is common to every soul and lli e ls common to every soul, but life is also 
in the Intelligence. [4] Having introduced the Intelligence and its life, 
let us posit a single genus, movement. which is common to all life. [5] 
Entity and movement, which is first life. let us posit as two genera. [6] 
For even if they are [really] one. they are separable in thought, which 
finds them to be one and yet not one; otherwise they could not be separ-
ated. 
7' 1-8: 
T ' .,.. • , ,, ' ' , .E ~ ' , £.Va 0 vv EO"iL KCl& 1T ()OCI. "iCl EJ!Opwµ.eva ; 'TTELOTJ EV 
,/, - • ti I p .. l II \ ...,. \ r 
.,,vxn evpoµev 0 VO&al' rl.J-1.tl. KCIL • (,f)"IJ.! - Kat TOV'TO KOLVOV .,, 
t f t ' / ,}, - I 8 I I r r I ,. ' ~ \ \ OVCTL<l E17'£. 1Tacrris 'f1''J<7f>, IC'OtlJOll E 1<4L 71 .,.w'T], =W7J 0£ KQL 
t A I I "'l\ - ,, I r1 
£V VCf> - E7TE"L<7ayayovres K'Cl& 701J J:l()l)IJ KClt "i'T}V 'TOV'TOV =WTJV, 
\ \ t ' I , - \. I • I () I () KoLvov -ro £1TL TOO"!/ r:,w71 ~J.J JCL.V7]qi.v EV 7i y£Vos T)Ooµe a. 
O' I ~\ ' I 'I II' ,. I 'f' ~I I 
vaLav u£ KCIL ICLVTJC1C.IJ "'P' -:rpw77JJ.J ':iw71v ovoav ovo Y£V'T} 
() I e K ' \ 1 • 'r I I , .. T)CToµe a. ai )'ap H eJ:J. XWfJ 1.., n avra Tfj VOT)CTH o EV 
t f\ f I "' ' "'- '\I- 8' I OVX EV £Vpwv' 11 OtJJC' '1.1-' CJ1n1: e:~r, );CJ.Jp,c;at. 
"[7] Witness also that i11 other things there is clearly a separation 
of movement and life from oeins; If uot in true being, then at least in 
the shadow of being and ln that which is being in name only. [8] For as 
in the image of a maa, man)1 things .are omitted and, above all, the 
Principal thing, life, EO it I~ that tbe being of sensible things is but 
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8 shadow of [trueJ being, and is separated from the greatest being, which 
is life in the primary sense. [9] Thus, we can here [i.e., in the sensible 
worldJ separate being from life and life from being. 
7, 8-15: 
"[10] There are many species of being and [evenJ a genus. [llJ But 
movement neither is subordinate to being nor Is in it; rather, it is with 
being, and is found in being but not as in a substrate. [12J For movement 
is the act of being and neither of the two exists apart the other except 
in thought, but the two natures are [really) one. [13J For being is in 
act, not in potency. [14] And if each of the two is considered separately, 
movement appears in being and being in movement, just as in the one which 
is [i.e., the One of the Parmenides),26 each [of the two--one and being--J 
is distinct from the other and yet is the other. [15] Nonetheless, 
intellection says that there are tvo terms and that each form is twofold 
and one. 
26Here Plotinus refers to the second hypothesis of the Parmenides 
(142 b-157 b), where ~the oae vhi~h is~ (which Plotinus identifies with 
the second hypostasis) is a unity having many parts. So when Plotinus 
here says that ''in the one which i.s each [of the two--one and beingJ is 
distinct from the other and yet Is the other," he is saying that the 
Whole, the complete Nous, has tlae part (one of its aspects or genera, 
e.g., movement) and the part: has the whole (e.g., movement has the whole 




"Q ' ~ ~ ~ ' \ ' ' , ' ~E' " t ' l!'T'OS' fl-EV 01') E'OTf TOJU\O KG.L )If.VOS'' K'VT]O'tS' a OVTE V1TO 
\ " I JI t 1 \ - Ill, ~\"\ \ \ ,... ., r 
TO ov 'TaKTEQ ()Irr E7n T(/J OJ..17'~ WV\G. f1-E7a TOV OVTOS', EvpE-
8 ... t • • t • l • I t I \ t -uua ev aVTC/-1 ovx UJS' _EJI tJ1f'OKHJ'EV~ • oepyna yap avTov 
\ t~ I ti' - « f • t I \ r ~I ,,,J.. I 
Kat OVOETEpov a.veu rov E7Ej>OlJ 71 E"!TtlJOtc;i, KQL at ovo 't'VO'ELS' 
I. \ \ • ' " ... ,~ ' K \' ' I 
I µta KQL yap EVEp"fEl.'t "iO Ol', OLJ ovvaµ.EL. at EL XWPLS' µEVTOL 
• , \ 'Q • • - ,, , .I. , ' • 
EKQTEpov /\Q./-'O,), K(IL CV 7~ Ol'T'L ICLV7)<1LS' 't'aVTJC1f.TQL KQL EV 
- I,. 'I' \l\ .... t\ II ti 
"Tl KLVTJC1EL TO 011, OtOJI ~(U E?iL 7()U EVOS' OVTOS' EKQ.Tepov 
\ • 8 I I \ ... 9 w r ~ f ~ I ,J. \ \ ·~ 
xwptS' ELXE a.repo11, OA/i oµ.ws "If otavota ovo 't''f/C1L KQL ELOOS' 
. , ~ \ . .. 
f.KQTf.pov DL1Tl\OVV EJI. 
"[16] The movemeut which appears with being does not alter the 
nature of being but rather is made co111plete in this being. [17) It is 
eternally of such a nature and thus ls permanent in its movement. [18) 
(Hence,] if one were not to introduce rest [into being}, he would be even 
more mistaken than he who would not give movement [to being]. For it is 
more evident to reflection and in tel le ct ion that rest accompanies being 
than that movement does. [l~J For existents There remain themselves and 
unaltered and they have a si11gle lntelH.gibility. 
7, 24-31: 
J:>' I ~· I • .. .J. I • 
n..t.J.J') lYECLJS' <JE VE/H 70 OV 'f'UJ.'ELG1JS' OVK 
'l I \ t I ~ - .-'I\ ~· t _ • t' E!i.tC1TQ.C17]S' T"lJIJ EJCEtJ.J01' 'f'1'C/t'l.I• f.LCJAAOJI O £V Tep ELJlaL OLOV 
I\ r t f - I ,,t_ I 't ,.. • 
TEl\f.LOV 1TOt01J0''1/), OtL TE TT)S 7'0,G.t!"i1')S 'f'tJO'EWS' EV 'T'f> OVTW 
-e J fl \_ I l I > I 
KLVE:LG UL µ.eve l.JCT7'jS'. E' "itS"' f.J.11 crraO't.J.J E17f.LUayoL, O.T01TWTEp0!> 
iiv £L1') Tov µ'7, 1<aV7fo'1..1 818ol"ros • .,,.pox".PoTlpa yap ~ ~s 
I \ ,. • ~I .,.. , \I 
O'TaC1(WS' 1T£PL 70 OV EJIJIO~<Z JCa' VO'f)CJt> 'T'TJS' '7TEPL rTJV ICLVTJCTLV 
II \ '\ "- , \ 1 r I \ ff '\ I 
OVC11]!>. 'T'O yap Ka7'1:1 rct.11rct. .ICOl CIJO'QVTW!; KQL EVQ l\Oyov 
"' . -EXOll EKEL. 
"[20] One may regard rest as a single genus, distinct from movement; 
in fact, it appears as the contrary of 111ovement. [21) That rest is also 
different from being is clear for several reasons. [22) If rest were the 
same as being, then, quite rightly mo~emeut should be the same as being. 
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[23] For why would rest bnt not lllovement be the same as being, when 
movement is the very life and act of being itself? [24] However, just as 
we separate movement from being, as both the same [in reality] but as not 
the same [in thought], and thus we say they are two and yet one, in like 
manner we separate rest from. being and yet do not separate it (ex~ept by 
thought), so as to posit it as another genus among real beings. 
7, 31-41: 
"E t'' \ ' "' ' .., ~ I UTW OT] 1((1..L UTOO'~)" EV '}'EVOS' E7'Epov ov KLVTJ-
• I • I .. .J. I tr' - ~ I OI • ., 
GEWS, 01T'OV KO.L EVO.VT&OJI (lJI 'F«.VE&7J. l OLJ OE OVTOS ws ETEpov, 
\\ - ~-\ " . ' ~ , . - ., . ' " ' 1T'Ol\/\O.XTJ DT)AOV 4V ELT} KO& QL07&• EL Tl.p 01.''TL TO.V'TOV ELT), OV 
~\ \ - , '9 \ ..., " A ' I ' ~ \ µa/\/\OV TTJS' KLJ!Tjr:JEW)" ra LJ70 reµ OVTL. . .LJLO. TL yap 77 µEv 
I ,. II • I r ~\ I 91 [ I t "" \ 
u-raats T'f' OV'TL TO..LJ'iOP, '7f OE l<C.V7fa&5' OIJ, .WT) TLS" QV'TOV KO.l 
' I ' - , • ' • - - .. • 'A'\' ~, EVEpyna KO.L TTJS' Otl<r~as 1<(1..L a l.J7()l.J 'iOLJ ELJlaL , IV\ W0-:7Ep 
' '1 ' , • - • ... , \ ' t ' EXWPL;oµEv TTJV H1v71a1v au7ol.J ws TC.LJ'iOIJ 1e 1eaL ov TCV'TOV 
, ..... ,, ~, ... ,,,_ • .,.., '1'• ',, , 
avnp KO.t ws- ovo a.µ'f'w E"eyopn.1 «at av El', -rov a.vToi· 7po-
' \ I - 9 - \ 9 t • 1T'OV KQL 77]11 0"7"0C7LV XCJ.JP&OV[J.EV' CLl.J701.1 ICO.L av ov xwpLDVµEV 
TOCTDU'TOV xwpi~OVTES rip V'q,, OCTOl.J ~o )'fros 8£o8at EV TOiS" 
OQCTLV. 
"{25] But if we totally co111blne rest and being into a unity, saying 
that there is absolutel1 no difference [between them], and in like manner 
combine being with move111ent,. then we would make rest and movement the 
same through the mediation of being~ and we would make movement and rest 
one. 
7, 41-45: 
.H t ~ J I " ' I ' ' .. EL 01.Jll(L.)IOlµEl' 7'TIUJ'TI'} ~IS EJ.I "rT)V O'TO.OU1 KO.L TO oi• 
µ7]8€v µ17Saµf; 8ta.<f;lpr::r..., 'Alyov-re;:. TO TE ov TV KLV~GEt 
f I \ f .. \ J ~\ I .,,.. 
WCTO.V'TW!;, 'TTJ"' ura CJ'tl.J "'Cit T7/ I' ICC.VJ) CJ'C.V OL(I µEoov 'TOV OV'TOS" 
t .. ' '~ 11111., P' -. c ' ' ~ , ELS" 'TQV'TOV avvas O~l!v. KCU Eura L .,,,.,. L V' ?') ICl."7JOL5' KQ.L 11 177'/J.OLS 
., 
EV. 
"[26] One must posit these I=e11tity, movement and rest] as three, 
since the Intelligence 'knows eacll separately. [27] Simultaneously the 
Intelligence knows them and si11111ltaneousl~ it posits them since it knows 
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them, and they are since they are known. [ 28] For those things which 
have their being with matter do not have their being in the Intelligence. 
[29] But these three genera are without matter, and for beings without 
JDatter, when thought, the thought [of the Intelligence] is their very 
being.27 
8, 1-5: 
'A''· ' ' - ·e e " · - ' .. 1\1\a 'X.i'TJ Tpta. TCUJT4 rt.. EU O.t, EL71Ep 0 VOVS' xwptS' EKaCT-
• • ~ '\ - ' 'Li ., ... ' ,, " TOV VOEL. aµa DE I/OE& l'((I( '7tr:r9a,., I Et7T'Ep VOEL, Kat ECTTLV, E L7TEp 
I o· \ \ \ 9 \ •\ t I I 
VCVOTJTO.L. &S' fJ-El.J )'Cl.p 70 et.VOi fLETa Vl\l]S' ECTTL, 'TOVIWl' 
' ' - - ' ,. [ '" \' ., .... , J .. ~· " "••\ OUK El' T'f .,~ 70 E LVCI&. (11'\A EO'T"W O.Ul\(1 a 0 EC1TLI' Ulll\a, 
~· , - 1 91 t .,. I f' 
EL VEJIOT)TaL, TOUT ECTi"L.l' CIVrOLS 70 E wat. 
" [ 30] Observe the Inte 11 igenee In its purity and intensely 
contemplate it, but not with these bodily eyes. [31} You see the hearth 
of being and a sleepless light on lt;28 and you see how beings rest in it 
and are distinct and yet are all together; and yo~ see abiding life and 
an intellection which is not ln aet with reference to the future but with 
reference to the present or rather to that which is now and always is 
now, and the present is eter11al 1 a thought thinking in itself and not 
outside. 
27In translating this last sentence I have not followed the sugges-
tion of Henry-Schwyzer to delete the bracketed words, ~).A.' f~rtv {l';,;,lo..., 
since they supply a premiss i11 ?lotinus 1 argufent. Instead I follow the 
majority of translators who retai11 them.. Brehier: "mais les etres qui 
sont dans !'intelligence 11011t sans 111atiere .. (Plotin, Vol. 6, Part 2, 
P• 107); Harder-Theiler: '"die ICJasseu aber sind immateriell" (Plotins 
Schriften, Band IV a, p. 1'4; Ficinus: ~alioquin forent a materia segre-
gata" ( Creuzer-Moser [eds.] Plotini. Eneades cum Marsili! Ficini Inter-
.P._retatione Castigata, p. 3ga). 
28This remark, of c:our se, is reu:lini scent of VI, 7 (Text D), chapters 
15-36 passim, which m ta te s that the Cood is the eternal light which 
illumines and brings goodnesm tQ the intelligible beings. 
8, 5-11: 
,, Joe OE vovi• Ka~ 
B ' ' Q' '.I. ' ' , • , \ ,, ' Ka apov KaL r'"'£'f'ov E'S avro11 a'T£Vr..aas, µ.71 oµµaat TOVTOtS' 
~ 8 ' 'O ~ ~' ' I • , I ,I.. ~ • • ~ ,, 
oE opKwS'. pgr 071 ovaiar ecrnaJJ Kat 'f'ws ev avT~ atnrvov 
' r • · t " ... ' r ~ ' r ._ 11 ' KaL WS' EUTTJKEV Ell a vrcp ICO..L CiJ~ Ot.ECT'T"l'}KEV' oµov OVTa l(QL 
t \ 1 ' I • » - 'I \ I\\ ~ \ \ 9 
,_w71v µ£Vovaav Ka.t vo71cri11 e>VK <l'epyovuav ELS' TO µ£/V\OV, ctl\I\ 
elS' To .ry877, µfuViov SE • 7;871 ic:a..1 ci~"t-°7;871 », icai To 7rapdv d.£1;:~ 
' r ... ' r ..... ' " "e KQL WS' VOWV Ell (CltJ'T"qJ K'1C. OVK E5W. 
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[32] [By analyzing the lntellection of ~' Plotinus now contrasts act 
and movement with being and entity only to connect them.] In thinking 
there is act and move111ent, but in the ~ thinking itself there is 
entity and being. [33] :ror the~ thinks provided it is and by thinking 
itself [it provides] beings and being is that in which thinking is 
grounded. [34] For act with reference to itself is not entity, and act 
with reference to that which results from thinking is being, [35] for 
that which is seen is being; being, however, is not the seeing itself. 
Even the seeing itself has beins [onlyJ because it is from being and is 
directed to being [and thereby] also is heing. [36] But seeing is being 
in act and not in potency and therehy it combines and does not separate 
the two [ couplets--i.e., set and 111o~e111ent !.!..!. being and entity]. For 
thinking makes itself be that (==being and entity] and makes being and 
entity be itself [•thinking].~9 
>/ 29rs Plotinus in th)s passage (032-,36) distinguishing being 
(o-V) from entity (avd't~)? Could It be as Inge suggests (The 
!._hilosophy ~ Plotinus [Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1968],-p-7 60) that 
.2!!, signifies only the genus, vhet:'eas ousla refers to the genus in union 
With the other four genera? Vhile the;:e-are some grounds to believe such 
(e.g., see II, 6 [17], L, 1-13J,, it Is unlikely that Plotinus intends to 
make the distinction in rext E. '11lroughoot most of the treatise he appears 
to use the terms interchangeably, '!1lus, if there is such a distinction 
in the passage in question (,3.?-.f3~), ft· does not appear to ~e of a 
technical sort crucial to our ~aderstan~ing of VI, 2. 
8, 11-18: 
'Ev µ.€v o~v 7-45 v~di• ~ 
t I \ • I , ~' ,.. • ' f t I \ \ II • 
EVYJY.!_La KQL T) JCWT)Ut>, I!" OE .,.~ EOVTOV TJ OVCTLa KaL ro ov 
.- \ ... ' " ' , - ' , " .. . ,~ . WV yap vou KQ' Oln'(t E4U70JI, K(tt E&S' 0 0 tOV £1T£puoero. OJ'. 
'H ' ' • ' • • , ' ' ' I ' " ~ ' ' µ£v yap EV~pyeto T) Et> <tV"IOl.I OVI< OVOLa, ELS 0 UE KQL 
•..1..• .. • • I I Q' I I • , f Q\ 1,/, 6r a'f ov, -ro ov · 70 ya.p ,,r.E7rOfL:.EJ•ov 70 011, ovx T/ ,.,1\£-rLS • lXEL 
~ \ ' • I 9 "' ',,_'("" .. \ , "' ;, 'E , B·' (}F KOL QV"IT} 70 EC.VQ(j Ort 0'1"" OV' K(tt ECS OJI, ov. V£pyng. E 
" · ., ~- .J I ~'\ t" \ t' I ' t 1r OV, OV ovvaµ.n, OVJ10'177H 1ia.f\tl.I CIV '74 OLIO KOL OV XWPL~EL, 
rua 1TO&.€L Eav;Ov ~K£'L.vo 1eci.1eEi110 lmrrrOv. 
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"[37] Being is the most flnily established of all and that about 
which all else have established their rest. [38] Being has a rest which 
does not come to it by borrowiDS but it has rest from itself and in 
itself. [39] Being is that at which intellection comes to a stop, though 
intellection is a rest which has c<> beginning and being is that from 
which intellection starts. though f:ntellection is a rest that never 
started; for movement does not begin or end in movement. [40] Again, the 
Form at rest is the limit of Intelligence, and Intelligence is the movement 
of the Form. Accordingly, every being is both movement and rest, which 
themselves are all-pervading genera; and everything subsequent is a 
particular [sort of] being. a particular (sort of] rest and a particular 
[sort of] movement. 
8, 18-27: 
•o 0( TO wdv.,-wv 
'O I ' ' "' \ ~ \ \a ._, , f , ' E poto7aTov Kai 17Ept <> 7CL CJ.A!'O, "rTJ'I' "7aaiv V1iE<rrTJC107'0 Ka.L 
,, , , , ~ ... "' , ·~ • - , , , .... "E ~ , , EXEL OVK E7TQK'T"OI', "> aVT'C>V' 1'((1:£. El' CIV1'"CfJ. OTL OE KO£ 
t ti\' I , l 1 t I J \ >.J..I T 
ELS 0 l\T}YEL .,, ll<>TJCTI) Oii.iC Of's op.Evq 07'QUH', KO£ a'f' ov 
fl , ff ' t ~t f I 
wpµ7]70L ovx opp.'r/uouo cna.a~s · 011 ya.p EK KtVT]OEWS KLV7JCTLS 
,~, t I .,.E 't \,. f t. '~ , 9 , I .. 
ovo ELS' KLVT)CTLV. re. Cl( 71 "1-EJ.J 41>fC2 ('JI <1'7aC1£L 7TEpos ovaa 
- '~\ - . .. . -VOL/ 1 0 0£ JIOVS' C2 V'M'/ )" T) JCl-V'T)O"I )". 
• r'\ «i # • r \ f \ ~ t fl\ 11 .:.~o7£ ov 7TC1l.l"T« Kac. 1rrrr;;cns icoi uraacs. KaL oL O/\WJ' ovro 
I \• .., • 6 t1111. I / I 




" [ 41] Now when anyone sees these three, having come into contact 
with the nature of being, he sees being by t:he being in himself and sees 
the other two in themselves by the movement and rest in himself, and fits 
his own being, movement: and rest to those in Intelligence. [42] They 
come to him together in a sort: of confusion, and he mingles them without 
distinguishing them; t:hen, as it: were, by distancing himself a little 
from them, he sees them both as t:he same but nonetheless as distinct, 
namely, as being, rest: and movement. These three are the same and [yet] 
each is one. [ 43] Does he not t:hen say that they are different from 
each other and distinguish them In dtf ference, and see the difference in 
being when he posits them as three, though each of them is [really] one? 
[44] Again, when he brings them l>ack t:o unity and sees them in a unity, 
all one, does he not collect tbem into sameness and, as he looks at them, 
see that sameness has come to be and isi (45) So we must add these two, 
the same and the different, t:o tbose first three so that there will be in 
all five genera: the last tw~ give to subsequent beings the characters 
of being different and same; fe>r each such being is a particular 'same' 
and a particular 'different:. ' 'Same' and 'different' taken simply and 
without the 'particular' are the [supreme] genera. 
8, 27-43: 
Tpta ~-r, 7'Q.U7(L r&c.i>v TIS'. 9 rrpocrf3o>..jj ~s 'TOV OV'TOS 
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'f'VCl£WS Y£YEVJ/f'O'Os;. 1du r'f-J 7ra.p CLU'T~ OV'TL -ro ov Kat -rots 
.!'\ \ ,~ ' \ ~\, "'\ \ , '\ t ' - ... ' , .... OJ\l\OLS 'owv 7(1. CL/V\Ct, 77fl' fl'(LJ'71CJJ.JI rriv Ell ClV'ny 771 £V Ea1!7'CfJ 
I \ - I \ J \ "'"" t I 9.J... KLVT)CIEL, KO.L T'lf O"T"C2CT"t( ,.,,..,. O"T"ClUtl' I I((].( TQ.1J7'a EKELVOLS Eyap-
1 t ,.. \ II \. 4f ' Ii; µ.oGas, oµov f.LfV' yo·ciµ < ~ois; "<11.. c&ov avyK£XV/HVOLS avµ.µ.t~ as 
t ~ I ~ s· 9"1 I ~ f \ t \ \ ov 0LaKpivw11, o.ioV' orit)'()I-' ota<r;71cras KO.L £11'u:rxwv KO.L 
~ I t ~\ °"' ~ I \ r ' ,.. ' aLaKpLvas £LO'l..OWIJ 01' fl'({a(.. (]"T"C2CTV l<CLL KIYT]UW, TpLa. TaVTa Kai 
• • f" • , • ~""\ ' "'" " ' ~ , EKC2C7'7'0V £V, a.p OllX f:TE(J'L WIA'Jllt&iV Et.pT)K£ KaL CJL£C7TTJUOI 
t t I '98 ~ 1 ..., w e I I 8' £11 E'T£p07''T]7' ICO.t (I.. E ")V er.i rep OV7l £TEPOTTJ'TO. TpLa TL ELS 
\ t\ • _!'\r. ~\ _.. 1 flt. \ t f' \ I 
KQ.L £V £KQ.C7"r0JI I 17Cl..J\t.IJ () £ 7CLU7CL El!ii' O' Ka' EV EVL KaL 11'ar.a 
• t , 1 W f ' ~,\ I t I ·~ EV, £LS' Ta. v-rov au Ci'l.JIJCl ('Cl.JIJ KC2t ,..., e~wv TO.V'TOT'T]Ta E Loe y£Vo-
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EKQO'TOV C1TrAW> -ye ravrov 1<a' crepov O.VEV 'TOV «'TL )) EJ.' J'El'EL 
av ELTJ. 
" [ 46] These are the primary genera, because you cannot apply any 
[other] predicates to them vhic:h would express what they are. [47] For 
[although] you will certainly predicate being of them, for they are beings, 
still [you do not predicate being of them] as their genus, for they are 
not particular beings; nor can you predicate being as the genus of move-
ment and rest, for they are not species of being. All beings are either 
species of being or participants of It. [But the other four genera are 
neither species nor participants.] ( 48] Nor does being participate in 
them as its genera, since they al:'e 11either higher nor prior to being." 
a, 43-49: 
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t -. tt'\ I ,. • 
a.vnp ovoe 7rpo7cpa rov OJ.''i"ClS. 
[The five genera of being. then, are entity, sameness, difference, 
movement and rest. That these alone are the primary genera of being can 
be proven indirectly-by ~isnissi11g all alternatives. For example, as has 
already been argued (chs. l-4), tbe One ls not a primary genus, because 
He transcends being and ca11not be a predicate or admit differences (chs. 
9-12).] 
[Neither is quantity a pl:'i~al:'y genns. Quantity is either discontin-
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uous, i.e., number, or continuous, I.e., extension or magnitude. But the 
unity of intelligible being, In which all genera are really identical 
with one another, precludes number. And the genera cannot be magnitudes, 
since they do not contain matter. Hence, quantity is posterior to the 
primary genera (ch. 13).J 
[The key text resumes by dis111issing quality as a primary genus.] 
"[49] Concerning quality, why is it not in the primary genera? 
[50] Quality is not There because it Is posterior to and subsequent to 
entity. [51] It is necessary that primary [sensible] entity have 
[accidental] qualities follovlng upon it, but not as though it was 
constituted by them nor as though it was completed through them. If so, 
it would be posterior to quality and quantity. 
[ 52] In entities composed. of m.ul tiple parts, there are numbers and 
quantities which make these entitles distinct, and yet qualities can be 
seen in them as something they have in common. 
[ 53] But in the pri1J1ary genera there is no differentiation that 
must be made between simples and co111posltes, but the difference is between 
simples and those realities (=other Forms, which themselves are simples] 
that complete entity as such and not any particular [sort of] entity. 
14, 1-11: 
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\ .,. "" l]I t J \ , \,.,.. t 'f' \ 
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' ~· • I' I - ~ I • f " -aeTaL • EV oE ro LS 7rpW7 <>LS yE11• C7t. -r7Jll ota.tpf.ULV ovx ar. wv 
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\I , ._, '.,,, 
C1VJJ.1T11T)p0Ul'TWV, C>tl "i1Jl' iLJ..!C .oucna.11. 
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"[54) Now it is not absurd that a particular [sort of entity 
should be completed by quality; It has its entity prior to quality. 
[This entity completes Itself with] a particular quality as though the 
quality [like accidential qualities] came from a source external to the 
entity; but the entity it has belongs to it essentially. [55) Nonethe-
less, we have maintained elsewhere that the completions of entity are 
qualities in name only. 30 [ 56) Those things which are external and 
are posterior to entity (alone I are strict qualities. [57] And those 
factors which are essentially in entities are their acts, whereas those 
which are subsequent upon them are what they undergo from outside. [58) 
We may now state that what completes a particular [sort of] entity does 
not belong to entity generally--[that is, to entity as entity]. For 
nothing is added to man ~ rn.an [that is, man on the human level] that 
might constitute his entity: entity comes from above ["animal"] before 
30Here Plotinus refers to a distinction made in the much earlier 
treatise, II, 6 (17). At several places in that treatise (e.g., ch. 1, 
lines 7, 20-23, 31-3:2,. 36-39) he indicates that the verb rrV.M'lrA#v, 
and its various forms, should refer only to the specific differences of 
entities (see especially ch. l, lines 19-:24; however, he later--ch. 2, 
lines 3-8--allows one to occasionally call accidental qualities "comple-
tions," since they f111:ther complete an entity already perfected by its 
specific difference). He ,goes on in I I, 6 to conclude that specific 
differences are the acts of the logot of sensible entities (ch. 2, lines 
20-25). For example, heat is a11 act of the logos, fire (ch. 2, lines 
14-20; ch. 3, lines l!i-2()). Only those things which are not acts of the 
logoi of entities are true qualities (ch. 3, 20-22). (However, even 
accidental qualities are traces or shadows of acts. These acts are 
eternal Forms which have necessary a11d intrinsic relationships with other 
Forms.) 
In Text E Plotinus resurrects thls distinction between essential 
qualities (qualities in name only, 155) or completions (symplerotika or 
diaphorai) and accidental ciuall ties (pathe) so as to strengthen his 
argument for refusing qualit, a place among the megista gene. Specific-
ally, he attempts to prove (fi59-166) not only that accidental qualities 
cannot belong to the supre111e genera but also that the very essential 
qualities, which are the intrinsic energeiai of sensible entities, cannot 
belong There. 
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specific difference is added; thus, man is already animal before rational 
is added as a specific difference, 
14, 11-22: 
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"[ 59] How then do the four I other) genera complete entity [which is 
the primal genus] without causing the entity to be qualified [i.e., with-
out the four other genera belng Us qualities or specific differences]? 
For it is not a particular I sort of] entity. [60] It is said that being 
is first and yet it ls clear that belng is not other than movement or 
rest or difference or samenes~. (61] And that movement itself does not 
act as a quality is eciually apparent, 'but to say more will make it even 
clearer. [62] For if move111ent ls the act of entity and if being is in 
act, and if in general the prlm.ary genera are in act, then movement cannot 
be an accident but is an act of "being :in act, nor [if one were to speak 
with complete accuracy] can it even 'be said to be a completion of being 
[as a specific difference] but to be being itself. 
15, 1-10: 
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"[63] Thus, movement has uot been rendered into something posterior, 
or into a quality, but has been placed on the same level as being. [64] 
For it is not the case that bei.ng Ls and then is moved; nor is it the 
case that being is and then is at rest. Nor is rest something happening 
to being from outside, [6.>) Nor are sameness and different posterior 
to being, as though bei.ng eutails 111.ul tiplicity only by this latter addition 
[of sameness and of difference]. No, being is what it always was--a one-
many. But if being is a multLplicity, then difference belongs to it, and 
if being is a many which Ls oue, theu sameness belongs to it. And these 
are added to being. (66) But vhen we turn to consider the lower realm, 
there are other things which do not make entity exist precisely as entity 
but only render entity qualified and quantified, and they generate genera 
but not the primary genera. ••31 
31of the remainlng seven chapters of VI, 2, three (chs. 16-18) con-
tinue to discuss why certain reaU ties cannot be among the primary genera. 
Relation, the fourth of Aristotle's categories, cannot be a primary genus 
because it presupposes mul ti:ple beings, which by their reference to one 
another make relation posslble (ch. 16). Neither is the Good a primary 
genus, for the Good is above ousLa and thus cannot be among the genera of 
being (ch. 17). Also beaut)' Ls not a genus, because beauty is reducible 
either to being, which ls alread1 a genus, or to the Good, who is above 
all genera (ch. 18), The last four chapters no longer consider the main 
theme of the treatise, namely,. what and how many are the primary genera, 
but take up a new discussion an~ therefore may be said to comprise what 
Richard Harder calls an Anhang (PlotLnus Schriften, Band IV b, p. 475). 
These chapters aim to expla1u bov each form (in itself) is act and (in 
relation to every other) is potency. Vhile these remarks on energeia are 
helpful, we need not presently discuss them, having referred to them 
already in Text B (see our comments on the energeia of noesis). 
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15, 10-18: 
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C ODIJ!lents 
The movement of thought in Text E proceeds as follows. 
[In the opening six chapters of VI, 2 Plotinus argues the following 
important points: (1) the fi11e Platonic genera are the constitutive 
principles of intelligible being; (2) these genera -are logically inde-
pendent of and equal to one another; (3) the union of these genera is 
not the result of subordination to a higher genus but the result of 
participation in the One; (4) body and soul (since each is a one-in-many) 
are useful analogies for understanding how intelligible being is a unity 
that encompasses multiplicity; especially soul (since it is the logos of 
~) is useful because in its ovn Imperfect way it reflects the unity of 
intelligible being. Whi Le st ill disc as sing what perfections belong to 
soul, Plotinus introduces chapter seven., where he begins to explain how 
the five genera belong to the Intelligence and are acts.] 
a. What factors aod bow many are observable in soul? At least two 
factors are evident in soul: entit1 and Life. These are present to soul 
because soul is independent of bo~y sud brings life to body. But because 
entity and life are in soul, the1 Dust be Intelligence as well [for soul 
is the logos of Intelligence), Horee>ever ~ m.ovement is common to all lives 
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[because life implies movement] (#L-#3). 
b. Having moved from soul to Intelligence, one must posit not only 
life in the Intelligence but the genus, movement, as well, [for life or 
intellection is movement] ,32 Since Intelligence is also entity [as a 
perfect, independent being], then both entity and movement are primary 
genera. [Because entity and movement are two aspects of the intelligible 
world (which is a unity),] they are [really] identical but logically 
distinct (#4-#6). 
c. Whereas in the intelligible world life and movement are not 
[really] distinct from being, in the sensible world life and movement are 
really distinct from being. l'hls is because sensible being is a shadow 
of true being and thus cannot attain the unity of true being. Sensible 
being is to [true or] intelligible being as an image-of a man is to that 
man himself. Just as in the iatage many things are omitted, especially 
life, so in sensible being (s~nce sensible being is only an image of true 
being) many perfections are ab11ent (or, at least, greatly diminished], 
especially life. Hence, in the sensible world life appears as really 
distinct from being, but it certainly is not distinct There from being 
(#7-#9). 
d. [As a unity of logically distinguishable elements,] being is a 
genus having many species. Bein& also has movement as an eternal 
accompaniment. But being does not have movement in such a way that 
movement is subordinate to being [as, for example, a species is subordinate 
to a genus]. Nor does 111ove111ent belong to being as a form in a substrate 
[where one, the form, Is tile perfection, and the act, while the other, 
32see our comments on the nature of zoe in Text D. 
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the substrate, is the (passive) potency]. No, movement is neither dis-
tinct from being nor subordinate to being, because it is really the very 
act of being. Being is act and because it is act it is movement; other-
wise it would be in potency [for only that which is in potency (•passive 
patency), namely, prime matter or non-being, exists without movement 
(•life)].33 Because movement is the very act of being [and because being 
is never without its act), movement and being are not [really] distinct; 
they are separable only in thought (110-113). 
e. Even though being and movement are logically distinct, their 
real and necessary association is very evident [for movement must be, and 
being, if perfect, requires life or lllovement] , just as in the case of 
"the One which is'" [of Plato's Parmenlcl.esJ, the whole is really the same 
as the part and the part the same as the whole. In other words, intellec-
tion separates movement and. being and yet grasps that they are united. 
Being is one and yet two because it ls also movement (#14-#15). 
f. Movement is a nee es sary ancl eternal aspect of true being; 
otherwise being would be incomplete [for only imperfect being lacks 
movement]. But if movenent must accompany being, then rest must accom-
pany being, for it is clearer that being necessitates rest than that 
being necess,itates movement. This ts 'because without rest being is 
neither eternal nor one (~16-~19). 
g. [While rest and move111ent are Te.ally the same as being,] rest 
33The Nous cannot be In potency to the Forms, for it actually pro-
duces the Forms, al though it i;.equires a coexistent producer, the One. 
!._ous is the very powe7 ( ~ d t.J ya..,i• ~j ) of the Forms not a passive 
recipient ( r'6 £.,vt\.M~t fv, of their power. Its act is possible only 
because of its prior active po~el". [f its objects were permanently and 
really dis tine t from it.. the Nous would forever be dependent on them 
(again, see comments on the energeia of noesis in Text B). 
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and movement are [logically] distinct from one another. Indeed, they are 
contraries. That rest is also logically distinct from being is clear. 
If rest were [logically] the same as being, then movement also would be 
the same as being, for movement Is the life and act of being. But one 
does not [logically] identify rest with being, just as one does not [in 
the same way] identify movement with being. Because they are logically 
distinguishable from being, rest and movement may be considered as genera 
together with being. If one identified rest with being and movement with 
being, he would have to conclude through the mediation of being that rest 
is the same as movement. [~u t instead they are contraries] (1120-1125). 
h. So far, then, there are at least three genera of intelligible 
being: entity, movernea t and rest. These genera are known by the 
Intelligence, which posits them when it knows them. Since these genera 
exist in the Intelligence, they exist without matter, which cannot exist 
There. Their independence of 1118 tte r means that they depend on the 
Intelligence, for what is incorporeal can exist only through intellection 
(1126-112 9) • 
i. [To understand ho~ the intelligence is a unity that encompasses 
multiple Forms,] one 11t11st contemplate the Intelligence, not with one's 
eyes [but with one's own intelligence]. By this contemplation one will 
discover that the Intelligence is the hearth of being [that it is the 
universe of true being]; that the light (of the Good] eternally illumines 
it; that perfect beings, 1r1Jdch are [really] one with but [logically] 
distinct from each other, re11t Tliere eternally; that life and intellec-
tion are There; that tile i11tellec tion There is eternal act and, simply 
by knowing itself, comprehends [e11e cy thing) in a single, eternal "now" 
(1130-1131). 
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j. [Plotinus now briefly interrupts his reflections on being, rest 
and motion by contrasting act and 111ove111eni: with being and entity, and 
then by linking them through his doctrine of intellection.] Act, as well 
as movement, is present in thinking but in order for there to be entity 
and being Intelligence must have an object that is; it must thin~ itself 
(1132-1133), even though it can only think if it is (#33). Act itself is 
not automatically entity but is so only in reference to that which results 
from thinking or act ( '34) or seeing. This, however, is being only as 
from and directed to being ( 035). ~ut because seeing is in act and not 
in potency, it unites .act, aovement, being and entity, for seeing or 
thinking makes itself be belug and entity, which also constitutes thinking 
itself (#36). 
k. [After that digression :Plotinus continues _to speak of being, 
rest and movement.] As what ls most firmly established, being from and 
in itself entails rest,. since it is the terminus of intellection (1137-
#39). Being or form at rest deteralnes intellection but form as moving 
is identical with intellectlon itself. Thus, being, movement and rest 
are primal genera common to all, although particular sorts of being, of 
rest and of movement are operative on subsequent levels (#40). 
m. One such subsequent level is that of an individual knower, who 
in order to successfully contemplate being, rest and movement, must unite 
himself with being. [In other vorde, he must ascend through contemplation 
to the intelligible world itself.) Ee can ascend to~ and know being 
by the being in himself; likewise he can know rest and movement by the 
rest and movement in himself, ~ben he knows being, rest and movement, he 
knows them at first intuitively end as they exist all together in unity. 
But if he detaches his thinking so111ewhat from this union of being, 
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movement and rest, he can analyze being and separate it from movement 
and rest (#41-142). 
n. Being, movement and rest are distinct from one another [if only 
by philosophical analysis]. l'his lllE!ans that differentiation is also an 
aspect of being. [In other words, to (logically) separate being, rest 
and movement from one another is to make difference a part of being.] On 
the other hand, to reali~e that being. movement and rest are [really] one 
is to make sameness also a part of being. Hence, to the original three 
genera there must be added a fourth and a fifth, sameness and difference. 
Accordingly, all beings are .. same"' and 0'different." But "same" and 
"different" here refer to particular kinds of beings. However, what is 
"same" and "different .. There ls being itself, not any particular sort of 
being. In other words. sameness and. difference There are genera of being 
(#43-#45). 
o. "Same" and '"different9' as applied There must be primary genera 
because one cannot predicate anytlliug of them which would differentiate 
them as though they were particul.a.r sorts of things. As aspects of 
being they are neither prior to being nor posterior to it. They are not 
genera for being [for that would. me.an they are prior to being]; nor is 
being a genus for them [because that would mean being is prior to them] 
( #46-#48). 
[In essence chapters seven aud eight (11-049) of the key text argue 
the following: the world of Intelligible being consists of five logically 
distinct genera or forcns. The first of these is entity, because the ~ 
(which encompasses all beings) b a separate, complete existent; the 
second is movement, because the~ Is an eternal life and intellection; 
the third is rest, beca11se the~ knovs 1 causes and is constituted by the 
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eternal beings or Forms; the fot1rth and fifth genera are sameness and 
difference, because the Nous is a single intellection (a unity) of the 
plurality of beings (a mul tlplici ty). Each of these genera is an act in 
that it represents a logically distinct aspect of the Nous itself, which 
as a whole is pure act.) 
[The chapters that intervene between chapter eight and chapter 
fourteen (which begins the latter portion of the key text) argue that the 
One is not a primary genus (chs. 9-12) and that the Aristotelian category 
of quantity cannot be a primary genus (ch. 13). The key text resumes 
with Plotinus taking lip another Aristotelian category, quality.] 
p. [Plotinus asks why <1.uali ty is not among the primary genera?] 
He answers that quality cannot be among them because quality is [really] 
posterior to and dependent en ot1sia [whereas the primary genera are only 
logically posterior to ousla). It is necessary that qualities belong to 
sensible ousia [for through its qt1alities sensible ousia becomes com-
pleted,] al though this is 110 t to say that sensible ousia qua ousia is 
perfected or constituted by its qualities, for, then, it would be pos-
terior to its qualities (149-~51). 
q. In entities that are colllposed of multiple parts, there are 
numbers and quantities which distinguish them from one another, as well 
as qualities which these entitles have in common. These quantities and 
qualities are composite en.d are posterior to the entities, which are 
simple. But in the prime 1 genera there is no [real] difference between 
the simple ousia and completions which make it composite, but the differ-
ence is between a simple ousia [the genus ousia, i.e., ousia as such] and 
those other simples [the c tiler priral genera] which complete ousia as 
such rather than any particular sort of ousia. [The other genera complete 
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the genus ousia in the sense that they are logically distinct aspects of 
0 usia] (#52-153). 
- . 
r. [While it is unreasonable to hold that the primal genus ousia 
is completed by qualities,] it does not seem unreasonable to hold that a 
particular sort of ousia (e.g., nan) ls completed by its qualities. It 
has ousia prior to lts qualities and It brings about those qualities 
which are its completions [•specific differences] as if they were [like 
its accidental qualities) froa an external source. But the completions 
of an ousia are not from an external source and therefore [as was shown 
in II, 6 ( 17)] are qualities ln 11a111e only. The completions of ous ia 
[i.e., its specific differences] are not its qualities but its acts. 
Only those factors which are altogether unrelated to the ousia, only those 
which are pathe, are, strictly speaking, ~ualities (#54-#57). 
s. But even though the co111pletlons of a particular sort of ousia 
are its acts, they do not belong to the ousia qua ousia. The completions 
are posterior to the ousia, just as 111an is already "animal" before his 
specific difference "rational .. Is added (158). 
t. But if one .allovs that the other genera There are acts and 
completions of the genus ousia, are they completions after the fashion of 
specific differences? No, specific cilf ferences are posterior to ousia 
and thus cannot belong to the primal genus ousia but only to a particular 
sort of ousia. Everything rbere--be ing, movement, rest, sameness and 
difference--is the sa111e (and therefore there is nothing distinct or 
posterior which could be a specific difference or a quality] (#59-#60). 
u. For example, vhile movement is an act of being, it is not an 
act after the fashion of a specific. ciUference. This becomes clearer if 
one considers kinesis further.. Mo~e111ent is an act of being because 
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everything There, including entity and being, is act. This unity of act 
means that movement is neither an accident of being nor a completion of 
being [that would make being really distinct from other acts There] but 
is being itself (#61-162; also see #3?-#36). 
v. The various genera 1 then [as acts of being], repres~nt how 
being is at once really one but logically many. Everything There [is act 
and] really the same and thus [accidental] qualities do not belong There. 
Nor do specific dif fere11ces l>elong There because, even though they are 
acts, specific differences belong only to particular [sorts of] entities 
rather than to entity as such. But certain beings [•specific differences 
and accidents] here make entity qualified and quantified. These comple-
tions and accidents generate genera. but, of course, not the primary 
genera (#63-#66). 
[The principal argument of chapters 14 and 15 (#49-#66; #p-/lv) is 
as follows. Th~ supreme genera cannot be true qualities (i.e., accidental 
qualities) because such qualities are always posterior to ousia, whereas 
nothing is posterior to anything else in the intelligible world. Moreover, 
the supreme genera cannot be qualities after the fashion of specific 
differences, even though, like specific differences, they are acts. For 
the acts of a particular sort of ousia are posterior, whereas the act 
which are the intelligible genera are neither prior nor posterior but are 
the logically distinct aspects of ~itself.] 
In sum: Text E argues that the Intelligible world consists of five 
logically distinct Fons or genera, each of which is an act because it 
reflects a different aspect of the ~ itself, which is pure act. 
To fully understand energel.a. i11 this our last key text, let us 
examine and clarify two 1aportant issues: Plotinus' interpretation of the 
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~egista gene of Plato's Sophist; and the nature of quality. 
-
Plotinus' Interpretation 2.f Plato's Megista Gene 
Plotinus' development of energeia in Text E results largely from his 
interpretation of megista gene of Plato's Sophist. Hence, to ul~imately 
understand Text E, we must take up Plo ti nus' handling of the megis ta 
.a.ene, focusing especially oc how he modifies Plato's position so as to 
accommodate energeia. To Introduce this discussion we will turn to the 
Sophist. 
Let us begin by sullllJlari:zing certain important portions of the 
Sophist which lead to :Plato's treatment of the megista gene. Early in 
the dialogue {217 a) :Plato considers whether there is any difference 
between the sophist, the st.atesnan and the philosopher. After judging 
that they differ from. one auother, he states that the task for the 
remainder of the dialogue ls to define the first of the three, the 
sophist.34 Plato next (213 a-221 c) chooses to explain his method of 
34Plato takes up the second of these three characters in the 
Statesman. Since he wrote dialogues on the sophist and the statesman, it 
is likely that he intended to write one on the philosopher as well. There 
are at least three indications of this, which Cornford has conveniently 
summarized: ''{l) At Soph. 253 e • after the description of Dialectic, 
the Stranger says: 'In some sueh region as this we shall find the phil-
osopher now and hereafter, if we look for him.' (2) That Plato did not 
think of this account of Dialectle as sufficiently describing the philos-
opher seems to be implied at the beginning of the Statesman {257 a-c), 
where Theodorus speaks as If the Sophist had accomplished only one-third 
of the task and asks the Stranger whether he will now take the Statesman 
first or the Philosopher. (3) Later (258 a), Socrates, discussing who 
shall act as respondent 111 the Statesman, remarks that Theatetus has 
already served in the Theatetus as Socrates' respondent and in the 
Sophist as the Stranger's .and suggests that the young Socrates should 
answer the Stranger in the Statesaan (as he does) and 'myself on another 
occasion'" (Plato's 'l'heory of Xcowledge, [New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 
1957], ·p. 168). -
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Dialectics or Collection (synagoge) and Division (diairesis)35 which he 
will use to define the sophist. This method consists of identifying a 
genus and dividing it into its various species and sub-species. He next, 
in a half-playful manner, illustrates the method by defining the angler.36 
Afterward (221 c-237 b) he applies the method directly to defin,ing the 
sophist. Beginning with the genus "hunting" (at which he had arrived 
when considering the illustration of the angler), Plato identifies six 
35Plato has briefly characteri2ed the method of Dialectics (Collec-
tion and Division) 265 d. Ther:e he states that Collection must precede 
Division, because otherwise one will not understand how the many divisions 
belong under a single genus or Form.. 
36Pla to begins this illustra tlon with the genus Art. He divides 
this genus into three species: the acquisitive, the separative and the 
productive. He further divides acquisitive art into subspecies so that 
the entire division may be diagrammed as follows. 
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divisions (221 c-231 c), each of which expresses a characteristic of the 
sophist. After summarizing and criticizing these six divisions (231-235 
a)37 he chooses a new genus (which also was discovered when defining the 
angler), the image-making division of productive art. Starting with this 
genus, Plato eventually concludes (235 a-236 c) that, because the sophist 
provokes disputation In every field. of knowledge, he promotes falsehood 
and illusion, for no one can be an expert in all knowledge. With this 
tentative definition Plato faces a new task, for, if his description of 
the sophist is to stand., he must solve the traditional Greek problem 
concerning the possibility of false statements and false appearances. 
This problem is of special importance for Plato, because to affirm that 
either false statements or false appearances are possible is to offend 
the Eleatic tradition vhich he respects. If false statements are possi-
ble, then there can be, contrary to Parmenides, meaningful statements 
concerning .!!!.!!. .!! ~ .. for a false statement affirms that something is 
not what it is or is what it is not. If false appearances are possible, 
then there can be, contrary to Parinenides again, things which are not, for 
an appearance (eidolon) Is not vhat it seems to be or is what it does not 
seem to be. This problem, conceraing how what is not in some sense is, 
occupies the remainder of the dialogue, and it is within this discussion 
that Plato introduces the 111egista gene. 
In the passages of the Sophist which remain before the megista gene 
appear, Plato evaluates his ovn collllllitment to the Eleatic position, which 
37These six divislons Identify the sophist as a hunter, three kinds 
of a salesman, a lover of eristics and a deceitful employer of cathartic 
lD.ethod. Plato concludes that none of these characteristics precisely 
defines the essence of the soph:i st. He undertakes in the next passage 
(235 a-237 b) to find what tlese characteristics have in common. 
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holds dogmatically that~.!!. cannot in any sense not be and that~ 
is not cannot in any sense be. Plato agrees with Parmenides that absolute 
--
non-being can never in any sense be (237 c-239 c). What absolutely is 
not can never be the object of meaningful discourse. He disagrees with 
p8 rmenides, however, by holding that in some sense non-being has meaning 
(239 c-242 b). Before explaining how wbat is not can in some sense be, 
Plato (242 c-2 51 a) decides to investigate .E!!!!, which truly .!! (to pantelos 
on), thinking that, if one first understands£!!!! which is, he will be 
-
better prepared to eventually understand ~ which .!! ~· What is 
significant in this passage is Plato's dramatic break with the Eleatic 
tradition, which comes with tbe announcement that among the class of that 
which truly .!! belongs not only the unmoved (the Forms) but also the 
moved (intelligence or soul).38 
At this point Plato finally introduces the megista gene, the purpose 
of which is twofold: first. to prove once and for ali against the Eleatics 
that there can be meaningful statements about .!!:!.!! !!. ~; secondly, to 
further demonstrate the science of Dialectics by showing how Forms 
38Plato argues (2lt8 a-2 .. H a) that, since both the unmoved (the 
eternal Forms) and the moved. ( i.n tellect and soul) are necessary for 
knowledge, kinesis must belong to the order of the truly real. He 
expresses this realization eino tionall)7 at 248 e: "But tell me, in Heaven's 
name: are we really to be so easily convinced that in actual fact 
movement, life, soul and understanding have no place in that which truly 
is--that it has neither life itself nor thought, but stands unmoving, 
solemn and holy, without intelligence? .. ' (translation mine). 
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participate in Forms.39 
Plato begins (251 a) by considering, without any explicit 
justification,40 three of the mesista gene: being (ousia), motion 
(kinesis) and rest (stasis). the best way to understand these Forms, 
Plato says, is to consider how they relate to one another. Both motion 
and rest .!!!.; therefore, 111otion and rest combine with or participate 
(metechein) in being.41 Motion and rest, of course, cannot combine with 
each other, for each is the contrary of the other. Since motion and rest 
combine with being, being is the most universal of the three Forms. 
Nonetheless, motion and rest are truly megista gene, for they divide all 
39The Sophist differs from earlier dialogues by holding that an ex-
istent may participate in more th.an one Form and that Forms may themselves 
participate in other Forms. Thus, Plato has expanded his doctrine of 
participation to involve not onl1 the relationship of individual sensible 
objects to Forms (monoeides) but also the relationship of Forms to other 
Forms (polueides). This change in participation has impact on Plato's 
theory of Dialectics: now genuine knowledge will not just. consist in 
understanding how sensibles rel.ate to Forms but in the way Forms relate to 
each other. It is Plato's task to consider some of those relationships 
in his treatment of the megista gene (251 a-259 d). 
40Plato probably begins vi.th these three Forms because he has just 
finished explaining (248 a-151 a) that the realm of ousia must admit the 
moved and the unmoved. However, it is important to point out that Plato 
apparently does not intend to identify the kinesis which is the megiston 
genos of 251 a-259 d with the kinesis which is intellection of 248 a-251 
a. The latter, kinesis as intellection, belongs to the order of the 
truly real but is not itself the same as the Form of kinesis which is one 
of the supreme genera and noeta of Dialectics. As we shall discover in 
our comments below, Plotinus, unlike Plato, does identify kinesis as 
intellection with kines is as m.egis ton genos, in keeping with his radical 
and dynamic interprets tlon of ?lato 1 s theory of Forms. See Cornford, 
Plato's Theory of Knowledge~ p. 27?~ see also J. B. Skemp,!!!! Theory~ 
Motion in PlatoTSLater Dialogues. P• 19. 
41As Cornford notes (ibid., p. 256) participation of Forms in Forms 
is not the same as participation of Individual things in Forms. Partici-
pation of Forms in Fol"llls is a S)'lllllletrical relationship and therefore may 
be called a kind of conbining or blending. In contrast participation of 
things in Forms is asymmetrical and therefore should not be called a 
hle~hg. · 
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beings between themselves; something either moves or rests. In addition, 
it is also evident that motion and rest are not reducible to being. If 
they were the same as being, eac:h would ~ the same as the other. But 
this is absurd, since motion and rest are contraries. 
Besides these three (being, motion and rest), there are at least 
two other megista gene, 42 Pirst, since every Form is distinct from 
every other, difference (heteron) must belong among the supreme classes 
or F~rms (Plato appears to use genes or eidos synonymously). Secondly, 
since every Form is identical with itself, sameness (tau ton) must also 
belong among the megista gene. Like being, difference and sameness 
combine with every Form and therefore are more universal than motion and 
rest. 
These considerations have prepared Plato to - solve the problem 
concerning non-being raised in the eaTlier part of the dialogue. He has 
shown that both motion and rest participate in being and thus are. Also 
motion and rest participate ill sameness, since each is itself, and in 
difference, since each is separate from everything else. Now, it is this 
last genos, i.e., difference (heteron) • that enables us to explain how 
what is not in some sense is. When one says "something is not", he may 
---
not mean "something absolutely Is not" but only that "something relatively 
is not," that it ''is not something else ... In other words, the expression 
"something is not" does not necessarily mean something is opposite 
42Plato nowhere b14ica tes the t 'his list of the five megista gene is 
exhaustive. Plotlnus, 'however, loes appear in Text E to regard the list 
as complete. His position there is probably the result of his aim to 
provide a set of categories whic'h vlll replace the Aristotelian ones. It 
is probably only as years passed that be began to appreciate how Plato's 
mere list of five could satisfy that aim, for in the much earlier treatise, 
V, 1 (10), 4, 34-41, Plotlnus i.11c:ludes !!2!!, among the supreme genera. 
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(enantion) that which is but is merely different from that which is. 
Having reached this conclusion that not-being is, Plato has now 
proven that falsehood and illusion are possible. He next shows that not-
being can combine with discourse in such a way as to make false expres-
sions.43 Thus, through the analysis of the megista gene, Pl~to has 
vindicated his definition of the sophist, as one who mistakes what is not 
for what is and what is for what is not. 
Let us now examine llow Plotinus adopts Plato's doctrine of the 
megista gene. 
A careful reading of Text E reveals that he does not simply repeat 
Plato's position regarding the megista gene but recasts it for the sake 
of his own philosophy.44 Tllis recasting of the Sophist leads Plotinus to 
deviate from Plato in several respects. These modifications are important 
because they bear on how and why energeia is operative in Plotinus' 
philosophy, as we will show in the comments that follow. 
43Plato realizes that simply proving the possibility of not-being 
does not complete his task. He still must prove that not-being can 
combine with discourse and thus make falsehood and sophistry possible. 
Plato (261 a-264 b) aualy.zes language to prove that not-being combines 
with discourse. There are (he sa1s) two main classes of words: nouns 
and verbs. Verbs are symbols o:f ac tlons (praxeis) and nouns are names 
(onomata) of persons or ·things, For discourse to be meaningful, nouns 
must combine with verbs. The slnplest discourse consists of a single noun 
and a single verb, e.g., "a 111an understands." Furthermore, every state-
ment has a certain quality ( poios tis): it is either true or false. 
Consider the following s ta te111ents: ""T'fhea tetus now sits"; "Thea tetus now 
flies." The f !rs t statement has the quell ty of truth, but the second has 
the quality of falsehood. Yrom these observations it is clear that false 
thoughts can be expressed through words, thereby making the art of 
sophistry possible (264 b-268 d). 
44In my comments ()n this Plotinian recasting of the Sophist I am 
indebted to John Anton's fine ar tiele, ••p1otinus' Approach to Categorical 
Theory" (in .!h! Significance oi lfeoplatonism, edited by R. Baine Harris, 
pp. 83-99) and to John lUst's book,. Plotinus: The Road to Reality 
(especially chapter 8 Oll the sensil>le existent). - - -
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The first, and perhaps nos t conspicuous, difference between Plato 
and Plotinus on the meglsta gene lies in the latter's description of the 
intelligible world as a realm not only of noeta but also of noesis (129-
#31; #32-#36). This difference, of course, results from Plotinus' 
interpretation of the Platonic Foras as the logically distinct ~ontents 
of the Demiurge or divine ~· Accordingly, for Plotinus the megista 
jene, the most universal Forms, are not just Forms or the supreme objects 
of the science of Dialectics but are those ousiai which most perfectly 
represent the nature of the living Intelligence, the second hypos tasis. 
This recasting of the megista gene is best illustrated by kinesis. 
Whereas for Plato there appears to be no identification of kinesis as 
megiston genos with kinesis as intellection (Sophist, 248 e-249 d), for 
Plotinus this identification is fundamental to his- conception of the 
intelligible world ( fi4-fJ6; '1?3-124; #32-1136; 1140). Plotinus involves 
kinesis in his explanation of each of the two logically distinct aspects 
of the intelligible world, 11oeta and noesis. Kinesis is the eternal 
noesis which actuates the intelligible realities (1112; #23; #26-#29; #31; 
#32-1136). Kinesis also pertains to the noeta, for every Form is also an 
intelligence which contemplates frOCL its own point of view the whole of 
the intelligibles (#35-136; #40-'14.2; #47). Moreover, each of the other 
megista gene denote In some vay either' one or both of the dual aspects of 
~· Stasis describes ~ to the extent it is a universe of eternal, 
stable Forms which are the coatent11 of Its eternal contemplation (#18-
#19; #40; #64) .45 tautoa Is Nous in that all the logically distinct 
45we have already expla:111ecl ('!ext A, comments on the priority of 
the superior to the lnfedor ia J>lotinus' thought; Text C, comments on 
the application of the four e:x:presdons to the intelligible world) that 
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aspects and contents of the intelligible world are really identical (#43-
#45). ~, the whole, Is the same as its parts (#14). Heteron denotes 
the diversity in !2.!!.!= the distinctions of Forms and the logical separa-
tion of noesis from noeta (142-#45). Ousia signifies that the contents 
of the intelligible world are cle terminate natures, true beings and per-
feet Forms (#18-#19; #31; #32-136).46 
Now one should have no dif ffculty in seeing how Plotinus connects 
energeia to his conception of the megista gene, for energeia figures 
prominently in his interpretation of the intelligible world as union of 
noesis and noeta. Energeia mainly refers to the noeta which are the 
products and the objects of the contemplation of ~.47 This contempla-
tion is at first only an actiYe dynamis. The latter, however, reverts 
back to its source by contemplation and thereby acquires content or 
energeia, which consists in the plurality of the intelligibles. For this 
reason energeia may be generall~ defined as the content of the contempla-
Nous (as well as every hypostH is) utldergoes two moments in its production, 
~first moment of which is the e1Eatlation of dynamis from the One. The 
second is the contemplation which that active dynamis engages in-a 
contemplation which Is "both operative state and content. This last 
especially deserves the title of energeia and is in turn contemplation as 
both operative state and content, atld It thus produces the next level of 
reality. As lower and level' levels of energeia are reached, lower and 
lower levels of contemplation are also reached, so that eventually 
contemplation is no 1011ger productive but ends against the empty and 
passive dynamis of matter. 
46That ousia means determination explains why neither mattter nor 
the One is ousia. Both Eatter end the One are indeterminate: the former 
because of its inferiority to ousla; the latter, because of its superior-
ity. 
47As we have already seen (~32-036; also see n. 28) energeia some-
times refers to noes is rather t ban noeta. Strictly and more properly 
speaking, however, enel'geia reters to the noeta, since the Forms are the 
complete realization (or actuation) of the active power of noesis. 
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tion of an hypostasis (see above, n. 45). Accordingly, the megista gene, 
since they are the most universal contents of the divine mind, are the 
most perfect energeiai (161-#65). 3ecause each megiston genos denotes an 
aspect of ~' each may be salci to reflect in its own way the entire 
actuality of Nous. Accordingly, klnesis represents the act of Nous as 
intellection (#32); stasis, as immutability and eternity (#18); tauton, 
as unity (#44); heteron, as diversity (043); ousia, as intelligiblity or 
form ( 1135) • 
A second basic difference between the two thinkers regarding the 
megista gene is that Plotin11s conceives them as categories of being. 
That this is a radical departure fro11l Plato is evident, since the Sophist 
nowhere speaks of the 111egista gene as categories. Indeed, Plato never 
uses the word kategoria to signify a property of being .. 48 It is Aristotle, 
not Plato, who first uses kategoria io this sense. 
But why would Plotin11s be amcious to treat the megista gene as 
categories and genera? The ansver is that these gene provide him with an 
alternative to the Aristotelian categories, which he regards as inadequate 
since they are based 011 sensible ousia. To Plotinus the Aristotelian 
theory of categories is probleaatic because it mistakenly assumes that 
sensible ousia qua sensible ousia is real and therefore a fit object for 
science. Against Aristotle Plotinus holds that the sensible ousia qua 
sensible ousia is unreal aod only a shadowy image of an intelligible 
ousia. To find the reall ty of seusible ousia, one must refer to its logos, 
which exists in the intelligible vorld. Hence, genuine science can only 
be of intelligible beings. 
48see Cornford, Plato's lheor~ £_f Knowledge, pp. 274-278. 
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What the Aristotelian theory lacks, Plotinus argues, the Platonic 
doctrine of the megista gene can supply. The five supreme Forms or genera 
are real and therefore can ground true epis teme. Energeia is part of 
this new conception of the categories, for energeia describes the true 
beings (#62). The five megista gene are true categories because they are 
acts. The Aristotelian categories are only images of acts, or at best 
only ephemeral, shadowy acts, and thus are inadequate to ground episteme. 
In a third respect Plotinus differs from Plato by not allowing 
participation among the megista gene (n47-#48). This may be because for 
Plotinus participation is associated with the doctrine of logos, the 
purpose of which is to explain the hierarchy of realities. Accordingly, 
Plotinus employs participation only to describe the relationship of lower 
existents to higher ones. A secon!I reason he does not permit participation 
among the highest Forms is that his conception of participation, since it 
is designed for the needs of an henology rather than an ontology, is far 
more literal than Plato's. According to Plotinus, when one existent 
participates in another, it actually acquires the reality of that other. 
The participant, to the extent it is real, is identical with that in 
which it participates and, llltimately, is identical with the One. But 
since the product must be less perfect than the producer (and participation 
is a kind of production), participation is always between a lower and a 
higher and never be tween the 111egi sta gene which are equal in reality. 
By rejecting participation Plotinus must find a substitute which 
will explain the interrelationships between the megista gene. This 
substitute he finds :in his doctrine of energeia. Through energeia he 
explains how each megiston genos ls distinct from the remaining gene and 
yet is also identical wl th tllelll. Since through abstraction every genus 
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is separable from all the others, each may be thought of as a distinct 
act. Considered sepal:"ately each genus represents from its own point of 
view the entire actuality of Nous. For example, kinesis represents the 
!!iergeia of Nous as in tellection (132) producing its own noeta, which are 
represented by the acts of stasis and heteron (//31; 1140; 1143). In i;eality, 
however, all the genei:a are Identical (1144). Together they are a real 
unity which constitutes the p1u::e actuality of Nous. Accordingly, the 
Intelligence may be defined as a real union of five logically distinct 
energeiai: ousia, kinesis, stasis, tauton and heteron. These gene 
together represent the contemplation of Nous and its contents. Clearly, 
since energeia very suitably eiq>lains the interrelationships of the genera 
as well as their individual natui:es, P lotinus has no need to depend on 
Plato's doctrine of participation. 
Plotinus differs fro~ Plato :in a fourth respect by denying that the 
megista gene are the primal i:ealit:ies. For Plato the megista gene as the 
supreme principles of Dialectics are also the supreme beings. As the 
supreme beings the gene are also the supreme realities, for Plato's 
metaphysics is an ontology. Plot:i11us' metaphysics, however, is a heno-
logy and therefore the lllegis ta gene as the supreme beings are subordinate 
to the One, the supreme i:ea 1::1. ty . 49 The genera are the con ten ts of the 
contemplation of Nous and therefoi:e are derivative rather than primary in 
reality. 
49John Anton has carei11lly pointed out ("Plotinus' Approach to 
Categorical Theory,'" pp. 37-90; 9&-97) that Plotinus' interpretation of 
the Platonic genera Is gui!led largely by his mysticism, whereby the 
megista gene are not Just <>bjects of Dialectics but also are important 
objects in the Soul's jo1u:De)i back to God. The megista gene are the 
penultimate stage in this jo11mey, When Soul unites with these Forms, it 
may contemplate God thi:ough the Nous itself and may ultimately unite with 
the One so as to transcend cogni.tion. altogether. 
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Although the megista aene do not constitute for Plotinus the primal 
reality, they nonetheless serve the same purpose for his metaphysics as 
they do for Plato's, namely. to ground episteme. For Plotinus, since the 
one transcends cognition, the supreme objects of knowledge can exist 
only on the second rather than the first level of reality. Because the 
second level of reality is the universe of acts, Plotinus ironically 
employs the Aris toteliau notion of energeia to reject Aristotle's con-
ception of episteme, vhic:h is based on sensible ousia, in favor of a 
Platonic conception, which Is based on intelligible ousia. To provide 
further support for this Platonic position on episteme, Plotinus criti-
cizes in the latter portions of VI, 2 (specifically, chapters 13-16) 
certain Aristotelian categories 1 one of which, quality, is especially 
relevant because it ln\7olves energeia in several important respects. 
The Nature of Quality 
In chapters 14 and 15 (~~9-166) of Text E Plotinus basically argues 
that the megista gene as the true objects of cognition cannot admit 
qualities. In explaining why the Intelligible world precludes qualities, 
Plotinus, by way of brief, obscure and elliptical arguments, makes an 
important contribution to his doctrine of energeia. This contribution is 
more implicit50 than explicit and is essentially twofold, revealing (1) 
how energeia as contea t of contemplation on the sensible level con-
trasts with energeia as content of contemplation on the intelligible, 
50The argument In chapters fourteen and fifteen implies several 
remarkable conclusions so long as one realizes that Plotinus is relying 
somewhat on his earlier discussion of quality in II, 6 (17) and that he 
is at once presenting his ~W'll position on quality and criticizing 
Aristotle's. 
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and (2) how energeia, although originally an Aristotelian doctrine, 
conforms to a Platonlc explanation of the sensible existent and the 
categories. To witness how Text E develops this twofold contribution, 
let us first briefly recapitulate its central argument concerning quality. 
Essentially, the argument is as follows. The megista gene are such 
perfect energeiai that none of them is prior or posterior to any other 
(1162-1165). All qualities, however, whether essential (=diaphorai or 
symplerotika) or accidental (pathe) are less perfect energeiai (1149-1151; 
1155-1158) and therefore are posterior to the ousiai which they modify.SI 
An accidental quality (e.g., ~hiteness in man) presupposes an ousia (man) 
to which it may attaeh itself as an external energeia. Moreover, an 
essential quality (e.g., rationality in man) presupposes an ousia (animal; 
1158) for which it can be a di ff eren tia tion and necessary energeia. In 
conclusion qualities, even though they are energeiai, cannot belong among 
the megista gene, the supreme intelligibles, where there is only perfect 
energeia, the absence of real distinctions and nothing prior or posterior 
(1153; 1160; 1162-#66). 
This argument aims uo t only to present Plotinus' own position on 
quality but also to critici2!:e Aristotle's. As a criticism of Aristotle, 
however, this argume11t doe:s fs:r more than focus exclusively on quality. 
It is also an indictrne11t of Aristotle's entire theory of categories, 
because the same reason that eJCclude:s qualities from the intelligible 
51Text E does not explicitl~ identify accidental qualities as 
acts; however, we kno~ them to be :such from II, 6 (17); (see also n. 29). 
To supply this detail here is ap])r()priate since it helps to stress how 
the first part (the refusal to admit accidental qualities into the 
intelligible world) of Flo tlnus' argument parallels the second (the 
refusal to admit essential 1111alities into the intelligible world). 
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world likewise excludes the re111aining categories, especially Aristotle's 
primary ousia (~ !£.). Since for Aristotle all categories, like qual-
ity, are sensible, none of them, Plotinus concludes, can be genuine 
objects of episteme. According to Plotinus, then, Aristotle's theory of 
categories, as well as his entire philosophy of the sensible e~istent, 
fails because it mistakenly assumes that sensible ousia, which for Plo-
tinus is only pseudo-ousia,. can ground episteme. Only immutable and 
eternal ousia is a true no et on and can fom the basis of authentic science. 
Thus, the argument on quality in text E betrays Plotinus' conviction that 
without the Platonic FoTIDs knowledge is impossible. 
In place of an .Aristotelian theory of quality Plotinus substitutes 
a Platonic one. 52 Essentially, this Platonic explanation, as we have 
seen, holds that qualities c.an exist only in the sensible world, where 
there are only images aud traces of true beings. Qualities are condemned 
to this lower level because the1 require real distinctions, which the 
intelligible world precludes. ~y examining the role of energeia in this 
position, we can see 1.rrec.isel1 vhy qualities belong exclusively to the 
sensible world. 
If qualities are energeiai, they must be the products and the 
contents of contemplation.53 lut qualities are the energeiai of precisely 
what contemplation? We have .a.ll'eady discovered that they are not the 
qualities of ~' for they entail that things are really prior or 
posterior. Qualities, therefore, are the result of the inferior con-
52This Pia tonic subs t:i tu tion, of course, also holds true for all 
the Aristotelian categories. 
53see n. 43. 
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templation of Soul or Nature, Sii Whereas ~ can comprehend all beings 
intuitively and in a single eternal moment, Soul can comprehend them only 
discursively and in successive moments.SS The contents of ~ form a 
great unity and are really indistinct from each other. The contents of 
soul, however, form a lesser unity and to a degree are really d~stinct 
from each other. It is on thls level of lesser unity, where there are 
real distinctions, that qualities can appear. In the intelligible world 
all acts are really united. This ls because ~ can at once grasp how 
one and the same nature (or Form.) can have multiple, although really in-
distinct, characteristics. T'llus. there is no fragmentation or separation 
in the intellection of ~· For example, ~ can grasp intuitively and 
immediately how human nature can at once and in one real respect be both 
rational and musical. 
This is because all perfections There are Forms that constitute a 
unity in which there are only logical distinctions. The Intelligence sees 
at once how the Form, Man, ls re ally the same as The Rational and The 
Musical. The contemplation of Soul, however, is weaker and thus cannot 
intuitively and immediately kuov h<>w all Forms are really identical. 
Soul can know how rational and musical relate to the ousia, man, only as 
they are really distinct fron one another. The contemplation of Soul is 
fragmented and in time; hence, it can only know perfections when they are 
prior or posterior to each other. 
54According to Ilr, 8 (lO). L-S Nature is the reality that produces 
qualities. However, since ?lotintiB ls somewhat unclear on whether Nature 
is a separate hypostasis, I vill regard the Soul (but in its function as 
Nature) as the source of ~ualities. This ts appropriate since the contrast 
We discussed between So Ill aud ~ iu Text D will apply here. 
55our comments in Text D on life explain how ~ as eternity 
differs from Soul as tine. 
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The contents of the contemplation of ~ are the archetypes of 
qualities. These archetypes themselves, however, are not qualities. 
Qualities are these natures as they are subject to the contemplation of 
soul in time and as logoi In a fragmented, imperfect world. What are 
pure acts There are here only imperfect acts and inferior ousiai. 
In conclusion, Plotinus' theory of quality is complex, resulting 
from his general position on production and from his reaction to the 
Aristotelian theory of categories. Quality is energeia because it is the 
content of Soul in its reversion to Nous. However, because only the 
energeiai of~. the archetypes of the contents of Soul, are true onta 
and true noeta, quali t:i es 'belong to a world which is largely unreal and 
illusory and which by no 111eans ean ground the science that Aristotle 
sought. 
SUllllllSry ~ Conclusions 
Our final task is to sU111111ari~e our conclusions on energeia in Text 
E, a study of Ennead VI, 2 (43) • 7-8 and 14-15. This treatise is the 
' ....... second part of a trilogy concer11i119 the genera of being ( Tfef L Tw Y ylvwv 
- ,.. 
I () LJ ), the flrst and third parts of which are VI, 1 (42) 
and VI, 3 (44) respectively. Onl:ike VI, 1 and VI, 3, which are polemics 
against the Aristotelians and Stoics, VI, 2, while it contains polemical 
passages, is primarily a statement of Plotinus's position on the primary 
genera. 
Before taking up VI, 2 ve found it obligatory to explain why VI, 8 
(39)-- a treatise contai11i119 nany remarkable passages on energeia-- is 
not a key text. We co11clucled that VI, 8 is not rightfully Text E because 
Plotinus wrote it for reaso11s that make it unreliable as a statement of 
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his view on energeia. The purpose of VI, 8 is to refute an argument 
brought against Plotinus 1 position 011 the One by certain contemporary 
critics (perhaps Gnostics). l'hls argument, which Plotinus labels {ch. 
12, line 11) a "presumptuous discourse'" (tolmeros logos), presents 
essentially the following dilelllllla: either the One has a cause and a 
determinate nature and, therefore, He is a being and not the transcendent 
source of being; or the One does cot have a cause and a determinate nature 
and, therefore, He exists by accident or chance. Rather than dismiss 
this argument as irrelevant, since it fails to take into account his neg-
ative theology, Plotinus appears to accept it as a legitimate challenge. 
This acceptance, however, is only a pretense so as to allow him to refute 
these critics on their own tenis, presumably for the benefit of his 
students. To accomplish this end, Plotinus is willing temporarily to 
suspend (as he explicitl1 tells us in chapter 13, line 1-5) his negative 
theology and to describe the Que in positive terms, such as ousia and 
energeia. Accordingly, the exceptional character of VI, 8 renders it 
unsuitable for a study of energeia and, thus, we pass on to VI, 2 (43) as 
the legitimate Text E. 
Text E divides general Ly into two parts, the first consisting of 
chapters seven and eight (ll-D48) and the second of chapters fourteen and 
fifteen (#49-#66). The si~ chapters that precede the first part of Text 
E makes several important pe>!.nts. (1) The Platonic genera are the 
logically distinct components of Intelligible being; (2) each genus 
represents from 1 ts OWll point of view the entire nature of Nous and 
therefore is equal to every other genus; {3) although logically distinct 
from each other, the genera really constitute a single, living reality, 
the unity of which results fre>11l participation in the One; (4) the unity 
269 
of the genera is analogous to the unities of body and soul, which first 
should be studied before one examines the intelligible realities. 
In chapters seven and eight (11-#48) Plotinus, following Plato, 
identifies the five most universal Forms or megista gene (ousia, kinesis, 
stasis, tauton, and heteron) of the intelligible world. However, ~e does 
not simply repeat Plato but modifies Plato's treatment of the subject to 
suit his own metaphysics. Specifically, he departs from Plato in four 
important respects. First, whereas for Plato the noesis of the Demiurge 
is really separate from the noeta (the eternal Forms} for Plotinus the 
Demiurge (•.?!22!, the second hypostasis) and the noeta together form a 
single nature. Consequently, according to Plotinus the megista gene are 
not only the ultimate objects of cognition but are also the necessary 
living principles of all beings. As a logically distinct constituent of 
~· each megiston genos represents either one or both of the dual 
aspects of ~: noesis and noeta. Kinesis, for instance, may signify 
both noesis and noeta. As the former kinesis is the eternal intellection 
(after Sophist 248 e-249 d) which actuates the eternal Forms. As the 
latter kinesis is one of the Forms, the supreme objects and contents of 
intellection. Kinesis, therefore, is at once energeia as intellection 
and energeia as noeton. The remaining genera are also energeiai. Stasis 
refers to the diverse energeiai which are the immutable and eternal 
products of the noetic energeia of Intelligence. Tauten expresses that 
the multiple energeiai of .!2.!:!!_ are unified into one nature. Heteron, in 
contrast to tauton, expresses that the unity of ~ can be divided by 
abstraction into plural energeiai. Ousia refers to the actuality of ~ 
as both a sameness and a difference. Ousia signifies sameness because 
~ is a complete, unitary energeia with a determinate nature. Ousia 
270 
signifies difference because Not1s is comprised of multiple energeiai, 
each of which is a detel'lllinate nature. 
Secondly, Plotinus, unlike Plato, regards the megista gene as 
categories. Plato has no reason to regard them as such because the whole 
question of categories or predicamenta did not arise until Aristotle. 
With the Aristotelian legacy before him, however, Plotinus conceives the 
Platonic genera as cons ti tu ting a theory of categories. He not only posits 
the genera as categories but also considers them an alternative to the 
Aristotelian categories. Essentially, Plotinus argues that the megista 
gene, since they are immutable noeta and energeiai, can alone ground 
knowledge of the natt1C"e oi being. The Aristotelian categories, since 
they are trans! tory noeta end shadowy energeia i, can provide only the 
illusion of knowledge. True e:pis teme, the knowledge of immutable and 
eternal being, requires the suprerne objects of the intelligible world, 
i.e., the principles of Dialectics,, and not the objects of the sensible 
world, i.e., the principles of Aristotelian philosophy. 
Thirdly, Plotin11s does not employ Plato's doctrine of participation 
to explain the interrelationships of the megista gene. There appear to 
be three reasons he <Ices not C"e ly on participation. (1) According to 
Plotinus an existent participates in another to the extent it is a logos 
of that other. In other woC"ds, a participant is an inferior manifestation 
of a superior reality. Since the doctrine of logos mainly describes the 
causal relationship of higher to lower, participation, by its association 
with logos, cannot express relationships between the megista gene, which 
are equal realities. (?) Flotiuus' conception of participation is very 
literal, according to which a pat:'ticipant actually is its archetype on 
a lower level, a level of greater multiplicity and unreality. Thus, for 
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the same reason as above, participation cannot apply to the interrelation-
ships between the meglsta gene. (3) Plotinus deos not require partici-
pation since he can rely on energeia to explain the interrelationships of 
the genera. As energeiai the genera are in one respect identical in that 
each is really the same as the entire actuality of ~· However, they 
differ in that each may be considered by abstraction as a distinct act 
representing from its own point of view the unitary nature of ~· 
Finally, Plotinus parts with Plato by denying that the megista gene 
are the primary realities, EJCcept for his provocative remark in the 
Republic (509 c), Plato's metaphysics is essentially an ontology. 
Accordingly, the megista gene as the supreme Forms or~ are the supreme 
realities. However, since Plotinus' metaphysics is monistic, the megista 
gene in his philosophy have derivative rather than primary status in 
reality. The primal reality !JIUSt be purely One. Since the genera as 
energeiai and ousiai presuppose sane measure of multiplicity, they cannot 
constitute the first reality. The 11ltimate reality transcends energeia 
and ousia and therefore cognLtLou. Thus, for Plotinus Plato's science of 
Dialectics cannot disco,,,er reality but only bring us to its threshold. 
After presenting his i11terpretation of Plato's megista gene, 
Plotinus attempts to strengthen his positlon indirectly by explaining why 
certain realities cannot be true categories. In particular he criticizes 
certain Aristotelian categoTles. When he takes up the category of qual-
ity (chapters fourteen and fLfteenj ~49-U66) he introduces the second part 
of Text E. 
His comments on quality argae that neither essential nor accidental 
qualities belong among the 11e1ista gene. This is true even though 
qualities are acts. The ver9 1tat11re of qualities presuppose real dis-
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tinctions so that some things can be prior or posterior to others. Even 
essential qualities (=specific differences), while they are necessarily 
related to their ousiai,56 are really posterior to them and therefore 
cannot have a place in the intelligible world. In other words, none of 
the megista gene completes (sympleratai) the primal genus ousia· in the 
way specific difference completes a sensible ousia. 
This criticism of quality betrays an almost complete rejection of 
Aristotelian philosophy, for by denying quality a place in the intelligi-
ble world, Plotinus denies it a place in genuine episteme. Since Aris-
totelian science is based on the assumption that qualities disclose ousia 
or eidos, such a science ls only illusory. The ousiai that qualities 
disclose are imperfect and not genuine noeta. 
Qualities are not true objects of episteme because they result from 
contemplation of Soul rather than contemplation of Nous. As an inferior 
power Soul contemplates and produces energeiai which contain many real 
distinctions and whicl1 manifest themselves in time rather than in eter-
nity. 
These energeiai resulting from the fragmented and diminished con-
templation of Soul are qualities. They presuppose real distinctions 
and therefore cannot belong in the intelligible world where everything is 
apprehended in tu !ti ve ly and aB a unity. What appear here as qualities 
are There really perfect Forms, For example, in the sensible world the 
56Plotinus' ill11Btration at 158 makes it clear that the logos of 
the sensible ousia which a completion differentiates is itself a genus. 
It deserves to be an ousia by virtue of its greater universality. This 
shows a Platonic conception e>f ousia: the greater the universality, the 
greater the reality. Hence, ••animal" is the ousia which "rational" 
differentiates. 
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ousia man exists with qualities which are really distinct from it. This 
is because the inferior con temp la tlon of Soul is unable to grasp how a 
single nature can have at once distinct and yet really identical 
characteristics. However, 1 n the in telllgible world the superior con-
templation of ~ can i111medtately grasp how human nature can be really 
the same as other Forms. Whereas Soul can only grasp how man is both 
musical and grammatical by making real distinctions between these char-
acteristics and the ousia, ~ can grasp how Man is both Musical and 
Grammatical by knowing precisely in what way such Forms are all really 
identical. 
In essence Text E shows that one can understand quality only if he 
sees it in connection with Plot!nus' view of production. Qualities are 
the inevitable products of a contemplation which has begun to diminish as 
it achieves lower and lower levels of reality. Qualities are energeiai 
to the extent they are images and participants of the energeiai There, 
which are not qualities bec:ause they are only logically separable from 
each other. 
In conclusion Text E depends on Plato and Aristotle to accomplish 
certain very important elem.ands on Plotinus' metaphysics. The first of 
these is to provide a ground. fol'.' e:plstime. Plotinus relies on the Pla-
tonic doctrine of the 111egista gene to satisfy this provision. They 
support episteme by enabling Plotinus to show how a Platonic theory of 
being, knowledge and the ca tegor!e s has advantages over an Aristotelian 
theory. However, Plotlnas relies on Aristotle to help establish the 
second demand of his 111etaph1si..cs. Under Aristotle's influence Plotinus 
comes to understand that the ulti111ate being must be an Intelligence. 
Then, by transcending both Plato and Aristotle he concludes that the 
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megista gene are the living eternal constituents of this Intelligence. 
-
They are not separate from lntelligence, as Plato thought, but are the 
very nature of Intelligence. This enables Plotinus to give the megista 
.1.ene a function that even Plato could not have foreseen. The megista 
_aene are not only Forms but are also the necessary penultimate stage on 
the soul' s journey back to God. Ac co rd ingly, the megi s ta gene at once 
satisfy the demands of epistene and mysticism. 
SUMMAltY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Let us now close our study of energeia in Plotinus with a general 
summary and some final conclusions. 
Text A: Plotinus Adapts Aristotle's Doctrine of Energeia 
Our project opened with an examination of energeia in three chapters 
of Ennead IV, 7, chronologically the second of Plotinus' fifty-four 
treatises. The object of this treatise is to defend the Platonic theory 
of the human soul against opposing theories, including Aristotle's. 
This polemic against Aristotle, however, does not prevent Plotinus from 
adopting as his own the fo:rme r• s doctrine of energeia. This becomes 
immediately apparent in chapters 82 and 83 (111-118) of Text A, where 
Plotinus employs energela in a series of criticisms against the Stoics. 
Energeia first emerges when he attacks the Stoic position that the soul is 
corporeal. Plotinus interprets the Stoics as maintaining that the union 
of soul and body ls really a kiad of mixture (krasis). Such a mixture, 
however, would destroy the very being (.!£. einai) of the soul, for the 
components of a mixture are In potency and not in act. The actuality of 
soul, therefore, militates against Stoic materialism.l 
This criticism, however "brief, is sufficient to indicate what 
energeia means for Plotinus. If dynamis signifies a nature altered by or 
lit should be noted that a Stoic would immediately object to 
Plotinus' argument on the ,gr.,unds that it fails to respect the Stoic 
distinction between mi~toa and krasis. The latter is a kind of mixture 
which consists of elements i11terpenetrating each other so that each retains 
its actuality. (See Text A. m~ 14). 
175 
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subordinated to elements of a mixture, energeia signifies a nature free 
from such alteration or subordination. So understood, what Plotinus 
means by energeia accords with Aristotle's meaning when the latter speaks 
of energeia as it pertains to rnixture in De Generatione (Bk. I, 10, 327 b 
22-26), a passage Plotinus himself may have had in mind: 
Since some things are in potency while others 
are in act, the ingredients of a compound can 
be in one sense and yet not be in another 
sense. The compot1nd may be in act other than 
the ingredients from which it has resulted; 
nevertheless each of the ingredients may still 
be in potency what it was before they combined.2 
Supported by this qt1otation as well as by other passages from 
Aristotle,3 we may take Aristotle to be saying specifically that energeia 
refers to that which ls a distinguishable or determinate or intelligible 
nature, namely, an eidos or ot1sLa. We may take Plotinus to be implying 
the same in his criticism. Thus, the opening lines of Text A are re-
markably informative, revealing at once what energeia primarily means for 
both Aristotle and Plotinus. This agreement we will discover again and 











S'IJy{M I-{. J' 
3see Metaphysics Garnlll8 2, 1003 b 25-27; Theta 8, 1050 b2-3. 
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again throughout our study of the !nneads. 
Despite this concord between the two thinkers, it must be remembered 
that Plotinus is a Neoplatontc. rather than an Aristotelian, metaphysician 
and therefore must give energeia a subordinate, rather than a primary, 
role in his explanation of reality. Aristotle, of course, is U;nder no 
such restraint and may conclude that energeia signifies the reality of 
every existent. This follovs from the fact that Aristotle is an ontolo-
gist, for whom reality is being {ousia or !2_ ~ or eidos). As a henolo-
gist, however, Plotinns cannot hold such a view. For him reality is not 
being, but unity. Accordingly. energeia by signifying being presupposes 
some measure of multiplicity and therefore cannot refer to the reality of 
every existent but only to that which has already to some degree fallen 
away from reality. Moreover. while Aristotle can a~ply energeia to the 
supreme reality, Plotinus ca11oot. He may agree with Aristotle that 
energeia describes peYfectly the divine ~; however, for Plotinus, the 
divine Nous is derivative, not primary, in reality. Consequently, if 
Plotinus is consistent with bis l>asic philosophic principles, energeia 
must never apply to the One and must never be taken to mean unity but 
only unity-in-multiplicity. 
Energeia appears also in Flotlnus' second criticism of the Stoics 
in Text A (#2-113). If soul were corporeal, as the Stoics maintain, it 
would be divisible iuto i11floitessimal parts, whereby it could inter-
penetrate the whole body. Flo tlnus concludes that this interpenetration 
would result in an actual infinity (energeia ta apeira) which he, like 
Aristotle, considers absurd44 
He follows Aristotle in a third respect (#4-#8) by appealing to the 
principle that energeia f$ ontol ogkally prior to dynamis. Plotinus 
278 
invokes this principle so as to uncover another absurd implication of the 
stoic psychology. Since the Stoics argue that the divine In~elligence 
and even God are only the results of the alterations of the cosmic pneuma, 
they imply that the superior can come from the inferior. This is 
impossible, however, because the superior (the actual) must exist before 
the inferior (the potential). Of course, it is not surprising to find 
plotinus drawing on this Aristotelian principle since it is compatible 
with the third of the three basic principles of his philosophy, namely, 
that whatever is prior in the universe is more real than whatever is 
posterior.5 
However, we must be cautious at this point and not assume that 
Plotinus intends his thlrd principle to be fully equivalent to Aristotle's 
principle regarding the priority of act to potency. -The reason for this 
is that Plotinus cannot hold the priority of act to be absolute since the 
One, by transcending being is 'beyond energeia. Act may be prior in the 
order of beings (in the realm of~ and all subsequent existents), but 
it cannot be prior in the order of reality. Indeed, the One is not act 
but sheer active power: d:uamis ton panton (III, 8 [30], 10, l; cf. V, 
4, 1, 25). 
Finally, we find Text A (~9-110) accepting Aristotle's doctrine of 
4It is important to note that Plotinus does not deny that infinity 
is a perfection of the One4 The One is infinite (apeiron or aoriston) by 
transcending the limitation (peras) and determination (horos) of energeia 
which is identical with the Intelligence. For illumining texts see VI, 
9, (9), 3, 4-39; V, S (32). 6, 4-5; 11, 1-5; VI, 7 (38), 17, 15-40; 28, 
28; 32, 9; 33, 13-21. 
5The first two principles are that whatever is one is real and that 
whatever is one is al so good. For our full discussion see Text A, 
especially those passages colltai11ecl in the pages corresponding to notes 
29 through 37. 
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energeia but rejecting his doctrine of entelecheia. Whereas Aristotle 
-
appears to regard the two doctrines as basically indentical, Plotinus 
regards them as distinct. considering entelecheia to be exclusively bound 
up with Aristotle's psychology. Along with rejecting Aristotle's theory 
of soul, then, Plotinus rejects entelecheia. However, he is wil,ling to 
accept energeia, interpreting it as a genuinely ontological doctrine rath-
er than a purely psychological one. Energeia does not just describe the 
human soul but all beings, and especially the hypostases Nous and Soul 
since both are true ousiai • 
..!!.!.!!= Plotlnus Ras Dznamis Prior to Energeia 
in Distinguishing the One from the Intelligence 
Although as brief as its predecessor, Text B, consisting of the 
second chapter of Ennead v. ~ (7) 9 presents a far more elaborate picture 
of energeia, for it indicates some of the most important ways by which 
the theory is operative in ?lotiniaa metaphysics. Plotinus must treat of 
energeia in order to achieve the primary objective of Text B. This is to 
explain the relationship of~. the meeting-place of the eternal Forms, 
to its principle, the One. Specifically, Plotinus draws on Aristotle's 
doctrine of energeia to describe the production of the second hypostasis 
out of the First. 
When describing the Intelligence as energeia, Plotinus of course is 
following Aristotle for whom energeia as perfect ousia most suitably 
applies to ~· In text 8 C/2) ?lotinus specifies that this ousia is 
one whose very energeia ls ooesis. This description, when complemented 
by relevant observations from~, 9 (5), provides the clue for explicating 
Plotinus' brilliant b11t co111p lex conception of the intelligible world. 
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Because of our discovery in Text A that energeia primarily means 
ousia, we can justly conclude In Text B that, by defining ~ as the 
energeia of noesis, Plotinus means that ~ is nothing less than pure 
-
intellection. While other beings, such as Soul and Nature, may share in 
noesis or, as we may say, have noesls, the Intelligence simply.!!. noesis, 
thereby constituting the very first noes is. Indeed, all subsequent beings 
have noesis only because they are logo! of that which is noesis. 
Several other perfections must belong to Nous if it is an existent 
whose energeia is intellection. Pirst, ~ is an eternal knower. This 
follows because~ does not lllerely have the power to know but is knowing 
.P!! .!!.• Accordingly,~ nust be an intuitive knower, because discursive 
knowledge requires becoming and tillle. Secondly, as an eternally actual, 
rather than potential, knower, Intelligence must be its own object of 
knowledge. If its object were separate from itself, it would be dependent 
on and in potency to that object. Thus, Plotinian ~ is comparable to 
Aristotelian noesis noeseos. However, Plotinus goes beyond Aristotle, 
explaining that, when the~ contemplates itself, it contemplates the 
Platonic Forms which are the contents of the divine Mind. Consequently, 
Plotinus' vision of the intelligible world is a synthesis of Platonic 
Forms and Aristotelian lntelligence. 
Thirdly, we may infer that, U eidos is the same as ousia and if 
~ is identical witll e.,,ery elcios, the divine Intelligence is perfect 
being and is really the wb~le universe of beings, a conclusion which 
Plotinus takes to vindicate Parmenides' famous statement (fragment 3) 
that thinking and being are the same.5 
6see Text B, n. 10. 
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From this analysis of !2!!, as the energeia of noesis, it follows 
that~ must be the second and not the first reality (Ill). The plurality 
of the noeta, even though comprised of only logically distinct elements, 
admits some disunity and thus is necessarily derivative rather than 
primary in reality. Nous Is being and composite and therefore requires 
ultimate simplicity as lts cause. Thus, Plotinus in Text B confirms what 
we concluded in Text A that energeia by denoting being cannot denote the 
First Reality. While energeia may describe the ~ perfectissimum (where 
.!!!!. signifies only being), It cannot describe the.!.!!. perfectissima (where 
.!!!. means reality). 
After this critically important description of the nature of the 
Intelligence as energeia of noesls, :Plotinus considers exactly how the 
~ originates out of the One. In doing so he incorporates (#3) a term 
borrowed from the "Unvritteo Doctrines"' (agrapha doginata) of Plato, name-
ly, the "Indefinite Dyad'• (aoristos dyas). By this obscure term Plotinus 
designates intelligible m.atter or the first moment of the emanation of 
Nous. This first moment, which Plotinus calls the stage of prohodos of 
procession, is dynamis In the sense of active power. This moment is 
necessary for the Intelligence to become a distinct hypostasis, because 
it first must separate itself froa the One before it can, inspired by 
love, undergo epistrophe or reversion which consists of a contemplation 
producing the tmiverse of ?latonic Forms and the energeia of ~· 
Plotinus' appropriation of the Indefinite Dyad proves that dynamis 
is significantly prior to energela in his system. Hence, Text B confirms 
our interpretation of Text A vhere, for Plotinus' philosophy, the 
Aristotelian principle of tme priority of act to potency was cautiously 
limited to the orde·r of 'beings alone. Text B supports this restriction 
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in two ways: first, by showing that~ is indeterminate and is dynamis 
until ~ contemplates the One and thus becomes energeia and, secondly, 
by showing that the One ltself is absolute power (panton ton onton 
dynataton, cf. ch. 1, lines ?3-26 or V, 4). 
We have already seen that lext B (112) defines ~ as an ~nergeia 
consisting of eternal intellection. However, Text B (116), even at the 
apparent risk of Plotln11s' negative theology, also ascribes knowledge 
(katanoesis and synaisthesis) to the One. 
There are three alternative Interpretations one can give to this 
ascription of knowledge to the One: the One knows through intrinsic 
denomination (in and of His very llSture Re has knowledge); secondly, the 
One knows through extrinsic. denolllination (Re causes knowledge in the 
Intellect); and, thirdly, He knows through mediation- (He knows inasmuch 
as the Intellect has k.11owledge; 1. e,, Re knows through the Intellect). 
The first two interpretations are unacceptable since neither has the 
support of the key text. The first interpretation is particularly 
objectionable since 1 t contrailiets other parts of the key text (111-112; 
#12), as well as the chapter tllat precedes it (V, 4, 1, 9-10), where 
Plotinus emphasizes the One's transcendence over intellection and being. 
Accordingly, the correct lnterpre ta tion appears to be that the One has 
knowledge through the Intellect. This interpretation is made plausible 
by Plotinus' selection of katanoesfs and synaisthesis, rather than simply 
noesis and aisthesis, to signify the One's knowledge. These terms indi-
cate that the One is not a kuover i11 his own intrinsic nature but through 
or with ~, which is the One on a lower level of reality. In other 
words, the One has kuowleilge by ..,,irtue of the relation of Intellect to 
Him. Hence, katanoesis and. syn.alsthesis may be predicated of the One 
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through "mediation" rather tban through intrinsic or extrinsic denomina-
tiOn• 7 
One may wonder why Plotlnus feels a need in Text B to ascribe 
katanoesis to the One. The answer appears to be that he wants to reply 
to opponents, imaginary or otherwise, who would insist that the First 
Reality has intellectlon. It is only natural for Plotinus to anticipate 
an objection of this kind., since his commitment to the One's radical 
transcendence challenges the traditional Greek supposition that intellec-
tion is the consummate perfection. By replying as he does (that the One 
~.!.sense has intellection), Plotlnus is able to concede something to the 
Greek tradition but also to preserve his general position on the trans-
cendence of the One.8 
The heart (#5-#11) of text B shows how energeia is basic to Plotinus' 
account of the production of the hypostases. Since all things, even 
inanimate objects, must strive to communicate their perfections to other 
existents, we may infer that the One, who is unlimited in power and per-
fection (so unlimited ic fact that Rls reality is altogether undiminished 
in its productivity), must certainly strive to so communicate His 
perfection. This necessary colDDlucication of the Good brings about another 
existent, also superabundant in goodness, namely, the Intelligence. As 
we have seen, this ex is tent is generated in two eternal (not temporal) 
moments: a moment of procession and dynamis and a moment of reversion and 
7As explained above In Text E (n. 2), however, predication through 
mediation is a specific sort of precilcation through extrinsic denomina-
tion. 
Ssee Text D, n. 5,, f~r a list of passages in Plotinus stating the 
transcendence of the One over energeia, as well as over ousia and noesis. 
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energeia. These two moments not only apply to the generation of~ but 
-
to all levels of production. All hypostases are produced through a stage 
involving dynamis and one Involving energeia. As a hypostasis becomes 
energeia, its own perfection must overflow and produce the next level of 
-
reality. Hence, in this way, energeia may be said to generate energeia. 
Plotinus attempts to explain this priority of energeia in production {as 
it applies to the levels of ~and below) by distinguishing between the 
energeia "of" an ousia and the energeia "from.. an ousia { #9-#11). 
Plotinus' writings furnish certain analogies to help clarify this 
distinction. One of these analogies, that of fire, he mentions in Text B 
(#10-#11). In our experience of natural phenomena, we often find certain 
entities, such as fire, consistently producing certain effects. The 
perfection which empowers an entity to emanate a certain product may be 
called the energeia ··or an ousia, while the effect itself may be called 
the energeia "from" an ousla. For example, fire (the energeia "of" an 
ousia) radiates heat (the energela "from·· an ousia) and snow radiates 
cold. Plotinus regardis this re la tlonship of energeiai as true on all 
levels of being and invokes it as a principle necessary for explaining 
production of the hypo:stases. Accordingly, ~ is an energeia "of .. an 
ousia as it emanates Soul, a11 energeia '"from .. an ousia. Likewise Soul is 
an energeia "of" an ousia as it produces Nature (or whatever we may wish 
to call the subsequent 1 iv ing cosmos), an energeia .. from" an ousia. 
Nature takes its turn as a prior energeia and so does every subsequent 
level of being until perfection and energeia are exhausted, terminating 
against the darkenss, sterility and unreality of prime matter. 
Because of what ve know about the nature of the One, it would appear 
incorrect to extend this relationship of energeiai to the level of the 
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One itself. To say the One is energeia tes ousias would contradict other 
important passages of V, 4, (e.g., ch. 1, lines 9-10 and #12 of the key 
text) in which Plotinus declares that the One transcends ousia. Hence, 
we must seek another interpre ta tlon of lines 34-36 (Text B, #11): 
Jc rijs l11 a,,.,;; ,.~ 
'"l"'Of ical ~"'JS '"f11~lc.r i ')'CWl'/lc"1a. l.lnc"' oft. 
O"f'aaui Ao/ !Naa, · · · 
The answer seems to re st vi th .. predication through mediation" which we 
employed earlier to explain #6. Accordingly, energeia belongs to the One 
in the same way katan()esb belongs to Him. The One is not energeia 
intrinsically but only through His product, the Intelligence, which 
depends on Him. If we look at the One from the standpoint of this 
relationship of dependence, then He can be said to have energeia present 
to Him (synouses energelas) In light of the fact that the perfection 
present in Him (ek tes ~ auto teleiotetos) and proper to Him allows Him 
to be the source of the energeia tes ousias of the Intelligence. This 
latter simultaneously Is applicable to the One through mediation as though 
the One involved also au energeia tes ousias from which the energeia of 
the Nous came. 
Thus, while Text B implies that every energeia ek tes ousias 
requires an energeia tes ouslas ~blch is an altogether separate existent, 
the relation of the Nous to the Due IIIUSt be an exception. In other words, 
the One cannot be energeia teis ()Usias, simply because He is not ousia. 
Moreover, if the One vere energeia tes ousias, consistently He would also 
have to be an energela ek tes ousiais, in the sense that another reality 
would be above Him as His cause. Hence, Intelligence, not the One, is the 
very first energeia tes ous:ias, although the One may be said to involve 
both energeia tes ousias a11d energela ek tes ousias thro'ugh mediation. 
Text C: He Dynamis as Intelligible Matter 
is Prior to He Energeia as Achieved Eidos; 
and the Two Constitute To Energeia On in 
Nous 
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Texts A and B do not study energeia as their primary subject, and, 
therefore, we must extract what they tell us about energeia from their 
treatment of different, albeit related, topics, such a Soul (Text A) and 
Intelligence (Text B). Yith Text c, however, we take up a treatise, II, 
5, (25), which studies energeia as lts main subject. Consequently, Text C 
demands our closest attention, 
A very important contriblltion of Text C is its distinction between 
two types of energeia as well as two types of dynamis.9 The first two 
chapters of II, 5 (II-U30) state that heenergeia differs from to energeia 
~' just as he dynamis differs from~ dynamei ~· The former distinction 
we translate as that l>etween "'act" and "being in act," and the latter as 
that be tween '"potency" and '"being i.n potency ... 
To understand these dis ti11c tions, it is best to begin with to dynamei 
on since it charactedzes sensi.ble matter and thereby is the basis of 
helpful inductive illustratr.011s. In simplest terms being in potency is 
something which can l>ecorne something else (#5-#6). Bronze, for instance, 
is being in potency because It can become a statue; water, because it can 
become something else altogether, e.g., air or bronze (#6-119). Such 
examples indicate that something Ls a being in potency if it can receive 
9The two kinds of e11ergeia distinguished in Text Care more analyti-
cal and technical than the tw~ kinds distinguished in Text B (i.e., than 
the distinction between energela tes ousias and energeia ek tes ousias). 
For this reason the d Ls tlnct Lon in Text C appears repeatedly throughout 
the Enneads. 
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either accidental or substantial form from an extrinsic cause. Hence, 
being in potency is passive dynamis: that which can be a substrate (#15) 
for another or rather that which can be formed by another (par' allou; 
#29). 
So understood, ~ dynamei ~ compares readily with element~ in the 
Aristotelian philosophy. First, Aristotle himself uses the Greek phrase 
12. dynamei ~ to mean passive potency. Secondly, Plotinus' example of 
bronze (chalkos; 16-#9; #17; 120-#21; #26-#27; #SO) echoes one of Aris-
totle's favorite illustrations of passive potency. Thirdly, by saying 
that being in potency 111akes change possible (from which it follows that 
being in potency cannot belong in the immutable intelligible world), 
Plotinus accepts Aristotle's position that being in potency is the prin-
ciple of change. Because of this third parallel PlO-tinus is willing to 
largely accept Aristotle's doctrine of prime matter as pure passive po-
tency. Furthermore, since pri111e 111atter is always being in potency and 
never being in act, for both thinkers it is the ultimate substratum of 
change. Finally, Plotinus also accepts Aristotle's distinction between 
prime matter (prote hyle) and second (eschata hyle) matter, as is indi-
cated by his illustrations regarding bronze (#16-#17; #50). Prime matter 
is being in potency in an absolute sense, while second matter is such 
only relatively. 
A grasp of~ dyuamei E1! prepares one for its correlate, ~ energeia 
-2!!,, an expression whic11 also appears in Aristotle. Being in act refers 
to any existent which is co111pleted by fom (#17). Thus,~ energeia ~, 
unlike~ dynamei ~·may belong i11 the intelligible world, for intelligi-
ble beings are also completed by form. However, the matter which is 
There completed by fom is ,.Intelligible'" and potency (~ dynamis) rather 
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than being in potency (to dynamei ~). Unlike sensible matter, the matter 
There is indeterminate but real and, as such, truly unites with form. In 
other words, intelligible matter and form are only logically distinct. 
In the intelligible world there is no sensible matter, no being in potency, 
and therefore no change. In the sensible world, however, every ~ing in 
act is subject to change and therefore is also a being in potency. Each 
sensible thing is a composite of 111atter and form but is in potency to 
some extrinsic being. Ve may say generally, then, that with the exception 
of prime matter every being in potency is also a being in act. 
Plotinus asks (#l7) an important question regarding the relationship 
of being in potency to beiug In act: where there is change, does being in 
potency really become being in act or is the resulting being in act 
altogether different from the prior being in potency? There is no simple 
answer to this question. The resulting being in certain ways is the same 
and in certain ways is different from the prior being in potency. This 
is true whether one considers the being in potency as second or as prime 
matter. If second matter is considered in itself, i.e., as being in act, 
then it is different from the product it becomes, because every being in 
act is a distinct composite of 11.atter and form. But if second matter is 
considered not in and of 1 tself but relatively to that form it will 
acquire, then it is partly tile same as the resulting being in act. In 
other words, if second Datter is considered as a being in potency, it may 
be said in a sense to be the same as the product. It is the same in that 
it remains as the substxate for the newly received form. This is true, 
however, only of accidental cha11ge; in substantial change the form is 
altogether lost and therefore cannot be said to be a part of the product. 
Like second matter, prime matter is also partly distinct from and 
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partly identical with the resulting being in act, depending on one's 
point of view. Since matter is never itself in act, matter is necessarily 
different from the resulting composite. But matter is certainly a part 
of the composite, since it is the ultimate substrate of the latter. 
This brings us to he energeia itself. Here Plotinus S$ys the 
energeia is form (027). Thus, Text C further confirms the finding of our 
prior key texts that Plotinus follows Aristotle by identifying energeia 
with eidos. How does act (energeia) relate to the prior two distinctions, 
being in potency and being in act? Being in potency receives and becomes 
substrate of act. Since being in potency is passive dynamis, act comes 
to being in potency only through the agency of another (par' allou; #29). 
The resulting union of being in potency (substrate) and of act (form) 
brings about a being in act. Hence, to energeia ~ denotes the whole, 
whereas he energeia denotes the part. At times Plotinus uses he energeia 
and to energeia .£!! interchangeably. This is permissible in that an 
existent is an intelligiDle unity because of its form. 
Finally, we come to he dynamis, which we translate "potency." How 
exactly does he dynamis differ from~ dynamei ~? Plotinus answers that 
the former is active potency or power but that the latter is passive 
potency. Whereas being in potency is determined by another (par'allou; 
1129), potency (he dynamis) determines itself, or rather the agent who 
exercises the potency determines it. Plotinus explains this through his 
allusion to the sculptor (kata ~ poiein; #10-#11). The sculptor's per-
fections (his talent, imagination and artistic judgment) cause operations 
perfecting not only external objects but also the sculptor's active powers 
themselves. Through the sculptor's active powers, he perfects himself. 
One and the same agent is origin and recipient of act. 
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Plotinus further elaborates this point through the illustrations of 
the knower (1122-#25) and the moral agent (1130). Knowledge is possible 
through knowing powers which belong to a subject who himself is perfected 
(i.e., acquires energeia) through the exercise of those powers. Moral 
conduct is the result of powers (habits) which themselves are ,further 
perfected by that conduc t. 
Potency, therefore, is the active power of a living agent. The 
agent, moreover, has act through his own active power, because an agent 
perfects himself through his powers and their immanent operations. 
These technical distinctions furnish the principles for an analysis 
of the intelligible world which appears in chapter three of Text C (#31-
#39). As noted earlier,. if to dynamei ~ is the principle of change, it 
cannot belong in the intelligible world. Hence, while it is correct to 
call intelligible beings potencies (more precisely, active powers), it is 
incorrect to call them beings in potency. 
Being in act applies to the intelligible world because intelligible 
beings are composites of mtter (albeit intelligible matter) and form. 
True, the matter There b a potency rather than a being in potency; 
nonetheless it is a logically distinct constituent of an intelligible 
being which, as composite,. may be called a being in act. Because an 
intelligible being is a composite of potency and act rather than of being 
in potency and act, it ls a real unity of parts only logically distinct. 
This differentiates it sharply from sensible beings, for the latter are 
composed of sensible matter which repels form and thus never really unites 
with its act. It ls for this reason that sensible beings are poor 
imitations, mere shadows,. of intelligible beings. 
All intelligible beings are pure acts, because each is really 
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identical with its form, having intelligible matter only in a logically 
distinguishable way. The beings are the logically distinct contents of a 
single, divine nature, namely, the second hypostasis which by comprehend-
ing all acts may itself be called pure act. 
Without energeia belonging to the intelligible order, ther~ could 
be no energeia in the sensible, for the sensible exists as a participant 
or logos of the intelligible. As the logo! of ~ reflect a descending 
hierarchy of perfections, the entire universe of beings may be considered 
a gradation of energeiai. 
How precisely does potency (he dynamis) belong in the intelligible 
world? Potency is the procession out of the One which, through its own 
perfection and tendency ( ephesis), reverts back to its source so as to 
become energeia. Potency ls that indeterminate perfection which makes 
possible an order of existents (energeiai) which are distinct from the 
One. Thus, Plotinus applies to production (which he explains in greater 
detail in Text B) the realization that active power and act can describe 
the same existent. Just as a knower or moral agent may under his own 
power perfect himself, so Nous may under its power perfect itself. This 
it does by reverting to its source, contemplating It and becoming thereby 
energeia. Hence, Text C repeats a central finding of Text B: dynamis is 
necessary in explaining the nature of the Intelligence (as well as of 
every hypostasis). 
The indeterminate power (he dynamis) which accounts for intelligible 
being is, of course, intelligible matter, which Text B calls "the Indef-
inite Dyad." The kinship of intelligible matter to the indeterminacy of 
the One makes it a perfection even greater than that of being itself. 
This sharply contrasts intelligible matter with its sensible counterpart, 
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sensible matter, which Plotinus paradoxically describes in the closing 
passages of Text C (940-#56) as "truly false" and "really unreal." As 
pure being in potency sensible matter is nothing in itself; yet it is in 
potency all beings since it may serve as the substrate successively of all 
forms. In order to be the substrate of all forms, matter must never be 
any single form and therefore is unable to truly unite with any form. As 
the eternal capacity for form, matter is never itself in act. As being in 
potency matter is powerless to acquire form without an extrinsic agent. 
Although matter is alien to being (an "outcast," ekritheisa, of 
reality; #51) and indeed repels being, it nonetheless has a kind of 
nature, which can be known only to the "bastard reasoning" described in 
Plato's Timaeus (52 b). Like intelligible matter, sensible matter is an 
otherness (heterotes). Just as intelligible matter is the otherness 
which makes it possible for a distinct hypostasis to exist; so sensible 
matter is the otherness by which sensible forms can exist. Whereas, 
however, the otherness of intelligible matter is real and perfect, the 
otherness of sensible Jll8 tter is unreal and imperfect. Plotinus' treatises 
unfortunately do not consistently specify in what way sensible matter is 
other than the One. His texts at different times support opposite views. 
On the one hand, Plotious regards matter as the final product or stage of 
emanation, as the darkness and sterility which comes as emanation is 
exhausted. On the other,. matter is the unproduced, unreal something 
eternally opposite the One, it is the darkness and sterility against 
which (not into which) elllSnation gives out.10 
10Emerging out of Plotinus' very latest treatises is the dualist po-
sition that matter does not emanate (see I, 8 [51) ). This is contradicted 
by the early treatise,. III, 4 (15), 1. Each of these treatises follows 
Text D: Plotinus Elevates the Cosmological Principles 
(Kinesis, Ousia, Teuton and Heteron) of Plato's Timaeus 
to Explain How the Energia of Life of the Intelligence 
Differentiates it from the One. 
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'While very informative Text C is irritatingly brief, particularly 
in its remarks on energeia in the intelligible world. This terseness, 
however, is corrected by Text D (VI, 7 [38), 13; 17-18; 37 and 40), which 
elaborates on the nature of energeia in the intelligible world, explaining 
also why the One transcends energeia. 
The nature of Nous is the focus of Part One (chs. 1-15) of VI, 7, 
in which the first Sec ti on, chapter thirteen (#1-#30), of Text D occurs. 
Prior to chapter thirteen Plotinus presents an interpretation of Plato's 
Timaeus, holding that the Demiurge is equivalent to the Plotinian Nous, 
one nature comprehending the plurality of Platonic Forms. Since the 
Demi urge is the cause of the sensible world, Plotinus concludes that 
there is nothing here that does not have its archetype There. But such a 
position, he admits, entails difficulties. How can the imperfections and 
deficiencies that appear here belong There, where there is only perfect 
being? Plotinus explains (chs. 1-12) that inferior beings in the sensible 
world result from the fact that as logoi they cannot be equal in reality 
to their causes. All beings in the intelligible world are equal and 
perfect. They only display imperfections as they appear in the world of 
becoming. Hence, the forms of even irrational and inanimate beings are 
periods of uncertainty. Plotinus expresses uncertainty in two treatises 
which antedate III, 4: namely, IV, 8 (6), 6 and II, 4 (12). Likewise he 
is uncertain in the fol loving later treatises: IV, 5 (23), 8; II, 5 
(25), 5; III, 6 (26), 14; V, 8 (31), 7; VI, 3 (44), 7; III, 2 (47), 2. 
Again, see 'William J. Carroll, Plotinus on the Origin of Matter (M. A. 
Thesis, catholic University of America, 'Washington, D.c:;-1973), p. 132. 
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proper to the nature of Nous, for they are perfect beings and are them-
selves (as they exist There) intelligences. Such beings only have imper-
fections insofar as imperfections appear in their participants. Plotinus 
concludes from this analysis that the intelligible world is a universe 
teeming with living, perfect, intelligible beings, each of which is a 
form or an act. 
Chapter thirteen of VI, 7, which is Section One of Text D, undertakes 
to describe more fully the unity-in-multiplicity of Nous. To accomplish 
this Text D borrows four special principles from Plato's Timaeus: kinesis, 
ousia, tauton and heteron. In the Timaeus Plato employs these principles 
to explain the World Soul. First, the Soul is an ousia because the 
Demiurge fashions it according to the divine exemplars so as to be a 
distinct existent with a definite nature. It entails tauton and thateron 
insofar as that nature also is specifically constituted by two circles, 
an inner circle of difference and an outer circle of sameness. Soul is 
kenesis in two respects: first, as cognition of the intelligible All and 
of the sensible All through the circles of sameness and difference; 
secondly, as the principle cognitively moving itself and thereby imparting 
to all heavenly bodies their circular locomotions, which in turn reflect 
the order and harmony of time as "the moving image of eternity." 
In chapter thirteen of VI, 7 Plotinus simply elevates these Platonic 
principles to the level of Nous. He employs them in particular to explain 
how the diverse nature of Nous is the result of its cognition. Kinesis 
is this eternal intellection which brings about the infinite plurality of 
noeta or forms (14-18; 010; ~19). Of course, kinesis is at first only 
the active power for in tellection and is not intellection in the full 
sense. It is the indetemina te ephesis or tendency which is separate 
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from the One and is preparatory for reversion, for full contemplation and 
energeia. To express more erecisely how kinesis is necessary for the full 
-
realization of all intelligibles, Plotinus connects kinesis with energeia. 
This connection is evident in Plotinus' conception of life (zoe) as 
presented in Sections One (ch. 13) and Two (chs. 17-18) of 'fext D. 
Plotinus agrees with Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics that life in 
the truest sense is intellection. Accordingly, the highest life will not 
be the One, which transcends intellection, but the~, which is the very 
energeia of intellection. If life is best exemplified by ~, then life 
will consist of two stages, prohodos (dynamis) and epistrophe (energeia). 
As~ exists in procession, it is only life as indeterminate, like its 
source, the One. By contemplating its source, life is completed and 
becomes energeia. Fully realized and determined life, therefore, is the 
actuated~ (150). 
Intelligence actuates the plurality of Forms and beings as it actu-
ates itself. Accordingly. ~is not just a single life but all lives, 
a universe teeming with life (ch. 12), equivalent to "the eternal living 
being" of Plato's Timaeus. Since every being subsequent to Nous is 
really only~ on an inferior level of reality, every sensible being is 
a life and an act ( #58). lndeed, the logoi of~' by virtue of reflect-
ing ever decreasing levels of perfection, reflect a diminishing hierarchy 
of lives. The sensible hierarchy of lives and acts is the product of the 
contemplation of Soul, the third hypostasis and the principal logos of 
Nous. Because its life ls realized only successively and in time, its 
products represent Plotinus' equivalent of "the moving image of eternity" 
depicted in the Timaeus. 
Of course, if life Is Intelligence, then the One must transcend 
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life and energeia. Text D is the first of our key texts to explicitly 
state this transcendence of the One over energeia, arguing this point on 
grounds that life and act rest on duality, whereas the Source of these 
perfections must be sheer simplicity (#31-#41). 
Text]_: The Meglsta Gene are the Logically Distinct 
Energeiai Constituting the Second Hypostasis and 
Existing as the Supreme Objects of Dialectics 
The four principles (ousia, kinesis, tauton and heteron), which 
Text D employs to e:icplain the role of energeia in the intelligible world, 
also appear (along with a fifth principle, stasis) in our final key text--
though this text is more under the influence of Plato's Sophist than of 
his Timaeus. Text E (VI, Z (43), 7-8; 14-15) is the second of a three-part 
study. It includes VI, l (42) and VI, 3 (44), the aim of which is to 
clarify and defend Plotlnus' interpretation of the Platonic theory of the 
megista gene against the alternative theories of the Aristotelians and 
Stoics. VI, 2 in particular argues that the Platonic megista gene are 
the true noeta, ~and energeiai, each of which is one in reality with 
the divine Nous, the Plotinian equivalent of the Platonic Demi urge. 
It was necessary to preface our treatment of the Text E with a 
brief discussion of Ennead VI, 8 (39), which chronologically follows 
right after VI, 7 (Text D). Although VI, 8 refers to energeia often and 
in ways apparently in conflict with Texts A through D, it nonetheless 
does not warrant attention as a key text. This conclusion follows from a 
careful evaluation of the purpose of VI, 8. The objective of the treatise 
is to uncover the mistake in the Gnostic position (which Plotinus calls a 
tolmeros logos--ch. 12, line 11) that the One is either an ousia or the 
product of chance or ace tden t. Although this position clearly shows a 
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failure to appreciate negative theology, Plotinus responds to it in VI, 8, 
as though it were a respectable position and a fair challenge, presumably 
for the sake of showing once and for all to his students the error of 
Gnosticism. In pretending to respect this Gnostic argument, Plotinus is 
willing to speak of the One in positive terms, including ousia and 
energeia. However, Plotinus Is still quite aware that such a practice 
conflicts with sound philosophy, as his disclaimer in chapter thirteen 
(lines 1-5) indicates. Since the presentation of VI, 8 is largely con-
trived for the benefits of a polemic against the Gnostics, the treatise 
cannot be regarded as a faithful representation of Plotinus' views on 
energeia. For this reason VI, 2 (43) rather .than VI, 8 (39) is Text E. 
Text E falls into two parts, the first consisting of chapters seven 
and eight (Ul-#48) and the second of chapters fourteen and fifteen (#49-
1166). Part One is a direct statement of Plotinus' own position on the 
megista gene, while Part Two is a criticism of one aspect of Aristotle's 
position on the categories and the genera. Both parts have significant 
bearing on energeia :in Plot:inus' philosophy. 
Chapters seven and eight of Text E culminate a discussion that 
originates in the opening chapters of the treatise. Chapters one through 
seven lay down several Important conclusions. First, the megista gene 
are not only the ultimate objects of the science of Dialectics but are 
also the logically distinct constituents of the intelligible world which 
are identical with the second hypostasis. Secondly, each genus is equal 
to every other, since each :is really identical with every other. Thirdly, 
the real unity of the i11telligible world results from its participation 
in the One. Lastly, the uolties of body and soul are analogous to the 
intelligible unities and therefore make helpful beginnings toward a 
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knowledge of the intelligible world. 
In chapters seven and eight (11-#48) Plotinus shows that an analysis 
of the intelligible world yields five supreme Forms: ousia, kinesis, 
stasis, tauton and heteron. While he follows Plato in accepting these 
Forms as the ultimate beings and objects of knowledge, Plotinu~ parts 
from his predecessor in several respects. First, whereas Plato separates 
the noesis of the Demiurge from the Forms, Plotinus unites them. This 
union of noesis and noeta unlocks Plotinus' whole account of the role of 
the megista gene in the intelligible world. Each genus represents either 
one or other of those two logically distinct components of ~: noesis 
and noeta (#29-#31;· #32-136). Kinesis is the noesis which actuates the 
eternal Forms (e.g., #12; fJ26-fJ29). But kinesis from another point of 
view is itself a Form, since every Form is an intellection and, therefore, 
also a noeton (#35-#36; #40-042; #47). Furthermore, in these two respects 
kinesis is energeia. Kinesis is energeia in that it is the actuation of 
all Forms and in that it itself is numbered among the totality of acts. 
The other four megista gene are likewise energeiai. Stasis is the 
energeia of ~ signified by the Forms which are the termini of kinesis 
(#18-/119; #40; #64). Ousi.a. is energeia in two respects: first in that 
~as a whole, i.e., as the second hypostasis, is the Plotinian equiv-
alent of Aristotle's noesis noeseos and thus is pure act; secondly, in 
that each of the Forms (each an ousia) is a logically distinct act (#18-
#19; #31; 1132-1136). Heteron ls energeia since it also refers to the 
plurality of the Foras (1~2-~+5). Finally, tauton is energeia in that it 
denotes the unity of all Forms comprehended by the divine noesis (/143-
1145). 
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Secondly, Plato does not regard his megista gene as categories, yet 
Plotinus interprets them es s11ch in order to refute the Aristotelian and 
Stoic theories of categories. In fact, Plotinus holds that the Platonic 
genera are the only true categories because they are modes of perfect or 
intelligible being, which alone is a true noeton. Accordingly, P.lotinus 
rejects the Stoic and Aristotelian categories because they are grounded on 
sensible being which is unreal and a false noeton. Consequently, 
Dialectics, the science of Platonic Forms, is genuine episteme, while 
Aristotelian and Stoic wisdom is a pseudo-science. 
It is important to see that Text E involves energeia in this 
conception of the categories because energeia describes these supreme 
..2!!!! and noeta (#62). The megista gene are genuine categories, the most 
comprehensive modes of being, because they are acts. The Aristotelian 
categories are only pseudo-ousiai and therefore pseudo-energeiai. Accord-
ingly, they can only support pseudo-episteme. 
Thirdly, Plotious' indebtedness to energeia frees him from the 
Platonic doctrine of participation when he explains the interrelationships 
of the megista gene (~47-143). Since participation, as Plotinus under-
stands it, is between lower and higher realities, it is not suited to an 
account of the supreme genera, which are equal realities. This equality 
is, in the final aDalysis, due to the real identity of the genera. As 
identical with No11s they may collectively be defined as pure act. As 
logically distinct they .are each an act. Thus, energeia rather than 
metechein explains the nature and relationships of Forms for Plotinus. 
Fourthly, Plotin11s does not admit with Plato that the megista gene 
are the primary realities. As the supreme objects of Dialectics, the 
genera are the supreme beings, but Plotinus relegates them to a secondary 
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place in reality since, for him, being entails some measure of multiplicity 
and imperfection. The First Reality, however, must be purely~ and thus 
perfect. For Plotinus ontology must give way to henology; moreover, 
Dialectics must ultimately give way to negative theology and mysticism, 
the object of which transcends the genera. 
After Plotinus' presentation in chapters seven and eight of VI, 2, 
he highlights several questions to illumine further his conception of the 
megista gene. First, be responds at length to the question of whether 
the One can be Himself a genus (chs. 9-12). Secondly, he considers 
whether the Aristotelian category of quantity can belong among the megista 
gene (ch. 13). After replying negatively to this last question, he next 
(chs. 14-15; 049-1166) explains why the Aristotelian category of quality 
cannot belong There. His comrnents in these chapters form the second part 
of Text E in which he cla rifles how energeia in the sensible world 
contrasts with energeia in the intelligible. 
In general Plotinus argues here (#49-#66) that quality presupposes 
real distinctions and therefore cannot belong in the intelligible world. 
This is true whether one considers essential or accidental qualities 
(symplerotik.a or pathe) even. though both, like the megista gene, are 
energeiai. Essential qualities are acts that flow directly from an ousia, 
but are nonetheless really llistinct from those ousiai and thus cannot 
belong where there are ouly logically distinct existents. Accidental 
qualities certainly cannot 1>elong There since they are acts altogether 
extrinsic to ousiai. In essence, then, the megista gene do not complete 
(sympleratai) intelligible ousia in the way that qualities complete 
sensible ousia. In the sensible world the completion is between the 
really distinct and the prior ousia and the posterior qualities. However, 
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in the intelligible world the completion is between what is really 
identical and what is only logically distinct (#53; #60; #62-#66). 
When Plotinus denies quality a place among the intelligibles, he 
denies quality a place ln science as well, for the intelligibles are the 
only true objects of science, Qualities are part of sensible. ousiai 
which are, according to Platonism, shadows and phantoms of true reality. 
Obviously, such a view veils a serious criticism of Aristotelian philos-
ophy, since, according to that school, sensible qualities and ousiai are 
the proper objects for science. Thus, Text E betrays a purely Platonic 
conception of science and i111plicitly charges Aristotelian science with 
the pursuit of illusions. 
Since qualities, as well as sensible ousiai, appear on an inferior 
level of reality, it must be assumed that they are not objects of the 
contemplation of ~· Qualities result from the inferior contemplation 
of Soul. The contemplation in the intelligible world would forbid 
qualities, since the object of contemplation There is a real unity, only 
logically fragmented. Accordlngly, the~ through its contemplation is 
able at once to comprehend how one Form or act is really the same as 
(i.e., neither prior nor posterior to) another. Nous knows that The 
Human is in real union with The Grammatical and The Musical. The 
contemplation of Soul, however, fragments its object, producing real 
distinctions and thereby producing qualities and separate ousiai. 
Accordingly, Soul cannot know the real identity of man and musical. It 
knows them as really d ls tlnguishable ac ts--the one as an ousia and the 
other as a quality. 
Thus, Text E shows, as did our other key texts, that energ_eia is 
bound up with Plotinus' account of production and is fundamental to his 
302 
contrast of the intelligible with the sensible world. 
What shall we say by the way of some final conclusions concerning 
energeia in Plotinus'? The first is simply that energeia is a central 
doctrine in his me ta physics, This conclusion is clearly implied by the 
preceding summary of our key texts which show that energeia and/or its 
correlate, dynamis, is involved with almost all significant subjects in 
Plotinus' philosophy: e.g., the production of the hypostases out of the 
One; the transcendence of the One over being, life and Intelligence; the 
nature of contemplation; the hierarchy of beings and lives; the nature of 
the intelligible world, the universe of Plato's megista gene; the nature 
of the One itself (who is not energeia but pure active dynamis); and the 
nature of prime matter (which is not energeia but pure passive dynamis). 
Plotinus' commitment to energeia is further demonstrated by the 
simple fact that he devotes an entire treatise (indeed one from his middle 
period, in which, as Porphycy says, he produced works "of the highest 
perfection"),11 namely, II., 5 (25), our Text c, to the energeia/dynamis 
distinction. He there presents certain technical distinctions which, on 
the whole, prevail thro11ghou t the Enneads, namely the expressions he 
energeia vs. he dynamis and to energeia ~ vs. to dynamei ~· These 
distinctions are cri.tical in Plotinus' accounts of the intelligible and 
the sensible worldsl Z and, th11s, they are important to his philosophical 
project as a whole. 
llPorphyry, The Life of Plotinus, p. 25 (lines 34-35). 
12Three of the dis tine tions--namely, ~ energeia ~' he energeia 
and he dynamis--are operati11e in both the intelligible and the sensible 
worlds. However, the final distinction--to dynamei on--is operative only 
in the sensible world (see Text C, #31-#34). ~ 
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On the basis of such evidence, then, we must conclude that Philip 
Merlan (in ~ Cambridge History of Later Greek ~ Early Medieval 
Philosophy, as quoted in our Introduction)13 is quite mistaken in his 
remark that Plotinus has no need for either energeia or dynamis. On the 
contrary, our study has showu that without energeia Plotinus' entire 
ontology is quite inexplicable. 
By studying precisely how energeia is operative in that ontology, 
we have come to a second conclusion: energeia, which is synonymous with 
contemplation (noesis) and being (ousia; eidos;.12, .2!!,i noeton), should be 
translated in various ways out of respect for the fact that there are 
different levels of contemplation and being and that there are different 
ways of looking at being. Of course, in its most perfect sense, i.e., 
when signifying Divine Mind and the intelligible wor-ld, energeia should 
be translated as "act"' or .. achieved perfection." These seem to be the 
best English equivalents for reality which is perfect thought or being, 
i.e., for reality which Is fully realized unity-in-multiplicity. It is 
important to note that these terms will also apply to any logos of 
Intelligence, in that every logos is a certain thought or being realized 
on a certain level of perfection. 
In addition to ··.a.ct" or .. achieved perfection" it is also correct 
to translate energeia as ••actuation," since form and intellection emerge 
out of a prior dynamils. If energeia properly describes the stage of 
epistrophe, then energeia has In a sense "become" and thus may be trans-
lated as "actuation,'" slgnifyf.ng that which has become act. 
Additionally, as it refers to the level of human praxis, a weakened 
13see Introduction, p. l and note 3. 
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kind of contemplation that entails the development of moral habits and 
conduct, energeia may be correctly translated as "activity." This is a 
translation of the term that we uncovered in our comments on Text C.14 
Thirdly, we come to one of the most important conclusions of our 
study: Plotinus' handling of energeia may be generally described as a 
reaction, in both pos:l tlve and negative ways, to the philosophies of 
Plato and Aristotle. Of course, a response to Aristotle is demanded by 
the simple fact that in the first place Plotinus adopts Aristotle's 
neologism, energeia. Upon accepting this term, Plotinus finds it rea-
sonable to follow Aristotle in several applications of its doctrine. Of 
these applications, of· course, the most conspicuous is the description of 
the second hypostasis as pure act. Here it is important to recall that, 
while Plotinus denies energeia of the highest reality, he agrees with 
Aristotle that energeia signifies ousia and form and therefore most 
perfectly applies to the divine ~' the Separate Intelligence. By so 
describing perfect Intelligence, energeia (Plotinus agrees) must signify 
perfect life, for, as Aristotle argues in Book Lambda of the Metaphysics, 
to contemplate most fully is to live most fully. 
Additionally, we find. Aristotelian influence in the way Plotinus 
separates he dynamis (active potency or power) from .!2. dynamei ~ (passive 
potency). The former expression, as it applies to the order of beings, 
denotes perfection that is rooted in energeia. Active power follows from 
the presence of form (act). ?lie latter expression, .!2. dynamei ~' applies 
only to that which fro11l a certain point of view lacks form or determination 
14But such a translation is accurate only with reference to praxis, 
not elsewhere as others ( e, g, 11 A. H. Armstrong and S. Mac Kenna) would 
have it. 
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(act). In the strictest sense passive potency characterizes prime matter, 
which is never form but the eternal capacity for form (act). This general 
analysis clearly harmonizes with Aristotle's conception of active and 
passive potency and witnesses to Plotinus' willingness to remain faithful 
to Arisotle's idea of dynamls as well as energeia. That he is faithful 
regarding the latter notion ls particularly evident in his conception of 
he energeia as form and~ energeia ~as a completely realized or inf2!!!ed 
being. This interpretation of these expressions accords perfectly with 
Aristotle's conception of them. 
The influence of Aristotle is evident even when Plotinus takes up 
ostensibly Platonic tasks, such as his handling of the Sophist's megista 
gene. His task here is to justify the Platonic categories over the 
Aristotelian ones, and yet he does not hesitate to employ Aristotelian 
energeia to achieve this objective. He defines each of the megista gene 
as energeia. This definition follows from the fact that each megiston 
genos is only logically distinct from the second hypostasis which is pure 
act. Accordingly, each Form, logically or abstractly considered, is also 
act. 
We may note a certain irony arising from this treatment of the 
Platonic genera. Because the megista gene, Plotinus concludes, are 
perfect energeiai, they are true objects of science; however, the 
Aristotelian categories are Imperfect energeiai and not true objects of 
science. Hence, we find P lo tlnus employing Aris tot le to condemn the 
latter's theory of science. 
We should add that ?lotinus is even indebted to Aristotle's 
potency/act distinctfon when Plotinus offers a dynamic account of the 
intelligible world. He draws on Aristotle because, unlike Plato, Plotinus 
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argues that the universe of Forms (while eternal) is dependent on the One 
and thus "emerges" Into 'being. To explain this emergence of the second 
hypostasis, Plotinus employs act and potency in ways Aristotle himself 
could not have foreseen. Plotinus incorporates the act/potency principle 
by explaining that out of a prior potency, indeed, the ultimate ,potency 
(he dynamis ton panton) which is the infinite active power of the One, the 
order of posterior hypostases (acts) originates. 
But it is here that ve also note a divergence from Aristotle in two 
important respects: (1) for Plotinus this emergence from potency to act 
is a movement not into perfection but imperfection; (2) for Plotinus the 
absolute priority of the One, who is sheer dynamis, renders objectionable 
the Aristotelian principle that energeia is ultimately prior to dynamis 
in reality. These divergences prove that, no matter how indebted he may 
be to Aristotle in many respects, Plotinus often qualifies his acceptance 
of Aristotle's doctrines. He does not follow Aristotle as if he were a 
disciple, that is, as If he were himself an Aristotelian. This is 
demonstrated by his rejection of Aristotle's notion of entelecheia (which 
we discussed in Text A). Plotinus, of course, agrees that soul is act 
(energeia), for it is a logos of the hypostasis, Soul, but denies that it 
is merely the act ( entelechela) of the body. Soul is an act because it is 
a complete, independent ousia, not because it is incomplete and dependent. 
Plotinus does not follow Aristotle uncritically, because he thinks 
of himself primarily as a Platonist. 
/_ 
In fact, as Brehier observes,15 he 
often perceives himself as an enemy of Aristotelianism. For this reason 
Plotinus' adaptation of energeia is largely governed by Platonic princi-
15Plotin, Vol. 6, Part 1, p.8 
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ples. This is evident, for example, in the way he appropriates energeia 
to his Platonic conception of that most fundamental megiston genos, 
kinesis. He satisfies the demands of Aristotelian philosophy by char-
acterizing the Separate Intelligence as pure act but also satisfies 
Platonic philosophy by describing the second hypostasis as motion. This 
synthesis would at first seem impossible since Aristotle infers that the 
Separate Intelligence as pure act must be akinetos. But Plotinus can 
achieve this synthesis because he makes Platonic kinesis prior to Aris-
totelian energeia, in the sense that kinesis is the eternal pre-condition 
for the actuation of the divine ousiai and eide which constitute the 
second hypostasis. the Intelligence is at once kinesis and energeia 
because the former condition is logically prior to the latter. 
Plato's doctrine of participation, although reinterpreted somewhat 
by Plotinus, also governs the incorporation of energeia into Plotinus' 
philosophy. According to Plotinus every lower being is an act because it 
is a participant in a higher being or higher act. Because Plotinus' 
philosophy is a monism, be Interprets participation in a far more literal 
sense than Plato. For Plotlnus a lower existent participates in a higher 
because it really is that higher but only as manifested on a lower, more 
fragmented, more multiple,. !llore unreal level of being. Thus Plotinus' 
conception of participation Is expressed in his logos doctrine: a logos 
is a higher existent oa a lower level of reality. Since every logos is an 
act, we can say the t Plot!.n11s adapts energeia to his interpretation of 
the Platonic doctrine of participation. 
Of course, Plato's theory of Forms is a basic theme in Plotinus, as 
we have seen in our treatment of the megista gene. He does not hesitate 
to refashion energeia to su!.t the Platonic theory of Forms, at least as 
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he understands it. If, according to Aristotle, energeia belongs to 
Intelligence, then it should also, Plotinus infers, belong to the Platonic 
Forms, for they are the logically distinct but really identical constit-
uents of Divine Mind, resulting from its act of epistrophe. Accordingly, 
Plotinus concludes that each Form is itself an intelligence and a ~eparate 
life. Each Form is an act that contains all other lives and acts. This 
is so because in its intellection it comprehends the eternal reasons for 
all beings. Thus, the second hypostasis is, considered individually, 
pure act and is also, considered universally, the totality of acts. 
Given the a hove observations, we may conclude that isolating the 
Platonic and Aristotelian influence on Plotinus' doctrine of energeia is 
a chief contribution of this study. 
Let us append a fourth and fifth conclusion. Fourthly, we observe 
that energeia is at the heart of Plotinus' negative theology, according 
to which the philosopher c:an never adequately express what the One is, 
only what it is not, P lo tinus of ten implies that the One is unknowable 
and ineffable on grounds the t it is not energeia.16 This, of course, 
becomes quite clear given what we now know about energeia. If energeia 
signifies the universe of ousia and eide, the divine noeta, and the 
objects and conditions of all knowledge, then it cannot signify the One. 
Ousia is one-in-many, not purely one. Another way of saying this is 
that, since the One is not energeia or form, it is unknowable and beyond 
predication. Thus, our re flee tions on energeia deepen our appreciation 
for the paradox of Plotinian mysticism: the One must be .. known" through 
16see especially IlI, 9 (13), 9, 8-12; V, 6 (24), 6, 3; III, 8 
(30), 10, 3; VI, 7 (39), 17, 9-11; V, 3 (49), 15, 32-34; I, 8 (51), 2, 1-
9; I, 7 (54), 19-20. 
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not-knowing.17 
Lastly, energeia does not appear to fundamentally change or develop 
throughout the Enneads, The issues in which energeia emerges often vary 
from treatise to treatise, but the basic notion itself perdures from the 
early to the late treatises. The stability of energeia is' further 
indicated by the fact that the distinctions between nominative and dative 
uses of energeia and dynarnis (which are emphasized in Text C) occur in 
the very earliest treatises (see especially IV, 7 [2] and V, 9 [5]) and 
persist throughout the Enneads. 
Despite the fact that the meaning of energeia remains stable 
throughout the Enneads and despite the fact that Plotinus inherited the 
word and, to some extent, the doctrine from Aristotle, still its meaning 
was considerably altered when Plotinus inserted it into his own metaphys-
ics. This metaphysics is an henology and not an ontology and, thus, he 
transposes energeia into a different and higher key. 
With these words we complete our investigation. We have now 
discovered what energeia is for Plotinus and how it is operative in his 
philosophy. But this achievement brings us to new questions. How 
influential is Plotinus' theory of energeia? 
the writings of his immediate successors: 
How does energeia appear in 
e.g., Porphyry, Proclus, 
Iamblichus, Damascius, Pseudo-Dionysius? Can one discern the influence 
of Plotinus' handling of energeia in the writings of the Church Fathers? 
Is such influence as evident in the Latin Fathers (who translate energeia 
as "actus" and "act1Jali tas'") as it is in the Greeks? Indeed, if it were 
not for Plotinus, would the doctrine of energeia have been generally lost 
17see VI, 9 (9), 7-LO. 
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to medieval philosophers until the recovery of Aristotle in the thir-
teenth-century? Furthermore, altogether apart from the question of 
Plotinus' influence, it would be of intrinsic interest to ask about the 
theories of act that appear in medieval, modern and contemporary thinkers 
generally. Also there would be no small value in inquiring into one's 
own personal position regarding energeia. These are all questions that 
we might, and perhaps should, address at a later time. 
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